{"id":25986,"date":"2013-02-25T12:00:56","date_gmt":"2013-02-25T12:00:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=25986"},"modified":"2017-04-26T13:08:23","modified_gmt":"2017-04-26T12:08:23","slug":"everything-we-know-so-far-about-drone-strikes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2013\/02\/everything-we-know-so-far-about-drone-strikes\/","title":{"rendered":"Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes"},"content":{"rendered":"

5 Feb 2013<\/i> – This post has been <\/em>corrected<\/i><\/a>. It was originally published Jan. 11, 2013.<\/em><\/p>\n

You might have heard about the \u201ckill list.\u201d You\u2019ve certainly heard about drones. But the details of the U.S. campaign against militants in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia — a centerpiece of the Obama administration\u2019s national security approach \u2013 remain shrouded in secrecy. Here\u2019s our guide to what we know\u2014and what we don\u2019t know.<\/i><\/p>\n

Where is the drone war? Who carries it out?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Drones have been the Obama administration\u2019s tool of choice for taking out militants outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Drones aren\u2019t the exclusive weapon \u2013 traditional airstrikes and other attacks have also been reported<\/a>. But by one estimate, 95 percent<\/a> of targeted killings since 9\/11 have been conducted by drones. \u00a0Among the benefits of drones: they don\u2019t put American troops in harm\u2019s way.<\/p>\n

The first reported drone strike against Al Qaeda happened in Yemen in 2002<\/a>. The CIA ramped up secret drone strikes<\/a> in Pakistan under President George W. Bush in 2008<\/a>. Under Obama, they have expanded drastically there and in Yemen in 2011<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The CIA isn\u2019t alone in conducting drone strikes. The military has acknowledged<\/a> \u201cdirect action\u201d in Yemen and Somalia. Strikes in those countries are reportedly carried out by the secretive<\/a>, elite Joint Special Operations Command. Since 9\/11, JSOC has grown<\/a> more than tenfold, taking on intelligence-gathering<\/a> as well as combat roles. (For example, JSOC was responsible for the operation that killed Osama Bin Laden.)<\/p>\n

The drone war is carried out remotely, from the U.S.<\/a> \u00a0and a network of secret bases<\/a> around the world. The Washington Post got a glimpse<\/a> \u2013 through examining construction contracts and showing up uninvited \u2013 at the base in the tiny African nation of Djibouti from which many of the strikes on Yemen and Somalia are carried out. Earlier this year, Wired pieced together an account<\/a> of the war against Somalia\u2019s al-Shabaab militant group and the U.S.\u2019s expanded military presence throughout Africa.<\/p>\n

The number of strikes in Pakistan has ebbed in recent years<\/a>, from a peak of more than 100 in 2010, to an estimated 46 last year. Meanwhile, the pace in Yemen picked up, with more than 40 last year. But there have been<\/a> seven strikes in Pakistan in the first ten days of 2013.<\/p>\n

How are targets chosen? <\/strong><\/p>\n

A series<\/a> of<\/a> articles<\/a> based largely on anonymous comments from administration officials have given partial picture of how the U.S. picks targets and carries out strikes. Two recent reports \u2013 from researchers at Columbia Law School<\/a> and from the Council on Foreign Relations<\/a>\u2013 also give detailed overviews of what\u2019s known about the process.<\/p>\n

The CIA and the military have reportedly long<\/a> maintained overlapping \u201ckill lists.\u201d<\/a> According to news reports last spring, the military\u2019s list was hashed out in Pentagon-run interagency meetings, with the White House approving proposed targets. Obama would authorize particularly sensitive missions himself.<\/p>\n

This year, the process<\/a> reportedly<\/a> changed, to concentrate the review of individuals and targeting criteria in the White House. According to the Washington Post<\/a>, the reviews now happen at regular interagency meetings at the National Counterterrorism Center. Recommendations are sent to a panel of National Security Council officials. Final revisions go through White House counterterror adviser John Brennan to the president. Several profiles<\/a> have highlighted<\/a> Brennan\u2019s powerful and controversial role in shaping the trajectory of the targeted killing program. This week, Obama nominated<\/a> Brennan to head the CIA.<\/p>\n

At least some CIA strikes don\u2019t have to get White House signoff<\/a>. The director of the CIA can reportedly<\/a> green-light strikes in Pakistan. In a 2011 interview,<\/a> John Rizzo, previously the CIA\u2019s top lawyer, said agency attorneys did an exhaustive review of each target.<\/p>\n

According to the Washington Post<\/a>, the Obama administration’s recent effort to impose more stringent requirements for kill lists and signature strikes exempts the CIA’s campaign in Pakistan. The CIA will have at least a year to continue strikes in Pakistan according to its own protocols.<\/p>\n

Doesn\u2019t the U.S. sometimes target people whose names they don\u2019t know? <\/strong><\/p>\n

Yes. \u00a0While administration officials often have frequently framed drone strikes as going after \u201chigh-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks<\/a>\u201d against the U.S., many strikes go after apparent militants whose identities the U.S. doesn\u2019t know. The so-called \u201csignature strikes\u201d began<\/a> under Bush in early 2008 and were expanded by Obama. Exactly what portion of strikes are signature strikes isn\u2019t clear<\/a>.<\/p>\n

At various points the CIA\u2019s use of signature strikes in Pakistan in particular have caused<\/a> tensions<\/a> with the White House and State Department. One official told the New York Times<\/a> about a joke that for the CIA, \u201cthree guys doing jumping jacks,\u201d was a terrorist training camp.<\/p>\n

In Yemen and Somalia, there is debate about whether the militants targeted by the U.S. are in fact plotting against the U.S. or instead fighting against their own country. Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who has been critical of the drone program, told<\/a>ProPublica that the U.S. is essentially running \u201ca counterinsurgency air force\u201d for allied countries. At times, strikes have relied on local intelligence that later proves faulty. The Los Angeles Times recently examined<\/a> the case of a Yemeni man killed by a U.S. drone and the complex web of allegiances and politics surrounding his death.<\/p>\n

How many people have been killed in strikes? <\/strong><\/p>\n

The precise number isn\u2019t known, but some estimates<\/a> peg the total\u00a0around<\/a>\u00a03,000.<\/p>\n

A number of groups are tracking strikes and estimating casualties:<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Long War Journal covers Pakistan<\/a> and Yemen<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The New America Foundation covers Pakistan<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The London Bureau of Investigative Journalism covers Yemen<\/a>, Somalia<\/a>, and Pakistan<\/a>, as well as statistics<\/a> from on drone strikes carried out in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n

How many of those killed are have been civilians?<\/strong><\/p>\n

It\u2019s impossible to know.<\/p>\n

There has been considerable back<\/a>-and-forth<\/a> about the tally of civilian casualties. For instance, the New America Foundation estimates<\/a> between 261 and 305 civilians have been killed in Pakistan; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism gives a range<\/a> of 475 – 891. All of the counts<\/a> are much higher than the very low numbers of deaths the administration claims. (We\u2019ve detailed<\/a> inconsistencies<\/a> even within those low estimates.)\u00a0 Some analyses show that civilian deaths have dropped<\/a> proportionally in recent years.<\/p>\n

The estimates are largely compiled by interpreting news reports relying on anonymous officials or accounts from local media, whose credibility may vary. (For example, the Washington Post reported<\/a> last month that the Yemeni government often tries to conceal the U.S.\u2019 role in airstrikes that kill civilians.)<\/p>\n

The controversy has been compounded by the fact that the U.S. reportedly<\/a> counts any military-age male killed in a drone strike as a militant. An administration official told ProPublica<\/a>, \u201cIf a group of fighting age males are in a home where we know they are constructing explosives or plotting an attack, it’s assumed that all of them are in on that effort.\u201d It\u2019s not clear what if any investigation occurs after the fact.<\/p>\n

Columbia Law School conducted an in-depth analysis<\/a> of what we know about the U.S.\u2019s efforts to mitigate and calculate civilian casualties. It concluded that the drone war\u2019s covert nature hampered accountability measures taken in traditional military actions. Another report<\/a> from Stanford and NYU documented \u201canxiety and psychological trauma\u201d among Pakistani villagers.<\/p>\n

This fall, the U.N. announced<\/a> an investigation into the civilian impact \u2013 in particular, allegations of \u201cdouble-tap<\/a>\u201d strikes, in which a second strike targets rescuers.<\/p>\n

Why just kill? What about capture?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Administration officials have said<\/a> in speeches that militants are targeted for killing when they pose an imminent threat to the U.S. and capture isn\u2019t feasible<\/a>.\u00a0But killing appears to be is far more common than capture, and accounts of strikes don\u2019t generally shed light<\/a> on \u201cimminent\u201d or \u201cfeasible.\u201d\u00a0 Cases<\/a> involving secret, overseas<\/a> captures under Obama show the political and diplomatic quandaries in deciding how and where a suspect could be picked up.<\/p>\n

This fall, the Washington Post described<\/a> something called the \u201cdisposition matrix\u201d \u2013 a process that has contingency plans for what to do with terrorists depending where they are. The Atlantic mapped out<\/a> how that decision-making might happen in the case of a U.S. citizen, based on known examples. But of course, the details of the disposition matrix, like the \u201ckill lists\u201d it reportedly supplants, aren\u2019t known.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s the legal rationale for all this?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Obama administration officials have given a series of speeches<\/a> broadly outlining the legal underpinning for strikes, but they never talk about specific cases. In fact, they don\u2019t officially acknowledge<\/a> the drone war at all.<\/p>\n

The White House argues that Congress\u2019 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force<\/a> as well as international law on nations\u2019 right to self-defense provides sound legal basis for targeting individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda or \u201cassociated forces,\u201d even outside Afghanistan. That can include U.S. citizens<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u201cDue process,\u201d said Attorney General Eric Holder said in a speech last March, \u201ctakes into account the realities of combat.\u201d<\/p>\n

What form that \u201cdue process\u201d takes hasn\u2019t been detailed. And, as we\u2019ve<\/a> reported<\/a>, the government frequently clams up when it comes to specific questions \u2013 like \u00a0civilian casualties<\/a>, or the reasons specific individuals were killed.<\/p>\n

NBC News obtained<\/a> a Justice Department memo<\/a> that was given to some members of Congress in June laying out the administration’s legal case for targeted killing in more detail. The memo, which was not classified, says that a U.S. citizen who is a “senior operational leader of al-Qaida or an associated force” can be targeted even if they are not tied to an active plot against the U.S. It also offers more detail on criteria for determining that capture is not feasible.<\/p>\n

A federal judge had ruled<\/a> earlier this year that the government did not have to release a separate secret legal memo<\/a> making the specific case for the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen. The judge also ruled the government did not have to respond to other requests<\/a> seeking more information about targeted killing in general. \u00a0(In making the ruling, the judge acknowledged a \u201cCatch-22,\u201d saying that the government claimed \u201cas perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws while keeping the reasons for their conclusion a secret.\u201d)<\/p>\n

The U.S. has also sought to dismiss<\/a> a lawsuit brought by family members over Awlaki\u2019s death and that of his 16-year-old son<\/a> \u2013 also a U.S. citizen — who was killed in a drone strike.<\/p>\n

When does the drone war end?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The administration has reportedly<\/a> discussed scaling back the drone war, but by other accounts<\/a>, it is formalizing the targeted killing program for the long haul. The U.S. estimates<\/a> there Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has a \u201cfew thousand\u201d members; but officials have also said<\/a> the U.S. cannot \u201ccapture or kill every last terrorist who claims an affiliation with al Qaeda.\u201d<\/p>\n

Jeh Johnson, who just stepped down as general counsel for the Pentagon, gave a speech<\/a> last month entitled, \u201cThe Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?\u201d He didn\u2019t give a date.<\/p>\n

John Brennan has reportedly said<\/a>\u00a0the CIA should return to its focus on intelligence-gathering. But Brennan\u2019s key role in running the drone war from the White House has led<\/a>\u00a0to debate<\/a>\u00a0about how much he would actually curtail the agency\u2019s involvement if he is confirmed as CIA chief.<\/p>\n

What about backlash abroad?<\/strong><\/p>\n

There appears to be plenty of it. Drone strikes are deeply unpopular<\/a> in the countries where they occur, sparking frequent protests<\/a>. Despite that, Brennan said last August<\/a> that the U.S. saw,\u201clittle evidence that these actions are generating widespread anti-American sentiment or recruits.\u201d<\/p>\n

General Stanley McChrystal, who led the military in Afghanistan, recently contradicted that, saying<\/a>, \u201cThe resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes … is much greater than the average American appreciates. They are hated on a visceral level, even by people who’ve never seen one or seen the effects of one.\u201d The New York Times recently reported that Pakistani militants have carried out<\/a> a campaign of brutal reprisals against locals, accusing them of spying for the U.S.<\/p>\n

As for international governments: Top U.S. allies have mostly kept silent<\/a>. A 2010 U.N. report raised concerns<\/a> about the precedent of a covert, boundary-less war. The President of Yemen, Abdu Hadi, supports<\/a> the U.S. campaign, while Pakistan maintains an uneasy combination of public protest<\/a> and apparent acquiescence<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Who to Follow<\/strong><\/p>\n

For reporting and commentary on the drone war on Twitter:<\/p>\n

@drones<\/a> collects op-eds and news on well, drones. (Run by members of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which has been outspoken about privacy concerns in the use of domestic drones, but it also covers national security.)<\/p>\n

@natlsecuritycnn<\/a> has breaking news.<\/p>\n

@Dangerroom<\/a> from Wired covers national security and technology, including a lot on drones.<\/p>\n

@lawfareblog<\/a> covers the drone war\u2019s legal dimensions.<\/p>\n

@gregorydjohnsen<\/a> is an expert on Yemen, who is closely following the war there.<\/p>\n

@AfPakChannel<\/a> from the New America Foundation and Foreign Policy tweets news and commentary on Afghanistan and Pakistan.<\/p>\n

Correction:<\/b> An earlier version of this piece referenced a speech given by former State Department legal adviser Harold Koh. The speech was in fact given by Jeh Johnson, then general counsel for the Pentagon.<\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 propublica.org<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

You might have heard about the \u201ckill list.\u201d You\u2019ve certainly heard about drones. But the details of the U.S. campaign against militants in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia — a centerpiece of the Obama administration\u2019s national security approach \u2013 remain shrouded in secrecy. Here\u2019s our guide to what we know\u2014and what we don\u2019t know.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[57,65,51],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-25986","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-militarism","category-anglo-america","category-europe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25986","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=25986"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25986\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=25986"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=25986"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=25986"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}