{"id":235026,"date":"2023-05-08T12:00:03","date_gmt":"2023-05-08T11:00:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=235026"},"modified":"2023-05-08T09:17:19","modified_gmt":"2023-05-08T08:17:19","slug":"geoffrey-roberts-why-putin-went-to-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2023\/05\/geoffrey-roberts-why-putin-went-to-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Geoffrey Roberts \u2013 Why Putin Went to War"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Interview with Historian Geoffrey Roberts by <\/span><\/span>Flemming Rose<\/span>,<\/span> Editor<\/span>\u2013<\/span>in<\/span>\u2013<\/span>chief of <\/span><\/span><\/em>Frihedsbrevet<\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

4 May 2023 – <\/em>For this week\u2019s<\/span> \u2018<\/span>Free Thought<\/span>\u2019<\/span>, I have spoken with<\/span> the British historian Geoffrey<\/span>
Roberts about an article he recently published in the<\/span> Journal of Military and Strategic<\/span>
Studies<\/span> under the title \u201cNow or Never: The Immediate Origins of Putin\u2019s Preventive<\/span>
War on Ukraine\u201d.<\/span>\u00a0We also talked about the historical<\/span> craft, how the war in Ukraine<\/span>
will be viewed in 50 years, and what secret documents Roberts would like to see if he<\/span>
could get access to the Russian archives.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Geoffrey Roberts has researched and written about the history of diplomacy for<\/span>
many<\/span> decades. In<\/span> particular, he has dealt with the process<\/span>es<\/span> leading up to the<\/span>
outbreak of the Second World War and<\/span> to<\/span> the Hitler<\/span>\u2013<\/span>Stalin Pact<\/span> of<\/span> 1939, which<\/span>
involved the division of Eastern Europe into spheres of interest between Germany<\/span>
and the Soviet Union<\/span>. He<\/span> is<\/span> the author<\/span> a voluminous work entitled<\/span> Stalin\u2019s Wars:<\/span>
From World War to Cold War 1939<\/span>\u2013<\/span>1953<\/span>,<\/span> which was<\/span> based<\/span> on<\/span> his<\/span> studies in the<\/span>
Russian<\/span> archives. Roberts is also co<\/span>\u2013<\/span>author of a book on the<\/span> wartime<\/span> relationship<\/span>
between Churchill and Stalin and has written<\/span> a biography of Georgy Zhukov, Stalin\u2019s<\/span>
most important general during World War II. Most recently, Roberts has written a<\/span>
book<\/span> entitled<\/span> Stalin\u2019s Library: A Dictator and His Books<\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Reasons for War<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/h3>\n

Frihedsbrevet<\/span>:<\/strong> Why did Vladimir Putin decide in February 2022 to invade Ukr<\/span>aine and start the<\/span> biggest land war in Europe since World War II? And when did he make that fateful<\/span>
decision?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Geoffrey Roberts:<\/strong> There are many opinions about that.<\/span> It is one of th<\/span>ose<\/span> events that historians will <\/span>write thousands of articles and books about for decades to com<\/span>e.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Some believe that Putin is driven by the ambition to restore the Soviet Union or the <\/span>Russian Empire. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Others point out that Putin is motivated by the desire to gain control<\/span> of what is called \u201cthe Russian world\u201d, which includes<\/span> regions where the Russian <\/span>Orthodox Church and Russian language and culture dominate.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Still others point to Putin launching the war to consolidate his power at home and <\/span>save his regime from internal threats and opposition.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

A fourth claim is that the decision to go to war was the w<\/span>ork of an isolated, maniacal<\/span> dictator. A dictator surrounded by puppets who was convinced the Russian army <\/span>would be welcomed by a majority of the Ukrainian population.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/span>A fifth explanation says that Putin feared a democratic Ukraine with a political order <\/span><\/span>alternative to<\/span> his<\/span> authoritarian regime in Russia, which could lead disaffected<\/span> Russians to rebel against the Kremlin.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Geoffrey Roberts rejects all these explanations. He believes that Putin went to war to<\/span> prevent Ukraine from developing into an<\/span> increasingly strong and threatening military <\/span>bridgehead for NATO on the border with Russia.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

According to Roberts, for Putin<\/span> the decision to invade Ukraine<\/span> was not only about<\/span> the<\/span> immediate<\/span> situation<\/span>;<\/span> it was<\/span> about a<\/span> future<\/span> in<\/span> which<\/span> he<\/span> feared<\/span> Russia<\/span> would face<\/span> an existential threat from the West. In that context, Roberts states, it is not decisive<\/span> whether Putin is morbidly paranoid or whether his fantasies have no root in the real<\/span> world. The key is what Putin actually thought and on what basis he made<\/span> the<\/span> decision to go to war;<\/span> for Roberts as a historian, it is about uncovering the logic and <\/span>inner dynamics of Putin\u2019s reasoning that preceded the war.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Roberts does this by reviewing Putin\u2019s<\/span> public<\/span> comments and statements<\/span> from spring<\/span> 2021 until the invasi<\/span>on in February 2022<\/span>,<\/span> comparing<\/span> them<\/span> with what he has said <\/span>since.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

His method is empirical, meaning<\/span> that<\/span> he reconstructs the<\/span> story<\/span> based on what Putin<\/span> says and does<\/span>.<\/span> Roberts identifies a common thread of elements and talking points<\/span> that recur all the way th<\/span>rough the<\/span> narrative<\/span> \u2013<\/span> the fear of NATO expansion, concern<\/span> about NATO missile defense in Poland and Romania, the transformation of Ukraine<\/span> into an anti<\/span>\u2013<\/span>Russia<\/span> and<\/span> a<\/span> NATO armed outpost on the border with Russia, criticism of<\/span> Ukraine for<\/span> discriminat<\/span>ion<\/span> again<\/span>st pro<\/span>\u2013<\/span>Russians and not implemen<\/span>ting<\/span> the so<\/span>\u2013<\/span>called Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, which were an attempt to regulate the conflict between the Ukrainian central government and the Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

According to Roberts, throughout the run up to the February 2022 invasion, Putin maintained that the Minsk agreements were the only mechanism available to deal with the dispute between Kiev and the Donbass rebels. Roberts also cites Putin\u2019s \u2018infamous\u2019 summer 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russia and Ukraine, in which he laments alleged discrimination against Russians in Ukraine, declaring:<\/span><\/span> \u201cWe will never allow our historic lands and people close to us to be used against Russia.\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In autumn 2021, the rhetoric sharpened, and on November 18, i.e. a month before Moscow submitted its formal security demands to NATO, Putin proposed legally binding security guarantees from NATO in relation to Ukraine. When his demands were published, they went even further and were not only about Ukraine, but also about the infrastructure NATO had built in its new member states.<\/span><\/span> Russia\u2019s demands were rejected by the West at the end of January 2022. A few days later, Putin said at a press conference in the Kremlin:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cIt is stated in Ukraine\u2019s doctrines that they will take Crimea back, if necessary
by force. It\u2019s not just something Ukrainian representatives say publicly, it\u2019s
written down in their documents. Imagine then that Ukraine becomes a
member of NATO. It is being loaded with weapons and more offensive
weapons will be deployed on its territory, just like in Poland and Romania \u2013
who is going to stop it? Imagine Ukraine launching an operation against
Crimea or Donbass. Crimea is Russian territory. We see that case as settled.
Imagine that Ukraine is a member of NATO and begins a military operation. So
what should we do? Fight against NATO? Has anyone even thought about
that? Apparently not.\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Roberts hypothesizes that it was the fear of a nuclear-armed Ukraine that prompted Putin to attack at the last minute. The historian refers to Volodymyr Zelensky\u2019s speech at the security conference in Munich five days before the invasion, in which the Ukrainian president aired the idea that Ukraine should acquire tactical nuclear weapons in order to defend itself. None of the Western leaders present objected, <\/span><\/span><\/span>according to Roberts, even though such an initiative would have been a violation of the international agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Three days later, Putin was asked whether he considered Zelensky\u2019s words to be bluster or a real statement of intent.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Putin replied:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cWe reckon that his words were primarily directed at us. I would like to say
that we have heard them. Ever since Soviet times, Ukraine has had broad
nuclear capabilities. They have several nuclear power plants and a nuclear
industry which is quite developed and they have a school to educate people.
They have everything to be able to solve that problem much faster than the
countries that are starting from scratch.\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

He added:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe only thing they lack is systems for enriching uranium. It\u2019s just a matter of
technology. It is not an insurmountable task for Ukraine. It can be done quite
easily, and the presence of tactical nukes in Ukraine and missiles with a range
of 300\u2013500 kilometres means they can hit Moscow. It is a strategic threat to
us and that is how we perceive it. We have to and will take it extremely
seriously.\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

<\/span><\/span><\/span>Roberts summarizes:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cOn the eve of the invasion, many astute and well-informed commentators convinced themselves that the supposedly realistic and pragmatic Putin would not risk such an attack. What they missed was the crystallization of Putin\u2019s apocalyptic vision of a future, nuclear-armed Ukraine embedded in NATO and intent on provoking a Russian-Western war. Arguably, it was that long-term nuclear threat that finally prompted Putin to go to war.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

_______________________________________________<\/p>\n

Originally posted in Danish at <\/span><\/span><\/em>Frihedsbrevet <\/a><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Go to Original – braveneweurope.com<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

4 May 2023 – I have spoken with the British historian Geoffrey Roberts about an article he recently published in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies under the title \u201cNow or Never: The Immediate Origins of Putin\u2019s Preventive War on Ukraine\u201d.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":235029,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[166],"tags":[1104,417,1035,1268,1126,1050,2462,91,1301,2571,112,818,278,961,2200,95,70,1594,481,172],"class_list":["post-235026","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-interview","tag-arms-trade","tag-bullying","tag-eastern-europe","tag-european-union","tag-hegemony","tag-imperialism","tag-military-industrial-media-complex","tag-nato","tag-nuclear-war","tag-official-lies-and-narratives","tag-pentagon","tag-proxy-war","tag-russia","tag-ukraine","tag-us-empire","tag-us-military","tag-usa","tag-war-economy","tag-warfare","tag-west"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/235026","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=235026"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/235026\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":235032,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/235026\/revisions\/235032"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/235029"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=235026"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=235026"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=235026"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}