{"id":248856,"date":"2023-11-27T12:00:59","date_gmt":"2023-11-27T12:00:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=248856"},"modified":"2023-11-23T05:39:36","modified_gmt":"2023-11-23T05:39:36","slug":"actual-u-s-military-spending-reached-us-1-537-trillion-in-2022-more-than-twice-acknowledged-level-us-765-8-billion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2023\/11\/actual-u-s-military-spending-reached-us-1-537-trillion-in-2022-more-than-twice-acknowledged-level-us-765-8-billion\/","title":{"rendered":"Actual U.S. Military Spending Reached US$ 1.537 Trillion in 2022\u2014More than Twice Acknowledged Level (US$ 765.8 billion)"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"\"<\/a>

Cai Meng, “U.S. weapons sale,” China Daily, 7 Mar 2022<\/p><\/div>\n

New Estimates Based on U.S. National Accounts<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

November 2023 – <\/em>For decades, it has been recognized by independent researchers that actual<\/i> U.S. military spending is approximately twice the officially acknowledged<\/i> level.1<\/sup><\/a> In 2022, actual U.S. military spending reached $1.537 trillion\u2014more than twice the officially acknowledged level of $765.8 billion. Data on U.S. military spending reported by the U.S. government, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, generally considered the definitive source on international military expenditures), and NATO all primarily rely on the figures of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB).2<\/sup><\/a> These data, however, are subject to two major shortcomings.First, the numbers provided by the OMB with respect to \u201cdefense spending\u201d are substantially lower than those provided in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), the most complete and definitive source on U.S. national income and expenditures as a whole, constituting an input-output approach to the whole economy, and the basis of all analysis of the U.S. economy.<\/p>\n

Second, as is well-known, key areas of U.S. military spending are included in other parts of federal expenditures and do not fall under the OMB\u2019s \u201cdefense spending\u201d category. Although SIPRI and NATO adopt wider definitions of \u201cdefense spending\u201d than the U.S. government and claim to increase their estimates using the OMB figures as a base, in practice, they do so only marginally and in ways that are not entirely transparent, with the result that their figures are only slightly above those of the officially acknowledged U.S. figures.3<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

If the reality is that actual U.S. military spending has been consistently around twice the acknowledged amounts\u2014something demonstrated repeatedly in independent studies\u2014the methodology for approaching the question of actual military spending on a consistent, statistically conservative, and incontestable basis has only developed over time. Most attempts have sought simply to add components of actual military spending appearing in other parts of federal spending and not included under OMB figures for \u201cnational defense.\u201d Although these studies helped to set the stage, they often appeared to have a scattered and arbitrary character, rather than employing a truly consistent methodology.<\/p>\n

A breakthrough in this respect was first achieved by Jurgen M. Brauer at Augusta State University\u2019s College of Business Administration in 2007. Brauer introduced an approach that took the NIPA data on U.S. military consumption and investment expenditures as the base for U.S. military spending, and then added in other military expenditures outside of official defense using the NIPA accounts, creating a methodology for detailing U.S. military expenditures that not only surmounted the limitations of the OMB data with respect to accounting for \u201cdefense spending\u201d itself, but adopted an entirely consistent approach, based on NIPA data, to adding in unacknowledged expenditures.4<\/sup><\/a> Brauer\u2019s approach was then developed further by Hannah Holleman, John Bellamy Foster, and Robert W. McChesney in an article in Monthly Review <\/i>in 2008 that provided detailed estimates of actual U.S. military expenditures, as opposed to those officially acknowledged by the OMB, for 2007.5<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Although the estimates of military spending here rely on the 2008 study by Holleman, Foster, and McChesney (building on Brauer\u2019s 2007 methodological breakthrough) as its original basis, the method and results differ somewhat from that earlier study, adopting more conservative assumptions, while incorporating some refinements that Brauer introduced in 2019. Thus, the percentages attributed to the military in federal space expenditures and in grants to foreign countries are lower in the present estimates, in accord with widely accepted mainstream assumptions. Military medical insurance (consisting of payments for medical services for dependents of active duty military personnel at nonmilitary facilities) is also added, which was not included in the earlier study by Holleman, Foster, and McChesney. (It should be noted that military spending in the Department of Energy associated with nuclear weapons is included in both OMB and NIPA, as recognized in the earlier study.)<\/p>\n

In addition to the NIPA data for total defense consumption and gross investment expenditures, our figures for actual U.S. military expenditures include seven further categories: veterans\u2019 benefits, veterans\u2019 life insurance, other veterans\u2019 costs, military medical insurance, the military portions of space spending, grants in aid to other governments, and the share of net interest attributed to actual federal military expenditures. (Net interest here includes only \u201con-budget\u201d net interest, excluding the \u201coff-budget\u201d net interest associated with Social Security and other transfer payments, as well as the Post Office.)<\/p>\n

Veterans\u2019 benefits and net interest both constitute what are known as so-called legacy costs of militarism and war, and thus are part of overall military spending, but are not included in the official \u201cdefense budget.\u201d Euroconsult has attributed 42.4 percent of federal space consumption and investment expenditure to the military.6<\/sup><\/a> The Council of Foreign Relations conservatively classified 33 percent of all U.S. grants in foreign aid as for military purposes.7<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

All of these categories, taken together, thus constitute the components of actual military spending as shown in Table 1. The table shows that actual<\/i> U.S. military spending in 2022 came to $1.537 trillion, as opposed to the $765.8 billion in acknowledged<\/i> (OMB) defense spending (and the $876 billion estimated by SIPRI and $821 billion by NATO). This means that actual U.S. military spending in 2022 was more than double the acknowledged \u201cdefense spending\u201d provided by OMB.<\/p>\n

\n

Table 1. Actual U.S. Military Spending in 2022 (Billions USD)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Category<\/td>\nTable Line Item<\/td>\nAllocation<\/td>\nAmount<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NIPA National Defense Expenditure<\/td>\nConsumption expenditures<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\n732.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military Medical Insurance<\/td>\nGross investment<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\n192.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military medical insurance<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\n5.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Veterans\u2019 life insurance<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\n0.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Veterans-Related Expenses*<\/td>\nVeterans\u2019 benefits<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\n153.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Other<\/td>\n25%<\/td>\n26.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Space Consumption and Gross Investment Expenditure**<\/td>\nSpace<\/td>\n40%<\/td>\n15.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Grants to Foreign Countries<\/td>\nGrants to foreign countries<\/td>\n33%<\/td>\n29.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Net Interest Attributed to Military***<\/td>\nNet interest attributed to military<\/td>\n381.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nTotal<\/td>\n1,536.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Sources:<\/i> See Table 2 in Statistical Appendix for a discussion of data and sources.<\/p>\n

* Since the data corresponding to \u201cVeterans-Related Expenses,\u201d from NIPA Table 3.12 (\u201cGovernment Social Benefits\u201d) for the year 2022 were not available at time of writing, we adopted a conservative assumption and assigned the same nominal value that such expenses adopted in 2021.<\/p>\n

** Since the data corresponding to \u201cSpace Consumption and Gross Investment Expenditure,\u201d from NIPA Table 3.15.5 (\u201cGovernment Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment by Function\u201d) for the year 2022 were not available at time of writing, we adopted the same nominal value from the year 2021 for this variable.<\/p>\n

*** The details corresponding to the calculation of this item are explained in the Statistical Appendix, Table A-2.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Chart 1 shows actual<\/i> U.S. military spending as a percentage of GDP, compared to the acknowledged<\/i> defense spending and the closely related SIPRI data from 2007 (the year in which the Great Recession began) to 2022. Over the entire period, actual military spending (NIPA augmented) as a percentage of GDP averaged 6.7 percent. In 2022, actual U.S. defense spending came to 6 percent of GDP, while acknowledged military spending was only half that, at 3 percent of GDP.<\/p>\n

\n

Chart 1. U.S. Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Source:<\/i> See Statistical Appendix for sources and notes.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Chart 2 presents actual military spending as a percentage of total federal government consumption and gross investment, which averaged 72 percent over the entire period and, in 2022, was 70.2 percent. Once again, however, it is rising.<\/p>\n

\n

Chart 2. U.S. Military Spending as a Percentage of Federal Consumption and Gross Investment, 2007\u20132022<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Source:<\/i> See Statistical Appendix for sources and notes.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cNational Defense Consumption Expenditures\u201d and \u201cNational Defense Gross Investment\u201d accounted, respectively, for 47 percent and 13 percent of actual military spending in 2022, according to NIPA. The remaining 40 percent of U.S. military spending is not included in OMB figures or in the larger figures on \u201cdefense\u201d spending reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in NIPA, but appears in other budgets in NIPA. The breakdown is shown in Chart 3.<\/p>\n

\n

Chart 3. U.S. Military Spending by Component, 2022<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Source:<\/i> See Statistical Appendix for sources and notes.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

All of this demonstrates that the extent of U.S. military spending has been grossly understated by the U.S. government. Washington has allocated expenses corresponding to military-related activities under departments other than the Department of Defense.<\/p>\n

Although institutions like SIPRI and NATO claim to reflect the actual military spending of most countries, their estimations for the United States are vastly understated. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the base data from which we start our calculations (National Defense Consumption and Gross Investment Expenditure, using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA tables) are already larger than the final estimations reported by SIPRI and NATO. Central to the estimates of actual military expenditure presented here, then, is the fact that expenses of military-related activities are not fully included under the expenditure announced by the OMB. Significantly, legacy costs, which support the entire military systems, such as veterans\u2019 benefits and the enormous net interest payments attributable to the military and largely responsible for U.S. government deficits, are fully incorporated in our analysis, while excluded in military spending acknowledged by the U.S. government and largely excluded by SIPRI (see Statistical Appendix).<\/p>\n

It is no wonder, then, that, taking the ten countries with the highest military spending in the world in 2022, the United States\u2014based on its actual military spending as shown here\u2014accounts for more than 70 percent of the total.8<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Statistical Appendix<\/h2>\n

Methodological Approach<\/h3>\n

To estimate actual U.S. military spending, we utilize a set of nine items from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) produced by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (see Table A-1). The criteria to allocate each of these items is described below:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. National Defense consumption expenditure.<\/span> This information is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. We allocate 100 percent of this item to the estimation of the U.S. military spending.<\/li>\n
  2. National Defense gross investment expenditure.<\/span> This information is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. We allocate 100 percent of this item to the estimation of the U.S. military spending.<\/li>\n
  3. Veterans\u2019 related costs.<\/span> This information is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and consists of three categories:\n
      \n
    1. Veterans\u2019 life insurance<\/li>\n
    2. Veterans\u2019 benefits<\/li>\n
    3. Other<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
      \n

      Table A-1. Sources for Calculation of Actual Military Spending<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Category<\/td>\nLine Name (Line #)<\/td>\nTable<\/td>\nSource<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      NIPA National Defense Expenditure<\/td>\nConsumption expenditures (18)<\/td>\nTable 3.9.5. Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment<\/a><\/td>\nNIPA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Gross investment (19)<\/td>\nTable 3.9.5. Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment<\/a><\/td>\nNIPA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Military Medical Insurance*<\/td>\nMilitary medical insurance (16)<\/td>\nTable 3.12. Government Social Benefits<\/a><\/td>\nNIPA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Veterans-Related Expenses<\/td>\nVeterans\u2019 life insurance (14)<\/td>\nTable 3.12. Government Social Benefits<\/a><\/td>\nNIPA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Veterans\u2019 benefits (17)<\/td>\nTable 3.12. Government Social Benefits<\/a><\/td>\nNIPA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Other (26)<\/td>\nTable 3.12. Government Social Benefits<\/a><\/td>\nNIPA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Space Consumption and Gross Investment Expenditure<\/td>\nSpace (58)<\/td>\nTable 3.15.5. Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment by Function<\/a><\/td>\nNIPA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Grants to Foreign Countries<\/td>\nGrants to foreign countries (32)<\/td>\nTable 3.2. Federal Government Current Receipts and Expenditures<\/a><\/td>\nNIPA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Net Interest Attributed to Military<\/td>\nNet interest payments (on budget)<\/td>\nTable 3.2 Outlays by Function and Subfunction: 1962\u20132028<\/a><\/td>\nOMB<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

      Sources and Notes:<\/i> NIPA Tables, bea.gov\/itable; OMB: White House Historical Tables, whitehouse.gov\/omb\/budget\/historical-tables. Also see direct links to tables above.<\/p>\n

      * Consists of payments for medical services for dependents of active duty military personnel at nonmilitary facilities.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      We allocate 100 percent of the items 3.a and 3.b to the estimation of the U.S. military spending. The category \u201cOther\u201d (3.c) is shared among other institutions, therefore we allocated only 25 percent of this expenditure to the military.<\/p>\n

        \n
      1. Military medical insurance<\/span> (payments for medical services for dependents of active-duty military personnel at nonmilitary facilities).<\/li>\n
      2. Space consumption and gross investment expenditure.<\/span> This information is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. We allocate 40 percent of the space consumption and gross investment of the United States for defense purposes, following the study<\/a> of Euroconsult, which reports that 42.4 percent of global space spending in 2021 was meant for defense purposes.<\/li>\n
      3. Grants in foreign aid.<\/span> This information is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. We allocate 33 percent of this expenditure to military purposes, following the analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations<\/a>.<\/li>\n
      4. Net interest paid by the federal government attributed to military.<\/span> This information is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (see Table A-2). We allocated this item according to the following formula:
        \n\n\n\n\n\n
        Percentage of allocation =<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Total expenditures of the federal government with military
        \npurposes on consumption and gross investment<\/i><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Total expenditures of the federal government
        \non consumption and gross investment<\/i><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        It is important to note that we are considering federal gross investment expenditures in both the numerator and denominator, and not only the consumption expenditure.<\/p>\n

        \n

        Table A-2. Calculation of Net Interest Attributed to U.S. Military Spending in 2022 (Billions USD)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Item<\/td>\nAmount<\/td>\nSource\/Note<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Total Federal Government Consumption and Gross Investment Expenditure<\/td>\n1,646.7<\/td>\nNIPA, Table 3.9.5. Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment (lines 10 + 11)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Actual Federal Military Spending (without Interest)<\/td>\n1,155.4<\/td>\nNIPA (see Table 1)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Interest Allocation<\/td>\n70.2%<\/td>\nRow 2 \/ Row 1 (above)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Net Interest Payments (On Budget)<\/td>\n543.6<\/td>\nOMB, Table 3.2. Outlays by Function and Subfunction: 1962\u20132028<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Net Interest Attributed to Military<\/td>\n381.4<\/td>\nRow 3 * Row 4 (above)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        Comparison with Other Estimations<\/h3>\n

        Table A-3 compares our method with mainstream estimations of U.S. military spending. Here, we can see that the expenditures reported by the OMB ($765.8 billion) are significantly lower than other sources. SIPRI and NATO claim to report actual military spending of the countries, including some legacy costs, but their numbers are still below those of independent researchers (see Table A-4 below). Indeed, our estimation of the actual U.S. military spending for 2022 is twice that reported by the White House, 1.9 times the spending estimated by NATO, and 1.8 times that reported by SIPRI.<\/p>\n

        \n

        Table A-3. Comparison with Mainstream Estimates of U.S. Military Spending for 2022 (Current USD)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Source<\/td>\nYear<\/td>\nAmount estimated<\/td>\nAs % of GDP<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        NIPA Augmented (JBF\/GC)<\/td>\n2022<\/td>\n1,536.9<\/td>\n6.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        \u201cAcknowledged\u201d U.S. Military Spending (OMB)<\/td>\n2022<\/td>\n765.8<\/td>\n3.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        SIPRI Military Expenditure<\/td>\n2022<\/td>\n876.9<\/td>\n3.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        NATO<\/td>\n2022<\/td>\n821.8<\/td>\n3.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

        Sources:<\/i> NIPA Augmented, see Table A-1; \u201cAcknowledged,\u201d Office of Management and Budget (OMB), \u201cTable 3.2. Outlays by Function and Subfunction: 1962\u20132028<\/a>,\u201d whitehouse.gov; SIPRI, \u201cMilitary Expenditure by Country, 1949\u20132022<\/a>,\u201d sipri.org; NATO, Defense Expenditure Tables: 2022, nato.int.<\/p>\n

        Notes:<\/i> \u201cAcknowledged\u201d U.S. military spending consists of three elements: 1) spending by the Department of Defense; 2) spending in atomic energy defense activities (under the Department of Energy); 3) and other defense-related activities. See Eric Berger, \u201cReport Finds that the US Accounts for Half of Global Space Spending<\/a>,\u201d Ars Technica, January 6, 2022, arstechnica.com.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

        \n

        Table A-4. Independent Estimates of U.S. Military Spending<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Source<\/td>\nYear<\/td>\nAmount estimated<\/td>\nPercent of GDP<\/td>\nUnit<\/td>\nMethod<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Cockburn<\/td>\n2023<\/td>\n1,447.70<\/td>\n\u2014<\/td>\nCurrent USD<\/td>\nReal U.S. defense budget<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Smithberger and Hartung<\/td>\n2020<\/td>\n1,254.20<\/td>\n6.0<\/td>\nCurrent USD<\/td>\nU.S. national security state budget<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Brauer<\/td>\n2018<\/td>\n1,202.80<\/td>\n6.5<\/td>\nConstant 2012 USD<\/td>\nAugmented NIPA U.S. military spending<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Foster, Holleman, and McChesney<\/td>\n2007<\/td>\n1,002.50<\/td>\n6.9<\/td>\nCurrent USD<\/td>\nAugmented NIPA U.S. military spending<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

        Sources:<\/i> Andrew Cockburn, \u201cGetting the Defense Budget Right: A (Real) Grand Total, over $1.4 trillion<\/a>,\u201d Responsible Statecraft, May 7, 2023, responsiblestatecraft.org; Mandy Smithberger and William Hartung, \u201dMaking Sense of the $1.25 Trillion National Security State Budget<\/a>,\u201d POGO, May 7, 2019, pogo.org; \u201cDon\u2019t Just Click \u2018Download\u2019: The Case of U.S. Military Expenditure Data<\/a>,\u201d Economics of Peace and Security Journal<\/i> 14, no. 2 (2019): 55\u201364; John Bellamy Foster, Hannah Holleman, and Robert W. McChesney, \u201cThe U.S. Imperial Triangle and Military Spending<\/a>,\u201d Monthly Review<\/i> 60, no. 5 (October 2008): 1\u201319<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

        Using our method, actual U.S. military spending doubled acknowledged military spending for the year 2022. Between 2007 and 2022, the gap between our measure and mainstream estimates averaged around 3 percent as a share of GDP.<\/p>\n

        Independent researchers have devised a number of critical approaches to the calculation of actual U.S. military spending. In Table A-4, we present estimates for selected years by Cockburn; Smithberger and Hartung; Brauer; and Foster, Holleman, and McChesney. As can be seen, these authors have reached estimates that are similar to each other\u2014and, of course, significantly higher than official estimates for the respective years.<\/p>\n

        Notes<\/h2>\n
          \n
        1. \u21a9<\/a> James Cypher, \u201cThe Basic Economics of \u2018Rearming America<\/a>,\u2019\u201d Monthly Review <\/cite>33, no. 6 (November 1981): 11\u201317; James Cypher, \u201cFrom Military Keynesianism to Global Neoliberal Militarism<\/a>,\u201d Monthly Review<\/cite> 59, no. 2 (June 2007): 37\u201355; Jurgen Brauer, \u201cUnited States Military Expenditure,\u201d in Arms, War, and Terrorism in the Global Economy Today<\/cite> (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2007), 61\u201394; Hannah Holleman, John Bellamy Foster, and Robert W. McChesney, \u201cThe U.S. Military Triangle and Military Spending<\/a>,\u201d Monthly Review<\/cite> 60, no. 5 (October 2008): 1\u201318; Jurgen Brauer, \u201cDon\u2019t Just Click \u2018Download\u2019: The Case of U.S. Military Expenditure Data<\/a>,\u201d Economics of Peace and Security Journal<\/cite> 14, no. 2 (2019); Andrew Cockburn, \u201cGetting the Defense Budget Right: A (Real) Grand Total, over $1.4 Trillion<\/a>,\u201d Responsible Statecraft, May 7, 2023, responsiblestatecraft.org; Mandy Smithberger and William Hartung, May 7, 2019, \u201cMaking Sense of the $1.25 Trillion National Security State Budget,\u201d Project on Government Oversight, May 7, 2019.<\/li>\n
        2. \u21a9<\/a> Note that OMB data is reported by fiscal year. For further explanation, see Table 4 in the Statistical Appendix.<\/li>\n
        3. \u21a9<\/a> SIPRI, \u201cFrequently Asked Questions: What Is the SIPRI Definition of Military Expenditure?\u201d; NATO, \u201cInformation on Defence Expenditures,\u201d July 7, 2023.<\/li>\n
        4. \u21a9<\/a> Brauer, \u201cUnited States Military Expenditure.\u201d<\/li>\n
        5. \u21a9<\/a> Holleman, Foster, and McChesney, \u201cThe U.S. Military Triangle and Military Spending.\u201d<\/li>\n
        6. \u21a9<\/a> Eric Berger, \u201cReport Finds that the US Accounts for Half of Global Space Spending,\u201d Ars Technica, January 6, 2022, arstechnica.com.<\/li>\n
        7. \u21a9<\/a> James McBride, \u201cHow Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?,\u201d Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2018, cfr.org.<\/li>\n
        8. \u21a9<\/a> See \u201cCountries with the Highest Military Spending Worldwide in 2002,\u201d Statista, statista.com.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/section>\n

          2023<\/a>, Volume 75, Number 06 (November 2023)<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

          ___________________________________________<\/p>\n

          Gisela Cernadas<\/span> is an economist at the National University of La Plata, Argentina, and a Master\u2019s student on Economic Development and researcher at the Center of Economic Development Studies at the National University of San Martin, Argentina.<\/em><\/p>\n

          \"\"<\/a>John Bellamy Foster is a North American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the <\/span><\/em>Monthly Review<\/span>. He writes about political economy of capitalism and economic crisis, ecology and ecological crisis, and Marxist theory.<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

           <\/p>\n

          Go to Original \u2013 monthlyreview.org<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

          Nov 2023 – How much does it cost to maintain an empire? A stunning new analysis shows the true scale of U.S. military spending, which far outstrips conventional estimates, which use data gleaned from traditional sources. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":248858,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[57],"tags":[1161,112,2200,95,1073],"class_list":["post-248856","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-militarism","tag-arms-industry","tag-pentagon","tag-us-empire","tag-us-military","tag-weapons"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/248856","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=248856"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/248856\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":248924,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/248856\/revisions\/248924"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/248858"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=248856"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=248856"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=248856"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}