{"id":261821,"date":"2024-05-06T12:00:49","date_gmt":"2024-05-06T11:00:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=261821"},"modified":"2024-05-05T05:53:29","modified_gmt":"2024-05-05T04:53:29","slug":"blame-south-sudans-civil-war-on-elites-not-ethnic-tensions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2024\/05\/blame-south-sudans-civil-war-on-elites-not-ethnic-tensions\/","title":{"rendered":"Blame South Sudan\u2019s Civil War on Elites, Not \u201cEthnic Tensions\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"attachment_261822\" style=\"width: 410px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Salva-Kiir-president-South-Sudan.jpg\" ><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-261822\" class=\"wp-image-261822\" src=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Salva-Kiir-president-South-Sudan.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"400\" height=\"267\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Salva-Kiir-president-South-Sudan.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Salva-Kiir-president-South-Sudan-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Salva-Kiir-president-South-Sudan-768x512.jpg 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 400px) 100vw, 400px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-261822\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Salva Kiir, the president of South Sudan, attends the meeting of the National Liberation Council at the Freedom Hall in Juba on 2 Dec 2022. (Samir Bol \/ AFP via Getty Images)<\/p><\/div>\n<blockquote><p>30 Apr 2024 &#8211; <em>South Sudan\u2019s post-independence instability is often blamed on ethnic tensions. But exploitation by international companies and zero-sum competition over resources between local elites are the real causes of ongoing violence in the country.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In South Sudan, generals and politicians have <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/atavist.mg.co.za\/how-south-sudans-elite-looted-its-foreign-reserves\/\" >siphoned<\/a> off the country\u2019s oil wealth (<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/trendsresearch.org\/insight\/south-sudan-rivalry-between-strategic-and-conflicting-groups\/\" >98 percent<\/a> of state revenue in 2013 alone), bolstered by a \u201c<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/africacenter.org\/spotlight\/taming-the-dominant-gun-class-in-south-sudan\/\" >gun class<\/a>\u201d of government soldiers, community militias, cattle raiders, and private guards who then fight over cattle, mining, and timber industries. While public reporting and official narratives largely <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/latest\/news\/2023\/03\/violent-conflicts-in-south-sudan-almost-always-involve-human-rights-violations-and-abuses-and-crimes-under-international-law\/\" >focus<\/a> on the ethnic nature of South Sudan\u2019s violence, an unrestricted race for wealth and power is what really undergirds this contest. South Sudan may be the world\u2019s youngest country, but the ongoing conflict is a process decades in the making. Since the 1950s, foreign governments and corporations have consistently legitimized the most predatory actors in the region.<\/p>\n<section id=\"ch-1\" class=\"po-cn__section po-wp__section\">\n<h3 class=\"po-cn__subhead po-wp__subhead\">Elite Conflicts<\/h3>\n<p>After two civil wars spanning virtually all of independent Sudan\u2019s history (1955\u201372, 1983\u20132005), South Sudan achieved independence by popular referendum in 2011. The conflicts were often <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/blog-post\/the-history-behind-sudans-identity-crisis\" >framed<\/a> as \u201cArab\u201d Khartoum versus \u201cAfrican\u201d South Sudanese tribes, but <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/chapter\/10.1057\/9781137437143_6\" >struggles for oil wealth<\/a> and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.smallarmssurvey.org\/sites\/default\/files\/resources\/HSBA-WP40-Oil.pdf\" >factional enrichment<\/a> were far better explainers. Indeed, some of the <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/525368?origin=crossref\" >most brutal fighting<\/a>, including the massacre of two thousand people in Bor in 1991, was between South Sudanese factions.<\/p>\n<p>Accordingly, only two years after independence, coalitions under President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar (architect of the Bor bloodbath) <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/afraf\/article\/113\/452\/347\/78186\" >came to blows<\/a> in the capital of Juba, initiating a civil war that engulfed much of the country. Parties to the conflict would employ systematic <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.humanrightspulse.com\/mastercontentblog\/the-spoils-of-war-south-sudan-and-the-surging-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-against-women\" >sexual and gender-based violence<\/a>, <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/2016\/10\/south-sudan-dangerous-rise-ethnic-hate-speech-must-be-reined-zeid\" >hate speech<\/a> and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2014\/01\/16\/south-sudan-ethnic-targeting-widespread-killings\" >ethnic cleansing<\/a>, and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2020\/10\/starvation-being-used-method-warfare-south-sudan-un-panel\" >starvation as a weapon of war<\/a>. Kiir\u2019s centralization of access to state oil revenues was <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/horn-africa\/south-sudan\/305-oil-or-nothing-dealing-south-sudans-bleeding-finances\" >important<\/a> to the war\u2019s initiation, and the oil fields of Unity State and Upper Nile became <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.smallarmssurvey.org\/sites\/default\/files\/resources\/HSBA-WP40-Oil.pdf\" >key battlegrounds<\/a>. Though the conflict technically ended with a <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.usip.org\/south-sudan-peace-process-key-facts\" >peace deal<\/a> in 2018 and a power-sharing government in 2020, the parties have merely <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/acleddata.com\/2021\/08\/19\/surface-tension-communal-violence-and-elite-ambitions-in-south-sudan\/\" >decentralized<\/a> their economic and political contests. Accordingly, violence <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/unmiss.unmissions.org\/sites\/default\/files\/q4_infographics_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_2023_0.pdf\" >against civilians<\/a> and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/civil-war-south-sudan\" >between proxy forces and militias<\/a> persists.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"sr-at__slot sr-at__slot--left prt-x\"><\/aside>\n<p>But rather than a \u201ctwo feuding generals\u201d narrative (as <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/news\/sudan-war-fighting-2023-crisis\/\" >we<\/a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2023\/04\/24\/podcasts\/the-daily\/sudan-civil-war.html\" >see<\/a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/africa\/how-two-feuding-generals-drove-sudan-to-the-brink-of-starvation-379eb94f\" >again<\/a> in discussion of Sudan today), violence in the country has always been tied to local realities. The many factions in South Sudan are hardly top-down or ideologically driven. Elites in Juba and provincial capitals can only fight over personal wealth by <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/thesentry.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/07\/report_NexusCorruptionConflict_SouthSudan_TheSentry.pdf\" >paying<\/a> off militias and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2678167\" >mobilizing<\/a> patronage networks that took decades to build. Since the 1980s, Kiir, Machar, and others have been arming communities, <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.smallarmssurvey.org\/sites\/default\/files\/resources\/HSBA-WP41-White-Army.pdf\" >promoting<\/a> ethnicized violence, and cynically <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com\/articles\/10.1186\/s41018-018-0030-y\" >politicizing<\/a> traditional beliefs and rituals that had once regulated murder and theft.<\/p>\n<p>Rather than intrinsic hatred, ethnic\/tribal identity became a tool to create networks of <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.csrf-southsudan.org\/repository\/what-drives-the-cattle-camps-exploring-the-dynamics-of-pastoralist-communities-in-western-lakes-state-south-sudan\/\" >mutual<\/a> protection and profit during the deprivations of civil war. In instances in which the supposed ethnic loyalties of factions have come into conflict with their material interests, the latter have often won out. For example, the Nuer <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/sudantribune.com\/article56977\/\" >White Army<\/a>, diffuse bands of cattle raiders responsible for Bor and essential to the 2013 civil war, have <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/journal-of-modern-african-studies\/article\/abs\/it-takes-a-village-to-raise-a-militia-local-politics-the-nuer-white-army-and-south-sudans-civil-wars\/2950DB004141185586D297BB710B4BD0\" >often<\/a> ignored or killed Nuer elites that opposed them.<\/p>\n<p>The official peace of 2018, <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/newleftreview.org\/sidecar\/posts\/the-war-they-call-peace\" >focused<\/a> on formal institutions and power-sharing in Juba, could hardly resolve the zero-sum economic competition, instrumentalized identities, and coercive nature of such diffuse networks. South Sudan is now in its sixth year of \u201ctransition\u201d with very little to show for it. The unified armed forces are <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n23\/336\/13\/pdf\/n2333613.pdf?token=UgnRAEt4816HJi1taO&amp;fe=true\" >starved<\/a> of money and support, political offices are <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/thesentry.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Sentry_WCSP_Finalx.pdf\" >treated<\/a> as personal coffers, and Kiir\u2019s <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/hrbodies\/hrcouncil\/cohrsouthsudan\/A_HRC_54_CRP.6_0.pdf\" >repression<\/a> in the run-up to December elections is creating a <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/press.un.org\/en\/2024\/sc15611.doc.htm\" >powder keg<\/a> for renewed violence.<\/p>\n<p>The money for these essential patronage networks has had to come from somewhere. Despite war crimes and repression, international corporations have been active and essential in all phases of South Sudan\u2019s violence. In the eleven years between the First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars, Chevron (with investment from Shell) <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/reports\/2003\/sudan1103\/10.htm\" >discovered<\/a> and began developing oil fields in the Greater Upper Nile region. In 1980, in contravention of the 1972 peace deal, Sudanese president Gaafar Nimeiry created \u201cUnity\u201d State to take the fields completely out of the hands of the South\u2019s already marginalized regional government.<\/p>\n<p>Nimeiry routed oil through a pipeline northward to Port Sudan rather than southward to Kenya, which has ensured Sudan takes a cut of South Sudanese oil to this day. This extraction was an important catalyst for the second war, as cited by the Sudan People\u2019s Liberation Movement\/Army (SPLM\/A) when it <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.smallarmssurvey.org\/sites\/default\/files\/resources\/HSBA-WP40-Oil.pdf\" >declared<\/a> itself in 1983.<\/p>\n<p>After an attack on the oil fields by unaffiliated Nuer soldiers, Chevron halted operations. The SPLM\/A, which still rules South Sudan, told Chevron not to restart work. Khartoum pressed for the opposite, and Chevron countered with a five-point plan to build locally inclusive oil infrastructure and invest in local health, water, and education. However, not only did this investment never materialize, but Chevron ignored the fact that Khartoum-armed Bagg\u0101ra militias and Nuer proxy forces under Paulino Matiep were violently clearing the lands around the oil fields of Dinka and Nuer villagers. Furthermore, the oil conglomerate had reportedly been the party that asked Khartoum for these \u201coil protection\u201d forces; both South Sudanese officials and a journalist with the <em>Economist<\/em> even <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/reports\/2003\/sudan1103\/10.htm#_ftn165\" >accused<\/a> Chevron of directly supporting the militias.<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<section id=\"ch-2\" class=\"po-cn__section po-wp__section\">\n<h3 class=\"po-cn__subhead po-wp__subhead\">Protection Rackets<\/h3>\n<p>This \u201cprotection\u201d effort <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/pdf\/20454976.pdf?casa_token=3vBIcqgZ-P8AAAAA:z5mMPYMf4rZ_CfTh04qV4L3SEtxL4wD5rsXGkcvky40juPHVH7Pvztgq2ZZnB-f7m6uTJ0Ekdd92IfVYnFw503DjBHvtQzMMDkTGw7W8Or0GmPpx8ag\" >intersected<\/a> nicely with Khartoum\u2019s operations against the civilian population. As seen in <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/report\/2004\/05\/06\/darfur-destroyed\/ethnic-cleansing-government-and-militia-forces-western-sudan\" >Darfur<\/a> a decade later, gunships bought with oil money buzzed villages while well-armed and coordinated \u201cprotection forces\u201d besieged and cleared communities (often robbing them and enslaving the women and children). Beyond oil profits that funded Khartoum\u2019s indiscriminate war effort, the oil industry\u2019s infrastructure \u2014 roads, airstrips, physical facilities \u2014 enhanced the mobility of the militias and government forces. These \u201coil protection\u201d units then became key participants in the profiteering \u201cSouth-South\u201d violence of the 1990s (like the Bor massacre) and perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities of the South Sudanese Civil War (the Padang Dinka \u201cOil Protection Force\u201d <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.amnesty.nl\/content\/uploads\/2017\/06\/South-Sudan-briefing.pdf?x2587\" >campaign<\/a> against the Shilluk in 2017).<\/p>\n<p>Loosely affiliated, opportunistic militias thus proliferated throughout the 1980s and 1990s to alternately protect or procure oil rents for the highest bidder. The new coup government of Omar al-Bashir eventually <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.elibrary.imf.org\/view\/journals\/002\/2020\/073\/article-A003-en.xml\" >ran<\/a> Chevron out of Unity in 1985 and all of Sudan in 1992. Khartoum partnered with a less risk-averse consortium comprising the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (the largest in China), Malaysian state-owned Petronas, and private Canadian firm Arakis (later bought up by a larger Canadian firm, Talisman). Chevron would not reap the full profits of an industry it had carved out amid Greater Upper Nile\u2019s suffering. This was the <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/books.google.com\/books?hl=en&amp;lr=&amp;id=dwsnDAAAQBAJ&amp;oi=fnd&amp;pg=PP1&amp;dq=south+sudan+international+oil&amp;ots=J5WdzC_Aya&amp;sig=SQeyi_tp4kIwXywknNHJ2F7kW34#v=onepage&amp;q=south%20sudan%20international%20oil&amp;f=false\" >beginning<\/a> of Chinese, Malaysian, and later Indian and East African corporate domination of South Sudan\u2019s resources.<\/p>\n<p>The United States also offers a common thread in this period. Then US ambassador to the UN George Bush Sr <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/reports\/2003\/sudan1103\/10.htm#_ftn116\" >reportedly<\/a> facilitated Chevron\u2019s contract with Nimeiry. Later, the United States <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.elibrary.imf.org\/view\/journals\/002\/2020\/073\/article-A003-en.xml\" >pressured<\/a> Chevron into exiting Sudan as it soured on al-Bashir\u2019s coups, violence, and support for international Islamist fundamentalism. The United States became a <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/chapter\/10.1007\/978-3-030-46636-7_20\" >leading driver<\/a> of the southern \u201cpeace\u201d process, pressuring Khartoum with sanctions while corralling the main South Sudanese actors to the table, culminating in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).<\/p>\n<aside class=\"sr-at__slot sr-at__slot--left prt-x\"><\/aside>\n<p>But the main South Sudanese actors were often the same self-styled \u201coil protection forces\u201d and various other predatory power players (SPLM\/A factions included). The CPA largely <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/10357718.2018.1510895?casa_token=f4UbKmWFCNQAAAAA%3AfBV-hi_hzUQ-1Z64kWyMon0mVFii7vzNLwABv_Lsmb-J2vcX2WHly0k8SoWjlZoFENL-iw4cihGt\" >excluded<\/a> South Sudanese civil society and did more to get Khartoum and Juba to divide up oil rents than <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/03056240500121008?casa_token=i5NFJvSbNvAAAAAA%3Arei8LGuHKQoBxsr4GJS6lrvY2pVlV1toeWTwD_sxPXwJPjoeVhvapDlZQDpXU-g02F4OFdMOa9vI\" >work toward<\/a> actual equity and accountability after years of destructive war. It not only glossed over but exacerbated the violent economic contestation underneath much of the vicious South-South violence of the 1990s. Salva Kiir\u2019s SPLM\/A government ramped up violent \u201c<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/eprints.lse.ac.uk\/107520\/1\/CRP_violence_crime_and_gender_in_south_sudan.pdf\" >disarmament<\/a>\u201d campaigns against rivals while plundering the opaque, state-run oil conglomerate <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.globalwitness.org\/en\/campaigns\/south-sudan\/capture-on-the-nile\/#chapter-0\/section-0\" >Nilepet<\/a> (created in 2009).<\/p>\n<p>From 2005 to 2013, international \u201cpeacebuilders\u201d and \u201cstatebuilders\u201d <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/newleftreview.org\/sidecar\/posts\/the-war-they-call-peace\" >reveled<\/a> in crafting the \u201cnew\u201d South Sudan. The United States, United Kingdom, and Norway (the \u201cTroika\u201d) and various African governments (often with <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/horn-africa\/south-sudan-african-union-regional-bodies\/south-sudan-keeping-faith-igad-peace\" >their own<\/a> political and economic stakes) played the roles of mediators, bureaucrats, and humanitarians. Militia leaders, community elders, and militarized businessmen who had spent years appealing to ethnic hatred, religious prophecy, and pure force were expected to freely commit to formal institutions and winner-take-all elections. Though Khartoum and Juba reached a relatively stable working arrangement on the Port Sudan pipeline, it should hardly be surprising that frequent enemies of the 1990s (Kiir\u2019s <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com\/articles\/10.1186\/s41018-018-0030-y\" >Dinka <\/a><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com\/articles\/10.1186\/s41018-018-0030-y\" ><em>Titweng <\/em><\/a><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com\/articles\/10.1186\/s41018-018-0030-y\" >troops<\/a> and Machar\u2019s White Army allies) returned to violence in 2013.<\/p>\n<p>After the interregnum of the civil war, South Sudan returned to similar processes. The oil fields began to dry up, but international commodity traders <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.occrp.org\/en\/investigations\/as-south-sudan-seeks-funds-for-peace-a-billion-dollar-spending-spree\" >allowed<\/a> the government to trade in prepayments for future oil sales, mortgaging South Sudan\u2019s main income source tomorrow so leaders could <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/thesentry.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Sentry_WCSP_Finalx.pdf\" >buy<\/a> mansions and luxury cars today. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/enactafrica.org\/enact-observer\/cattle-rustling-a-flourishing-illicit-market-in-east-africa\" >Massive cattle herds<\/a> (built through violent <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.csrf-southsudan.org\/repository\/what-drives-the-cattle-camps-exploring-the-dynamics-of-pastoralist-communities-in-western-lakes-state-south-sudan\/\" >raiding<\/a>), <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/rainforestjournalismfund.org\/stories\/loggers-impunity-leaving-south-sudans-forest-ruin\" >destructive<\/a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.csrf-southsudan.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/2020-10-The-impact-of-logging-on-local-communities-Final-Report.pdf\" >logging<\/a>, and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/globalinitiative.net\/analysis\/south-sudan-gold-sector-crime-corruption\/\" >exploitative<\/a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/thesentry.org\/reports\/untapped-unprepared\/\" >mines<\/a> are often overseen by soldiers, funded by foreign companies, and integrated into transnational supply chains. Juba is more stratified than ever, with new luxury hotels overlooking the Nile and waterfront bars catering to aid workers, diplomats, and government officials. The short distance from the international airport to the Vatican Embassy is covered with a pristine paved road, <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/theradiocommunity.org\/govt-tars-proposed-pope-francis-rd-ahead-of-papal-visit\" >built<\/a> solely for the Pope\u2019s February 2023 visit.<\/p>\n<p>But in this microcosm of South Sudan\u2019s inequity, much of Juba remains a sea of uneven dirt roads, emaciated goats and cattle, tuk tuks and biker gangs, cash lenders and charcoal traders. Walls near the Presidential Palace are marked by bullet holes from the 2013 battles. Not-so-hidden machine guns ring the infamous <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2020\/12\/14\/witness-silencing-dissent-south-sudan\" >Blue House<\/a>, from which Kiir\u2019s military and intelligence services torture and terrorize the population. Embassies, NGO compounds, and UN offices make up islands of barbed wire \u201ctranquility\u201d for foreigners. Campaigning season is underway, <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/hrbodies\/hrcouncil\/cohrsouthsudan\/A_HRC_54_CRP.6_0.pdf\" >meaning<\/a> media repression, arbitrary arrest and detention of rivals and activists, and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/peacekeeping.un.org\/en\/violence-against-civilians-persists-across-south-sudan-according-to-latest-unmiss-human-rights-brief#:~:text=Disturbingly%2C%20there%20were%2022%20documented,South%20Sudan%20security%20apparatus%20personnel.\" >extrajudicial killings<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>In this context, narratives of ethnic hatred or purely localized violence are not only inaccurate but actively harmful to the cause of understanding the kinds of exploitation taking place in the country. State and national officials claim that despite their commitment to the peace process, they\u2019re simply being undermined by \u201clocal\u201d violence. And while they search for solutions through conferences and unfunded initiatives, they plead innocence as the patrons and profiteers of specific raids and industries. In this internationally financed status quo, they have no incentive to share power, lay down arms, or introduce regulation and oversight.<\/p>\n<p>December elections may destroy the house of cards. To paraphrase one advocate: \u201cThere are 550 seats in the transitional legislature, but only 250 in the post-transition assembly. That means three hundred powerful people will lose parliamentary immunity to everything from corruption charges to The Hague.\u201d It remains to be seen whether South Sudan will fragment violently or Kiir will become more powerful than ever. Either way, there is money to be made and lives to be lost.<\/p>\n<p>_____________________________________________<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><em>Stefan Bakumenko is an independent researcher based in Washington, DC. He has previously worked with <\/em>Refugees International, the International Peace Institute, <em>and<\/em> the Center for Civilians in Conflict<em>.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/jacobin.com\/2024\/04\/south-sudan-civil-war-oil-elites\" >Go to Original &#8211; jacobin.com<\/a><\/p>\n<\/section>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>30 Apr 2024 &#8211; South Sudan\u2019s post-independence instability is often blamed on ethnic tensions. But exploitation by international companies and zero-sum competition over resources between local elites are the real causes of ongoing violence in the country.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":261822,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[127],"tags":[237,555,103,2819,128],"class_list":["post-261821","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-africa","tag-africa","tag-elites","tag-racism","tag-south-sudan","tag-sudan"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/261821","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=261821"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/261821\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":261824,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/261821\/revisions\/261824"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/261822"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=261821"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=261821"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=261821"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}