{"id":222250,"date":"2022-10-24T12:00:33","date_gmt":"2022-10-24T11:00:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=222250"},"modified":"2022-10-18T04:19:07","modified_gmt":"2022-10-18T03:19:07","slug":"ukraine-war-new-developments","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2022\/10\/ukraine-war-new-developments\/","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine War: New Developments"},"content":{"rendered":"

October 2022 – A no-nonsense analysis of recent political and military developments in the Ukraine war.<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Overview<\/strong>: Energy situation \/ Military and political situation \/ Crimea bridge attack \/ War crimes and propaganda \/ Outlook<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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Ukraine war: Nord Stream sabotage, Crimea bridge attack, annexation referendums, LNG tanker (10\/2022)<\/p><\/div>\n

Energy Situation<\/h4>\n

In a previous analysis<\/a>, it was shown that, contrary to widespread media reports, the decision to decouple Europe from Russian energy supplies was an entirely Western geostrategic decision, not a Russian decision or Russian retaliation: while Russia would still like to export oil and gas and receive foreign exchange revenues, NATO countries and especially the US would like to reduce Russian export revenues and Russian economic influence in Europe.<\/p>\n

Thus, the Jamal pipeline was closed in May by Poland, the Soyuz pipeline was closed in May by Ukraine, the Nord Stream II pipeline remained closed due to US pressure, and the Nord Stream I pipeline was closed<\/a> in September by Russia due to Western sanctions that prevented the repair and return of several gas turbines (see the map of pipelines below).<\/p>\n

By September, only the Brotherhood pipeline to Ukraine and Western Europe and the TurkStream pipeline to Southeast and Central Europe remained operational<\/a>, though some countries refused<\/a> payment in Euro to Gazprom Bank due to EU sanctions against Russian financial institutions. In addition, Russia offered<\/a> to supply additional gas through the Nord Stream II pipeline, which is maintained by Russia itself, as soon as Germany would open it.<\/p>\n

In recent months, however, several new and important developments have taken place concerning Russian energy infrastructure and Russian energy supplies to Europe.<\/p>\n

In June, the EU decided<\/a> to ban Russian seaborne oil supplies by January 2023. In addition, Germany and some other EU countries decided to stop Russian oil supplies via the large Druzhba pipeline<\/a>. Moreover, the EU and the US announced<\/a> their intention to impose a global \u201cprice cap\u201d on Russian oil exports, likely by sanctioning non-compliant countries or insurance companies. The US hoped that OPEC countries would support the oil price cap, but this was not the case: OPEC in early October sided with Russia and further reduced<\/a> their oil production.<\/p>\n

In August, Ukraine briefly closed<\/a> the Druzhba oil pipeline to Europe in response to EU financial sanctions against Russia. In September, Ukraine demanded<\/a> payment of transit fees from Russia for the Soyuz gas pipeline that Ukraine had already closed back in May; if this transit fee dispute escalates, Ukraine or Russia could decide to close the larger Brotherhood gas pipeline to Europe.<\/p>\n

On September 22, the Russian security service claimed<\/a> to have thwarted a Ukrainian sabotage operation against the offshore TurkStream pipeline; Kiev denied this, but had previously launched a successful drone attack<\/a> against a Russian oil refinery. On October 12, Poland reported<\/a> a minor leak in the Polish branch of the Druzhba oil pipeline to Europe; it was not immediately clear if this leak was due to an accident or due to sabotage.<\/p>\n

Most importantly, on September 26 \u2013 four days after the alleged Ukrainian sabotage of the TurkStream pipeline and one day before the opening<\/a> of the Baltic pipeline connecting Norway via Denmark to Poland \u2013 a series of explosions damaged<\/a> the NordStream I and II<\/strong> offshore pipelines between Russia and Germany. Although nobody claimed responsibility, European experts confirmed<\/a> that these explosions were almost certainly the result of a sabotage operation.<\/p>\n

Interestingly, despite a total of four explosions, one of the two lines of Nord Stream II apparently remained undamaged, and Russia renewed<\/a> its offer to supply gas through this remaining line. Moreover, Russia emphasized that it is possible to repair<\/a> the damaged Nord Stream pipelines, especially since spare segments are already being stored in Germany<\/a>. Yet neither of these offers received an answer; instead, Russia was excluded<\/a> from the investigation of the explosions.<\/p>\n

Thus, the available evidence seems to indicate a NATO-backed sabotage operation against the Nord Stream pipelines, possibly involving the US and the UK (the two countries leading and coordinating the NATO military response against Russia), Denmark and Sweden (the two countries controlling the offshore area of the explosions and the investigation), and perhaps Poland and Ukraine (the two countries most opposed to the Nord Stream pipelines).<\/p>\n

Germany, at the top political level, may or may not have been informed<\/a> about this attack against its energy infrastructure. Prior to the explosions, the German government came under increasing pressure<\/a>, both from German voters and from German industry, to open the Nord Stream II pipeline to ensure security of supply and affordable energy prices during the upcoming winter season.<\/p>\n

It has been noted that in June<\/a> and again in September<\/a>, US and NATO military units were conducting naval exercises, including underwater exercises, in the Baltic Sea near the locations of the subsequent pipeline explosions. Such exercises might have served as a cover for the sabotage operation. However, simply lowering a remote-controlled underwater explosive device does not necessarily require advanced submarine technology. Indeed, according to Russian information relayed to Germany by the US CIA, Ukraine tried to rent a boat<\/a> in Sweden for this very purpose.<\/p>\n

Britain, in particular, has been planning sabotage operations against Russian energy and transportation infrastructure since spring, as recently leaked documents revealed<\/a> (see discussion below). In the aftermath of the explosions, British media, referring to \u201canonymous military sources\u201d, proposed<\/a> that Russia itself might have sabotaged its own infrastructure \u2013 a classic propaganda narrative that has been used repeatedly since the beginning of the Ukraine war (see below).<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, former Polish defense minister Radek Sikorski publicly thanked<\/a> the US for the sabotage of Nord Stream, and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken described<\/a> the destruction of the pipelines as a \u201ctremendous strategic opportunity\u201d to reduce Russian influence in Europe. Both US President Biden and US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria Nuland (\u201cfuck the EU\u201d<\/a>), previously vowed<\/a> to \u201cbring Nord Stream to an end\u201d, in \u201cone way or another\u201d, if Russia should invade Ukraine.<\/p>\n

In fact, the destruction of Nord Stream could be seen as the culmination of a 40-year US effort to prevent or reduce Russian energy influence in Europe \u2013 or European energy independence from the US \u2013 starting with Reagan\u2019s attempt<\/a> to stop or delay the construction of the West-Siberian gas pipeline (the Brotherhood pipeline) in 1982 through sanctions and possibly sabotage.<\/p>\n

In response to the current energy situation, Europe has been trying to access<\/a> new gas and oil supplies, including from Norway, Algeria, Azerbaijan (which recently invaded Armenia), and especially through American and Arab LNG shipments. Yet the short-term and medium-term impact on security of supply, energy prices, industry and agriculture will likely be significant, which is why Western media and governments have been eager to shift the blame onto Russia.<\/p>\n

Figure: Russian gas pipelines to Europe (for oil pipelines, see here<\/a>).<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Russian gas pipelines to Europe (WELT<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

<\/h4>\n

Military Developments<\/h4>\n

In September, Ukraine launched a successful counter-offensive<\/a> against Russian forces and managed to reconquer significant territories in both the northeast (Kharkiv) and the south (Kherson) of Ukraine. Ukrainian troops made maximum use of their numerical superiority, high-precision long-range artillery provided by NATO countries, and reconnaissance information from both tactical drones and Western satellites.<\/p>\n

Although Ukraine did not capture or kill many Russian troops, they forced Russian units to evacuate large areas and retreat or \u201cregroup\u201d to new defensive lines. Moreover, there is a real possibility that the Ukrainian military may try to reconquer<\/a> or siege the city of Kherson (see map below).<\/p>\n

As shown in a previous analysis<\/a>, the Russian government initially believed or hoped it could achieve its goals in Ukraine by conducting a \u201cSpecial Military Operation\u201d using only its peace-time professional army (without reserve soldiers or conscripts), Donbas militias, and Wagner mercenaries. This strategy was likely based on domestic political considerations (avoiding conscription, in particular) and an underestimation of NATO military support to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

In response to the successful Ukrainian counter-offensive, the Russian government was forced to announce, in late September, a partial mobilization<\/a> of 300,000 men. There are indications<\/a> that Russia may in fact be mobilizing even more men, and that Belarus will contribute<\/a> additional troops. This could indicate that Russia will launch a WWII-style large-scale ground and air offensive with up to half a million men, in an attempt to overcome the current WWI-style stationary trench warfare<\/a>.<\/p>\n

However, one could also argue that Russia has been trying to follow a \u201clegalistic strategy\u201d: first recognize the independence of the Donbas republics and ask Ukraine to stop attacking them; then respond to a \u201ccall for help\u201d from the republics by launching a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d; then organize referendums in pro-Russian territories and declare them Russian; then ask Ukraine to stop attacking Russian territory; and finally mobilize and declare war against Ukraine.<\/p>\n

As previously noted<\/a>, it is still likely that Russia will try to conquer the port city of Odessa in the south (thus cutting off Ukraine from the Black Sea) and advance to the Dnjepr river and possibly to Kiev from the north. However, it will remain very difficult for Russia to conquer major Ukrainian cities without resorting to large-scale destruction, siege warfare, or urban warfare. In addition, at some point NATO may decide to send in troops or planes to create a \u201csafe zone\u201d in western Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the US Pentagon announced<\/a> the creation of a new command in Germany to coordinate the US\/NATO operation in Ukraine. From the perspective of international law<\/a>, several NATO countries, including the US, the UK, Germany and France, are likely already at war with Russia, since they provide not only weapons<\/a>, but also strategic intelligence and training of Ukrainian troops.<\/p>\n

There is also a Middle Eastern angle to the Ukraine war: While Iran has been supplying kamikaze drones to Russia, Israel, in response, has been supplying<\/a> satellite intelligence to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

In terms of military casualties<\/a>, by October Ukraine may have lost about 30,000 soldiers (deaths only), Russia about 10,000 soldiers, and the Donbas militias about 5,000 soldiers. In addition, about 5,000 civilians may have died<\/a> in Western and Eastern Ukraine. If Russia will launch a large-scale ground offensive, both military and civilian casualties could surge dramatically.<\/p>\n

Figure: Ukrainian counter-offensive (purple) and Russian airstrikes (red dots).<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Ukrainian counter-offensive (purple) and Russian airstrikes (red dots). (BBC\/ISW<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

<\/h4>\n

Political Developments<\/h4>\n

At the political level, and as previously anticipated<\/a>, Russia in late September organized referendums on the independence and subsequent incorporation or annexation of four Ukrainian regions currently (partly) controlled by Russian troops: Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas region and Kherson and Zaporozhie in southern Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Western commentators called these referendums fake and illegal, but the situation is a bit more complicated: Donetsk and Luhansk wanted to join Russia already in 2014<\/a> and have since endured eight years of shelling and bombing by Kiev, while Kherson and Zaporozhie used to vote, prior to the 2014 coup, for pro-Russian presidential candidates<\/a>, though not with over 90% of the votes. Obviously, people not in favor of Russian control may already have fled these regions.<\/p>\n

In addition, Russia refers to the independence of Kosovo in 2008 \u2013 established after a NATO military campaign<\/a> against Serbia and backed<\/a> by the UN International Court of Justice \u2013 as a political and legal precedent. Nevertheless, in a recent non-binding vote<\/a> at the UN General Assembly, only five countries supported the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territories (though 45 abstained).<\/p>\n

In response to the Russian annexation, the US and the EU added new sanctions<\/a> against Russia. While pro-Russian commentators may claim that Russia is hardly affected by these sanctions, this is not the case: Russian oil and gas revenues have started to decline<\/a>, the Russian federal budget will have to be reduced<\/a>, and the Russian microelectronics industry has a lag of at least ten years<\/a> compared to the US and Asia. Moreover, the United States pressured<\/a> Turkey and other countries to leave the Russian Mir payment system. Nevertheless, according to The Economist, the Russian economy is apparently still performing better<\/a> than most European economies.<\/p>\n

Overall, the American and European strategy against Russia appears to broadly follow the political, economic and military measures proposed in the well-known 2019 RAND strategy paper on \u201cExtending Russia\u201d<\/a> (see summary below). Although recent US regime change<\/a> attempts in Venezuela (2019), Belarus (2021), Syria (2011-) and possibly Kazakhstan (2022) and Turkey (2016) failed, the destabilization of the current Russian government remains a possibility and could lead to either a more pro-Western government (similar to the 1990s) or a more nationalist Russian government.<\/p>\n

Figure: \u201cExtending Russia\u201d: Summary of 2019 RAND report<\/strong><\/p>\n

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\u201cExtending Russia\u201d: Summary of 2019 RAND report (RAND<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

<\/h4>\n

Attack on the Crimea Bridge<\/h4>\n

In the early morning of October 8 \u2013 a few hours after the birthday of Russian President Putin \u2013 a large truck bomb exploded on the Crimea bridge connecting the Russian mainland and the Crimean peninsula. The Russian security service stated that the explosives were disguised in rolls of polyethylene construction film and were sent, in early August<\/a>, from the Ukrainian port city of Odessa to NATO member state Bulgaria, possibly making use of the grain export deal<\/a> brokered by the UN in late July. In September, the freight was shipped to Georgia, imported to Russia, and finally transported to Crimea by an unwitting truck driver (see the map below).<\/p>\n

According to the Russian investigation, the operation was coordinated<\/a> by the Ukrainian security service, which based on currently available evidence seems plausible. However, independent US online magazine The Grayzone published phished documents and emails<\/a> belonging to a senior British military intelligence officer that show how British military intelligence was planning or considering a proxy attack against the Crimea bridge already in April.<\/p>\n

Although the leaked British plan considered a missile attack or an underwater attack, it is noteworthy that the truck bomb exploded close to the location recommended<\/a> in the British document (near the shipping canal). Thus, it seems possible that the attack against the Crimea bridge may have been initiated or supervised by Britain and executed by the Ukrainian security service.<\/p>\n

Russia considered the operation against the Crimea bridge a \u201cterrorist attack\u201d and responded<\/a> with over 200 cruise missile strikes against over 100 military, energy, and railway infrastructure targets in Ukraine. The New York Times noted<\/a> that the Russian strikes were \u201cwide-ranging but not as deadly as they could have been\u201d (about 20 deaths<\/a> in total, including military deaths), which supposedly \u201crenewed questions over the quality of Russia\u2019s weapons.\u201d<\/p>\n

Figure: Delivery route of the Crimea bridge bomb.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Delivery route of the Crimea bridge bomb (Readovka<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

<\/h4>\n

War Crimes and Propaganda<\/h4>\n

In a previous analysis<\/a> it was shown that, in stark contrast to Western media reporting, most war crimes in Ukraine up until July were committed not by Russian forces, but by Ukrainian forces \u2013 including paramilitary forces \u2013 fighting against Russian invaders, (supposed) Ukrainian collaborators, and pro-Russian secessionists.<\/p>\n

The general reporting strategy of Western media, guided by the three global news agencies<\/a>, Western intelligence services<\/a> and several PR firms<\/a>, can be described as follows:<\/p>\n