{"id":1635,"date":"2008-12-13T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-12-13T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/wordpress\/2008\/12\/total-defeat-for-u-s-in-iraq\/"},"modified":"2008-12-13T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-12-13T00:00:00","slug":"total-defeat-for-u-s-in-iraq","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2008\/12\/total-defeat-for-u-s-in-iraq\/","title":{"rendered":"TOTAL DEFEAT FOR U.S. IN IRAQ"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>It&#8217;s All Spelled Out in Unpublicized Agreement <\/em><\/p>\n<p>On November 27 the Iraqi parliament voted by a large majority in favor of&nbsp; a security agreement with the US under which the 150,000 American&nbsp; troops in Iraq will withdraw from cities, towns and villages by&nbsp; June 30,&nbsp; 2009 and from all of Iraq by&nbsp; December 31, 2011. The Iraqi government will take over military responsibility for the Green Zone in Baghdad, the heart&nbsp; of American power in Iraq, in a few weeks time. Private security companies&nbsp; will lose their legal immunity. <\/p>\n<p>US military operations and the arrest of Iraqis&nbsp; will only be carried out with Iraqi consent. There will be no US military&nbsp; bases left behind when the last US troops leave in three years time and&nbsp; the US military is banned in the interim from carrying out attacks on other&nbsp; countries from Iraq.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed after eight months of&nbsp; rancorous negotiations, is categorical and unconditional. America&rsquo;s bid to act as the world&rsquo;s only super-power and to establish quasi-colonial control&nbsp; of Iraq, an attempt which began with the invasion of 2003, has ended in&nbsp; failure. There will be a national referendum on the new agreement next July, but the accord is to be implemented immediately so the poll will be&nbsp; largely irrelevant. <\/p>\n<p>Even Iran, which had furiously denounced the first drafts&nbsp; of the SOFA saying that they would establish a permanent US presence in&nbsp; Iraq, now says blithely that it will officially back the new security pact after&nbsp; the referendum. This is a sure sign that Iran, as America&rsquo;s main rival in the&nbsp; Middle East,&nbsp; sees the pact as marking the final end of the US occupation&nbsp; and as a launching pad for military assaults on neighbours such as Iran.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Astonishingly, this momentous agreement has been greeted with little&nbsp; surprise or interest outside Iraq. On the same day that it was finally&nbsp; passed by the Iraqi parliament international attention was wholly focused&nbsp; on the murderous terrorist attack in Mumbai. For some months polls in the US showed that the economic crisis had replaced the Iraqi war as the main&nbsp; issue facing America in the eyes of voters. So many spurious milestones in Iraq have been declared by President Bush over the years that when a&nbsp; real turning point occurs people are naturally sceptical about its&nbsp; significance. <\/p>\n<p>The White House was so keen to limit understanding of what&nbsp; it had agreed in Iraq that it did not even to publish a copy of the SOFA in&nbsp; English. Some senior officials in the Pentagon are privately criticizing President&nbsp; Bush for conceding so much to the Iraqis, but the American media are fixated on the incoming Obama administration and no longer pays much&nbsp; attention to the doings of the expiring Bush administration.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The last minute delays to the accord were not really about the terms&nbsp; agreed with the Americans. It was rather that the leaders of the Sunni&nbsp; Arab minority, seeing the Shia-Kurdish government of prime minister Nouri&nbsp; al-Maliki about to fill the vacuum created by the US departure, wanted to&nbsp; barter their support for the accord in return for as many last minute&nbsp; concessions as they could extract. Some three quarters of the 17,000&nbsp; prisoners held by the Americans are Sunni and they wanted them released&nbsp; or at least not mistreated&nbsp; by the Iraqi security forces. They asked for an&nbsp; end to de-Baathication which is directed primarily at the Sunni community.&nbsp; Only the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr held out against the accord to the&nbsp; end, declaring it a betrayal of independent Iraq. <\/p>\n<p>The ultra-patriotic&nbsp; opposition of the Sadrists to the accord has been important because it has&nbsp; made it difficult for the other Shia parties to agree to anything less than a&nbsp; complete American withdrawal. If they did so they risked being portrayed&nbsp; as US puppets in the upcoming provincial elections at the end of January&nbsp; 2009 or the parliamentary elections later in the year.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The SOFA finally agreed is almost the opposite of the one which US&nbsp; started to negotiate in March. This is why Iran, with its strong links to the Shia parties inside Iraq, ended its previous rejection of it. The first US draft&nbsp; was largely an attempt to continue the occupation without much change&nbsp; from the UN mandate which expired at the end of the year. Washington&nbsp; overplayed its hand. The Iraqi government was growing stronger as the Sunni Arabs ended their uprising against the occupation. The Iranians&nbsp; helped restrain the Mehdi Army, Muqtada&rsquo;s powerful militia, so the&nbsp; government regained control of Basra, Iraq&rsquo;s second biggest city, and Sadr&nbsp; City, almost half Baghdad, from the Shia militias. <\/p>\n<p>The prime minister Nouri&nbsp; al-Maliki became more confident, realizing his military enemies were&nbsp; dispersing and, in any case, the Americans had no real alternative but to&nbsp; support him. The US has always been politically weak in Iraq since the fall&nbsp; of Saddam Hussein because it has few real friends in the country aside&nbsp; from the Kurds. The leaders of the Iraqi Shia, 60 per cent of the total&nbsp; population, might ally themselves to Washington to gain power, but they&nbsp; never intended to share power with the US in the long term.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<br \/>The occupation has always been unpopular in Iraq. Foreign observers&nbsp; and some Iraqis are often misled by the hatred with which different Iraqi&nbsp; communities regard each other into underestimating the strength of Iraqi&nbsp; nationalism. Once Maliki came to believe that he could survive without US&nbsp; military support then he was able to spurn US proposals until an&nbsp; unconditional withdrawal was conceded. He could also see that Barack&nbsp; Obama, whose withdrawal timetable was not so different from his own,&nbsp; was going to be the next American president. Come the provincial and&nbsp; parliamentary elections of 2009, Maliki can present himself as the man who&nbsp; ended the occupation. Critics of the prime minister, notably the Kurds,&nbsp; think that success has gone to his head, but there is no doubt that the&nbsp; new security agreement has strengthened him politically.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>It may be that, living in the heart of the Green Zone, that Maliki has an&nbsp; exaggerated idea of what his government has achieved. In the Zone there is access to clean water and electricity while in the rest of Baghdad people&nbsp; have been getting only three or four hours electricity a day. Security in&nbsp; Iraq is certainly better than it was during the sectarian civil war between&nbsp; Sunni and Shia in 2006-7 but the improvement is wholly comparative. <\/p>\n<p>The&nbsp; monthly death toll has dropped from 3,000 a month at its worst to 360&nbsp; Iraqi civilians and security personnel killed this November, though these&nbsp; figures may understate the casualty toll as not all the bodies are found.&nbsp; Iraq is still one of the most dangerous places in the world.&nbsp; On&nbsp; December 1, the&nbsp; day I started writing this article, two suicide bombers killed 33 people and&nbsp; wounded dozens more in Baghdad and Mosul. Iraqis in the street are&nbsp; cynical about the government&rsquo;s claim to have restored order. &ldquo;We are&nbsp; used to the government always saying that things have become good and&nbsp; the security situation improved,&rdquo; says Salman Mohammed Jumah, a&nbsp; primary school teacher in Baghdad. &ldquo;It is true security is a little better but&nbsp; the government leaders live behind concrete barriers and do not know&nbsp; what is happening on the ground. They only go out in their armoured&nbsp; convoys. We no longer have sectarian killings by ID cards [revealing that a&nbsp; person is Sunni or Shia by their name] but Sunni are still afraid to go to&nbsp; Shia areas and Shia to Sunni.&rdquo;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Security has improved with police and military checkpoints everywhere&nbsp; but sectarian killers have also upgraded their tactics. There are less&nbsp; suicide bombings but there are many more small &lsquo;sticky bombs&rsquo; placed&nbsp; underneath vehicles. Everybody checks underneath their car before they get into it. I try to keep away from notorious choke points in Baghdad,&nbsp; such as Tahrir Square or the entrances to the Green Zone, where a&nbsp; bomber for can wait for a target to get stuck in traffic before making an&nbsp; attack. <\/p>\n<p>The checkpoints and the walls, the measures taken to reduce the&nbsp; violence, bring Baghdad close to paralysis even when there are no bombs.&nbsp; It can take two or three hours to travel a few miles. The bridges over the&nbsp; Tigris are often blocked and this has got worse recently because soldiers&nbsp; and police have a new toy in the shape of a box which looks like a&nbsp; transistor radio with a short aerial sticking out horizontally. When pointed at the car this device is&nbsp; supposed to detect vapor from explosives and&nbsp; may well do so, but since it also responds to vapor from alcohol or&nbsp; perfume it is worse than useless as a security aid.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Iraqi state television and government backed newspapers make&nbsp; ceaseless claims that life in Iraq is improving by the day. To be convincing&nbsp; this should mean not just improving security but providing more electricity,&nbsp; clean water and jobs. &ldquo;The economic situation is still very bad,&rdquo; says&nbsp; Salman Mohammed Jumah, the teacher. &ldquo;Unemployment affects everybody&nbsp; and you can&rsquo;t get a job unless you pay a bribe. There is no electricity and&nbsp; nowadays we have cholera again so people have to buy expensive bottled&nbsp; water and only use the water that comes out of the tap for washing.&rdquo; <\/p>\n<p>Not&nbsp; everybody has the same grim vision but life in Iraq is still extraordinarily&nbsp; hard. The best barometer for how far Iraq is &lsquo;better&rsquo; is the willingness of&nbsp; the 4.7 million refugees, one in five Iraqis who have fled their homes and&nbsp; are now living inside or outside Iraq, to go home. By October only 150,000&nbsp; had returned and some do so only to look at the situation and then go&nbsp; back to Damascus or Amman. One middle aged Sunni businessman who&nbsp; came back from Syria for two or three weeks, said: &ldquo;I don&rsquo;t like to be here.&nbsp; In Syria I can go out in the evening to meet friends in a coffe bar. It is&nbsp; safe. Here I am forced to stay in my home after 7pm.&rdquo;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The degree of optimism or pessimism felt by Iraqis depends very much&nbsp; on whether they have a job, whether or not that job is with the&nbsp; government, which community they belong to, their social class and the&nbsp; area they live in. All these factors are interlinked. Most jobs are with the&nbsp; state that reputedly employs some two million people. The private sector&nbsp; is very feeble. Despite talk of reconstruction there are almost no cranes&nbsp; visible on the Baghdad skyline. Since the Shia and Kurds control of the&nbsp; government, it is difficult for a Sunni to get a job and probably impossible&nbsp; unless he has a letter recommending him from a political party in the&nbsp; government. Optimism is greater among the Shia. <\/p>\n<p>&ldquo;There is progress in&nbsp; our life, says Jafar Sadiq, a Shia businessman married to a Sunni in the&nbsp; Shia-dominated Iskan area of Baghdad. &ldquo;People are cooperating with the&nbsp; security forces. I am glad the army is fighting the Mehdi Army though they&nbsp; still are not finished. Four Sunni have reopened their shops in my area. It&nbsp; is safe for my wife&rsquo;s Sunni relatives to come here. The only things we need&nbsp; badly are electricity, clean water and municipal services.&rdquo; But his wife Jana&nbsp; admitted privately that she had warned her Sunni relatives from coming to&nbsp; Iskan &ldquo;because the security situation is unstable.&rdquo; She teaches at&nbsp; Mustansariyah University in central Baghdad which a year ago was&nbsp; controlled by the Mehdi Army and Sunni students had fled. &ldquo;Now the Sunni&nbsp; students are coming back,&rdquo; she says, &ldquo;though they are still afraid.&rdquo;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>They have reason to fear. Baghdad is divided into Shia and Sunni&nbsp; enclaves defended by high concrete blast walls often with a single&nbsp; entrance and exit. The sectarian slaughter is much less than it was but it&nbsp; is still dangerous for returning refugees to try to reclaim their old house in an&nbsp; area in which they are a minority. In one case in a Sunni district in west&nbsp; Baghdad, as I reported here some weeks ago,&nbsp; a Shia husband and wife with their two daughters went back to&nbsp; their house to find it gutted, with furniture gone and electric sockets and&nbsp; water pipes torn out. <\/p>\n<p>They decided to sleep on the roof. A Sunni gang&nbsp; reached them from a neighboring building, cut off the husband&rsquo;s head&nbsp; and threw it into the street. They said to his wife and daughters: &ldquo;The&nbsp; same will happen to any other Shia who comes back.&rdquo; But even without&nbsp; these recent atrocities Baghdad would still be divided because the memory&nbsp; of the mass killings of 2006-7 is too fresh and there is still an underlying&nbsp; fear that it could happen again.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Iraqis have a low opinion of their elected representatives, frequently&nbsp; denouncing them as an incompetent kleptocracy. The government&nbsp; administration is dysfunctional. &ldquo;Despite the fact,&rdquo; said independent&nbsp; member of parliament Qassim Daoud, &ldquo;that the Labor and Social Affairs is&nbsp; meant to help the millions of poor Iraqis I discovered that they had spent&nbsp; only 10 per cent of their budget.&rdquo; Not all of this is the government&rsquo;s fault.&nbsp; Iraqi society, administration and economy have been shattered by 28&nbsp; years of war and sanctions. Few other countries have been put under&nbsp; such intense and prolonged pressure. <\/p>\n<p>First there was the eight year Iran- Iraq war starting in 1980, then the disastrous Gulf war of `1991, thirteen&nbsp; years of sanctions and then the five-and-a-half years of conflict since the&nbsp; US invasion. Ten years ago UN officials were already saying they could not&nbsp; repair the faltering power stations because they were so old that spare&nbsp; parts were no longer made for them.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Iraq is full of signs of the gap between the rulers and the ruled. The&nbsp; few planes using Baghdad international airport are full foreign contractors&nbsp; and Iraqi government officials. Talking to people on the streets in Baghdad&nbsp; in October many of them brought up fear of cholera which had just started&nbsp; to spread from Hilla province south of Baghdad. Forty per cent of people in&nbsp; the capital do not have access to clean drinking water. The origin of the&nbsp; epidemic was the purchase of out of date chemicals for water purification&nbsp; from Iran by corrupt officials. Everybody talked about the cholera except in&nbsp; the Green Zone where people had scarcely heard of the epidemic..&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The Iraqi government will become stronger as the Americans depart. It&nbsp; will also be forced to take full responsibility for the failings of the Iraqi&nbsp; state. This will be happening at a bad moment since the price of oil,&nbsp; the state&rsquo;s only source of revenue, has fallen to $50 a barrel when the budget&nbsp; assumed it would be $80. Many state salaries, such as those of teachers,&nbsp; were doubled on the strength of this, something the government may now&nbsp; regret. <\/p>\n<p>Communal differences are still largely unresolved. Friction between&nbsp; Sunni and Shia, bad though it is, is less than two years ago,&nbsp; though&nbsp; hostility between Arabs and Kurds is deepening. The departure of the US&nbsp; military frightens many Sunni on the grounds that they will be at the mercy&nbsp; of the majority Shia. But it is also an incentive for the three main&nbsp; communities in Iraq to agree about what their future relations should be&nbsp; when there are no Americans to stand between them. As for the US, its&nbsp; moment in Iraq is coming to an end as its troops depart, leaving a ruined&nbsp; country behind them.<br \/>____________________________________<\/p>\n<p><em>Patrick Cockburn is the author of &#8216;The Occupation: War, resistance and daily life in Iraq&#8217;, a finalist for the National Book Critics&#8217; Circle Award for best non-fiction book of 2006. His new book &#8216;Muqtada! Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia revival and the struggle for Iraq&#8217; is published by Scribner.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/em><br \/><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.counterpunch.org\/patrick12112008.html\" ><br \/>GO TO ORIGINAL<br \/><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>It&#8217;s All Spelled Out in Unpublicized Agreement On November 27 the Iraqi parliament voted by a large majority in favor of&nbsp; a security agreement with the US under which the 150,000 American&nbsp; troops in Iraq will withdraw from cities, towns and villages by&nbsp; June 30,&nbsp; 2009 and from all of Iraq by&nbsp; December 31, 2011. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[32],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1635","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-commentary-archives"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1635","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1635"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1635\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1635"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1635"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1635"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}