With increasing violence in Syria highlighted by the killing of the Defence elite on 18 July, 2012 and a stalemated UN diplomatic effort, the question of the possibility of good faith negotiations between Bashar al-Assad and members of the Syrian oppositions is crucial. \u00a0It is certain that issues of greater social, political and economic participation by more segments of the society could have been discussed at the start of the protests, over a year ago, when they were then non-violent. Neither the government nor the different strands of the opposition moved to setting an agenda of issues on which negotiations were possible, or a realistic timetable for such negotiations.<\/p>\n
Today, with a large number of people having been killed (there are estimates of some 17,000), refugee flows into neighbouring countries, and displaced persons within Syria, the atmosphere for negotiations on the future structures of society seems negative. \u00a0Arms are flowing into the country both for the government and for the armed opposition. \u00a0Foreign countries are increasingly involved, each motivated by its own views of its national interests. Despite an increasing number of meetings among high-level representatives of these foreign governments, a clear policy on issues for negotiations has not emerged.<\/p>\n
Has the time for negotiations passed? Is the only realistic possibility a \u201cYemen option\u201d in which the president leaves and a transition coalition is formed? \u00a0Can President Bashar al-Assad, late in the day, still undertake negotiations with the oppositions that would insure his continued role as President while at the same time undertaking reforms that would permanently modify the socio-political structure of the country in order to give greater roles to other social classes, ethnicities, and religious identities than at present?<\/p>\n
There has been a certain amount of reflection and research on the concept of \u201cripeness\u201d in the settlement of armed conflicts. (1) Are there times when it is too early to start collective negotiations and times when it is too late? While the concept of \u201cripeness\u201d is useful in judging fruit, is it a useful approach to sensing if a conflict is potentially ready for negotiations? There is always on the part of observers a desire to get the parties \u201cto the negotiating table\u201d, but sometimes the rush to negotiations may be counter-productive. An intermediary speaking separately to the parties as well as to the representatives of other states with an interest in the situation can be more productive. \u00a0Speaking separately to those concerned has been the approach of Kofi Annan, go-between jointly mandated by the United Nations and the League of Arab States. He has discussed with the government of Syria and some of the Syrian opposition groups, with states with a role or a strong position in the conflict such as Russia, China, Iran, and a fairly wide group of countries acting as a collective \u201cFriends of Syria.\u201d \u00a0Annan has also made suggestions as to the outline of a possible solution, largely on the Yemen conflict model. \u00a0For the moment, no country-wide negotiations have taken place.<\/p>\n
First the League of Arab States and then the United Nations have sent unarmed \u201cobservers\u201d. The Arab League ended its observer corps rather quickly saying that it was unable to work effectively in the ongoing violence. The United Nations has said the same thing, and the 300 UN Blue Helmets are not operational as was first envisaged. \u00a0However they are still continuing their presence based on a 19 July Security Council resolution for at least 30 more days. In fact, largely on their own initiative, they have facilitated localized discussions and helped to reach local and temporary cease-fires. \u00a0The fact that the UN forces have been able to do so is perhaps a sign that local negotiations rather than at a national level may be possible.<\/p>\n
\u201cRipeness\u201d may also be related to the degree of stalemate and desperation of a solution on the basis of current relations. \u00a0Each side may prefer a negotiated settlement rather than the current impasse of each trying to dominate the other. \u00a0A start would be to set an agenda of issues to be negotiated between the government and the oppositions. \u00a0A wise negotiator should know what to omit from an agenda as well as what to include.<\/p>\n
It is not clear to what extent the Syrian government and the oppositions are aware of the dangers of a continuing stalemate or if they are aware, do they really care? A useful next step would be to explore the possibility of setting an agenda of issues that could be the basis of negotiations. The setting of such an agenda may be more productive than the current proposal of creating by mutual agreement a government of transition: issues before new ministers. Notes<\/strong>:<\/p>\n (1) See Louis Kriesberg and Stuart Thorson (Eds.) Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991, 303pp.)<\/p>\n ________________________<\/p>\n Ren\u00e9 Wadlow, a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and of its Task Force on the Middle East, is president and U.N. representative (Geneva) of the Association of\u00a0World\u00a0Citizens. He is a member of the TRANSCEND Network for Peace, Development and Environment.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A useful next step would be to explore the possibility of setting an agenda of issues that could be the basis of negotiations. The setting of such an agenda may be more productive than the current proposal of creating by mutual agreement a government of transition: issues before new ministers.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[40,204],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-20406","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-transcend-members","category-syria-in-context"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20406","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20406"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20406\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20406"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20406"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20406"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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