{"id":258392,"date":"2024-04-01T12:00:50","date_gmt":"2024-04-01T11:00:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=258392"},"modified":"2024-07-01T08:19:58","modified_gmt":"2024-07-01T07:19:58","slug":"kosovo-independence-dilemmas-on-natos-aggression-in-1999","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2024\/04\/kosovo-independence-dilemmas-on-natos-aggression-in-1999\/","title":{"rendered":"Kosovo Independence: Dilemmas on NATO\u2019s Aggression in 1999"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>30 Mar 2024<\/em> &#8211; Twenty-five years commemoration of NATO\u2019s military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the FRY) in March\u2212June 1999 once again opened the question of the Western foundation for Kosovo\u2019s secession from Serbia and its unilateral proclamation of a quasi-independence in February 2008. Kosovo became the first and only European state today that is ruled by the terroristic warlords as a party\u2019s possession \u2013 the (Albanian) Kosovo Liberation Army (the KLA). This article aims to investigate the nature of NATO\u2019s war on Yugoslavia in 1999 which has as an outcome the creation of the first terroristic state in Europe \u2013 the Republic of Kosovo.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_258396\" style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/kosovo-nato-eu.jpg\" ><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-258396\" class=\"wp-image-258396 size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/kosovo-nato-eu-300x249.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"249\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/kosovo-nato-eu-300x249.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/kosovo-nato-eu-768x638.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/kosovo-nato-eu.jpg 1024w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-258396\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">By the author<\/p><\/div>\n<p><strong>Terrorism and Kosovo independence<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The KLA terrorists with support from the US and the EU\u2019s administrations launched full-scale violence in December 1998 for the sole purpose of provoking NATO\u2019s military intervention against the FRY as a precondition for Kosovo secession from Serbia hopefully followed by internationally recognized independence. To finally resolve the \u201cKosovo Question\u201d in the favor of the Albanians, the US Clinton administration brought two confronting sides to formally negotiate in the French castle of Rambouillet in France in February 1999 but in fact to impose an ultimatum to Serbia to accept <em>de facto<\/em> secession of Kosovo. Even though the Rambouillet ultimatum <em>de iure<\/em> recognized Serbia\u2019s territorial integrity, the disarmament of terroristic KLA and did not mention Kosovo&#8217;s independence from Serbia, as the conditions of the final agreement were in essence highly favorable to the KLA and its secessionist project towards independent Kosovo, Serbia simply rejected them. The US\u2019s answer was a military action led by NATO as a \u201chumanitarian intervention\u201d in order to directly support the Kosovo Albanian separatism. Therefore, on March 24<sup>th<\/sup>, 1999 NATO started its military operation against the FRY which lasted till June 10<sup>th<\/sup>, 1999. Why the UN\u2019s Security Council was not asked for the approval of the operation is clear from the following explanation:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u201c<em>Knowing that Russia would veto any effort to get UN backing for military action, NATO launched air strikes against Serbian forces in 1999, effectually supporting the Kosovar Albanian rebels<\/em>\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn1\" name=\"_ednref1\">[1]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The crucial feature of this operation was a barbarian, coercive, inhuman, illegal, and above all merciless bombing of Serbia for almost three months. Nevertheless, NATO\u2019s military intervention against the FRY \u2013 Operation Allied Force, was propagated by its proponents as a purely humanitarian operation, it is recognized by many Western and other scholars that the US and its client states of NATO had mainly political and geostrategic aims that led them to this military action.<\/p>\n<p>The legitimacy of the intervention in the brutal coercive bombing of both military and civilian targets in Kosovo province and the rest of Serbia became immediately controversial as the UN\u2019s Security Council did not authorize the action. Surely, the action was illegal according to international law but it was formally justified by the US administration and the NATO\u2019s spokesman as legitimate for the reason that it was unavoidable as all diplomatic options were exhausted to stop the war. However, a continuation of the military conflict in Kosovo between the KLA and Serbia\u2019s state security forces would threaten to produce a humanitarian catastrophe and generate political instability in the region of the Balkans. Therefore, \u201cin the context of fears about the \u2018ethnic cleansing\u2019 of the Albanian population, a campaign of air strikes, conducted by US-led NATO forces\u201d<a href=\"#_edn2\" name=\"_ednref2\">[2]<\/a> was executed with a final result of the withdrawal of Serbia\u2019s forces and administration from the province: that was exactly the main requirement of the Rambouillet ultimatum.<\/p>\n<p>It is of crucial importance to stress at least five facts to properly understand the nature and aims of NATO\u2019s military intervention against Serbia and Montenegro in 1999:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>It was bombed only Serbian side involved in the conflict in Kosovo while the KLA was allowed and even fully sponsored to continue its terroristic activities either against Serbia\u2019s security forces or the Serbian civilians.<\/li>\n<li>The ethnic cleansing of the Albanians by the Serbian security forces was only a potential action (in fact, only in the case of direct NATO\u2019s military action against the FRY) but not a real fact as a reason for NATO to start coercive bombing of the FRY.<\/li>\n<li>NATO\u2019s claim that the Serbian security forces killed up to 100.000 Albanian civilians during the Kosovo War of 1998\u22121999 was a pure propaganda lie as after the war it was found only 3.000 bodies of all nationalities in Kosovo.<\/li>\n<li>The bombing of the FRY was promoted as a \u201chumanitarian intervention\u201d, which means a legitimate and defensible action, that scholarly should mean <em>\u201c\u2026military intervention that is carried out in pursuit of humanitarian rather than strategic objectives<\/em>\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn3\" name=\"_ednref3\">[3]<\/a> However, today it is quite clear that the intervention had political and geostrategic ultimate objectives but not the humanitarian one.<\/li>\n<li>The NATO\u2019s military intervention in 1999 was a direct violation of the UN principles of international conduct as it is said in the UN Charter that:<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote><p>\u201c<em>All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations<\/em>\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn4\" name=\"_ednref4\">[4]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>What happened in Kosovo when NATO started its military campaign was quite expected and above all wishful by the US administration and the KLA\u2019s leaders: Serbia made a much stronger military assault on the KLA and the ethnic Albanians who supported it. As a consequence, there was a significantly increased number of refugees \u2013 up to 800.000 according to the CIA\u2019s and the UN\u2019s sources. However, the US administration presented all of these refugees as the victims of the Serb-led policy of systematic and well-organized ethnic cleansing (alleged \u201cHorse Shoe\u201d operation) regardless of the facts that:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The overwhelming majority of them were not real refugees but rather \u201cTV refugees\u201d for the Western mass media.<\/li>\n<li>The minority of them were simply escaping from the consequences of NATO\u2019s merciless bombing.<\/li>\n<li>Just part of the refugees have been the real victims of the Serbian \u201cbloody revenge\u201d policy for NATO\u2019s destruction of Serbia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Nevertheless, the final result of NATO\u2019s sortie campaign against the FRY was that the UN\u2019s Security Council formally authorized NATO\u2019s (under the official name of KFOR)<a href=\"#_edn5\" name=\"_ednref5\">[5]<\/a> ground troops to occupy Kosovo and give to the KLA free hands to continue and finish with the ethnic cleansing of the province from all non-Albanians. That was the beginning of the making of the Kosovo independence which was finally proclaimed by the Kosovo Parliament (without national referenda) in February 2008 and immediately recognized by the main Western countries.<a href=\"#_edn6\" name=\"_ednref6\">[6]<\/a> In such a way, Kosovo became the first legalized European mafia state.<a href=\"#_edn7\" name=\"_ednref7\">[7]<\/a> Nevertheless, in addition, the EU\u2019s and the US\u2019s policies to rebuild peace on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia did not manage to deal successfully with probably the main and most serious challenge to their proclaimed task to re-establish regional stability and security: al-Qaeda-linked terrorism, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Kosovo-Metochia.<a href=\"#_edn8\" name=\"_ednref8\">[8]<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Dilemmas<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>According to the NATO\u2019s sources, there were two objectives of the alliance\u2019s military intervention against the FRY in March\u2212June 1999:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>To force Slobodan Miloshevic, a President of Serbia, to accept a political plan for the autonomy status of Kosovo (designed by the US administration).<\/li>\n<li>To prevent (alleged) ethnic cleansing of the Albanians by Serbia\u2019s authorities and their armed forces.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>However, while the political objective was in principle achieved, the humanitarian one had quite the opposite results. By bombing the FRY in the three air strikes phases NATO succeeded in forcing Miloshevic to sign a political-military capitulation in Kumanovo on June 9<sup>th<\/sup>, 1999, to handle Kosovo to NATO\u2019s administration and practically to authorize the KLA\u2019s-led Islamic terror against the Christian Serbs.<a href=\"#_edn9\" name=\"_ednref9\">[9]<\/a> A direct outcome of the operation was surely negative as NATO\u2019s sorties caused approximately 3000 killed Serbian military and civilians in addition to an unknown number of killed ethnic Albanians. An indirect impact of the operation cost many ethnic Albanian killed civilians followed by massive refugee flows of Kosovo Albanians<a href=\"#_edn10\" name=\"_ednref10\">[10]<\/a> as it provoked the Serbian police and the Yugoslav army to attack. We can not forget that the greatest scale of war crimes against the Albanian civilians in Kosovo during NATO\u2019s bombing of the FRY was most probably, according to some research investigations, committed by the Krayina refugee Serbs from Croatia who after August 1995 in the uniforms of the regular police forces of Serbia as a matter of revenge for the terrible Albanian atrocities committed in the Krayina region in Croatia only several years ago against the Serb civilians<a href=\"#_edn11\" name=\"_ednref11\">[11]<\/a> when many of Kosovo Albanians fought the Serbs in the Croatian uniforms.<\/p>\n<p>The fundamental dilemma is why NATO directly supported the KLA \u2013 an organization that was previously clearly called a \u201cterrorist\u201d by many Western Governments including the US administration too? It was known that a KLA\u2019s warfare of partisan strategy<a href=\"#_edn12\" name=\"_ednref12\">[12]<\/a> was based only on direct provoking of Serbia\u2019s security forces to respond by attacking the KLA\u2019s posts with an unavoidable number of civilian casualties. However, these Albanian civilian victims were not understood by NATO\u2019s authorities as \u201ccollateral damage\u201d but rather as the victims of deliberate ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless, all civilian victims of NATO\u2019s bombing in 1999 were presented by NATO\u2019s authorities exactly as \u201ccollateral damage\u201d of NATO\u2019s \u201cjust war\u201d<a href=\"#_edn13\" name=\"_ednref13\">[13]<\/a> against the oppressive regime in Belgrade.<\/p>\n<p>Here we will present the basic (academic) principles of a \u201cjust war\u201d:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><em>Last resort<\/em> \u2013 All diplomatic options are exhausted before the force is used.<\/li>\n<li><em>Just cause <\/em>\u2013 The ultimate purpose of the use of force is to self-defend its own territory or people from military attack by the others.<\/li>\n<li><em>Legitimate authority <\/em>\u2013 To imply the legitimate constituted Government of a sovereign state, but not by some private (individual) or group (organization).<\/li>\n<li><em>Right intention \u2013 <\/em>The use of force, or war, had to be prosecuted on morally acceptable reasons, but not based on revenge or the intention to inflict damage.<\/li>\n<li><em>Reasonable prospect of success \u2013<\/em> The use of force should not be activated in some hopeless cause, in which human lives are exposed for no real benefits.<\/li>\n<li><em>Proportionality \u2013<\/em> The military intervention has to have more benefits than losses.<\/li>\n<li><em>Discrimination \u2013<\/em> The use of force must be directed only at purely military targets as the civilians are considered to be innocent.<\/li>\n<li><em>Proportionality \u2013 <\/em>The used force has to be no greater than it is needed to achieve morally acceptable aims and must not be greater than the provoking cause.<\/li>\n<li><em>Humanity \u2013<\/em> The use of force cannot be directed ever against the enemy personnel if they are captured (the prisoners of war) or wounded.<a href=\"#_edn14\" name=\"_ednref14\">[14]<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>If we analyze NATO\u2019s military campaign regarding just above presented basic (academic) principles of the \u201cjust war\u201d, the fundamental conclusions will be as follows:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The US administration in 1999 did not use any real diplomatic effort to settle the Kosovo crisis as Washington simply gave the political-military ultimatum in Rambouillet only to one side (Serbia) to either accept or not in full required blackmails: 1) To withdraw all Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo; 2) To give Kosovo administration to the NATO\u2019s troops; and 3) To allow the NATO\u2019s troops to use a whole territory of Serbia for the transit purpose. In other words, the basic point of the US\u2019s ultimatum to Belgrade was that Serbia would voluntarily become a US colony but without Kosovo province. Even the US President at that time \u2013 Bill Clinton, confirmed that Miloshevic\u2019s rejection of the Rambouillet ultimatum was understandable and logical. It can be said that Serbia in 1999 did the same as the Kingdom of Serbia did in July 1914 by rejecting the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum which was also absurd and abusive.<a href=\"#_edn15\" name=\"_ednref15\">[15]<\/a><\/li>\n<li>This principle was misused by the NATO\u2019s administration as no one NATO country was attacked or occupied by the FRY. In Kosovo at that time it was a classic anti-terroristic war launched by the state authorities against the illegal separatist movement but fully sponsored in this case by the neighboring Albania and the NATO.<a href=\"#_edn16\" name=\"_ednref16\">[16]<\/a> In other words, this second principle of the \u201cjust war\u201d can be only applied to the anti-terroristic operations by the state authorities of Serbia in Kosovo province against the KLA rather than to NATO\u2019s military intervention against the FRY.<\/li>\n<li>The <em>Legitimate authority<\/em> principle in the Kosovo conflict case of 1998\u22121999 can be applied only to Serbia and her legitimate state institutions and authorities which were recognized as legitimate by the international community and above all by the UN.<\/li>\n<li>The morally acceptable reasons officially used by NATO\u2019s authorities to justify its military action against the FRY in 1999 were quite unclear and above all unproved and misused for the very political and geostrategic purposes in the coming future. Today we know that NATO\u2019s military campaign was not based on the morally proven claims to stop a mass expulsion of the ethnic Albanians from their homes in Kosovo as a mass number of displaced persons appeared during NATO\u2019s military intervention but not before.<\/li>\n<li>The consequences of the fifth principle were selectively applied as only Kosovo Albanians benefited from both short and long-term perspectives by NATO\u2019s military engagement in the Balkans in 1999.<\/li>\n<li>The sixth principle also became practically applied only to Kosovo Albanians which was, in fact, the ultimate task of the US and NATO administrations. In other words, the benefits of the action were overwhelmingly single-sided. However, from the long-term geostrategic and political aspects, the action was very profitable with a minimum loss for the Western military alliance during the campaign.<\/li>\n<li>The practical consequences of the seventh principle became mostly criticized as NATO obviously did not make any difference between the military and civilian targets. Moreover, the NATO alliance deliberately bombed many more civilian objects and non-combat citizens than military objects and personnel. However, all civilian victims of the bombing of all nationalities became simply presented by NATO\u2019s authority as unavoidable \u201ccollateral damage\u201d, but, in fact, it was a clear violation of international law and one of the basic principles of the concept of a \u201cjust war\u201d.<\/li>\n<li>The eighth principle of a \u201cjust was\u201d surely was not respected by NATO as the used force was much higher as needed to achieve proclaimed tasks and above all was much stronger than the opposite side had. However, the morally acceptable aims of the Western policymakers were based on the wrong and deliberately misused \u201cfacts\u201d concerning the ethnic Albanian victims of the Kosovo War in 1998\u22121999 as it was primarily with the \u201cbrutal massacre of forty-five civilians in the Kosovo village of Ra\u010dak in January 1999\u201d<a href=\"#_edn17\" name=\"_ednref17\">[17]<\/a> which became a formal pretext for the NATO\u2019s intervention. Nevertheless, it is known today that those Albanian \u201cbrutally massacred civilians\u201d were, in fact, the members of the KLA killed during the regular fight but not executed by the Serbian security forces.<a href=\"#_edn18\" name=\"_ednref18\">[18]<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Only the last principle of a \u201cjust war\u201d was respected by NATO for the very reason that there were no captured soldiers from the opponent side. The Serbian authorities also respected this principle as all two NATO\u2019s captured pilots were treated as prisoners of war according to international standards and even were free very soon after the imprisonment.<a href=\"#_edn19\" name=\"_ednref19\">[19]<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><strong>Conclusions\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>The crucial conclusions of the article after the investigation of the nature of NATO\u2019s \u201chumanitarian\u201d military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 are:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>NATO\u2019s military intervention against the FRY during the Kosovo War in 1998\u22121999 was done primarily for political and geostrategic purposes.<\/li>\n<li>A declarative \u201chumanitarian\u201d nature of the operation just served as a formal moral framework for the realization of the genuine goals of the post-Cold War US policy in the Balkans whose foundations were laid down by the Dayton Accords in November 1995.<\/li>\n<li>The US administration of Bill Clinton used the terrorist KLA to press and blackmail the Serbian Government to accept the ultimatum by Washington to transform Serbia into the US\u2019s military, political, and economic colony with NATO membership in the future for the exchange for formal preservation of Serbia\u2019s territorial integrity.<\/li>\n<li>The Western Governments originally labeled the KLA as a \u201cterrorist organization\u201d \u2013 that is combat strategy of directly provoking Serbia\u2019s security forces was morally unacceptable and would not result in either diplomatic or military support.<\/li>\n<li>During the Kosovo War in 1998\u22121999, the KLA, basically, served as NATO\u2019s ground forces in Kosovo for direct destabilization of Serbia\u2019s state security which were militarily defeated at the very beginning of 1999 by Serbia\u2019s regular police forces.<\/li>\n<li>NATO\u2019s sorties in 1999 had as the main goal to force Belgrade to give Kosovo province to the US and EU\u2019s administration to transform it into the biggest US and NATO military base in Europe.<\/li>\n<li>NATO\u2019s \u201chumanitarian\u201d intervention in 1999 against the FRY violated almost all principles of the \u201cjust war\u201d and international law \u2013 an intervention that became one of the best examples in the post-Cold War history of unjust use of coercive power for the political and geostrategic purposes and at the same time a classic case of coercive diplomacy that fully engaged the Western Governments.<\/li>\n<li>Some 50.000 NATO troops displaced in Kosovo after June 10<sup>th<\/sup>, 1999 did not fulfill the basic tasks of their mission: 1) Demilitarization of the KLA as this paramilitary formation was never properly disarmed; 2) Protection of all Kosovo inhabitants as only up to January 2001 there were at least 700 Kosovo citizens murdered on the ethnic basis (mostly of them were the Serbs); 3) Stability and security of the province as most of the Serbs and other non-Albanians fled the province as a consequence of systematic ethnic cleansing policy committed by the KLA in power after June 1999.<\/li>\n<li>The US\u2019s reward for the KLA\u2019s loyalty was to install the army\u2019s members to the key governmental posts of today&#8217;s \u201cindependent\u201d Republic of Kosovo which became the first European state administered by the leaders of an ex-terrorist organization that started immediately after the war to an execute a policy of ethnic cleansing of all non-Albanian population and to Islamize the province.<\/li>\n<li>The ultimate national-political goal of the KLA in power in Kosovo was to include this province into the Greater Albania projected by the First Albanian Prizren League in 1878\u22121881 and for the first time realized during WWII.<a href=\"#_edn20\" name=\"_ednref20\">[20]<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Probably, the main consequence of NATO\u2019s occupation of Kosovo after June 1999 up to today is a systematic destruction of the Christian (Serb) cultural inheritance and feature of the province followed by its obvious and comprehensive Islamization and therefore transformation of Kosovo into a new Islamic State.<\/li>\n<li>What concerns the case of the Kosovo crisis in 1998\u22121999, the first and authentic \u201chumanitarian\u201d intervention was that of Serbia\u2019s security forces against the terroristic KLA in order to preserve the human lives of the ethnic Serbs and anti-KLA Albanians in the province.<\/li>\n<li>The Balkan Stability Pact for both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo-Metochia attempted to under-emphasize the traditional concept of sovereignty giving a full practical possibility to the UN\u2019s (in fact the West\u2019s) administrative control over these two ex-Yugoslav territories.<a href=\"#_edn21\" name=\"_ednref21\">[21]<\/a><\/li>\n<li>NATO\u2019s \u201chumanitarian\u201d intervention in 1999 against the FRY clearly violated the recognized international standards of non-intervention, based on the principle of the \u201cinviolability of borders\u201d going beyond the idea of \u201cjust war\u201d according to which self-defense is the crucial reason, or at least formal justification, for the use of force.<\/li>\n<li>While NATO declaratively fulfilled \u201cthe international responsibility to protect\u201d (the ethnic Albanians) by heavily bombing Serbia and too much little extent Montenegro, bypassing the UN\u2019s Security Council it is clear that this 78-day terror effort was counterproductive as \u201ccreating as much human suffer-refugees as it relieved\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn22\" name=\"_ednref22\">[22]<\/a><\/li>\n<li>The fundamental question regarding the Kosovo \u201chumanitarian\u201d interventions today is why the Western Governments are not taking another \u201chumanitarian\u201d coercive military intervention after June 1999 to prevent further ethnic cleansing and brutal violation of human rights against all non-Albanian population in Kosovo but above all against the Serbs?<\/li>\n<li>Finally, NATO\u2019s military intervention was seen by many social constructivists as a phenomenon of \u201cwarlike democracies\u201d as a demonstration of how the ideas of liberal democracy \u201cundermine the logic of democratic peace theory\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn23\" name=\"_ednref23\">[23]<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref1\" name=\"_edn1\"><\/a><strong>References: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>[1] S. L. Spiegel, J. M. Taw, F. L. Wehling, K. P. Williams, <em>World Politics in a New Era<\/em>, Thomson Wadsworth, 2004, 319.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref2\" name=\"_edn2\">[2]<\/a> A. Heywood, <em>Global Politics<\/em>, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 320.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref3\" name=\"_edn3\">[3]<\/a> <em>Ibid<\/em>., 319.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref4\" name=\"_edn4\">[4]<\/a> J. Haynes, P. Hough, Sh. Malik, L. Pettiford, <em>World Politics<\/em>, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011, 639.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref5\" name=\"_edn5\">[5]<\/a> The 1244 UN Security Council Resolution on June 10<sup>th<\/sup>, 1999. The KFOR\u2019s basic responsibilities were:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>To protect aid operations.<\/li>\n<li>To protect all Kosovo population.<\/li>\n<li>To create a stable security in the province in order that the international administration can function normally.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref6\" name=\"_edn6\">[6]<\/a> This recognition of the self-proclaimed Kosovo independence from a democratic country of Serbia with a pro-Western regime, basically gave victory to the Albanian Kosovo radicals of the ethnic cleansing after June 1999. The Albanians from Kosovo started their atrocities against the Serbs immediately after the Kumanovo Agreement in June 1999 when the KLA returned back to Kosovo together with NATO\u2019s occupation ground troops. Up to February 2008 there were around 200.000 expelled Serbs from Kosovo and 1.248 non-Albanians who have been killed in some cases even very brutally. The number of kidnapped non-Albanians is still not known but presumably majority of them were killed. There were 151 Serb Orthodox spiritual and cultural monuments in Kosovo destroyed by the Albanians in addition to 213 mosques built with financial support from Saudi Arabia. Before Kosovo independence was proclaimed, there were 80 percent of graveyards which were either completely destroyed or partially desecrated by the Albanians. On Kosovo right to independence, see [M. Sterio, <em>The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: \u201cSelfistans\u201d, Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers<\/em>, New York\u2212London: Routledge, Taylor &amp; Francis Group, 2013, 116\u2212129]. On secession from the point of the international law, see [M. G. Kohen, <em>Secession: International Law Perspectives<\/em>, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006].<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref7\" name=\"_edn7\">[7]<\/a> T. Burghardt, \u201cKosovo: Europe\u2019s Mafia State. Hub of the EU-NATO Drug Trail\u201d, 22-12-2010, http:\/\/www.globalresearch.ca\/kosovo-europe-s-mafia-state-hub-of-the-eu-nato-drug-trail\/22486.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref8\" name=\"_edn8\">[8]<\/a> J. Haynes, P. Hough, Sh. Malik, L. Pettiford, <em>World Politics<\/em>, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011, 588.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref9\" name=\"_edn9\">[9]<\/a> On the \u201cjust peace\u201d, see [P. Allan, A. Keller (eds.), <em>What is a Just Peace?<\/em>, Oxford\u2212New York: Oxford University Press, 2006].<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref10\" name=\"_edn10\">[10]<\/a> According to the official Western sources, even up to 90 percent of the Kosovo Albanian population became refugees during NATO\u2019s military intervention. Therefore, it should be the largest displacement of the civilians in Europe after WWII. Nevertheless, all of these Albanian refugees are unquestionably considered to be \u201cexpelled\u201d from their homes by Serbia\u2019s security forces and the Yugoslav army.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref11\" name=\"_edn11\">[11]<\/a> For example, in the \u201cMedak Pocket\u201d operation on September 9<sup>th<\/sup>, 1993 there were killed around 80 Serbian civilians by the Croatian forces [\u0412. \u0402. \u041c\u0438\u0448\u0438\u043d\u0430 (\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u043a), <em>\u0420\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0421\u0440\u043f\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u041a\u0440\u0430\u0458\u0438\u043d\u0430: \u0414\u0435\u0441\u0435\u0442 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0438\u0458\u0435<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0414\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u0459\u0430 \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434, 2005, 35] in which Kosovo Albanians served too.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref12\" name=\"_edn12\">[12]<\/a> The \u201cpartisan\u201d or \u201cguerrilla\u201d war is fought by irregular troops using mainly tactics that are fitting to the geographical features of the terrain. The crucial characteristic of the tactics of the partisan war is that it uses mobility and surprise but not direct frontal battles with the enemy. Usually, the civilians are paying the highest price in the course of the partisan war. In the other words, it is \u201cwar conducted by irregulars or <em>guerrillas<\/em>, usually against regular, uniformed forces, employing hit-and-run, ambush, and other tactics that allow smaller numbers of guerrillas to win battles against numerically superior, often heavily-armed regular forces\u201d [P. R. Viotti, M. V. Kauppi, <em>International Relations and World Politics: Secularity, Economy, Identity<\/em>, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2009, 544]. With regard to the Kosovo War in 1998\u22121999 the reconstruction of the Albanian guerrilla strategy is as following:<\/p>\n<p>\u201c\u2026<em>a police patrol is passing a village, when a sudden fire is open and some policemen killed and wounded. The police return the fire and the further development depends on the strength of the rebellious unit engaged. If the village appears well protected and risky to attack by the ordinary units, the latter stops fighting and calls for additional support. It arrives usually as a paramilitary unit, which launches a fierce onslaught<\/em>\u201d [P. V. Gruji\u0107, <em>Kosovo Knot<\/em>, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: RoseDog Books, 2014, 193].<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref13\" name=\"_edn13\">[13]<\/a> The \u201cjust war\u201d is considered to be a war that has a purpose to satisfy certain ethical standards, and therefore is (allegedly) morally justified.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref14\" name=\"_edn14\">[14]<\/a> A. Heywood, <em>Global Politics<\/em>, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 257.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref15\" name=\"_edn15\">[15]<\/a> \u041c. \u0420\u0430\u0434\u043e\u0458\u0435\u0432\u0438\u045b, \u0409. \u0414\u0438\u043c\u0438\u045b, <em>\u0421\u0440\u0431\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0443 \u0412\u0435\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443 1914\u22121915<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0421\u0440\u043f\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u043a\u045a\u0438\u0436\u0435\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430\u2212\u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0444\u043e\u0440\u0443\u043c \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0442 \u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0445, 2014, 94\u221295.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref16\" name=\"_edn16\">[16]<\/a> For instance, Albania supplied the Albanian Kosovo separatists by weapons in 1997 when around 700.000 guns were \u201cstolen\u201d by the Albanian mob from Albania\u2019s army\u2019s magazines but majority of these weapons found their way exactly to the neighboring Kosovo. The members of the KLA were trained in Albania with the help of the NATO\u2019s military instructors and then sent to Kosovo.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref17\" name=\"_edn17\">[17]<\/a> R. J. Art, K. N. Waltz (eds.), <em>The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics<\/em>, Lanham\u2212Boulder\u2212New York\u2212Toronto\u2212Oxford: Rowman &amp; Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, 257.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref18\" name=\"_edn18\">[18]<\/a> \u0412. \u0411. \u0421\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0438\u045b, <em>\u041e\u0433\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0438 \u0438\u0437 \u0458\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0458\u0435<\/em>, \u0412\u0438\u0459\u043d\u0443\u0441: \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e \u0438\u0437\u0434\u0430\u045a\u0435, 2013, 19\u221229.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref19\" name=\"_edn19\">[19]<\/a> On the NATO\u2019s \u201chumanitarian\u201d intervention in the FRY in 1999, see more in [G. Szamuely, <em>Bombs for Peace: NATO\u2019s Humanitarian War on Yugoslavia<\/em>, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013].<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref20\" name=\"_edn20\">[20]<\/a> A Greater Albania as a project is \u201cenvisaged to be an area of some 90.000 square kilometres (36.000 square miles), including Kosovo, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro\u201d [J. Haynes, P. Hough, Sh. Malik, L. Pettiford, <em>World Politics<\/em>, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011, 588].<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref21\" name=\"_edn21\">[21]<\/a> R. Johnson, \u201cReconstructing the Balkans: The effects of a global governance approach\u201d, M. Lederer, P. M\u00fcller (eds.), <em>Criticizing Global Governance<\/em>, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 177.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref22\" name=\"_edn22\">[22]<\/a> A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, R. Thakur (eds.), <em>The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy<\/em>, Oxford\u2212New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 766.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref23\" name=\"_edn23\">[23]<\/a> J. Haynes, P. Hough, Sh. Malik, L. Pettiford, <em>World Politics<\/em>, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011, 225.<\/p>\n<p>__________________________________________<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/vladislav-b-sotirovic-e1701152408833.jpg\" ><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft size-full wp-image-249279\" src=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/vladislav-b-sotirovic-e1701152408833.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"100\" height=\"116\" \/><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><em>Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic is an ex-university professor and a research fellow at the Centre for Geostrategic Studies, Belgrade, Serbia. Email: <\/em><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"mailto:sotirovic1967@gmail.com\"><em>sotirovic1967@gmail.com<\/em><\/a><em> &#8211; <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.geostrategy.rs\" ><em>www.geostrategy.rs<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><em><strong>Personal disclaimer<\/strong><\/em><strong><em>:\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><em>The author\u00a0writes for this publication in a private capacity which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his\u00a0own personal views. Nothing written by the author\u00a0should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official\u00a0positions of any other media outlet or institution.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>30 Mar 2024 &#8211; Twenty-five years commemoration of NATO\u2019s military intervention against Yugoslavia in Mar\u2212Jun 1999 once again opened the question of the Western foundation for Kosovo\u2019s secession from Serbia and its unilateral proclamation of a quasi-independence in Feb 2008.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":249279,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3102],"tags":[1268,2023,91,1885,70,2991],"class_list":["post-258392","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-nato","tag-european-union","tag-kosovo","tag-nato","tag-serbia","tag-usa","tag-yugoslavia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/258392","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=258392"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/258392\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":258397,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/258392\/revisions\/258397"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/249279"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=258392"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=258392"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=258392"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}