{"id":193847,"date":"2021-09-27T12:00:14","date_gmt":"2021-09-27T11:00:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=193847"},"modified":"2024-09-23T14:38:55","modified_gmt":"2024-09-23T13:38:55","slug":"irans-role-in-the-shifting-political-landscape-of-the-middle-east","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2021\/09\/irans-role-in-the-shifting-political-landscape-of-the-middle-east\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Role in the Shifting Political Landscape of the Middle East"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Other Regional Counter-Revolution<\/em><\/p>\n

July 2021 – <\/em>The last decade has seen historic political upheavals across the Middle East and North Africa: a tsunami of popular uprisings that have brought down several dictators and led to momentous transformations in political consciousness, if not always to democratic outcomes. But the last decade has also seen a concomitant counter-revolutionary roll-back across the region: authoritarian regimes, entrenched elites, ruling classes, deep states, and reactionary forces have marshalled considerable resources to torpedo these movements from below.[1]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>

Iraqi security forces firing tear gas and live rounds into a crowd of demonstrators during the 2019 Tishreen (October) uprising<\/p><\/div>\n

Saudi Arabia\u2019s role as a counter-revolutionary force in the Middle East is widely understood and thoroughly documented. Historian Rosie Bsheer calls the Saudi kingdom \u201ca counter-revolutionary state par excellence,\u201d indeed one that was \u201cconsolidated as such.\u201d[2]<\/a> The Saudi monarchy has gone into counter-revolutionary overdrive since the onset of the Arab uprisings, scrambling to thwart popular movements and keep the region\u2019s dictators in power \u2014 from Egypt and Bahrain to Yemen and Sudan (and beyond).[3]<\/a><\/p>\n

What is less understood is the counter-revolutionary role that Iran plays in the region\u2019s politics. This is poorly understood and under-examined because it flies in the face of the dominant narrative, that of Iran as a \u201crevolutionary\u201d state in the vanguard of a regional \u201cAxis of Resistance\u201d to US imperialism and its allies. This view is shared across the ideological spectrum, from neoconservatives and US foreign policy hawks (for whom Iran\u2019s \u201crevolutionary\u201d policies are dangerous and must be contained\/confronted) to large swaths of the \u201canti-imperialist\u201d Left and antiwar movement (for whom Iran is merely defending itself and \u201cresisting\u201d US\/Israeli\/Saudi belligerence). While the two camps disagree about whether Iran\u2019s \u201crevolutionary\u201d agenda is a good thing, they agree that it is \u201crevolutionary.\u201d This is also the official line of the Islamic Republic itself, whose self-image as a \u201crevolutionary\u201d state in the vanguard of an \u201cAxis of Resistance\u201d is central to its identity \u2014 and legitimacy.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n

Here we have a classic instance of what the sociologist Ulrich Beck calls a zombie category. Zombie categories, he argues, \u201care dead but somehow go on living, making us blind to the realities\u201d of the world.[5]<\/a> The view of Iran as a \u201crevolutionary\u201d state has been dead for quite some time yet somehow stumbles along and blinds us to what is actually happening on the ground in the Middle East. A brief look at the role Iran has played over the last decade in three countries \u2014 Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria \u2014 reveals a very different picture: not one of a revolutionary but rather of a counter-revolutionary force.<\/p>\n

Lebanon\u2019s \u201cOctober Revolution\u201d<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

In October 2019, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets across Lebanon in \u201cthe most comprehensive anti-government protests the country has seen at least since the civil war ended in 1990, in terms of numbers, geographic spread, and diversity of sects and class.\u201d[6]<\/a> While the proximate causes were the government\u2019s inept response to the wildfires that engulfed the country and its announcement of a tax on WhatsApp voice calls, the uprising \u2014 which came to be known as Lebanon\u2019s \u201cOctober Revolution\u201d \u2014 had deeper roots and gave expression to grievances that had been simmering for several years. The 2015 \u201cYou Stink\u201d protests against the disfunction and mismanagement that led to a crisis of uncollected garbage, for instance, in many ways prefigured the 2019 uprising.[7]<\/a> But the 2019 demonstrations were more far-reaching: people throughout the country \u2014 \u201cnot only in Beirut but in all major coastal cities and smaller inland ones\u201d \u2014 took to the streets \u201cin a show of solidarity never before seen.\u201d[8]<\/a> They were \u201crebelling against the socioeconomic violence\u2026produced by the sectarian order\u201d with its \u201crampant clientelism and corruption,\u201d notes Lebanese political scientist Bassel Salloukh.[9]<\/a> Along similar lines, Lebanese sociologist Rima Majed characterizes it as a revolt against \u201csectarian neoliberalism.\u201d[10]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Mass demonstration in Beirut during Lebanon\u2019s 2019 \u201cOctober Revolution\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

There were three distinct \u201cstreams\u201d within the uprising, according to Majed. What she calls the \u201cradical\u201d stream \u201chas been thinking intersectionally, centering class inequality, gender inequality\u2026questions of citizenship, race, and refugees. It is mobilizing around all these issues and making links between them, and demanding an overhaul of the neoliberal economic system as well as the sectarian political system.\u201d[11]<\/a> Majed and Lana Salman note the centrality of a feminist politics in the uprising, one that aims to \u201cdismantle interlinked manifestations of patriarchy, capitalism and sectarianism.\u201d[12]<\/a> Majed characterizes the second stream as essentially \u201cliberal\u201d and the third stream as \u201cmore ad hoc,\u201d lacking a \u201cclear political project or vision.\u201d A spectrum of orientations was thus present in the Lebanese uprising, with a decidedly progressive center of gravity.<\/p>\n

Close to a million people \u2014 a critical mass in a country of less than 7 million \u2014 participated in the demonstrations. An embodiment of what Yasser Munif calls \u201cthe politics of life\u201d[13]<\/a> or what Asef Bayat calls \u201cthe politics of fun,\u201d[14]<\/a> Jade Saab and Joey Ayoub describe the \u201ccarnival atmosphere\u201d in Lebanon\u2019s public squares, \u201cwith music, dancing, DJs and fireworks at night\u201d and a vibrant intellectual scene with \u201cdaily public lectures on the economy, the constitution, history,\u201d and other themes.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cIn these \u2018classes\u2019 you could see attempts at the creation of a new Lebanese identity,\u201d Saab and Ayoub observe \u2014 one that rejects and transcends the \u201cmyths of sectarianism.\u201d In the same vein, Salloukh sees Lebanon\u2019s \u201cOctober Revolution\u201d as a \u201ctruly foundational moment\u201d in which \u201cpeople are redefining their subjectivity.\u201d[16]<\/a> The uprising, he notes, \u201chas allowed for a reimagining of the Lebanese nation beyond top-down imposed narrow sectarian affiliations.\u201d He detects<\/p>\n

a shift in how people define themselves as agents: not as sectarian subjects in a political order cut along sectarian and religious lines, but rather as anti- and trans-sectarian citizens operating in a polyphonic and democratic civic space.\u2026[17]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Counter-revolution<\/em><\/p>\n

Where does Hezbollah, Iran\u2019s key ally in Lebanon, figure in this picture?<\/p>\n

The defining slogan of Lebanon\u2019s uprising \u2014 <\/em>\u201call of them means all of them\u201d (kellon yani kellon<\/em>) \u2014 called out the country\u2019s entire ruling class, which includes Hezbollah. One pointed variation on the slogan was \u201cAll of them means all of them, and Nasrallah is one of them.\u201d[18]<\/a> Protesters chanting \u201cthe people want the downfall of the regime\u201d (the defining slogan of the 2011 Arab uprisings) gathered outside the office of Mohammed Raad, the head of Hezbollah\u2019s parliamentary bloc.<\/p>\n

Hezbollah returned the favor: after some initial hedging, the \u201cParty of God\u201d unleashed a mob on Beirut\u2019s main protest site, beating unarmed activists at a peaceful sit-in and burning down their tents.[19]<\/a> In the southern Lebanese town of Nabatiyeh, according to Human Rights Watch, several hundred Hezbollah supporters \u201cattacked peaceful protesters, with sticks and sharp metal objects, including beating women, children, and older people indiscriminately.\u201d[20]<\/a> In response to that assault, protesters declared a \u201cday of solidarity with Nabatiyeh\u201d on October 24.[21]<\/a> \u201cThose who oppress Beirut don\u2019t liberate Palestine<\/em>,\u201d read graffiti scrawled in downtown Beirut in a poignant critique of Hezbollah.[22]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

A Hezbollah supporter (right) attacks a protester at Beirut\u2019s main protest site amid Lebanon\u2019s 2019 uprising. \u201cParty of God\u201d supporters burned down the tents at the encampment and attacked protesters in other Lebanese cities.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Hezbollah\u2019s attacks on the demonstrators were not only physical but rhetorical, framing the popular revolt as part of a foreign plot against Hezbollah and its regional allies in the \u201cAxis of Resistance\u201d \u2014 accusations that were \u201cmet with ridicule, especially since it was being spearheaded by a party that openly flouts the fact that it is almost exclusively funded by Iran.\u201d[23]<\/a> Activists fired back with satire, \u201cdistributing free sandwiches with \u2018funded by [name of foreign government]\u2019 written on them.\u201d[24]<\/a> Nasrallah is \u201ccoming up with conspiracy theories just to get people to stop revolting,\u201d a university student active in the protests, Ahmad Bshennaty, told Al Jazeera.[25]<\/a> Tehran amplified this line, blaming the protests on \u201cAmerica and Western intelligence services\u201d and warning of the \u201cinsecurity and turmoil\u201d they portended.[26]<\/a> Supreme leader Ali Khamenei invoked a highly revealing domestic comparison: in an apparent reference to the mass protests that rocked the Islamic Republic in late 2017 and early 2018, he said that foreign powers \u201chad similar plans\u201d for Iran, but \u201cthe armed forces were ready and that plot was neutralized.\u201d[27]<\/a><\/p>\n

This \u201ccampaign against the protests,\u201d Salloukh notes, \u201cbackfired among the public, even inside the Shi\u2018a community, for it portrayed Hezbollah as the main defender of the sectarian system with all its corruption and distortions.\u201d[28]<\/a> Hezbollah is \u201cnow viewed by many demonstrators as part of the corrupt and morally bankrupt political establishment that must be replaced,\u201d as Joseph Haboush observes.[29]<\/a> Lebanese activist and podcaster Nizar Hassan characterizes Hezbollah\u2019s role in the uprising as that of a \u201ccounter revolutionary guard.\u201d[30]<\/a><\/p>\n

Hezbollah\u2019s aim was to \u201cend the protest movement by proposing solutions that maintain the Lebanese sectarian and neoliberal framework, while continuing to use intimidation and sometimes violence against protesters,\u201d writes Joseph Daher, author of a book on Hezbollah.[31]<\/a> Although Hezbollah has been firmly entrenched in Lebanon\u2019s power structure for over a decade \u2014 Lebanese author Elias Khoury calls it \u201cthe system\u2019s staunchest supporter\u201d[32]<\/a> \u2014 the 2019 upheaval brought what Daher calls \u201cthe contradiction between Hezbollah\u2019s proclaimed support for the \u2018oppressed\u2019 and its orientation favourable to Lebanese neoliberalism and the country\u2019s elite class\u201d into ever sharper focus.<\/p>\n

The Lebanese writer and podcaster Joey Ayoub captures the Orwellian upside-down-ness of this ideological sleight of hand in his formulation \u201cHezbollah\u2019s Resistance\u2122 against resistance.\u201d[33]<\/a> Hezbollah, he shows, tries to have it both ways: on the one hand, defending the status quo and maintaining Lebanon\u2019s \u201csectarian-capitalist structures,\u201d while at the same time banking on its membership in the so-called \u201cAxis of Resistance.\u201d That is, posturing as a force for \u201cresistance\u201d \u2014 a zombie category amid Lebanon\u2019s current political landscape \u2014 while attacking people engaged in actual<\/em> resistance to the ruling system and undermining progressive social movements.<\/p>\n

Iraq\u2019s Tishreen uprising<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

The parallels between the Iraqi and Lebanese revolts are manifold, starting with their timing: mass protests engulfed both countries starting in October 2019. Iraqi and Lebanese protesters were conscious of the connections between their struggles: \u201cin the different protest squares people are shouting: \u2018One revolution, from Baghdad to Beirut,\u2019\u201d notes Sami Adnan, an activist in Baghdad with the group Workers Against Sectarianism.[34]<\/a> It\u2019s also important to see the two upheavals in their wider regional context, as part of the \u201csecond wave\u201d of Arab uprisings that also included momentous popular movements in Algeria and Sudan \u2014 or, as some argue, the uprisings that have been ongoing across the Middle East and North Africa since December 2010.[35]<\/a> Moreover, all four of these cases were part of a global<\/em> wave of simultaneous mass protests in late 2019 \u2014 in Chile, Hong Kong, India, France, Ecuador, Guinea, Haiti, Colombia, Iran, Argentina, and beyond \u2014 which could be \u201cthe largest wave of nonviolent mass movements in world history.\u201d[36]<\/a><\/p>\n

The protests that erupted in Iraq in October 2019 were arguably the \u201cbiggest grassroots socio-political mobilization\u201d in the country\u2019s history.[37]<\/a> At root, that mobilization was \u201cabout the poor, the disempowered and the marginalized demanding a new system,\u201d notes the Iraqi sociologist Zahra Ali.[38]<\/a> The Tishreen<\/em> (October) uprising, as it came to be known, quickly spread to \u201ccities and towns across central and southern Iraq\u201d[39]<\/a> and eventually \u201cengulfed virtually the whole country (though they were most concentrated in Baghdad and the Shia-dominated southern governorates).\u201d[40]<\/a><\/p>\n

By no means did this upheaval come out of nowhere: Iraq has seen a steady stream of protests in recent years \u2014 in 2009, 2011, 2015, and 2018.[41]<\/a> But the 2019 protests represented \u201cthe most serious challenge yet to the post-2003 political order,\u201d the Iraq scholar Fanar Haddad observes.[42]<\/a> The 2019 rebellion was \u201cbackboned\u201d by those previous protests \u2014 it was the \u201cculmination of a decade of mobilization\u201d[43]<\/a> \u2014 \u201cbut its identity was more radical and firmer,\u201d notes Zeidon Alkinani.[44]<\/a> \u201cPeople were no longer asking for better job opportunities, electricity or water. They were calling to overhaul the system.\u201d<\/p>\n

Alkinani underscores that the movement \u201cclassified itself as a \u2018revolution\u2019 in terms of discourse, demands, and objectives.\u201d \u201c[E]ven if the current movement fails to achieve a political revolution,\u201d Haddad argues, \u201cand even if it is not a revolution, it is undoubtedly a revolutionary movement<\/em> that has already achieved a cultural revolution.\u201d[45]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

An Iraqi activist being blanket-tossed into the air by fellow demonstrators in Baghdad\u2019s Tahrir Square, the site of what Fanar Haddad calls an \u201cexplosion of cultural, political and intellectual expression and creativity\u201d (December 2019)<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

What were the protesters calling for? First and foremost, \u201ceradicating the Muhasasa <\/em>system,\u201d Alkinani notes, referring to the ethno-sectarian scheme in which political representation and power are based on sub-national identities (Shi\u2018a\/Sunni\/Kurd).[46]<\/a> This system \u2014 established under the US occupation following the 2003 invasion and sustained by both American and Iranian influence in the years since \u2014 became \u201cthe target of popular rage,\u201d Haddad notes: \u201crage at the systemic failures, dysfunction and criminality that have marked the post-2003 order.\u201d That order has created a massive chasm, Haddad observes, between \u201cthe ruling few and those with connections to them\u201d on one hand and \u201cthe vast majority of impoverished and excluded Iraqis\u201d on the other.[47]<\/a> In 2019, those impoverished and excluded Iraqis rose up \u201cdemanding a whole new system,\u201d Zahra Ali and Safaa Khalaf write.[48]<\/a><\/p>\n

As in Lebanon, Asef Bayat\u2019s \u201cpolitics of fun\u201d was on full display in Iraq, especially in the epicenter of the 2019 protest movement, Baghdad\u2019s Tahrir Square, home to an \u201cexplosion of cultural, political and intellectual expression and creativity,\u201d writes Haddad.<\/p>\n

Amidst a forest of tents blaring everything from hip hop to poetry to Shia mourning recitations, reminders of why Iraqis have taken to the streets, and at what cost, abound in the form of pictures, murals, memorials, prayer meetings and other forms of commemoration dedicated to the young men who lost their lives over the course of the past two months of mass mobilisation.[49]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

And like Lebanon, the uprising involved an intellectual component. \u201cTahrir Square in Baghdad today is a revolutionary zone,\u201d says the aforementioned Baghdad-based activist Sami Adnan.<\/p>\n

There are places for reading books in one tent, and a medical tent. Some tents represent specific regions of Iraq, or retired people, or professional groups, like unions of engineers, etc. \u2026 [People] discuss day-to-day things about what to do, but also questions of leadership, writing a new constitution, or putting on seminars about different political topics.[50]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\u201cA new political awareness and culture have been formed\u201d through the protests, Haddad writes.[51]<\/a> Indeed, Alkinani argues, the uprising has \u201copened a new chapter in Iraq\u2019s modern history.\u201d[52]<\/a> The Tishreen uprising has \u201copened the door to a new Iraqi identity and national consciousness,\u201d proclaim the editors of Tuk Tuk, <\/em>a newspaper that grew out of the revolt, on the front page of its second issue.[53]<\/a><\/p>\n

Counter-revolution<\/em><\/p>\n

As Berman, Clarke, and Majed note:<\/p>\n

A movement demanding wholesale political change represented a real threat to the system of cronyism and rapaciousness that has enriched Iraq\u2019s politicians over the last two decades, and these elites quickly mobilized an array of state and non-state security agents in an attempt to quash this challenge.[54]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Mohammad al Basri, a figure affiliated with Iraq\u2019s paramilitary Popular Mobilization Units, expressed this mindset with rare bluntness: \u201cDo they really think that we would hand over a state, an economy, one that we have built over 15 years? That they can just casually come and take it? Impossible! This is a state that was built with blood.\u201d[55]<\/a><\/p>\n

Those forces wasted no time in launching a \u201cwar against unarmed protesters\u201d that left several hundred dead and several thousand wounded.[56]<\/a> Amnesty International documented the use of \u201cmilitary-grade tear gas grenades, live ammunition and deadly sniper attacks\u201d[57]<\/a> in what the organization calls a \u201clethal campaign of repression against protesters\u201d and an \u201congoing wave of intimidation, arrests and torture\u201d of Iraqi activists.[58]<\/a> Whereas this bloodbath of repression against crowds of protesters has been perpetrated in broad daylight, an ominous chain of assassinations targeting activists connected to the uprising has been happening in the shadows, creating what protesters call \u201can atmosphere of terror.\u201d[59]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Protest art in Baghdad depicting a demonstrator hit by a tear gas canister during the 2019 Tishreen<\/em> (October) uprising. A striking array<\/a> of\u00a0murals, graffiti, and public art has sprung up within Iraq\u2019s protest movement.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The uprising has been \u201cprofoundly shaped by the Iraqi security forces\u2019 violent repression,\u201d Ali and Khalaf observe.[60]<\/a> Indeed, Haddad notes, the demands of the protesters were \u201conly hardened by the violence that has been unleashed on them.\u201d[61]<\/a> \u201cThe more the political establishment cracked down on protests, the more outrage it triggered, resulting in fresh rounds of mobilization,\u201d write Chantal Berman, Killian Clarke, and Rima Majed.[62]<\/a><\/p>\n

Iran is deeply implicated in this counter-revolutionary repression \u2014 both indirectly, as the chief political ally and patron of the Iraqi government over the last 15 years, and directly, through the web of militias and paramilitary forces coordinated by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which have opened fire on protesters.[63]<\/a> Those militias \u201ccommitted bloody massacres against peaceful protesters\u201d in multiple Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Nasriyah, Basra and Najaf.\u201d[64]<\/a> \u201cThe authorities, paramilitary forces and militias connected to the political elite, backed by Iran<\/em>, are those primarily responsible for killing, beating, threatening and intimidating demonstrators, civil society activists and journalists,\u201d Zahra Ali notes.[65]<\/a><\/p>\n

Tehran also intervened politically, maneuvering to keep Iraqi Prime Minister Abdel Abdul Mahdi in power in the face of demands from protesters that he step down.[66]<\/a> (Mahdi eventually did resign, in late November 2019 \u2014 a major victory for the protest movement that Tehran endeavored to circumvent.)<\/p>\n

Iraqi protesters weren\u2019t just rebelling against Iran\u2019s local allies, but against Iran itself. Protesters in Baghdad\u2019s Tahrir Square smashed banners of Khamenei with their shoes.[67]<\/a> Others put up a white banner with red Xs drawn through photographs of Khamenei and Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, the architect of Iran\u2019s regional policy.[68]<\/a> \u201cImages of Ayatollah Khomeini were removed from cities like Najaf, and pro-Iran political parties with prominent militias that were involved in the violence against the protesters had their branch offices attacked and burned,\u201d Alkinani notes.[69]<\/a> Most spectacularly, protesters set fire to the Iranian consulate in Karbala and Najaf amid chants of \u201cIran out of Iraq\u201d.[70]<\/a><\/p>\n

Among the demands of the protesters, Adnan notes, are \u201can end to the rule of militias, and an end to corruption and foreign rule \u2014 especially Iranian rule, but also US rule.\u201d[71]<\/a> \u201cMost Iraqis are increasingly outraged at the way their national sovereignty is constantly infringed\u201d by both Washington and Tehran, notes Middle East scholar Gilbert Achcar.[72]<\/a> Vividly illustrating this point, Haddad observes that in Baghdad\u2019s Tahrir Square,<\/p>\n

while gazing at a mural proclaiming \u2018America go out of Iraq\u2019 complete with a depiction of an American dagger bleeding Iraq dry, a looped recording of a voice chanting \u2018Iraq is under Iranian occupation\u2019 can be heard.[73]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The Associated Press reported that the very day after the protests began in Iraq in October 2019, Soleimani flew to Baghdad in a helicopter for an emergency meeting with high-ranking Iraqi security officials. According to two of those officials, Soleimani said to them in that meeting: \u201cWe in Iran know how to deal with protests. This happened in Iran and we got it under control.\u201d[74]<\/a><\/p>\n

Despite the many parallels between the Lebanese and Iraqi uprisings, there are two key differences: (1) the protests in Iraq were met with a staggering level of violence, in contrast to the largely nonviolent Lebanese case; (2) Iran played a much more direct role in the Iraqi counter-revolution than it did in Lebanon, where its key ally, Hezbollah, represents and reflects the stance of the Islamic Republic. But what both cases illuminate is this: in the face of popular uprisings expressing emancipatory demands, Iran sides not with the protesters but with the ruling establishments they\u2019re protesting against. And the story is far from over: while the COVID pandemic dampened protests, the issues that gave rise to the uprisings remain unresolved, and activism in both countries continues.[75]<\/a><\/p>\n

Syria\u2019s forgotten revolution<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Moving in reverse chronological order, I\u2019ll now briefly examine Iran\u2019s response to the Syrian uprising in 2011. I will not examine Iran\u2019s role in the Syrian conflict writ large; rather, my focus will be on Iran\u2019s response to the initial, nonviolent phase of the Syrian uprising, from the spring to the autumn of 2011.<\/p>\n

With the colossal violence that has engulfed Syria over the last decade, it is often forgotten that it all began with peaceful protests expressing democratic demands. In March 2011, mass demonstrations broke out across the country \u2014 in provincial villages and urban areas alike. Syrians representing a cross-section of the country (Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, Druze, Ismailis, Kurds, and others) took to the streets chanting slogans that echoed those of their counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere across the region, and expressing the same aspirations \u2014 for freedom, dignity, social justice, democratic rights, and an end to dictatorship. Because this history has been largely obscured by the calamity that befell Syria, buried under the rubble of the tragedy \u2014 in some cases it has been actively erased<\/em> in the war of narratives over the conflict[76]<\/a> \u2014 it\u2019s critically important to take stock of the emancipatory, visionary, pluralistic, and radically democratic goals of the Syrian uprising. This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of that story, but I want to point to the rich literature on the subject, and to the vital archival and storytelling work of websites like SyriaUntold<\/a>, Creative Memory of the Syrian Revolution<\/a>, and 100 Faces of the Syrian Revolution<\/a>.[77]<\/a><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s official narrative is that its role in Syria is all about fighting terrorism \u2014 specifically Al Qaeda and ISIS. But this is a classic case of reading history backwards. In fact, Iran rushed to the defense of the Assad regime as soon as the uprising began \u2014 when there was no Al Qaeda or ISIS presence whatsoever (the only jihadists were the ones the regime intentionally let out of its prisons as part of its jihadization strategy).[78]<\/a> \u201cFrom the very moment Assad faced popular protests, the Quds Force and Tehran were ready to do all they could to save the rule of the Baath Party,\u201d notes Arash Azizi. Indeed, the Islamic Republic\u2019s emissaries \u201cwere pushing on Assad to suppress the uprising mercilessly.\u201d[79]<\/a> And that is precisely what the regime did. As I wrote in 2016:<\/p>\n

The Assad regime\u2019s response to those peaceful demonstrations across Syria in 2011 can be summed up in two words: live ammunition. The regime\u2019s security forces fired on crowds of unarmed protestors for upward of six months. The Islamic Republic defended its staunch ally in Damascus, as the latter unleashed a bloodbath of repression against a popular and nonviolent democratic uprising.[80]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Sketch of one of many torture techniques used in the Assad regime\u2019s dungeons (from the Human Rights Watch report Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Enforced Disappearances in Syria\u2019s Underground Prisons since March 2011)<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

In his book The Battle for Syria<\/em>, Christopher Phillips reports that Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran\u2019s foreign minister at the time, \u201cmade numerous trips to Damascus to reassure Assad.\u201d Tehran, Phillips notes, provided riot equipment to the Assad regime and dispatched hundreds of Quds Force operatives \u201cto offer security advice.\u201d[81]<\/a> Jubin Goodarzi, author of Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East<\/em>, adds:<\/p>\n

Iran provided technical support and expertise to neutralise the opposition; advice and equipment to the Syrian security forces to help them contain and disperse protests; and guidance and technical assistance on how to monitor and curtail the use of the internet and mobile phone networks by the opposition. Iran\u2019s security forces had learned valuable lessons in these areas during the violent crackdown against the opponents of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that followed the disputed presidential elections of June 2009.[82]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Iran expert Reza Marashi offers a similar analysis. The Islamic Republic\u2019s \u201cfirst reaction\u201d to the demonstrations in Syria \u201cwas to open its own playbook and show Assad pages from the post-election protests in 2009,\u201d he observes. \u201cDecision-makers appear to have hoped that Assad would use enough brute force \u2014 arrests, beatings, and a limited amount of killings \u2014 to spread fear and quickly re-establish control.\u201d[83]<\/a><\/p>\n

This \u201csecurity advice\u201d was augmented by a narrative strategy: Iran helped flip the script and present the Syrian protests not as part of the wave of Arab uprisings \u2014 which it decidedly was \u2014 but as a foreign-inspired terrorist plot. This rhetorical framing was awkward for the Islamic Republic, which had voiced support for other Arab uprisings \u2014 those in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Libya. This put Tehran in a bind, praising the people of the region for rising up against the dictators that oppressed them but siding with the dictator in Syria.[84]<\/a> Amin Saikal characterizes this Syrian exception as \u201can intervention that ran counter to Tehran\u2019s declared rhetoric of supporting the downtrodden masses.\u201d[85]<\/a><\/p>\n

Ewan Stein notes that Iran (and its ally Hezbollah) committed to \u201cdenying the democratic aspects of the [Syrian] revolution and instead casting it as a terrorist insurgency.\u201d \u201cIn so doing,\u201d Stein observes, \u201cthey appropriated the discourse of the [Global War on Terror].\u201d[86]<\/a> This framing allowed Iran to present itself as being on the \u201cright\u201d side of the Syrian conflict: fighting extremists. The militarization and sectarianization of the conflict[87]<\/a> \u2014 processes of which the Assad regime was the principal (though not exclusive) driver \u2014 were a godsend for Iran\u2019s war on terror framing: a self-fulfilling prophesy that was very much by design.<\/p>\n

Iran has projected this framing backwards, as if fighting terrorists had always been its mission in Syria. But this sleight of hand leaves a fundamental question unanswered: why was the Islamic Republic on the side of the Assad regime when it was shooting, detaining, torturing, and disappearing peaceful demonstrators[88]<\/a> whose demands and vision were decidedly democratic and emancipatory, well before any jihadist groups were present? And let\u2019s be clear: the Islamic Republic intensified its support for the Assad regime in 2011 but its stalwart support for the dynastic dictatorship in Damascus goes back several decades \u2014 and while the Assad regime exponentially heightened its level of repression in 2011, violence has been at the very core of its rule throughout.[89]<\/a><\/p>\n

The answer is that Iran\u2019s rhetorical posturing aside, its response to the popular uprising in Syria revealed its increasingly counter-revolutionary role in the region \u2014 a development that would come into sharper focus with the Lebanese and Iraqi uprisings of 2019-2020.<\/p>\n

Paradigms Lost: Time to Dispense with Zombie Categories<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Azizi characterizes the contours of Iran\u2019s post-2011 regional policy as follows:<\/p>\n

Iran would orient itself to the Arab Spring not in the spirit of revolutionary fraternity but with cold calculation worthy of a scheming monarch. Despite the words that came out of his mouth, Khamenei was now more of a sultan than a revolutionary.[90]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The Islamic Republic is out \u201cnot to foster revolutions against dictators,\u201d Azizi notes, but \u201cto preserve its own regime and spread its influence by any means necessary.\u201d[91]<\/a> Along these lines, Borzou Daragahi observes, \u201c[t]he \u2018revolutionary\u2019 slogans of Iran\u2019s \u2018resistance\u2019 are empty rhetoric that merely back whatever policies benefit the corrupt ruling elite in Tehran.\u201d[92]<\/a> In the same vein, Stein argues that the so-called Axis of Resistance, \u201costensibly dedicated to furthering the emancipatory aspirations of the Arab and Muslim masses,\u201d has in reality \u201cplayed a critical role in containing regional revolution<\/em> and preventing the emergence of a more democratically oriented regional order.\u201d[93]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Syria\u2019s dictator Bashar al-Assad and Iran\u2019s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Indeed, for all the talk of Iran\u2019s \u201cdisruptive\u201d role in the region, what the cases of Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon reveal is instead an Islamic Republic hell-bent on keeping entrenched political establishments and ruling classes in power while helping them quell popular movements for social justice, democratic rights, and human dignity. In an insightful essay, Rami Khouri notes this growing disconnect between ideological rhetoric and political reality, in which \u201c\u2018resistance\u2019 troops try to beat down \u2018revolutionary\u2019 protests\u201d across the Middle East.[94]<\/a><\/p>\n

This development has yet to be properly theorized, but it has not gone unnoticed. Saikal, for example, notes \u201cIran\u2019s growing shift towards being a middle power supportive of the status quo.\u201d[95]<\/a> The Islamic Republic \u201csounds more and more like those same sclerotic rulers it once railed against,\u201d Daragahi observes \u2014 \u201csuspicious of any new development that threatens the status quo it dominates.\u201d[96]<\/a> Even Edward Wastnidge, in a highly sympathetic account of the Islamic Republic\u2019s regional policies, acknowledges that Tehran \u201cis trying to maintain the post-2003 status quo, which has seen its influence in the region grow.\u201d[97]<\/a><\/p>\n

We need to revise our lexicon to reflect that post-2003 status quo. We need to retire zombie categories \u2014 like that of Iran as a \u201crevolutionary\u201d force in the Middle East, and the fiction of the \u201cAxis of Resistance\u201d (a term that should always appear in quotes or be qualified by \u201cso-called,\u201d if not dropped altogether) \u2014 that function as distorting mirrors and mystifications.<\/p>\n

The idea that Iran is a revolutionary power while Saudi Arabia is a counter-revolutionary power in the region is a stale binary. Both the Islamic Republic and the Saudi Kingdom play counter-revolutionary roles in the Middle East. They are competing counter-revolutionary powers, each pursuing its counter-revolutionary agenda in its respective sphere of influence within the region.<\/p>\n

Christopher Davidson speaks to this dynamic when he observes that \u201cSaudi Arabia and Iran\u2019s respective forms of authoritarian theocracy continue to serve as brakes on any prospects for meaningful reform in the wider Middle East.\u201d Both the Saudi Kingdom and the Islamic Republic, Davidson argues, \u201chave an equally vested interest in maintaining the counter-revolutionary status quo<\/em> in the territories they now contest.\u201d[98]<\/a><\/p>\n

The counter-revolution confronting the Middle East today in this period of dramatic upheaval is not headquartered in a single capital. Riyadh and Tehran form what we might think of as a regional counter-revolutionary hydra. (Abu Dhabi also belongs in the regional counter-revolutionary discussion \u2014 a development worthy of more research than it has yet generated.) With signs now pointing to some sort of rapprochement between the Saudi Kingdom and the Islamic Republic,[99]<\/a> Davidson\u2019s argument about the counter-revolutionary roles of both states might become less counter-intuitive: the rivalry between the regional hegemons has obscured what the two states share in common.<\/p>\n

NOTES:<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> See Jean-Pierre Filiu, From Deep State to Islamic State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and its Jihadi Legacy<\/em> (Hurst, 2015). Also see the interview with Filiu about the updated and expanded French edition of the book (G\u00e9n\u00e9raux, Gangsters et Jihadistes: Histoire de la Contre-R\u00e9volution Arabe<\/em>), \u201cTheir Dirty Business<\/a>,\u201d Diwan<\/em>, 21 May 2018.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Rosie Bsheer, \u201cA Counter-Revolutionary State: Popular Movements and the Making of Saudi Arabia,\u201d Past & Present<\/em>, Volume 238, Issue 1 (Feb. 2018), p. 240.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> See Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn\u2019t<\/em> (Stanford University Press, 2013); John M. Willis, \u201cOperation Decisive Storm and the Expanding Counter-Revolution<\/a>,\u201d Middle East Report Online<\/em> (MERIP), 30 Mar. 2015; and Madawi Al-Rasheed, \u201cSectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring,\u201d in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East<\/em> (Hurst, 2017).<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> See Shabnam J. Holliday, Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance<\/em> (Routledge, 2011) and Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Iran in an Emerging New World Order: From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani<\/em> (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), especially chap. 3 (\u201cIranian Geopolitical Imaginations: A Critical Account\u201d).<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Ulrich Beck, \u201cGoodbye to all that wage slavery<\/a>,\u201d New Statesman<\/em>, 5 Mar. 1999. Also see Jonathan Rutherford\u2019s interview with Beck, \u201cZombie Categories,\u201d in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), The Art of Life<\/em> (Lawrence & Wishart, 2000).<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Kareem Chehayeb and Abby Sewell, \u201cWhy Protesters in Lebanon Are Taking to the Streets<\/a>,\u201d Foreign Policy<\/em>, 2 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> See Bassel F. Salloukh, \u201cLebanese protesters united against garbage\u2026 and sectarianism<\/a>,\u201d Monkey Cage (Washington Post),<\/em> 14 Sept. 2015.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Jade Saab and Joey Ayoub, \u201cThe Revolutionizing Nature of the Lebanese Uprising,\u201d in Jade Saab (ed.), A Region in Revolt: Mapping the Recent Uprisings in North Africa and West Asia<\/em> (Daraja Press, 2020), p. 119.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Bassel F. Salloukh, \u201cHere\u2019s What the Protests in Lebanon and Iraq are Really About<\/a>,\u201d Monkey Cage (Washington Post),<\/em> 19 Oct. 2019. For an elaboration of Salloukh\u2019s analysis of Lebanon\u2019s ruling system, see his co-authored volume The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon<\/em> (Pluto Press, 2015) and his chapter \u201cThe Architecture of Sectarianization in Lebanon\u201d in Hashemi and Postel (eds.), Sectarianization<\/em>.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Rima Majed, \u201cSectarian Neoliberalism and the Uprising,\u201d in Jeffrey G. Karam and Rima Majed (eds.), The Lebanon Uprising of 2019: Voices from the Revolution<\/em> (I.B. Tauris\/Bloomsbury Academic, forthcoming).<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> Shireen Akram-Boshar, \u201cThe Lebanese Uprising Continues: An Interview with Rima Majed<\/a>,\u201d Jacobin<\/em>, 17 Feb. 2020.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Rima Majed and Lana Salman, \u201cLebanon\u2019s Thawra<\/a>,\u201d Middle East Report<\/em> (MERIP) 292\/3 (Fall\/Winter 2019).<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Yasser Munif, The Syrian Revolution: Between the Politics of Life and the Geopolitics of Death<\/em> (Pluto Press, 2020).<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Asef Bayat, \u201cThe Politics of Fun,\u201d chap. 6 of his book Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East<\/em> (Stanford University Press, Second Edition, 2013). Also see Bayat, \u201cIran: torch of fire, politics of fun<\/a>,\u201d openDemocracy<\/em>, 24 Mar. 2010.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Saab and Ayoub, \u201cThe Revolutionizing Nature of the Lebanese Uprising,\u201d p. 122.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> Interview with Salloukh<\/a> on the podcast of the Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation (SEPAD) project, Richardson Institute, Lancaster University, 22 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> Bassel F. Salloukh, \u201cReimagining an alternative Lebanon<\/a>,\u201d Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 8 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Bassem Mroue and Mariam Fam, \u201cLebanese protests test Hezbollah\u2019s role as Shiites\u2019 champion<\/a>,\u201d Associated Press, 18 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> \u201cHezbollah, Amal supporters attack main Beirut protest camp<\/a>,\u201d The New Arab<\/em>, 29 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> Human Rights Watch, \u201cLebanon: Protect Protesters from Attacks<\/a>,\u201d 8 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> Joey Ayoub, \u201cLebanon: A Revolution against Sectarianism<\/a>,\u201d CrimethInc.<\/em>, 13 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> Nassim Badani, \u201cNasrallah\u2019s Gallows Humor Comes Back to Haunt Lebanon<\/a>,\u201d Newlines Magazine<\/em>, 18 June 2021.<\/p>\n

[23]<\/a> Saab and Ayoub, \u201cThe Revolutionizing Nature of the Lebanese Uprising,\u201d p. 122.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/a> Joey Ayoub, \u201cHezbollah\u2019s Resistance\u2122 against resistance<\/a>,\u201d Discontent<\/em> Issue 1 \u2013 2021.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/a> Mersiha Gadzo, \u201c\u2018All of them\u2019: Lebanon protesters dig in after Nasrallah\u2019s speech<\/a>,\u201d Al Jazeera, 25 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/a> \u201cKhamenei says US stoking \u2018chaos\u2019 amid Iraq, Lebanon protests<\/a>,\u201d Al Jazeera, 30 Oct. 2019; Alaa Shahine, \u201cKhamenei Signals Iran Opposition to Uprisings in Lebanon, Iraq<\/a>,\u201d Bloomberg, 30 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> \u201cPointing to Iraq, Lebanon, Khamenei recalls how Iran put down unrest<\/a>,\u201d Reuters, 30 Oct. 2019. On the 2017-2018 protests in Iran and the state\u2019s brutal response to them, see Kaveh Ehsani and Arang Keshavarzian, \u201cThe Moral Economy of the Iranian Protests<\/a>,\u201d Jacobin<\/em>, 11 Jan. 2018 and Amnesty International, \u201cIran: Stop increasingly ruthless crackdown and investigate deaths of protesters<\/a>,\u201d 4 Jan. 2018.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/a> Bassel F. Salloukh, \u201cThe Sectarian Image Reversed: The Role of Geopolitics in Hezbollah\u2019s Domestic Politics<\/a>,\u201d in POMEPS Studies 38: Sectarianism and International Relations (Project on Middle East Political Science), Mar. 2020.<\/p>\n

[29]<\/a> Joseph Haboush, \u201cHezbollah and Amal change tactics and ratchet up violence amid ongoing protests<\/a>,\u201d Middle East Institute, 5 Dec. 2019.<\/p>\n

[30]<\/a> Julia Neumann, \u201cBeirut\u2019s ruling elite may be down, but they are not yet out: Interview with Lebanese activist Nizar Hassan<\/a>,\u201d Qantara<\/em>, 11 Dec. 2019.<\/p>\n

[31]<\/a> Joseph Daher, \u201cHezbollah and the Lebanese Popular Movement<\/a>,\u201d IEMed Focus 162, European Institute of the Mediterranean, Feb. 2020. For a trenchant leftist critique of Hezbollah, see Daher\u2019s book Hezbollah: The Political Economy of Lebanon\u2019s Party of God<\/em> (Pluto Press, 2016).<\/a><\/p>\n

[32] Lena Bopp, \u201cBeirut\u2019s ruling class \u2013 \u2018The stupidest mafia there is\u2019: Interview with Lebanese author Elias Khoury<\/a>,\u201d Qantara<\/em> (originally published in German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung<\/em>), 5 Aug. 2020.<\/p>\n

[33]<\/a> Ayoub, \u201cHezbollah\u2019s Resistance\u2122 against resistance<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[34]<\/a> Schluwa Sama, \u201c\u2018We Do Not Want These Criminals to Rule Us\u2019: An Interview with Sami Adnan<\/a>,\u201d Jacobin<\/em>, 23 Nov. 2019. Also see Rima Majed, \u201cUnderstanding the October Uprisings in Iraq and Lebanon<\/a>,\u201d Global Dialogue: Magazine of the International Sociological Association<\/em>, Volume 11, Issue 1 (Apr. 2021) and Nur Turkmani and Zeidon Alkinani, \u201cFrom Iraq to Lebanon and back: the people want the fall of the regime<\/a>,\u201d openDemocracy<\/em>, 7 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[35]<\/a> \u201cThe emergence of the 2019 wave of the uprisings in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq showed that the Arab Spring did not die,\u201d Asef Bayat observes. \u201cIt continued in other countries in the region with somewhat similar repertoires of collective action.\u201d (Quoted in Hashem Osseiran, \u201c\u2018The Arab Spring did not die\u2019: A second wave of Mideast protests<\/a>,\u201d AFP, 29 Nov. 2020.) Also on this point, see Jillian Schwedler, \u201cThinking Critically About Regional Uprisings<\/a>,\u201d Middle East Report<\/em> (MERIP) 292\/3 (Fall\/Winter 2019) and \u201cThe Arab Spring, a Decade Later\u201d<\/a> (interview with Gilbert Achcar, conducted by Jeff Goodwin), Catalyst<\/em> Vol 4 No 3 (Fall 2020).<\/p>\n

[36]<\/a> Erica Chenoweth, Sirianne Dahlum, Sooyeon Kang, Zoe Marks, Christopher Wiley Shay and Tore Wig, \u201cThis may be the largest wave of nonviolent mass movements in world history. What comes next?<\/a>\u201d Monkey Cage (Washington Post)<\/em>, 16 Nov. 2019. The globality of the 2019-2020 protests is also examined in \u201cThe Global Wave of Mass Protests<\/a>,\u201d a panel discussion hosted by the Center for International and Area Studies at Northwestern University on 20 Jan. 2020.<\/p>\n

[37]<\/a> Ranj Alaaldin, \u201cThe irresistible resiliency of Iraq\u2019s protesters<\/a>,\u201d Brookings Institution, 31 Jan. 2020.<\/p>\n

[38]<\/a> Zahra Ali, \u201cIraqis Demand a Country<\/a>,\u201d Middle East Report<\/em> (MERIP) 292\/3 (Fall\/Winter 2019).<\/p>\n

[39]<\/a> Omar Sirri, \u201cRevolutionary Protests Spread Across Central and Southern Iraq and Are Ongoing<\/a>,\u201d Jadaliyya<\/em>, 26 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[40]<\/a> Chantal Berman, Killian Clarke, and Rima Majed, \u201cPatterns of Mobilization and Repression in Iraq\u2019s Tishreen Uprising<\/a>,\u201d POMEPS Studies 42: MENA\u2019s Frozen Conflicts (Project on Middle East Political Science), Nov. 2020.<\/p>\n

[41]<\/a> On those earlier protests, see Ali Issa, Against All Odds: Voices of Popular Struggle in Iraq<\/em> (Tadween Publishing, 2015); Renad Mansour, \u201cProtests Reveal Iraq\u2019s New Fault Line: The People vs. the Ruling Class<\/a>,\u201d World Politics Review<\/em>, 20 July 2018; and Zahra Ali, \u201cFrom Recognition to Redistribution? Protest Movements in Iraq in the Age of \u2018New Civil Society,\u2019\u201d Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding<\/em> (2021).<\/p>\n

[42]<\/a> Fanar Haddad, \u201cIraq protests: There is no going back to the status quo ante<\/a>,\u201d Middle East Eye<\/em>, 6 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[43]<\/a> Berman, Clarke, and Majed, \u201cPatterns of Mobilization and Repression in Iraq\u2019s Tishreen Uprising<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[44]<\/a> Zeidon Alkinani, \u201cIraq\u2019s October uprising: Historical context, triggers, discourse, challenges and possibilities,\u201d in Saab (ed.), A Region in Revolt<\/em>, p. 87.<\/p>\n

[45]<\/a> Fanar Haddad, \u201cHip hop, poetry and Shia iconography: How Tahrir Square gave birth to a new Iraq<\/a>,\u201d Middle East Eye<\/em>, 9 Dec. 2019 (emphasis mine).<\/p>\n

[46]<\/a> Alkinani, \u201cIraq\u2019s October uprising,\u201d p. 93. Also see Arwa Ibrahim, \u201cMuhasasa, the political system reviled by Iraqi protesters<\/a>,\u201d Al Jazeera, 4 Dec. 2019.<\/p>\n

[47]<\/a> Haddad, \u201cIraq protests: There is no going back to the status quo ante<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[48]<\/a> Zahra Ali and Safaa Khalaf, \u201cIn Iraq, demonstrators demand change \u2014 and the government fights back<\/a>,\u201d Monkey Cage (Washington Post)<\/em>, 9 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[49]<\/a> Haddad, \u201cHip hop, poetry and Shia iconography<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[50]<\/a> Sama, \u201c\u2018We Do Not Want These Criminals to Rule Us\u2019<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[51]<\/a> Haddad, \u201cHip hop, poetry and Shia iconography<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[52]<\/a> Alkinani, \u201cIraq\u2019s October uprising,\u201d p. 100.<\/p>\n

[53]<\/a> Taif Alkhudary, \u201c\u2018No to America\u2026No to Iran\u2019: Iraq\u2019s Protest Movement in the Shadow of Geopolitics<\/a>,\u201d LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 20 Jan. 2020.<\/p>\n

[54]<\/a> Berman, Clarke, and Majed, \u201cPatterns of Mobilization and Repression in Iraq\u2019s Tishreen Uprising<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[55]<\/a> Quoted in Haddad, \u201cIraq protests: There is no going back to the status quo ante\u201d. On recent shifts in Iran\u2019s coordination of Iraq\u2019s militias, see John Davison and Ahmed Rasheed, \u201cExclusive: In tactical shift, Iran grows new, loyal elite from among Iraqi militias<\/a>,\u201d Reuters, 21 May 2021; and \u201cIntelBrief: Iran-Backed Militias Continue to Roil Iraq<\/a>,\u201d Soufan Center, 7 June 2021. Also see the investigation by James Risen, Tim Arango, Farnaz Fassihi, Murtaza Hussain, and Ronen Bergman, \u201cA Spy Complex Revealed: Leaked Iranian Intelligence Reports Expose Tehran\u2019s Vast Web of Influence in Iraq<\/a>,\u201d The Intercept<\/em> (published in partnership with the New York Times<\/em>), 17 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[56]<\/a> Ali and Khalaf, \u201cIn Iraq, demonstrators demand change \u2014 and the government fights back<\/a>.\u201d Amnesty International was reporting in January 2020 that the death toll had exceeded 600 and that \u201c[t]housands of Iraqis have been unlawfully killed, injured or arbitrarily detained over the past four months.\u201d See \u201cIraq: Protest death toll surges as security forces resume brutal repression<\/a>,\u201d 23 Jan. 2020.<\/p>\n

[57]<\/a> Amnesty International, \u201cIraq: Eyewitness describes \u2018street filled with blood\u2019 as at least 25 protesters killed in security force onslaught<\/a>,\u201d 28 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[58]<\/a> Amnesty International, \u201cIraq: Protest death toll surges as security forces resume brutal repression<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[59]<\/a> See Amnesty International, \u201cIraq: End \u2018campaign of terror\u2019 targeting protesters<\/a>,\u201d13 Dec. 2019; Iraq\u2019s Assassins<\/em><\/a>, PBS Frontline documentary produced by Ramita Navai and Mais al-Bayaa, Season 2021: Episode 11, 9 Feb. 2021; Sune Haugbolle, Henrik Andersen, \u201cPolitical Assassinations and the Revolutionary Impasse in Lebanon and Iraq<\/a>,\u201d Middle East Report<\/em> (MERIP), 11 May 2021; Nabil Salih, \u201cIraq: assassinations, repression, and the struggles of daily life<\/a>,\u201d openDemocracy<\/em>, 12 May 2021; and Thanassis Cambanis, \u201cIraq\u2019s Militias Continue Their Deadly Campaign Against Dissent<\/a>,\u201d World Politics Review<\/em>, 7 June 2021.<\/p>\n

[60]<\/a> Ali and Khalaf, \u201cIn Iraq, demonstrators demand change \u2014 and the government fights back<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[61]<\/a> Haddad, \u201cIraq protests: There is no going back to the status quo ante\u201d<\/a>. Also see \u201cMore Iraqi students join anti-government protests despite deadly crackdown<\/a>,\u201d The New Arab<\/em>, 28 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[62]<\/a> Berman, Clarke, and Majed, \u201cPatterns of Mobilization and Repression in Iraq\u2019s Tishreen Uprising<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[63]<\/a> \u201cExclusive: Iran-backed militias deployed snipers in Iraq protests \u2013 sources<\/a>,\u201d Reuters, 16 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[64]<\/a> Zeidon Alkinani, \u201cIran and Muqtada al-Sadr\u2019s alliance against the revolution in Iraq<\/a>,\u201d openDemocracy<\/em>, 10 Feb. 2020.<\/p>\n

[65]<\/a> Zahra Ali, \u201cIraqis Demand a Country\u201d<\/a> (emphasis mine).<\/p>\n

[66]<\/a> \u201cExclusive: Iran intervenes to prevent ousting of Iraqi prime minister \u2013 sources<\/a>,\u201d Reuters, 31 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[67]<\/a> Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Joseph Krauss, \u201cProtests in Iraq reveal a long-simmering anger at Iran<\/a>,\u201d Associated Press, 6 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[68]<\/a> Alissa J. Rubin, \u201cIraqis Rise Against a Reviled Occupier: Iran<\/a>,\u201d New York Times<\/em>, 4 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[69]<\/a> Alkinani, \u201cIraq\u2019s October uprising,\u201d p. 94.<\/p>\n

[70]<\/a> Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Joseph Krauss, \u201cIraqi protesters attack Iran consulate in Karbala<\/a>,\u201d Associated Press, 3 Nov. 2019; \u201cIraq unrest: Protesters set fire to Iranian consulate in Najaf<\/a>,\u201d BBC, 28 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[71]<\/a> Sama, \u201c\u2018We Do Not Want These Criminals to Rule Us\u2019<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[72]<\/a> Gilbert Achcar, \u201cIraqis want both countries out<\/a>,\u201d Le Monde diplomatique<\/em> (English edition), Feb. 2020. Also see Alkhudary, \u201c\u2019No to America\u2026No to Iran\u2019<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[73]<\/a> Haddad, \u201cHip hop, poetry and Shia iconography<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[74]<\/a> Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Joseph Krauss, \u201cProtests in Iraq and Lebanon pose a challenge to Iran<\/a>,\u201d Associated Press, 30 Oct. 2019.<\/p>\n

[75]<\/a> See Zeina Karam, \u201c\u2018We are hungry\u2019: Lebanese protest worsening economic crisis<\/a>,\u201d Associated Press, 16 Mar. 2021 and \u201cIraqi protesters take to streets, decry targeted killings<\/a>,\u201d The Independent<\/em>, 25 May 2021.<\/p>\n

[76]<\/a> See the open letter \u201cErasing people through disinformation: Syria and the \u2018anti-imperialism\u2019 of fools<\/a>,\u201d Al-Jumhuriya<\/em>, 27 Mar. 2021.<\/p>\n

[77]<\/a> See, for example: Afra Jalabi, \u201cAnxiously Anticipating a New Dawn: Voices of Syrian Activists,\u201d in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), The Syria Dilemma<\/em> (MIT Press, 2013); Tamara al-Om, \u201cDon\u2019t ignore Syria\u2019s nonviolent movement<\/a>,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, 7 June 2014; Malu Halasa, Nawara Mahfoud, and Zaher Omareen (eds.), Syria Speaks: Art and Culture from the Frontline<\/em> (Saqi Books, 2014); \u201cSyria\u2019s good guys \u2014 Inside a forgotten revolution<\/a>,\u201d special issue of the New Internationalist<\/em> (Sept. 2015, Issue 485); Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami, Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War<\/em> (Pluto Press, 2016), especially chaps. 3 (\u201cRevolution From Below\u201d), 4 (\u201cThe Grassroots\u201d), and 8 (\u201cCulture Revolutionised\u201d); Yassin al-Haj Saleh, The Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy<\/em> (Hurst, 2017), especially chap. 1 (\u201cRevolution of the Common People\u201d); Leila Al-Shami, \u201cThe Legacy of Omar Aziz: Building autonomous, self-governing communes in Syria<\/a>,\u201d Fifth Estate<\/em> # 397, Winter, 2017; Estella Carpi and Andrea Glioti, \u201cToward an Alternative \u2018Time of the Revolution\u2019? Beyond State Contestation in the struggle for a new Syrian Everyday,\u201d Middle East Critique<\/em> Volume 27, Issue 3 (2018); Anand Gopal, \u201cSyria\u2019s Last Bastion of Freedom<\/a>,\u201d The New Yorker<\/em>, 10 Dec. 2018; Wendy Pearlman, \u201cCivil Action in the Syrian Conflict,\u201d in Deborah Avant, Marie Berry, Erica Chenoweth, Rachel Epstein, Cullen Hendrix, Oliver Kaplan, and Timothy Sisk (eds.), Civil Action and the Dynamics of Violence<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2019); Wendy Pearlman, \u201cHow the Syrian uprising began and why it matters<\/a>,\u201d The Conversation<\/em>, 14 Mar. 2019; Yasser Munif, The Syrian Revolution: Between the Politics of Life and the Geopolitics of Death<\/em> (Pluto Press, 2020); Leila Al-Shami, \u201cBuilding Alternative Futures in the Present: The Case of Syria\u2019s Communes<\/a>,\u201d The Funambulist<\/em>, Issue 34 (Mar.-Apr. 2021); Lewis Sanders IV, Birgitta Sch\u00fclke-Gill, Wafaa Albadry, Julia Bayer, \u201cRazan Zeitouneh \u2013 the missing face of Syria\u2019s revolution<\/a>,\u201d Deutsche Welle (DW), 15 Mar. 2021; Charlotte Al-Khalili, \u201cRethinking the concept of revolution through the Syrian experience<\/a>,\u201d Al-Jumhuriya<\/em>, 5 May 2021. Also see \u201cThe Syrian Revolution: A History from Below<\/a>,\u201d a series of webinars convened over the summer and fall of 2020.<\/p>\n

[78]<\/a> Rania Abouzeid, \u201cThe Jihad Next Door<\/a>,\u201d POLITICO, 23 June 2014 and Maria Abi-Habib, \u201cAssad Policies Aided Rise of Islamic State Militant Group<\/a>,\u201d Wall Street Journal<\/em>, 22 Aug. 2014.<\/p>\n

[79]<\/a> Arash Azizi, The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran\u2019s Global Ambitions<\/em> (Oneworld, 2020), p. 215.<\/p>\n

[80]<\/a> Danny Postel, \u201cTheaters of Coercion<\/a>,\u201d Democracy: A Journal of Ideas<\/em>, Fall 2016, No. 42. On the extreme brutality of the regime\u2019s repression in response to peaceful demonstrations in 2011, see the Human Rights Watch report \u201cBy All Means Necessary!\u201d Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria<\/em><\/a>, 15 Dec. 2011.<\/p>\n

[81]<\/a> Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East<\/em> (Yale University Press, 2016; revised and updated edition, 2020), p.68. Also see Joby Warrick, \u201cIran reportedly aiding Syrian crackdown<\/a>,\u201d Washington Post<\/em>, 27 May 2011 and Robert Booth, Mona Mahmood and Luke Harding, \u201cExclusive: secret Assad emails lift lid on life of leader\u2019s inner circle<\/a>,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, 14 Mar. 2012.<\/p>\n

[82]<\/a> Jubin Goodarzi, \u201cSyria: the view from Iran<\/a>,\u201d European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 15 June 2013.<\/p>\n

[83]<\/a> Quoted in Roland Elliott Brown, \u201cSyria, Iran\u2019s \u2018Strategic Province,\u2019\u201d<\/a> IranWire<\/em>, 16 July 2014.<\/p>\n

[84]<\/a> Saeed Kamali Dehghan, \u201cTehran supports the Arab spring \u2026 but not in Syria<\/a>,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, 18 Apr. 2011.<\/p>\n

[85]<\/a> Amin Saikal, \u201cIran: Aspirations and Constraints,\u201d in Adham Saouli (ed.), Unfulfilled Aspirations: Middle Power Politics in the Middle East <\/em>(Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 117.<\/p>\n

[86]<\/a> Ewan Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 196. On this point, also see Edward Wastnidge, \u201cIran\u2019s Own \u2018War on Terror\u2019: Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Iraq During the Rouhani Era,\u201d in Luciano Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani\u2019s First Term (2013\u20132017)<\/em> (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 107-129.<\/p>\n

[87]<\/a> See Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, Burning Country, <\/em>chaps. 5 (\u201cMilitarisation and Liberation\u201d) and 6 (\u201cScorched Earth: The Rise of the Islamisms\u201d); Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: The Evolution of an Insurgency, <\/em>revised and updated edition (Hurst, 2017); and Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto, \u201cThe Shattered Nation: The Sectarianization of the Syrian Conflict,\u201d in Hashemi and Postel (eds.), Sectarianization<\/em>.<\/p>\n

[88]<\/a> See the Human Rights Watch report Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances in Syria\u2019s Underground Prisons since March 2011<\/em><\/a>, 3 July 2012; Ian Black, \u201cSyrian regime document trove shows evidence of \u2018industrial scale\u2019 killing of detainees<\/a>,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, 21 Jan. 2014; Budour Hassan, \u201cSyria\u2019s Desaparecidos<\/a>,\u201d The New Inquiry<\/em>, 18 Nov. 2016; and the 2017 documentary film Syria\u2019s Disappeared<\/em>, directed by Sara Afshar and co-produced by Afshar and Nicola Cutcher (available on Amazon Prime Video in the US and UK).<\/p>\n

[89]<\/a> See Salwa Ismail, The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2018), especially chaps. 1 (\u201cViolence as a Modality of Government in Syria\u201d) and 2 (\u201cAuthoritarian Government, the Shadow State and Political Subjectivities\u201d); and Yassin al-Haj Saleh, The Impossible Revolution,<\/em> especially chaps. 2 (\u201cThe Shabiha<\/em> and their State\u201d) and 5 (\u201cThe Roots of Syrian Fascism\u201d).<\/p>\n

[90]<\/a> Azizi, The Shadow Commander, <\/em>p. 207.<\/p>\n

[91]<\/a> Azizi, The Shadow Commander, <\/em>p. 213.<\/p>\n

[92]<\/a> Borzou Daragahi, \u201cIran\u2019s revolutionary bluster masks its role as oppressor in the Middle East<\/a>,\u201d Iran Source<\/em> (Atlantic Council), 5 Nov. 2019.<\/p>\n

[93]<\/a> Stein, International Relations in the Middle East, <\/em>p. 195 (emphasis mine).<\/p>\n

[94]<\/a> Rami G. Khouri, \u201cThe battle of \u2018resistance\u2019 vs \u2018revolution\u2019 in the Middle East<\/a>,\u201d Al Jazeera, 14 Jan. 2020. Also see Khouri, The Decade of Defiance & Resistance: Reflections on Arab Revolutionary Uprisings and Responses from 2010 \u2013 2020<\/em><\/a>, a report published by the Soufan Center, May 25, 2021.<\/p>\n

[95]<\/a> Saikal, \u201cIran: Aspirations and Constraints,\u201d p. 124.<\/p>\n

[96]<\/a> Daragahi, \u201cIran\u2019s revolutionary bluster masks its role as oppressor in the Middle East<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

[97]<\/a> Wastnidge, \u201cIran\u2019s Own \u2018War on Terror,\u2019\u201d p. 111.<\/p>\n

[98]<\/a> Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars: The Secret Struggle for the Middle East<\/em> (Oneworld, 2016), p. 514 (emphasis mine).<\/p>\n

[99]<\/a> Ben Hubbard, Farnaz Fassihi, and Jane Arraf, \u201cFierce Foes, Iran and Saudi Arabia Secretly Explore Defusing Tensions<\/a>,\u201d New York Times<\/em>, 1 May 2021; Ali Harb, \u201cSaudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement: What is driving push for diplomacy?<\/a>\u201d Middle East Eye<\/em>, 5 May 2021.<\/p>\n

____________________________________________<\/em><\/p>\n

This essay also appears in the Occasional Paper<\/a> series published by the\u00a0<\/em>Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver<\/a>. The PDF is here<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Danny Postel is Assistant Director of the Center for International and Area Studies at Northwestern University and a member of Internationalism from Below. He is the author of\u00a0<\/em>Reading<\/em>\u00a0Legitimation Crisis\u00a0<\/em>in Tehran<\/em>\u00a0(2006) and co-editor of\u00a0<\/em>The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran\u2019s Future<\/em>\u00a0(2010),\u00a0<\/em>The Syria Dilemma<\/em>\u00a0(2013), and\u00a0<\/em>Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East<\/em>\u00a0(2017). Formerly Senior Editor of\u00a0<\/em>openDemocracy<\/em>, his work has appeared in\u00a0<\/em>Boston Review, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Democratic Left, Dissent, The Guardian, In These Times, Middle East Report<\/em>\u00a0(MERIP),\u00a0<\/em>The Nation, New Politics,\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0<\/em>The Progressive<\/em>, among other publications.<\/em><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>New Politics<\/em>, published since 1986 as a semi-annual, follows in the tradition established in its first series (1961-1978) as an independent socialist forum for dialogue and debate on the left. It is committed to the advancement of the peace and anti-intervention movements. It stands in opposition to all forms of imperialism, and is uncompromising in its defense of feminism and affirmative action. In our pages there is broad coverage of labor and social movements, the international scene, as well as emphasis on cultural and intellectual history. Above all, <\/em>New Politics<\/em> insists on the centrality of democracy to socialism and on the need to rely on mass movements from below for progressive social transformation.<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original – newpol.org<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Other Regional Counter-Revolution – The last decade has seen historic political upheavals across the Middle East and North Africa: a tsunami of popular uprisings that have brought down several dictators and led to momentous transformations in political consciousness, if not always to democratic outcomes. But the last decade has also seen a concomitant counter-revolutionary roll-back across the region.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":193850,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[241],"tags":[2642,487,742,741,2097,767,1378,458,413],"class_list":["post-193847","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-paper-of-the-week","tag-anti-imperialism","tag-human-rights","tag-iran","tag-iraq","tag-lebanon","tag-middle-east","tag-protests","tag-social-movements","tag-syria"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/193847","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=193847"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/193847\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":265986,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/193847\/revisions\/265986"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/193850"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=193847"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=193847"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=193847"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}