{"id":296413,"date":"2025-06-02T12:01:02","date_gmt":"2025-06-02T11:01:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=296413"},"modified":"2025-05-30T06:54:11","modified_gmt":"2025-05-30T05:54:11","slug":"sharing-chopsticks","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2025\/06\/sharing-chopsticks\/","title":{"rendered":"Sharing Chopsticks?"},"content":{"rendered":"

29 May 2025 – China is presented with the same fundamental dilemma as is Russia. There are some noteworthy situational differences, though. Here is a summary denotation of both.<\/em><\/p>\n

China is the principal obstacle to the United States\u2019 retention of its dominant global position. In fashioning a strategy for dealing with Washington, it faces a singular dilemma.\u00a0 Put simply, it is how to deal with an America that remains blind in vision and impervious in policy to the epochal changes reshaping the configuration of the world system. To the extent that Washington does feel the vibrations from this tectonic shift, political leaders are seen as reacting instinctively to deny its practical consequences as they strive to affirm an endangered supremacy. That compulsion leads American policymakers to set themselves ever more arduous challenges to prove that nothing fundamental has changed. Hence, the drive to overturn a strategic commitment made half a century ago by pressing by every means for Taiwan\u2019s autonomy.\u00a0<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

The Sino-American relationship exhibits a number of distinctive characteristics. Here is a summary denotation of them.<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \u00a01. China poses no security threat to the United States or its allies. Beijing leaders have not indicated by word or deed any intention to act militarily in an aggressive manner. The intense speculation about war between the United States and China is due exclusively to the American provocation of rescinding the formal commitment it made in 1979 to recognize Taiwan as legally an integral part of China, and its multiform efforts to promote Taiwan independence \u2013 including significant arms deliveries and training of its armed forces. China accepted extreme strategic nuclear inferiority to the United States for decades until its recent program of expanding and upgrading its nuclear forces in response to belligerent moves by Washington over Taiwan and its trillion dollar plans to enhance its own missile capabilities. That was deemed necessary to retain a condition of Mutual Assured Destruction<\/li>\n
  2. \u00a02. Unlike the situation with Russia, China does not abut an American partner, nor is there an ongoing conflict in the region, nor territorial disputes other than the minor Spratley Islands affair<\/li>\n
  3. \u00a0 3. The United States never has been an Asian power in the sense of having institutional ties there approximating anything like its presence as a European power. It is a Pacific power<\/li>\n
  4. \u00a0 4. Unlike Russia that has been a major player in continental European affairs for centuries, China\u2019s sole historical intercourse with the West has been as a victim of Western imperialism. It did cross swords with the United States in Korea (in a war instigated by Stalin) when it perceived a direct threat from American forces advancing toward the Yalu frontier. Also, the PLA had a large presence (300,000), albeit non-combat, in North Vietnam during the Indo-China war. For 50 years, though, the main relationships with Western countries have been commercial<\/li>\n
  5. \u00a05.The PRC\u2019s nominal adhesion to Communism as its legitimizing doctrine is not a cause of concern since it today engages in no proselytization and, indeed, makes a point of dealing with all manner of governments on a strictly practical basis<\/li>\n
  6. \u00a06. Trump\u2019s disavowal of the long-standing American goals of promoting democracy and its penchant for nation-building, changes little in Beijing\u2019s view of American aims or actions. China\u2019s leaders have interpreted that dimension of American foreign policy as a derivative of the country\u2019s self-regard and cultivated by its leaders in order to make palatable \u2013 at home and abroad \u2013 its harsh realpolitik. The one troubling aspect of that cosmetic disguise is the use of a supposed human rights concern to blemish China\u2019s image. Beijing\u2019s angry rejection of charges that it systematically abuses the Uigurs is accompanied by sharp retorts that America should take a close look at itself in the mirror. Now, it is easier for the Chinese simply to ignore American \u2018slanders.\u2019 On matters of human rights, Washington has lost any semblance of credibility thanks to its complicity in the Palestinian genocide, backing of despotic regimes elsewhere and abuses domestically<\/li>\n
  7. \u00a0 7. Talk of an American retrenchment from its forward positions worldwide, of more discrimination where and how it will apply its power, likely are met with skepticism in Beijing. There surely is no sign of it in the Taiwan Strait. Is it credible that the United States will abandon its active presence in all regions or its commitment to \u201cfull spectrum dominance\u201d militarily? That is improbable short of a fundamental revision of Washington\u2019s global perspective \u2013 of which there is no evidence. The loosening of some formal ties along with the obligations they entail properly should be seen as a tactical move to gain greater flexibility and discretionary judgment in deciding how unchanging American goals best can be advanced. So, it is a reasonable expectation that the United States\u2019 assertive power moves will not be markedly reduced; they simply will become more erratic and even more arbitrary<\/li>\n
  8. 8. Beijing leaders are less attuned to the vicissitudes of the latest American presidency in its hostility toward China than they are to the progressive hardening of Washington\u2019s policies over the span of 5 administrations beginning with Bill Clinton. This is interpreted as evidence that the country\u2019s political elites have made an historic implicit judgment to reject the idea of peaceful cooperation\/rivalry for confrontation in a zero-sum game.\u00a0 It is a conclusion reinforced by the absence of any crisis point in their dealings that could have provoked this turn toward hostility (compare to Ukraine as the trigger sparking the fierce Russo-phobia)<\/li>\n
  9. 9. <\/em><\/strong>Americans are frightened of China not because of anything China does; the United States is frightened of China because it exists. It’s the purest example of existential anxiety – the word for which is dread<\/em>. In other words, it’s China, by its very success and growing global presence challenges the foundational assumption of American collective identity: that we’re superior, we are exceptional, we are born to be number one and always will be. The notion of being ordinary in any sense \u2013 much less surpassed – is anathema.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    10.10. Even if the U.S. manages to remain the strongest military power\u2014an increasingly difficult objective, it has limited practical meaning these days as regards China. People bandy about plans for a conflict and run their war games, totally disregarding the overriding reality that if you had a war with China, both countries would wind up using their nuclear arsenals and it would be all over for each of them. Even the Pentagon and the Rand Corporation would be ashes. However, that overwrought obsession emerges from the escapist fantasy world people revert to when reality becomes too complicated to bear. In effect, without realizing it, what they’re doing unconsciously is rerunning World War II. China is Imperial Japan and Russia is Nazi Germany. Of course, that is totally ridiculous \u2013 as well as being dangerous.\u00a0 Moreover, the correlation of military forces has no bearing on the underlying dread that Americans experience in contemplating China\u2019s rise<\/p>\n

    11.11. The Trump factor has intensified hostility between Washington and Beijing. This is due only secondarily to his unpredictability. Rather, it is the lifting of the already flimsy pretense intimating that the United States entertains the possibility of a constructive working relationship with China. Everything that the White House has been doing since January has as its magnetic North Pole the impending titanic conflict with China over who will be global Supremo<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. China does not have the option of moderating the current hostility by lowering the stakes. They are embedded in the global reach of both sides economically and the United States\u2019 dedication to keeping China bottled up in political and security terms<\/li>\n
    2. China\u2019s capacity to deter aggressive American moves or to retaliate for those actually taken is greater, and more varied, than is Russia\u2019s. Witness the Trump tariff war episode. China\u2019s systemically rooted economic strengths provided Beijing with a readily available, powerful retaliatory response to Trump\u2019s hair-brained scheme. It simply declared an embargo on exports to the United States to match what was a de facto<\/em>American boycott. That drastic action was accompanied by a raising of tariffs on American imports, and the cancelling or suspending of contracts for delivery of agricultural products and a few other politically freighted exports. Silently, it brandished China\u2019s financial WMD: the threat to divest the remaining $785 million of its dollar denominated assets which peaked at close to 3 trillion when Beijing began its monetary diversification program. (This drastic diversification of central bank assets can be interpreted as a move to reduce vulnerability to American induced monetary turbulence; or, a form of unilateral disarmament).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Trump, in his profound ignorance, evidently thought that the massive Chinese trade surpluses were based on the sale of cheap polo shirts and microwaves. The realities of modern-day supply chains for the manufacture of industrial and high-tech products eluded him \u2013 and his huckster advisers. (It is estimated that 52 percent of U.S. manufactures contain Chinese components).\u00a0It took only a few weeks for the shock-and-awe Chinese retaliation to register in the White House. The squeals from farmers, manufacturers, merchants, and consumers were loud enough to penetrate Trump\u2019s insular mind \u2013 drowning out the hoots of joy from currency speculators and insider traders. The capitulation quickly followed.<\/p>\n

      This instructive episode carries two lessons. First, strong leverage is required to deter or counter the aggressive moves by Washington. Two, it must be starkly brutal to get through the tangled underbrush and elaborate defensives of Trump\u2019s narcissistic mind.<\/p>\n

        \n
      1. The United States and China think in very different timeframes. For Washington, the focus habitually is on the hot topics of the here-and-now. Long-term perspectives are 3-5 years, e.g. the repeated public statements by senior American officials and military officers that a war with China can be expected before the end of the decade. President Xi and his associates concentrate on strengthening and extending the economic and social foundations of a stable, secure China into the foreseeable future. Since that naturally is accompanied by a growing presence and interests worldwide, their engagements with other countries have become deeper and more varied. Their strong preference is the stabilization of those relations via mutually advantageous dealings, aid, and tolerance for what other countries do in spheres that do not directly affect China. The emphasis on stability and predictability is the reason for China\u2019s taking a key role in BRICS along with its support for regional multilateral organizations in Asia.<\/li>\n
      2. The United States figures in this picture as a spoiler \u2013 unwilling to accept the implications of these developments for its weakening hegemonic control over world affairs. American hostility is shifting that role from spoiler to outright enemy.<\/li>\n
      3. 16. The United States\u2019 increasingly bellicose approach toward China is congenial to American policy elites for two distinct reasons: it plays to the country\u2019s relative strengths \u2013 military prowess and residual control over international financial institutions such as the IMF and SWIFT; and its spares them the need to do any serious strategic rethinking or to exercise sophisticated diplomatic skills \u2013 neither of which are an American forte.<\/li>\n
      4. The contrast with the American experience is stark in two critical respects. The United States readiness to use military force to expand its territorial control is a matter of record. Let\u2019s remind ourselves of the seizure of Florida from Spain in 1819, the war of conquest against Mexico that ended with the annexation of vast territories, the 1898 American instigated war with Spain that gave the U.S. possession of Puerto Rico, Cuba (de facto<\/em>) and the Philippines. There is nothing remotely comparable as regards China\u2019s conduct in Asia \u2013 despite their having ample means and opportunities to take the imperial route.*<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        More recently, America invaded and occupied Iraq on the flimsiest of pretexts, invaded and occupied Afghanistan \u2013 among other military actions across the Greater Middle East and Africa. Those places are many thousands of miles away from the United States. Compare to China\u2019s garrisoning of the disputed uninhabited sandbars we call the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n

          \n
        1. Western policymakers, and most analysts, superimpose on China a great power template modeled on their own history. They ascribe to Beijing\u2019s leaders a Realpolitik mentality that presumes an inevitable contest for dominance that is rooted in the nature of interstate politics. Yet, China\u2019s history indicates that its behavior does note neatly fit this model. The country has demonstrated little appetite for conquest, for the subjugation of other nations, for ruling foreign peoples (with the notable exception of its dominion over Vietnam in the first millennium C.E.) China\u2019s gradual expansion to the West and Southwest largely entailed the defeat and then assimilation of various \u2018barbarian\u2019 adversaries. Their characteristic approach to neighbors and trading partners emphasized the desire that they demonstrate a degree of deference and\/or accept tributary status.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          18.This conclusion is substantiated by China\u2019s extraordinary oceanic expeditions in the early 1400s – nearly a century before Europeans states embarked on their great era of exploration. From our Euro-centric view of world history, we ignore or slight events that occurred in other parts of the world and\/or do not fit our narrative. Too, we denigrate the accomplishments of other civilizations. This remarkable period of Chinese engagement with the wider world is an outstanding case in point.<\/p>\n

          The figure associated with this feat is admiral Zheng He \u2013 who was Muslim. His fleets were enormous, comprising up to 255 ships – Treasure ships and escort vessels – whose size, naval engineering, armament and complement of 28,000 sailors\/soldiers dwarfed anything that the Europeans were able to launch until the 18th\u00a0century (in terms of size, the 19th century). Each Treasure ship was twice as big as the Nina\/Pinta\/Santa Maria combined.\u00a0 Seven voyages over twenty-five years traversed all of Southeast Asia (perhaps as far as Australia\u2019s north coast), the Indian Ocean up to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. and the Swahili coast of Africa. The Chinese built no forts, installed no garrisons, left no permanent trading posts and annihilated no native peoples. They returned with an abundance of gifts, tribute and exotic animals.<\/p>\n

          This great enterprise was cut short suddenly by Imperial decree in 1435. It dictated that all existing ships be burnt, the shipyards disbanded, and the crews dispersed. The motive is obscure: the heavy cost, the limited benefits, preference for keeping China insulated from foreign influences, an Emperor\u2019s whim?\u00a0 Not at all the attitude of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, English or French monarchs. Westerners are uncomprehending of such bizarre self-denying behavior.<\/p>\n

            \n
          1. The United States and China do have one significant characteristic in common. Each esteems itself exceptional and superior. That conceit takes very different forms, though.\u00a0 Americans believe themselves born with a mission to lead other peoples along the enlightened path they have blazed \u2013 whether as by model, mentor or midwife. The Chinese believe that their uniqueness cannot be matched or imitated by other nations \u2013 much less that they have cause to assist them in trying. The implications are profound.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            20 .19. China is preparing itself for any eventually. Its preference is clearly for \u2018peaceful coexistence\u2019 albeit with elements of rivalry. If the United States, with its allies in the collective West in tow, insists on trying curbing China by aggressive means, it will fight back. In effect, Xi et al<\/em>\u00a0are saying: \u201cthe choice is yours.\u201d <\/em>Xi stated that in so many words at his meeting with Biden in San Francisco. The unspoken thought: in any event, we will outlast you; China enjoys the Mandate of Heaven<\/em>. Given the state of the American Republic and Europe\u2019s terminal decay, that is not just an idle boast.<\/p>\n

            ________________________________________________<\/em><\/p>\n

            \"\"<\/a>Michael Brenner is professor of international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh; a senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS-Johns Hopkins (Washington, D.C.), contributor to research and consulting projects on Euro-American security and economic issues. Publishes and teaches in the fields of US foreign policy, Euro-American relations, and the European Union. <\/em>mbren@pitt.edu<\/em><\/strong><\/a> – <\/em><\/strong>More<\/em><\/a>\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

            29 May 2025 – China is presented with the same fundamental dilemma as is Russia. There are some noteworthy situational differences, though. Here is a summary denotation of both.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":125356,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[48],"tags":[244,1778,278,70],"class_list":["post-296413","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-in-focus","tag-china","tag-conflict-analysis","tag-russia","tag-usa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/296413","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=296413"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/296413\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":296430,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/296413\/revisions\/296430"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/125356"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=296413"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=296413"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=296413"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}