{"id":269231,"date":"2024-07-15T12:00:03","date_gmt":"2024-07-15T11:00:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=269231"},"modified":"2024-07-12T06:59:05","modified_gmt":"2024-07-12T05:59:05","slug":"hegemony-or-bust","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2024\/07\/hegemony-or-bust\/","title":{"rendered":"Hegemony or Bust"},"content":{"rendered":"

11 Jul 2024 – <\/em>Novelty has observers rummaging through their inventory of ideas and concepts to find one to fit the new experience. Its application is supposed to provide some rudimentary meaning about the new phenomenon. Many are content with doing just that \u2013 however freighted with inappropriate connotations that label might be, however ambiguous its denotation(s). So, it is with concepts like populism, Fascism, and hegemony. All are in vogue; all are so promiscuously employed as to lose whatever capacity for clarification or explanation they could have for explicating the phenomena in question.<\/p>\n

Let\u2019s look at the last mentioned \u2013 Hegemony. The term holds a central place in the present discourse about the United States\u2019 place in the world: what it has been, its sustainability, and alternative ways of formulating the country\u2019s national interests.<\/p>\n

Hegemony<\/strong>\u00a0= dominance over places, political elites, institutions so as to control what a state does in its own interest. That dominance can vary in scope, in its methods of control, in its degrees of control.\u00a0 The much discussed American hegemony after WW II was geographically delimited by the Communist bloc outside its ambit. After 1991, it took on a putative global dimension with the aspirational goal to solidify the United States\u2019 primacy and dominion. It remains so today. (It was first enunciated in the notorious Wolfowitz Memorandum in February 1992, which since has become the template American foreign policymaking).1 During the earlier period, the United States\u2019 preoccupation was security, the means primarily military – albeit buttressed by a dense network of favorable economic relationships partially institutionalized. Over the ensuing 30-odd years, the emphasis gradually shifted toward the multifaceted, politico-economic strategy of neo-liberalism. That change in the balance between \u2018hard\u2019 and \u2018semi-soft\u2019 power never eclipsed purely military considerations \u2013 as evinced in<\/p>\n

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  1. the Pentagon\u2019s publicly stated commitment to broad spectrum military superiority in order to ensure escalation dominance in every region against any imaginable foe,<\/li>\n
  2. the scatter-shot interventions conducted in the name of the Global War On Terror, c) the relentless expansion of NATO.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Washington\u2019s readiness to use force to work its will, now expressed in its aggressive stance toward Russia and China, did not extinguish the idealistic Kantian belief that the spread of constitutional democracy along with the promised tangible rewards of world-wide economic independence, is the surest guarantee of international stability. A stability overseen by a benevolent America. The fulfillment of this presumed teleology, though, dictated the use of hard power to thwart\/subdue those who could challenge it.<\/p>\n

    Today, our political elites find themselves in a position where the goal of global hegemony has become unreachable \u2013 by any reasonable standard, for objective reasons. Yet, this logical conclusion is one that they are unwilling \u2013 or unable – to accept. That unwillingness is at once intellectual, ideological and emotional. The complex psychology of a declining great power that enjoyed unprecedented respect beyond its borders, that was founded on the belief in an inborn exceptionalness destining it to be the cynosure of ideas that would reshape the world, makes analysis of this behavior daunting. What we can say is that the prospect of diminished status is intolerable \u2013 even if the country\u2019s security and welfare face no direct threat. The compulsive quest for an imagined absolute security and natural superiority does not allow Americans to rest content with what they achieved at home and abroad. For what the country aspired to, and felt itself near to accomplishing, is slipping out of our reach. The gap between aspiration and reality widens year by year. Therein lies the rub.<\/p>\n

    Fading prowess is one of the most difficult things for humans to cope with \u2013 whether it be an individual or a nation.\u00a0\u00a0By nature, we prize our strength and competence; we dread decline and its intimations of extinction. This is especially so in the United States where for many the individual and the collective persona are inseparable. <\/em>No other country tries so relentlessly to live its legend as does the U.S<\/em>.\u00a0For many Americans \u2013 in the age of anxiety and insecurity – their sense of individual self-esteem and self-worth is grounded on their intimate association with being part of a uniquely endowed and virtuous nation. Today, events are occurring that contradict the American narrative of a nation with an exceptional destiny. That creates cognitive dissonance and unease.\u00a02<\/p>\n

    The remarkable uniformity of thinking among influential members of the political class militates against confronting that dilemma head-on. There is close to zero serious debate about foreign policy ends and means \u2013 at least, among those who have any access to the corridors of decision-making power. All observe the same holy writ and sing from the same hymnal. The result: deeply entrenched group-think impervious to contradictory evidence that is ignored or dismissed or twisted to fit preconceptions. That points to a troubling question: should American conduct internationally be understood in terms of a reasoned determination to follow chosen course internationally, however high the odds against achieving its ambitious goal? Or, are we observing compulsive actions rooted in deep-seated emotions and states of mind that are reified in doctrinal hegemony?<\/p>\n

    \u00a0Why Hegemony?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Every state\u2019s paramount concern is its security. That stems from the intrinsic nature of international affairs. The distinguishing characteristic of that environment is that each entity determines when and how it might use force to achieve its objectives \u2013 there is no superior authority setting and enforcing rules of behavior. Hence, the ubiquity of potential conflict situations for which states must prepare themselves. Is the hallmark of international relations. This truism, though, trails some cardinal questions. The circumstance in which any state finds itself is not fixed; there are a multitude of strategic configurations \u2013 each with its peculiar traits. Too, there is a range of policies that a state could follow to secure itself under any of those conditions.<\/p>\n

    Obviously, those theoretical options are limited by relevant parties\u2019 relative strength, domestic resources, degrees of internal cohesion, prevailing ideologies, etc. Nonetheless, alternative ways of setting one\u2019s security needs and formulating strategies for meeting them do exist. That holds even where \u2018discretionary response potential\u2019 is limited by objective conditions.<\/p>\n

    [See the attached essay that sketches in broad outline a radically different \u2018grand strategy\u2019 for the United States. It is composed of extracts from an earlier commentary.]<\/em><\/p>\n

    Determining what constitutes a satisfactory security situation is a function of judgments made by main decision-makers in their country\u2019s peculiar context and history. At one end of the continuum is the quest for absolute security \u2013 or, some approximation to it. Even then an assessment should be made of the feasible\/preferable timeframe. Absolute security for as far as the strategic eye can see? for this generation? Until some envisaged change in the balance-of-power is expected to register?<\/p>\n

    Predominant thinking in the United States is located toward that absolutist point on the continuum. In addition, it leans heavily toward the long-term \u2013 if not permanency. That is understandable. For its first 130 years or so, the U.S. was secured against threat to its physical cum<\/em>\u00a0political integrity by geography. The only exception was the hovering danger posed in its early years by a Britain which harbored hopes of retribution and restoration as became manifest in the War of 1812. For the next century, the Americans engaged in conflict with other states only because of their own ambitions to extend its dominions. \u00a0(Against Spain: 1819, 1898; against Mexico: 1848). Those were choices, by no means a necessity. So, too, was entry into World War I. Washington leaders were evidently more comfortable with the pre-war status quo than they were with a Europe dominated by a triumphant Germany. Still, the threat assessment was more abstract than concrete and \u2013 such as it was – could not emerge in the near future. Hence, it rightly also should be labelled a \u2018war of choice\u2019 rather than a war of security necessity. It was natural, if not preordained, that the U.S. would revert to neo-isolationism during the inter-war period.<\/p>\n

    The American confidence in its insularity from tangible security threats subsequently was punctured by three events: Pearl Harbor, the Soviet detonation of a nuclear bomb, and 9\/11. The last came 10 years after the dissolution of the threat from the USSR. In the intervening decade, the United States\u2019 political elites felt reassured that the country\u2019s near absolute security could be restored. The challenge was to exploit propitious conditions globally to establish a benign American hegemony wherein no threat could possibility materialize. A multiform strategy was in order to extend and deepen American influence, to affirm the allegiance and deference of other states, and to prepare for the use of force where necessary to PREVENT any prospective military rival from emerging. That is the underlying logic of the Wolfowitz Doctrine.<\/p>\n

    At present, its rootedness in the minds of the country\u2019s leadership is evinced by our confrontational attitude toward Russia, China, Iran and a slew of less formidable states whom Washington sees as hostile or in some way antagonistic. As Joe Biden pithily pronounced last week: \u201cnot only am I campaigning, but I\u2019m running the world.\u201d<\/em>\u00a0Now, that sounds like hyperbole, but we are the essential nation of the world.\u201d Interpolation: We should be running the entire world \u2013 for the world\u2019s sake as well as for our sake.<\/em><\/p>\n

    \u2018Our sake\u2019 implies a need. What sort of need? It is not an overt security need since there exists no manifest threat to the territorial integrity or political integrity. Nor is there such a threat to our principal allies\/partners \u2013 the confected delusion about Putin being another Hitler and equally fanciful notion of a diabolical Chinese plot to replace us as the global supremo, notwithstanding. What is threatened is American hegemony as conceived a la Wolfowitz. That hegemony is needed not for security reasons, but rather to confirm United States\u2019 entitlement to its exceptionalism and paramountcy embedded in the national psyche and its national creed.<\/p>\n

    That was the state-of-affairs when the Biden team of neo-cons and hardline nationalists came to power. They felt a sense of urgency. Trump had been too erratic in his dealings with Moscow and Beijing \u2013 a battery of sanctions notwithstanding. While he \u2018dithered,\u2019 China and Russia grew in strength, a progression that demanded swift action lest it get out of control. They were ready to take the bit between their teeth; they had a plan. The main players shared a clear \u2013 if unidimensional \u2013 cognitive map of the global environment, the goal was inscribed in granite, and their belief in the efficacy of American power unqualified. The main components were these. Russia was to be neutralized as a major power either by enticing it to shelter under the West\u2019s wing so as to protect itself from the voracious \u2018Yellow Peril\u201d on its border OR gravely weakened by a combination of NATO expansion and economic sanctions – with the hope of that leading to Putin\u2019s replacement by a more accommodating leadership. Joe Biden in March 2022: \u2018That man just has to go!<\/em>\u201d China was to be contained by the formation a ring-fence of American-led alliances in Asia coupled to measures designed to restrict its access to Western markets, technology and finance. In addition, concrete steps would be taken to promote Taiwan\u2019s independence while building up its defenses. The Bidens\u2019 expected that such a strategy would mean stagnation of China\u2019s economy with commensurate debilitation of its influence internationally. As for the other hostile parties. They could be dealt with by mobilizing America\u2019s arsenal of coercion weapons against them.<\/p>\n

    This far-reaching strategy implied a basic change in not just objectives but in risk calculations as well. During the Cold War standoff with the USSR, Washington\u2019s were tempered by prudence. No more. An historian of antiquity characterized the relations between the two great empires of Rome and Parthia this way: \u201cEach empire needed to show respect to the other\u2019s sensibilities. Pushing too hard risked bring on a far more serious war which neither side wanted.\u201d<\/em>\u00a0Today\u2019s hard-driving American leaders view that attitude as a quaint remembrance of a past epoch.<\/p>\n

    The common features of Washington\u2019s plans for Russia and China were<\/p>\n