Significant anniversaries are solemnly commemorated — Japan\u2019s attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, for example.\u00a0 Others are ignored, and we can often learn valuable lessons from them about what is likely to lie ahead.\u00a0 Right now, in fact.<\/p>\n
At the moment, we are failing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of President John F. Kennedy\u2019s decision to launch the most destructive and murderous act of aggression of the post-World War II period: the invasion of South Vietnam, later all of Indochina, leaving millions dead and four countries devastated, with casualties still mounting from the long-term effects of drenching South Vietnam with some of the most lethal carcinogens known, undertaken to destroy ground cover and food crops.<\/p>\n
The prime target was South Vietnam.\u00a0 The aggression later spread to the North, then to the remote peasant society of northern Laos, and finally to rural Cambodia, which was bombed at the stunning level of all allied air operations in the Pacific region during World War II, including the two atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.\u00a0 In this, Henry Kissinger\u2019s orders<\/a> were being carried out — \u201canything that flies on anything that moves\u201d — a call for genocide that is rare in the historical record.\u00a0 Little of this is remembered.\u00a0 Most was scarcely known beyond narrow circles of activists.<\/p>\n When the invasion was launched 50 years ago, concern was so slight that there were few efforts at justification, hardly more than the president\u2019s impassioned plea that \u201cwe are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence\u201d and if the conspiracy achieves its ends in Laos and Vietnam, \u201cthe gates will be opened wide.\u201d<\/p>\n Elsewhere, he warned further that \u201cthe complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history [and] only the strong… can possibly survive,\u201d in this case reflecting on the failure of U.S. aggression and terror to crush Cuban independence.<\/p>\n By the time protest began to mount half a dozen years later, the respected Vietnam specialist and military historian Bernard Fall, no dove, forecast that \u201cVietnam as a cultural and historic entity\u2026 is threatened with extinction…[as]…the countryside literally dies under the blows of the largest military machine ever unleashed on an area of this size.\u201d He was again referring to South Vietnam.<\/p>\n When the war ended eight horrendous years later, mainstream opinion was divided between those who described the war as a \u201cnoble cause\u201d that could have been won with more dedication, and at the opposite extreme, the critics, to whom it was \u201ca mistake\u201d that proved too costly.\u00a0 By 1977, President Carter aroused little notice when he explained that we owe Vietnam \u201cno debt\u201d because \u201cthe destruction was mutual.\u201d<\/p>\n There are important lessons in all this for today, even apart from another reminder that only the weak and defeated are called to account for their crimes. \u00a0One lesson is that to understand what is happening we should attend not only to critical events of the real world, often dismissed from history, but also to what leaders and elite opinion believe, however tinged with fantasy.\u00a0 Another lesson is that alongside the flights of fancy concocted to terrify and mobilize the public (and perhaps believed by some who are trapped in their own rhetoric), there is also geostrategic planning based on principles that are rational and stable over long periods because they are rooted in stable institutions and their concerns.\u00a0 That is true in the case of Vietnam as well.\u00a0 I will return to that, only stressing here that the persistent factors in state action are generally well concealed.<\/p>\n The Iraq war is an instructive case.\u00a0 It was marketed to a terrified public on the usual grounds of self-defense against an awesome threat to survival: the \u201csingle question,\u201d George W. Bush and Tony Blair declared, was whether Saddam Hussein would end his programs of developing weapons of mass destruction.\u00a0\u00a0 When the single question received the wrong answer, government rhetoric shifted effortlessly to our \u201cyearning for democracy,\u201d and educated opinion duly followed course; all routine.<\/p>\n Later, as the scale of the U.S. defeat in Iraq was becoming difficult to suppress, the government quietly conceded what had been clear all along.\u00a0 In 2007-2008, the administration officially announced that a final settlement must grant the U.S. military bases and the right of combat operations, and must privilege U.S. investors in the rich energy system — demands later reluctantly abandoned in the face of Iraqi resistance.\u00a0 And all well kept from the general population.<\/p>\n Gauging American Decline<\/strong><\/p>\n With such lessons in mind, it is useful to look at what is highlighted in the major journals of policy and opinion today.\u00a0 Let us keep to the most prestigious of the establishment journals, Foreign Affairs<\/em>.\u00a0 The headline blaring on the cover of the December 2011 issue reads in bold face: \u201cIs America Over?\u201d<\/p>\n The title article calls for \u201cretrenchment\u201d in the \u201chumanitarian missions\u201d abroad that are consuming the country\u2019s wealth, so as to arrest the American decline that is a major theme of international affairs discourse, usually accompanied by the corollary that power is shifting to the East, to China and (maybe) India.<\/p>\n The lead articles are on Israel-Palestine.\u00a0 The first, by two high Israeli officials, is entitled \u201cThe Problem is Palestinian Rejection<\/a>\u201d: the conflict cannot be resolved because Palestinians refuse to recognize Israel as a Jewish state — thereby conforming to standard diplomatic practice: states are recognized, but not privileged sectors within them.\u00a0 The demand is hardly more than a new device to deter the threat of political settlement that would undermine Israel\u2019s expansionist goals.<\/p>\n The opposing position, defended by an American professor, <\/strong>is entitled \u201cThe Problem Is the Occupation<\/a>.\u201d The subtitle reads \u201cHow the Occupation is Destroying the Nation.\u201d Which nation?\u00a0 Israel, of course.\u00a0 The paired articles appear under the heading \u201cIsrael under Siege.\u201d<\/p>\n The January 2012 issue features yet another call to bomb Iran<\/a> now, before it is too late.\u00a0 Warning of \u201cthe dangers of deterrence,\u201d the author suggests that \u201cskeptics of military action fail to appreciate the true danger that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond. And their grim forecasts assume that the cure would be worse than the disease — that is, that the consequences of a U.S. assault on Iran would be as bad as or worse than those of Iran achieving its nuclear ambitions. But that is a faulty assumption. The truth is that a military strike intended to destroy Iran\u2019s nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-term national security of the United States.\u201d<\/p>\n Others argue that the costs would be too high, and at the extremes some even point out that an attack would violate international law — as does the stand of the moderates, who regularly deliver threats of violence, in violation of the U.N. Charter.<\/p>\n Let us review these dominant concerns in turn.<\/p>\n American decline is real, though the apocalyptic vision reflects the familiar ruling class perception that anything short of total control amounts to total disaster.\u00a0 Despite the piteous laments, the U.S. remains the world dominant power by a large margin, and no competitor is in sight, not only in the military dimension, in which of course the U.S. reigns supreme.<\/p>\n China and India have recorded rapid (though highly inegalitarian) growth, but remain very poor countries, with enormous internal problems not faced by the West.\u00a0 China is the world\u2019s major manufacturing center, but largely as an assembly plant for the advanced industrial powers on its periphery and for western multinationals.\u00a0 That is likely to change over time.\u00a0 Manufacturing regularly provides the basis for innovation, often breakthroughs, as is now sometimes happening in China.\u00a0 One example that has impressed western specialists is China\u2019s takeover of the growing global solar panel market, not on the basis of cheap labor but by coordinated planning and, increasingly, innovation.<\/p>\n But the problems China faces are serious. Some are demographic, reviewed in Science<\/em>, <\/em>the leading U.S. science weekly. The study shows that mortality sharply decreased in China during the Maoist years, \u201cmainly a result of economic development and improvements in education and health services, especially the public hygiene movement that resulted in a sharp drop in mortality from infectious diseases.\u201d This progress ended with the initiation of the capitalist reforms 30 years ago, and the death rate has since increased.<\/p>\n Furthermore, China\u2019s recent economic growth has relied substantially on a \u201cdemographic bonus,\u201d a very large working-age population. \u201cBut the window for harvesting this bonus may close soon,\u201d with a \u201cprofound impact on development\u201d: \u00a0\u201cExcess cheap labor supply, which is one of the major factors driving China’s economic miracle, will no longer be available.\u201d<\/p>\n Demography is only one of many serious problems ahead.\u00a0 For India, the problems are far more severe.<\/p>\n Not all prominent voices foresee American decline.\u00a0 Among international media, there is none more serious and responsible than the London Financial Times<\/em>.\u00a0 It recently devoted a full page to the optimistic expectation that new technology for extracting North American fossil fuels might allow the U.S. to become energy independent, hence to retain its global hegemony for a century.\u00a0 There is no mention of the kind of world the U.S. would rule in this happy event, but not for lack of evidence.<\/p>\n At about the same time, the International Energy Agency reported<\/a> that, with rapidly increasing carbon emissions from fossil fuel use, the limit of safety will be reached by 2017 if the world continues on its present course. \u201cThe door is closing,\u201d the IEA chief economist said, and very soon it \u201cwill be closed forever.\u201d<\/p>\n Shortly before the U.S. Department of Energy reported<\/a> the most recent carbon dioxide emissions figures, which \u201cjumped by the biggest amount on record\u201d to a level higher than the worst-case scenario anticipated by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).\u00a0 That came as no surprise to many scientists, including the MIT program on climate change, which for years has warned that the IPCC predictions are too conservative.<\/p>\n Such critics of the IPCC predictions receive virtually no public attention, unlike the fringe of denialists who are supported by the corporate sector, along with huge propaganda campaigns that have driven Americans off the international spectrum in dismissal of the threats.\u00a0 Business support also translates directly to political power.\u00a0 Denialism is part of the catechism that must be intoned by Republican candidates in the farcical election campaign now in progress, and in Congress they are powerful enough to abort even efforts to inquire into the effects of global warming, let alone do anything serious about it.<\/p>\n In brief, American decline can perhaps be stemmed if we abandon hope for decent survival, prospects that are all too real given the balance of forces in the world.<\/p>\n \u201cLosing\u201d China and Vietnam<\/strong><\/p>\n Putting such unpleasant thoughts aside, a close look at American decline shows that China indeed plays a large role, as it has for 60 years.\u00a0 The decline that now elicits such concern is not a recent phenomenon.\u00a0 It traces back to the end of World War II, when the U.S. had half the world\u2019s wealth and incomparable security and global reach.\u00a0 Planners were naturally well aware of the enormous disparity of power, and intended to keep it that way.<\/p>\n The basic viewpoint was outlined with admirable frankness in a major state paper of 1948 (PPS 23<\/a>).\u00a0 The author was one of the architects of the New World Order of the day, the chair of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, the respected statesman and scholar George Kennan, a moderate dove within the planning spectrum.\u00a0 He observed that the central policy goal was to maintain the \u201cposition of disparity\u201d that separated our enormous wealth from the poverty of others.\u00a0 To achieve that goal, he advised, \u201cWe should cease to talk about vague and… unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization,\u201d and must \u201cdeal in straight power concepts,\u201d not \u201champered by idealistic slogans\u201d about \u201caltruism and world-benefaction.\u201d<\/p>\n Kennan was referring specifically to Asia, but the observations generalize, with exceptions, for participants in the U.S.-run global system.\u00a0 It was well understood that the \u201cidealistic slogans\u201d were to be displayed prominently when addressing others, including the intellectual classes, who were expected to promulgate them.<\/p>\n The plans that Kennan helped formulate and implement took for granted that the U.S. would control the Western Hemisphere, the Far East, the former British empire (including the incomparable energy resources of the Middle East), and as much of Eurasia as possible, crucially its commercial and industrial centers.\u00a0 These were not unrealistic objectives, given the distribution of power.\u00a0 But decline set in at once.<\/p>\n In 1949, China declared independence, an event known in Western discourse as \u201cthe loss of China\u201d — in the U.S., with bitter recriminations and conflict over who was responsible for that loss.\u00a0 The terminology is revealing.\u00a0 It is only possible to lose something that one owns.\u00a0 The tacit assumption was that the U.S. owned China, by right, along with most of the rest of the world, much as postwar planners assumed.<\/p>\n The \u201closs of China\u201d was the first major step in \u201cAmerica\u2019s decline.\u201d It had major policy consequences.\u00a0 One was the immediate decision to support France\u2019s effort to reconquer its former colony of Indochina, so that it, too, would not be \u201clost.\u201d<\/p>\n Indochina itself was not a major concern, despite claims about its rich resources by President Eisenhower and others.\u00a0 Rather, the concern was the \u201cdomino theory,\u201d which is often ridiculed when dominoes don\u2019t fall, but remains a leading principle of policy because it is quite rational.\u00a0 To adopt Henry Kissinger\u2019s version, a region that falls out of control can become a \u201cvirus\u201d that will \u201cspread contagion,\u201d inducing others to follow the same path.<\/p>\n In the case of Vietnam, the concern was that the virus of independent development might infect Indonesia, which really does have rich resources.\u00a0 And that might lead Japan — the \u201csuperdomino\u201d as it was called by the prominent Asia historian John Dower — to \u201caccommodate\u201d to an independent Asia as its technological and industrial center in a system that would escape the reach of U.S. power.\u00a0 That would mean, in effect, that the U.S. had lost the Pacific phase of World War II, fought to prevent Japan\u2019s attempt to establish such a New Order in Asia.<\/p>\n The way to deal with such a problem is clear: destroy the virus and \u201cinoculate\u201d those who might be infected.\u00a0 In the Vietnam case, the rational choice was to destroy any hope of successful independent development and to impose brutal dictatorships in the surrounding regions.\u00a0 Those tasks were successfully carried out — though history has its own cunning, and something similar to what was feared has since been developing in East Asia, much to Washington\u2019s dismay.<\/p>\n The most important victory of the Indochina wars was in 1965, when a U.S.-backed military coup in Indonesia led by General Suharto carried out massive crimes that were compared by the CIA to those of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao.\u00a0 The \u201cstaggering mass slaughter,\u201d as the New York Times<\/em> described it, was reported accurately across the mainstream, and with unrestrained euphoria.<\/p>\n It was \u201ca gleam of light in Asia,\u201d as the noted liberal commentator James Reston wrote in the Times.\u00a0 <\/em>The coup ended the threat of democracy by demolishing the mass-based political party of the poor, established a dictatorship that went on to compile one of the worst human rights records in the world, and threw the riches of the country open to western investors.\u00a0 Small wonder that, after many other horrors, including the near-genocidal invasion<\/a> of East Timor, Suharto was welcomed<\/a> by the Clinton administration in 1995 as \u201cour kind of guy.\u201d<\/p>\n Years after the great events of 1965, Kennedy-Johnson National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy reflected that it would have been wise to end the Vietnam war at that time, with the \u201cvirus\u201d virtually destroyed and the primary domino solidly in place, buttressed by other U.S.-backed dictatorships throughout the region.<\/p>\n Similar procedures have been routinely followed elsewhere.\u00a0 Kissinger was referring specifically to the threat of socialist democracy in Chile.\u00a0 That threat was ended on another forgotten date, what Latin Americans call \u201cthe first 9\/11<\/a>,\u201d which in violence and bitter effects far exceeded the 9\/11 commemorated in the West.\u00a0 A vicious dictatorship was imposed in Chile, one part of a plague of brutal repression that spread through Latin America, reaching Central America under Reagan.\u00a0 Viruses have aroused deep concern elsewhere as well, including the Middle East, where the threat of secular nationalism has often concerned British and U.S. planners, inducing them to support radical Islamic fundamentalism to counter it.<\/p>\n The Concentration of Wealth and American Decline<\/strong><\/p>\n Despite such victories, American decline continued.\u00a0 By 1970, U.S. share of world wealth had dropped to about 25%, roughly where it remains, still colossal but far below the end of World War II.\u00a0 By then, the industrial world was \u201ctripolar\u201d: US-based North America, German-based Europe, and East Asia, already the most dynamic industrial region, at the time Japan-based, but by now including the former Japanese colonies Taiwan and South Korea, and more recently China.<\/p>\n At about that time, American decline entered a new phase: conscious self-inflicted decline.\u00a0 From the 1970s, there has been a significant change in the U.S. economy, as planners, private and state, shifted it toward financialization and the offshoring of production, driven in part by the declining rate of profit in domestic manufacturing.\u00a0 These decisions initiated a vicious cycle in which wealth became highly concentrated (dramatically so in the top 0.1% of the population), yielding concentration of political power, hence legislation to carry the cycle further: taxation and other fiscal policies, deregulation, changes in the rules of corporate governance allowing huge gains for executives, and so on.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, for the majority, real wages largely stagnated, and people were able to get by only by sharply increased workloads (far beyond Europe), unsustainable debt, and repeated bubbles since the Reagan years, creating paper wealth that inevitably disappeared when they burst (and the perpetrators were bailed out by the taxpayer).\u00a0 In parallel, the political system has been increasingly shredded as both parties are driven deeper into corporate pockets with the escalating cost of elections, the Republicans to the level of farce, the Democrats (now largely the former \u201cmoderate Republicans\u201d) not far behind.<\/p>\n A recent study by the Economic Policy Institute, which has been the major source of reputable data on these developments for years, is entitled Failure by Design<\/em><\/a>.\u00a0 The phrase \u201cby design\u201d is accurate.\u00a0 Other choices were certainly possible.\u00a0 And as the study points out, the \u201cfailure\u201d is class-based.\u00a0 There is no failure for the designers.\u00a0 Far from it.\u00a0 Rather, the policies are a failure for the large majority, the 99% in the imagery of the Occupy movements — and for the country, which has declined and will continue to do so under these policies.<\/p>\n One factor is the offshoring of manufacturing.\u00a0 As the solar panel example mentioned earlier illustrates, manufacturing capacity provides the basis and stimulus for innovation leading to higher stages of sophistication in production, design, and invention.\u00a0 That, too, is being outsourced, not a problem for the \u201cmoney mandarins\u201d who increasingly design policy, but a serious problem for working people and the middle classes, and a real disaster for the most oppressed, African Americans, who have never escaped the legacy of slavery and its ugly aftermath, and whose meager wealth virtually disappeared<\/a> after the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008, setting off the most recent financial crisis, the worst so far.<\/p>\n _______________________<\/p>\n Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor emeritus in the MIT Department of Linguistics and Philosophy. He is the author of numerous best-selling political works. His latest books are <\/em>Making the Future: Occupations, Intervention, Empire, and Resistance<\/a>,<\/em> The Essential Chomsky<\/a> (edited by Anthony Arnove), a collection of his writings on politics and on language from the 1950s to the present, <\/em>Gaza in Crisis<\/a>, with Ilan Papp\u00e9, and <\/em>Hopes and Prospects<\/a>, also available as an <\/em>audiobook<\/em><\/a>. <\/em><\/p>\n