The Obama administration spent much of 2009 implementing a historic policy shift toward Iran.\u00a0 To its credit, a noticeable change in tone on the part of the U.S. government vis-\u00e0-vis Iran was followed by private messages from President Obama to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on how the U.S. and Iran might practically set up dialogue. Then-Undersecretary for Political Affairs William Burns met privately with Iran\u2019s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, emphasizing America\u2019s desire for dialogue and finding new ways to engage on a range of issues \u2013 nuclear and otherwise.<\/p>\n
After an interim confidence-building measure was agreed upon, Tehran balked.\u00a0 It was unable to sell the agreement at home in the midst of intense political fratricide.\u00a0 With Congress coming at the Obama administration like a steamroller, Washington quietly abandoned diplomacy in favor of punitive measures.\u00a0 In 2010, the U.S. withdrew its initial support for a revised confidence building measure brokered by Turkey and Brazil, and instead led the charge for a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution.\u00a0 The last meeting between Iran and the P5+1 in January 2011 ended with both sides refusing to budge from their respective entrenched positions.\u00a0 Since then, a powder keg overflowing with sanctions, stuxnet viruses, secret assassinations and dangerous threats of war have shown how easily a single incident can spark a wider conflict.<\/p>\n
How did the \u201cmutual interest and mutual respect\u201d of 2009 revert back to \u201call options are on the table\u201d in 2012?\u00a0 Privately, senior U.S. officials acknowledge they underestimated both the obstacles to normalizing relations with Iran, and the difficultly of understanding Iranian government decision-making.\u00a0 Yet these same officials increasingly believe that recycling demonstrably failed policies of pressure and containment will provide leverage, bring Iran to the negotiating table, and perhaps hasten the end of the regime.\u00a0 As the drumbeat of war intensifies, it is crucial to understand the political psychology of Obama\u2019s Iran policy.<\/p>\n
The Turning Point<\/strong><\/p>\n Despite their best efforts, Turkey and Brazil had little chance of securing nuclear concessions from Iran that the United States would have deemed acceptable.\u00a0 In private telephone conversations prior to the May 2010 Tehran summit, Secretary of State Clinton delivered tough messages to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and then-Brazilian President Lula da Silva: go to Tehran, see for yourself that Iran is not interested in a deal, then get on board with the UN sanctions process.\u00a0 Rather than capitalize on Iranian concessions and test the Islamic Republic\u2019s ability to follow through, the Turkish-Brazilian initiative was perceived by Washington as part of a larger Iranian strategy to divide the international community and give sanctions naysayers something to hang their hats on.<\/p>\n As the United States built up support for new UN sanctions in late 2009 and early 2010, most administration officials privately accepted the improbability of securing \u201cyes\u201d votes from Turkey, Brazil or Lebanon. \u00a0Only a minority inside the administration argued that the troika would support a new sanctions resolution precisely because of how watered down it was. \u00a0The U.S. acknowledged from the outset that any new Security Council resolution would be watered down and lack unanimity, with significant portions written in non-binding language.<\/p>\n Thus, UN Security Council sanctions secured in June 2010 under Obama\u2019s watch must be considered a failure \u2013 after nearly two years of working closely with the international community on Iran policy, the administration failed to secure a resolution as robust as the previous three ushered in by the wildly unpopular Bush administration.<\/p>\n The United States pushed forward with a sanctions-based approach largely because key administration officials believed that sanctions strengthened the credibility and leverage of those who wanted to engage Iran, while preventing more violent actions by Israel. \u00a0They insisted that such an approach best addressed the myriad long-term mutual interests shared by the United States and Iran.\u00a0 President Obama himself reached the conclusion that there were too few negative incentives to affect Iran\u2019s internal calculus, particularly regarding mutual interests.\u00a0 Based on this rationale, a policy of increasing pressure on Iran was constructed, predicated on the assumption that pressure would:<\/p>\n 1)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Bring the Iranians to the negotiating table;<\/p>\n 2)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Affect Iran\u2019s internal calculus;<\/p>\n 3)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Strengthen the credibility and leverage of the pro-engagement camps;<\/p>\n 4)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Prevent more violent actions by Israel.<\/p>\n As a general matter, senior administration officials believe U.S. leverage vis-\u00e0-vis Iran is at its highest immediately before a new set of sanctions hits, which in turn provides political space to carry out \u201clow-key engagement activities\u201d with Iran.\u00a0 To date, few such activities have taken place, largely because American outreach has been reactive rather than proactive, so as to avoid impairing sanctions implementation.<\/p>\n Bush Administration Redux? <\/strong><\/p>\n Despite its push for new sanctions, the vast majority of Obama administration officials privately acknowledge that sanctions are not a policy in and of themselves \u2013 even if they have in fact become the only policy pursued. This disconnect is reflective of the existing divisions on Iran within the White House, the absence of a concrete policy towards Iran, and a reliance on tactics rather than strategy.<\/p>\n Over the past three years, two schools of thought about Iran have emerged within the administration. The first camp equates U.S. security with Iranian democracy. It seeks to hasten a \u201ccolor\u201d revolution in Iran by emphasizing human rights and fortifying opposition groups in hopes of gaining the trust of the Iranian people and encouraging them to rebel. The second camp points out that the United States and Iran share too many common interests to ignore, including on Iraq and Afghanistan, among others.\u00a0 The resulting policy has become an attempt at compromise \u2013 publicly reiterating U.S. commitment to diplomacy, but applying pressure to tip the scale to the more hard-line end.<\/p>\n Most U.S. officials believe keeping Iran\u2019s file in the UN Security Council (a political body) versus the IAEA (a technical body) supports a legal case for punitive measures by providing concrete evidence on the diversion of Iran\u2019s civilian nuclear program toward military use.\u00a0 Nevertheless, these same officials acknowledge that Russia and China will veto any severe economic sanctions.\u00a0 The Obama administration also realizes that a military attack on Iran\u2019s nuclear installations by the United States or Israel remains a tough sell outside of Washington, London, Paris and Tel Aviv, as none of the aforementioned capitals have found the proverbial \u201csmoking gun.\u201d\u00a0 Here, senior Obama administration officials privately acknowledge two key points:<\/p>\n 1)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 A preference for continuing to incrementally increase both Security Council and \u201ccoalition of the willing\u201d sanctions; and<\/p>\n 2)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The risk\/benefit ratio of an attack does not make sense, particularly losing the \u201cpro-American\u201d people of Iran.<\/p>\n As such, in the future, the United States will likely move forward with a policy of \u201ccoalition of the willing\u201d sanctions with the EU and other allies, targeting Iran\u2019s financial and energy sector \u2013 foreign investment and financial transactions between Iran and multi-national corporations, including banks.\u00a0 Together with Security Council resolutions, these unilateral sanctions seek to tighten the screws on Iran and reduce its financial maneuverability.\u00a0 Yet few in the Obama administration believe this mix of punitive measures will compel Iran to change its policies or behavior.\u00a0 Beyond the existing policy of sanctions, the administration does not have a policy in place for moving forward.<\/p>\n The Military\u2019s Growing Influence<\/strong><\/p>\n U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) \u2013 the combatant command responsible for overseeing U.S. security interests in the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa \u2013 has standard planning objectives that provide the President with a set of military options to deal with Iran.\u00a0 At present, there are essentially three scenarios for Obama to choose from:<\/p>\n 1)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Punish Iran for its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and support for terrorism;<\/p>\n 2)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Set back Iran\u2019s nuclear program as significantly as possible;<\/p>\n 3)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Contain and change the Iranian regime.<\/p>\n Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey and CENTCOM Commander James Mattis, whose areas of command include Iraq and Afghanistan, have a keen interest in Iran because of its regional influence.\u00a0 For these reasons, they know that war with Iran is not a viable, risking regional chaos and breaking the back of America\u2019s military.\u00a0 Privately, Dempsey and Mattis both acknowledge that sanctions will not work because they fail to achieve the primary U.S. objective \u2013 changing Iranian government policies and behavior.\u00a0 As a result, these men will be a leading voice inside the Obama administration, publicly encouraging diplomacy and communication while privately probing an unofficial long-term policy of containment and below-the-radar efforts to destabilize the Iranian government.<\/p>\n As the United States moves away from sustained diplomatic engagement with the Iranian government, American military commanders will become an increasingly important voice on Iran policy \u2013 perhaps trumped only by President Obama himself.\u00a0 Dempsey and Mattis are particularly influential.\u00a0 Nobody on the political right can attack them, few can say \u201cno\u201d to them, and they have a nearly unrivaled ability to convince Congress and the administration on key national security issues.\u00a0 Even Obama is inclined to go along with their recommendations \u2013 a President can rarely go wrong politically when he says, \u201cI\u2019m going to listen to my generals.\u201d<\/p>\n Neither Obama nor his generals will advocate for the military to engage in the first two CENTCOM scenarios.\u00a0 In their view, the likelihood of failure far outweighs the chances of success. However, all three men increasingly believe that developing a strategy for the third scenario \u2013 containing and changing the regime \u2013 will provide political cover for the United States to avoid engaging in kinetic tactics.\u00a0 They acknowledge the \u201cmoderate risk\u201d associated with influence operations and support for opposition groups inside Iran, but nonetheless seek to better understand what outreach to the various facets of Iran\u2019s disenchanted society might look like, including to opposition politicians, major industry, labor and transportation unions, government employees, bazaar merchants, and oil workers. They also seek to understand how the United States can help these amorphous groups organize and coalesce.\u00a0 This long-term policy option is seen as providing flexibility, even if plans go awry.\u00a0 Barring a major and unforeseen Iranian concession on the nuclear front, this policy trajectory will be difficult to disrupt.<\/p>\n Conclusion <\/strong><\/p>\n The U.S. track record of implementing containment and destabilization policies worldwide is far from noteworthy.\u00a0 In the case of Iran, it is abysmal.\u00a0 With no on-the-ground presence and restricted interaction with Iranian counterparts, the United States is largely unable to accurately assess the real strengths and weaknesses of any policy.\u00a0 As a result, U.S. policy toward Iran under the Obama administration is rapidly falling prey to the same entrapments and mistakes that overwhelmed the four preceding U.S. administrations.<\/p>\n ______________________<\/p>\n