Not in any direct way. That is, it doesn\u2019t provide an argument for the existence of God.\u00a0 But it does so indirectly, by providing an argument against the philosophy called materialism (or \u201cphysicalism\u201d), which is the main intellectual opponent of belief in God in today\u2019s world.<\/p>\n
Materialism is an atheistic philosophy that says that all of reality is reducible to matter and its interactions. It has gained ground because many people think that it\u2019s supported by science. They think that physics has shown the material world to be a closed system of cause and effect, sealed off from the influence of any non-physical realities — if any there be. Since our minds and thoughts obviously do affect the physical world, it would follow that they are themselves merely physical phenomena. No room for a spiritual soul or free will: for materialists we are just \u201cmachines made of meat.\u201d<\/p>\n
Quantum mechanics, however, throws a monkey wrench into this simple mechanical view of things.\u00a0 No less a figure than Eugene Wigner<\/a>, a Nobel Prize winner in physics, claimed that materialism — at least with regard to the human mind — is not \u201clogically consistent with present quantum mechanics.\u201d And on the basis of quantum mechanics, Sir Rudolf Peierls, another great 20th-century physicist, said, \u201cthe premise that you can describe in terms of physics the whole function of a human being … including [his] knowledge, and [his] consciousness, is untenable. There is still something missing.\u201d<\/p>\n How, one might ask, can quantum mechanics have anything to say about the human mind?\u00a0 Isn\u2019t it about things that can be physically measured, such as particles and forces?\u00a0 It is; but while minds cannot be measured, it is ultimately minds that do the measuring. And that, as we shall see, is a fact that cannot be ignored in trying to make sense of quantum mechanics.\u00a0 If one claims that it is possible (in principle) to give a complete physical description of what goes on during a measurement — including the mind of the person who is doing the measuring — one is led into severe difficulties. This was pointed out in the 1930s by the great mathematician John von Neumann.\u00a0 Though I cannot go into technicalities in an essay such as this, I will try to sketch the argument.<\/p>\n It all begins with the fact that quantum mechanics is inherently probabilistic. Of course, even in \u201cclassical physics\u201d (i.e. the physics that preceded quantum mechanics and that still is adequate for many purposes) one sometimes uses probabilities; but one wouldn\u2019t have to if one had enough information.\u00a0 Quantum mechanics is radically different: it says that even if one had complete information about the state of a physical system, the laws of physics would typically only predict probabilities of future outcomes. These probabilities are encoded in something called the \u201cwavefunction\u201d of the system.<\/p>\n A familiar example of this is the idea of \u201chalf-life.\u201d\u00a0 Radioactive nuclei are liable to \u201cdecay\u201d into smaller nuclei and other particles.\u00a0 If a certain type of nucleus has a half-life of, say, an hour, it means that a nucleus of that type has a 50% chance of decaying within 1 hour, a 75% chance within two hours, and so on. The quantum mechanical equations do not (and cannot) tell you when a particular nucleus will decay, only the probability of it doing so as a function of time. This is not something peculiar to nuclei. The principles of quantum mechanics apply to all physical systems, and those principles are inherently and inescapably probabilistic.<\/p>\n This is where the problem begins. It is a paradoxical (but entirely logical) fact that a probability only makes sense if it is the probability of something definite. For example, to say that Jane has a 70% chance of passing the French exam only means something if at some point she takes the exam and gets a definite grade.\u00a0 At that point, the probability of her passing no longer remains 70%, but suddenly jumps to 100% (if she passes) or 0% (if she fails). In other words, probabilities of events that lie in between 0 and 100% must at some point jump to 0 or 100% or else they meant nothing in the first place.<\/p>\n This raises a thorny issue for quantum mechanics. The master equation that governs how wavefunctions change with time (the \u201cSchr\u00f6dinger equation\u201d) does not yield probabilities that suddenly jump to 0 or 100%, but rather ones that vary smoothly and that generally remain greater than 0 and less than 100%.\u00a0 Radioactive nuclei are a good example. The Schr\u00f6dinger equation says that the \u201csurvival probability\u201d of a nucleus (i.e. the probability of its not having decayed) starts off at 100%, and then falls continuously, reaching 50% after one half-life, 25% after two half-lives, and so on — but never reaching zero<\/em>. In other words, the Schr\u00f6dinger equation only gives probabilities of decaying, never an actual decay! (If there were an actual decay, the survival probability should jump to 0 at that point.)<\/p>\n To recap: <\/strong><\/p>\n (a) Probabilities in quantum mechanics must be the probabilities of definite events. (b) When definite events happen, some probabilities should jump to 0 or 100%. However, (c) the mathematics that describes all physical processes (the Schr\u00f6dinger equation) does not describe such jumps.\u00a0 One begins to see how one might reach the conclusion that not everything that happens is a physical process describable by the equations of physics.<\/p>\n So how do minds enter the picture?\u00a0 The traditional understanding is that the \u201cdefinite events\u201d whose probabilities one calculates in quantum mechanics are the outcomes of \u201cmeasurements\u201d or \u201cobservations\u201d (the words are used interchangeably).\u00a0 If someone (traditionally called \u201cthe observer\u201d) checks to see if, say, a nucleus has decayed (perhaps using a Geiger counter), he or she must get a definite answer: yes or no.\u00a0 Obviously, at that point the probability of the nucleus having decayed (or survived) should jump to 0 or 100%, because the observer then knows the result with certainty.\u00a0 This is just common sense. The probabilities assigned to events refer to someone\u2019s state of knowledge: before I know the outcome of Jane\u2019s exam I can only say that she has a 70% chance of passing; whereas after I know I must say either 0 or 100%.<\/p>\n Thus, the traditional view is that the probabilities in quantum mechanics — and hence the \u201cwavefunction\u201d that encodes them — refer to the state of knowledge of some \u201cobserver\u201d.\u00a0 (In the words of the famous physicist Sir James Jeans, wavefunctions are \u201cknowledge waves.\u201d)\u00a0 An observer\u2019s knowledge — and hence the wavefunction that encodes it — makes a discontinuous jump when he\/she comes to know the outcome of a measurement (the famous \u201cquantum jump\u201d, traditionally called the \u201ccollapse of the wave function\u201d). But the Schr\u00f6dinger equations that describe any physical process do not give such jumps!\u00a0 So something must be involved when knowledge changes besides physical processes.<\/p>\n An obvious question is why one needs to talk about knowledge and minds at all. Couldn\u2019t an inanimate physical device (say, a Geiger counter) carry out a \u201cmeasurement\u201d?\u00a0 That would run into the very problem pointed out by von Neumann: If the \u201cobserver\u201d were just a purely physical entity, such as a Geiger counter, one could in principle write down a bigger wavefunction that described not only the thing being measured but also the observer. And, when calculated with the Schr\u00f6dinger equation, that bigger wave function would not jump! Again: as long as only purely physical entities are involved, they are governed by an equation that says that the probabilities don\u2019t jump.<\/p>\n That\u2019s why, when Peierls was asked whether a machine could be an \u201cobserver,\u201d he said no, explaining that \u201cthe quantum mechanical description is in terms of knowledge, and knowledge requires somebody who knows.\u201d Not a purely physical thing, but a mind.<\/p>\n But what if one refuses to accept this conclusion, and maintains that only physical entities exist and that all observers and their minds are entirely describable by the equations of physics? Then the quantum probabilities remain in limbo, not 0 and 100% (in general) but hovering somewhere in between. They never get resolved into unique and definite outcomes, but somehow all possibilities remain always in play. One would thus be forced into what is called the \u201cMany Worlds Interpretation\u201d (MWI) of quantum mechanics.<\/p>\n In MWI, reality is divided into many branches corresponding to all the possible outcomes of all physical situations. If a probability was 70% before a measurement, it doesn\u2019t jump to 0 or 100%; it stays 70% after the measurement, because in 70% of the branches there\u2019s one result and in 30% there\u2019s the other result! For example, in some branches of reality a particular nucleus has decayed — and \u201cyou\u201d observe that it has, while in other branches it has not decayed — and \u201cyou\u201d observe that it has not. (There are versions of \u201cyou\u201d in every branch.) In the Many Worlds picture, you exist in a virtually infinite number of versions: in some branches of reality you are reading this article, in others you are asleep in bed, in others you have never been born. Even proponents of the Many Worlds idea admit that it sounds crazy and strains credulity.<\/p>\n The upshot is this: If the mathematics of quantum mechanics is right (as most fundamental physicists believe), and if materialism is right, one is forced to accept the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics. And that is awfully heavy baggage for materialism to carry.<\/p>\n If, on the other hand, we accept the more traditional understanding of quantum mechanics that goes back to von Neumann, one is led by its logic (as Wigner and Peierls were) to the conclusion that not everything is just matter in motion, and that in particular there is something about the human mind that transcends matter and its laws.\u00a0 It then becomes possible to take seriously certain questions that materialism had ruled out of court: If the human mind transcends matter to some extent, could there not exist minds that transcend the physical universe altogether? And might there not even exist an ultimate Mind?<\/p>\n ___________________<\/p>\n Stephen M. Barr is a professor of physics at the University of Delaware<\/a>. He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University<\/a> in 1978. He does research in theoretical particle physics, with emphasis primarily on \u201cgrand unified theories\u201d and the cosmology of the early universe.\u00a0 He also writes and lectures extensively on the relation of science and religion.\u00a0 Many of his articles and reviews have appeared in<\/em> First Things<\/em><\/a><\/em>, on whose editorial advisory board he serves. He is the author of the book Modern Physics and Ancient Faith<\/em><\/a> (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 2003) and A Student\u2019s Guide to Natural Science<\/em><\/a> (Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2006).<\/em><\/p>\n