{"id":29664,"date":"2013-06-10T12:00:20","date_gmt":"2013-06-10T11:00:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=29664"},"modified":"2015-05-06T12:52:55","modified_gmt":"2015-05-06T11:52:55","slug":"world-nuclear-forces-reductions-and-modernization-continue","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2013\/06\/world-nuclear-forces-reductions-and-modernization-continue\/","title":{"rendered":"World Nuclear Forces\u2014Reductions and Modernization Continue"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><em>(Stockholm, 3 June 2013) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) today launches the findings of SIPRI Yearbook 2013, which assesses the current state of international security, armaments and disarmament. Key findings include: (a) Alone among the five legally recognized nuclear weapon states, China expanded its nuclear arsenal in 2012; (b) The number of personnel deployed with peace operations worldwide is falling rapidly, due to the withdrawal from Afghanistan; (c) Progress towards a global ban on cluster munitions stalled in 2012.<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">At the start of 2013 eight states\u2014the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel\u2014possessed approximately 4400 operational nuclear weapons. Nearly 2000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert. If all nuclear warheads are counted, these states together possess a total of approximately 17 265 nuclear weapons (see table), as compared with 19 000 at the beginning of 2012.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">The decrease is due mainly to Russia and the USA further reducing their inventories of strategic nuclear weapons under the terms of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) as well as retiring ageing and obsolescent weapons.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">At the same time, all five legally recognized nuclear weapon states\u2014China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States\u2014are either deploying new nuclear weapon delivery systems or have announced programmes to do so, and appear determined to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely. Of the five, only China seems to be expanding its nuclear arsenal. India and Pakistan are both expanding their nuclear weapon stockpiles and missile delivery capabilities.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">\u2018Once again there was little to inspire hope that the nuclear weapon-possessing states are genuinely willing to give up their nuclear arsenals. The long-term modernization programmes under way in these states suggest that nuclear weapons are still a marker of international status and power,\u2019 says SIPRI Senior Researcher Shannon Kile.<\/p>\n<p><b>World nuclear forces, 2013<\/b><b><\/b><\/p>\n<table border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\">\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<td>Country<\/td>\n<td>Deployed warheads*<\/td>\n<td>Other warheads<\/td>\n<td>Total 2013<\/td>\n<td>Total 2012<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>USA<\/td>\n<td>2150<\/td>\n<td>5550<\/td>\n<td>7700<\/td>\n<td>8000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Russia<\/td>\n<td>1800<\/td>\n<td>6700<\/td>\n<td>8500<\/td>\n<td>10000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>UK<\/td>\n<td>160<\/td>\n<td>65<\/td>\n<td>225<\/td>\n<td>225<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>France<\/td>\n<td>290<\/td>\n<td>10<\/td>\n<td>300<\/td>\n<td>300<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>China<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>250<\/td>\n<td>250<\/td>\n<td>240<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>India<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>90-110<\/td>\n<td>90-110<\/td>\n<td>80-100<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Pakistan<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>100-120<\/td>\n<td>100-120<\/td>\n<td>90-110<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Israel<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>80<\/td>\n<td>80<\/td>\n<td>80<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Total<\/td>\n<td>4400<\/td>\n<td>12865<\/td>\n<td>17265<\/td>\n<td>19000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><i>Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2013 * \u201cDeployed\u201d means warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces.<\/i><\/p>\n<p><b>Peacekeeper numbers drop sharply\u2014Syrian crisis exposes gap between principles and action<\/b><\/p>\n<p>The number of peacekeepers deployed worldwide fell by more than 10 per cent in 2012, as the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan got under way. \u00a0At 233 642 personnel, the total was still more than double the number deployed in 2003. \u00a0These personnel were deployed in 53 operations worldwide, one more than in 2012.<\/p>\n<p>\u2018We are certainly going to see total peacekeeper numbers keep falling this year, and probably next year too, as a result of the NATO drawdown in Afghanistan,\u2019 said Dr Ja\u00efr van der Lijn, a SIPRI Senior Researcher, who leads SIPRI\u2019s work on peace operations, peacebuilding and conflict management. \u2018How far they fall, and what the future peacekeeping landscape looks like, is going to depend on how many troops are eventually deployed in Mali, the broader Sahel region and, potentially, Syria, as well as on states\u2019 willingness to take action to improve the protection of civilians through peace operations and implement the responsibility to protect instead of just bemoaning the failures. Austerity measures will also play a role, but paradoxically, austerity might well encourage states to send more troops to other peace missions in order to avoid domestic pressure to cut their armed forces.\u2019<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">The United Nations appeared paralysed on the Syria crisis. The new principle of an international responsibility to protect populations if the national government fails to do so\u2014the basis of the 2011 intervention in Libya\u2014was not invoked, as China and Russia threatened to veto any action through the UN and other Security Council members opposed outside \u2018interference\u2019 in Syria\u2019s domestic affairs.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">\u2018The lack of action over Syria in 2012 highlighted the weakness of international commitment to the responsibility to protect. \u00a0In the end, national interests and deep-rooted fears that the responsibility to protect undermines the principle of state sovereignty, seem to weigh heavier than the plight of populations caught up in conflict,\u2019 said van der Lijn.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><b>Cluster munitions control efforts stall in 2012<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">Attempts to enhance international controls on the use, production, trading and stockpiling of cluster munitions had a disappointing year in 2012, as supporters of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions proved unable to persuade any new states to sign the convention. Major cluster munitions producers that have not signed or ratified the convention include Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Israel, South Korea, Russia and the United States. Several of these states have in the past used cluster munitions. Cluster munitions disperse multiple smaller munitions, some of which can explode months or years later causing civilian casualties.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">\u2018As long as the major producers stay outside the Cluster Munitions Convention, they can argue that cluster munitions remain a \u201clegitimate\u201d means of waging war and military-industrial product\u2014even if most seem to have acknowledged their potentially grave humanitarian impacts,\u2019 said SIPRI Researcher Lina Grip, co-author of a new section of the Yearbook looking at humanitarian arms control.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">____________________________<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><i>The SIPRI Yearbook is a compendium of cutting-edge information and analysis on developments in armaments, disarmament and international security. SIPRI Yearbook 2013 includes sections on patterns of organized violence and the interactions between peace operations and conflict management alongside authoritative data and analysis on military spending, arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, and chemical and biological weapon arms control. Three major Yearbook data sets were pre-launched earlier this year: the Top 100 arms producing companies (18 February), international arms transfers (18 March) and world military expenditure data (15 April). See the earlier releases at\u00a0<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.sipri.org\/media\/pressreleases\/\" >www.sipri.org\/media\/pressreleases<\/a>. The SIPRI Yearbook is published by Oxford University Press. Learn more at <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.sipri.org\/\" >www.sipriyearbook.org<\/a>.<\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><i>For information and interview requests contact Stephanie Blenckner (<a href=\"mailto:blenckner@sipri.org\">blenckner@sipri.org<\/a>, +46 8 655 97 47).<\/i><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.sipri.org\/media\/pressreleases\/2013\/YBlaunch_2013\" >Go to Original \u2013 sipri.org<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>3 June 2013 &#8211; At the start of 2013 eight states\u2014the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel\u2014possessed approximately 4400 operational nuclear weapons. Nearly 2000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert. If all nuclear warheads are counted, these states together possess a total of approximately 17 265 nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[68],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-29664","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-weapons-of-mass-destruction"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29664","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29664"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29664\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29664"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29664"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29664"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}