{"id":167779,"date":"2020-08-31T12:00:59","date_gmt":"2020-08-31T11:00:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=167779"},"modified":"2020-08-30T05:46:24","modified_gmt":"2020-08-30T04:46:24","slug":"in-defence-of-conspiracy-theories-and-why-the-term-is-a-misnomer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2020\/08\/in-defence-of-conspiracy-theories-and-why-the-term-is-a-misnomer\/","title":{"rendered":"In Defence of Conspiracy Theories (and Why the Term Is a Misnomer)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Jeremy Renner as US journalist Gary Webb in the 2014 film Kill The Messenger. The film is an account of Webb\u2019s role in uncovering CIA links to cocaine contraband to the USA. Sierra\/Affinity,Bluegrass Films,The Combine<\/p><\/div>\n

Before 2012, if you had voiced suspicions that the Australian government had been anything but open and honourable in dealing with East Timor \u2013 its newly independent but impoverished neighbour \u2013 you would likely have been dismissed as a conspiracy theorist. But it was then revealed Australian Secret Intelligence Service agents had bugged East Timor\u2019s cabinet office during treaty negotiations over oil and gas fields<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Read more: When whistleblowers are prosecuted, it has a chilling effect on press freedom in Australia<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Yesterday\u2019s conspiracy theories often become today\u2019s incontrovertible facts. In the mid-1990s, journalist Gary Webb\u2019s claims that CIA officials conspired with drug dealers bringing crack cocaine into the United States were dismissed by many as a prime example of a conspiracy theory. But the claims were true<\/a>.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s reasonable to suppose many of the views that are now dismissed or mocked as conspiracy theories will one day be recognised as having been true all along. Indeed, the net effect of terms such as \u201cconspiracy theory\u201d and \u201cconspiracism\u201d is to silence people who are the victims of conspiracy, or who (rightly or wrongly) suspect conspiracies may be occurring. These terms serve to herd respectable opinion in ways that suit the interests of the powerful.<\/p>\n

Ever since the philosopher Sir Karl Popper popularised the expression in the 1950s<\/a>, conspiracy theories have had a bad reputation. To characterise a belief as a conspiracy theory is to imply it\u2019s false. More than that, it implies people who accept that belief, or want to investigate whether it\u2019s true, are irrational.<\/p>\n

On the face of it, this is hard to understand. After all, people do conspire. That is, they engage in secretive or deceptive behaviour that is illegal or morally dubious.<\/p>\n

Conspiracy is a common form of human behaviour across all cultures throughout recorded time, and it has always been particularly widespread in politics.<\/p>\n

Virtually all of us conspire some of the time, and some people (such as spies) conspire virtually all of the time. Given people conspire, there can\u2019t be anything wrong with believing they conspire. Hence there can\u2019t be anything wrong with believing conspiracy theories or being a conspiracy theorist.<\/p>\n

Thinking of conspiracy theories as paradigmatically false and irrational is like thinking of phrenology<\/a> as a paradigm of scientific theory. Conspiracy theories, like scientific theories, and virtually any other category of theory, are sometimes true, sometimes false, sometimes held on rational grounds, sometimes not.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s a striking feature of much of the literature on conspiracy theories, like much of the literature on terrorism, that authors assume they are referring to the same phenomenon, while a glance at their definitions (when they bother to offer them) reveals they are not.<\/p>\n

Read more: Online conspiracy theorists are more diverse (and ordinary) than most assume<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

But seeking a fixed definition of the term \u201cconspiracy theory\u201d may be an idle pursuit, since the real problem with the term is that, although it lacks a fixed meaning, it does serve a fixed function.<\/p>\n

A new Inquisition?<\/h2>\n

It\u2019s a function similar to that served by the term \u201cheresy\u201d in medieval Europe. In both cases these are terms of propaganda, used to stigmatise and marginalise people who have beliefs that conflict with officially sanctioned or orthodox beliefs of the time and place in question.<\/p>\n

If, as I believe, the treatment of those labelled as \u201cconspiracy theorists\u201d in our culture is analogous to the treatment of those labelled as \u201cheretics\u201d in medieval Europe, then the role of psychologists and social scientists in this treatment is analogous to that of the Inquisition.<\/p>\n

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Stefano di Giovani, The Burning of a Heretic, circa 1423-1426.<\/span> Wikimedia Commons<\/span><\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Outside the psychology and social science literature some authors will sometimes offer some, usually heavily qualified, defence of conspiracy theories (in some sense of the term). But among psychologists and social scientists the assumption that they are false, the product of an irrational (or nonrational) process, and positively harmful is virtually universal.<\/p>\n

Whenever we use the terms \u201cconspiracy theory\u201d, \u201cconspiracism\u201d or \u201cconspiracist ideation\u201d, we\u2019re implying, even if we don\u2019t mean to, there is something wrong with believing, wanting to investigate, or giving any credence at all to the possibility people are engaged in secretive or deceptive behaviour.<\/p>\n

One bad effect of these terms is they contribute to a political environment in which it\u2019s easier for conspiracy to thrive at the expense of openness. Another bad effect is their use is an injustice to the people who are characterised as conspiracy theorists.<\/p>\n

Following the philosopher Miranda Fricker, we may call this a form of \u201ctestimonial injustice<\/a>\u201d. When someone asserts that a conspiracy has taken place (especially when it is a conspiracy by powerful people or institutions) that person\u2019s word is automatically given less credence than it should because of an irrational prejudice associated with the pejorative connotations of these terms.<\/p>\n

When professional psychologists imply these terms it can constitute a form of gaslighting; that is, a manipulation of people into doubting their own sanity.<\/p>\n

I hope and believe that in the future these terms will be widely recognised for what they are: the products of an irrational and authoritarian outlook. Prior to Popper, we got along perfectly well without these terms. I\u2019m sure we can learn to do so again.<\/p>\n

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