{"id":302939,"date":"2025-09-15T12:01:20","date_gmt":"2025-09-15T11:01:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=302939"},"modified":"2025-09-12T05:45:08","modified_gmt":"2025-09-12T04:45:08","slug":"india-china-trade-route-warfare-sandwiching-nepal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2025\/09\/india-china-trade-route-warfare-sandwiching-nepal\/","title":{"rendered":"India-China Trade Route Warfare: Sandwiching Nepal"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n

10 Sep 2025 –<\/em>\u00a0Nepal and India share many similarities in language, cuisine, traditional clothing, culture, customs, marriages, and festivals. The two countries allow visa-free travel with just an identity card. India has territorial disputes with all its neighboring countries. India and China have a long-standing rivalry, which raises security concerns for Nepal. India had 18 military check posts in Nepal’s high Himalayas along the border to monitor China but was disappointed withdrawing them. India has had military troops stationed in Nepal’s territories of Lipulek since 1962.<\/p>\n

The objectives of the state-of-the-art paper are to examine the Nepo-India territorial disputes and analyze testimonies and other evidence that the Lipulek territories belong to Nepal. The information was gathered by drawing on experiences and archival literature reviews using the snowball technique from the past\u00a0(yesterday), understanding the axiomatic truth of Lipulek territories in the present\u00a0(today), and fostering hope for the transformation of disputes by dialogue for the future\u00a0(tomorrow). A recent agreement between India and China to use a trade route passing\u00a0 through Nepal’s Lipulek territories has triggered protests in Nepal. The signing of the agreement by India’s National Security Advisor and China’s Foreign Minister, in the presence of the Indian Foreign Minister, has raised concerns about potential conspiracy theories aimed at pressuring Nepal.<\/p>\n

Lipulek holds strategic significance as it is situated at the tri-junction of India, China, and Nepal. Residents of the Lipulek territory in the Darchula district of Nepal have several pieces of evidence to support their claim to the areas. These include land tax receipts, Nepali citizenship, voter lists, land ownership certificates, and participation in the Nepali population census. Historical maps dating back to the Sugauli Treaty of 1816 also show Lipulek as part of Nepal, with the Kali River serving as the eastern border. Additionally, the Joint Technical Level Nepal-India Boundary Committee (JTBC) was established in 1981 to reaffirm and maintain the border boundaries between the two countries. Over the past decade, Nepal has sent diplomatic notes to India on\u00a0 eight occasions but has not received any response. Anti-Indian sentiments are prevalent in Nepal due to India\u2019s encroachment on lands and major rivers and the disrespectful, contemptuous, condescending, and ineffective behavior of Indian embassy employees in Kathmandu.<\/p>\n

These employees are accused of fueling anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal, potentially influenced by China to safeguard their own positions. However, this perception holds little truth. India’s main weakness lies in its inability to cultivate harmonious relations with the people of Nepal,\u00a0 often prioritizing only infamous leaders in Nepal. Instead of resolving the territorial disputes, India’s Foreign Ministry always repeats the same old mantra, “The Lipulek territories claimed by Nepal belong to India.” Even though India has no choice but to engage in high-level bilateral meetings without hesitation, pursuing both indirect and direct mediation, as well as informal and formal dialogues. A man is great by soul, not by geography or population size or both. PM Modi has a great opportunity to be a leader of India alone or a great leader of all neighbors, transforming territorial disputes through peaceful means. Dialogue begets dialogue.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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Kathmandu Valley<\/p><\/div>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli visited Tianjin on 30 Aug 2025 at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting between 31 Aug and 1 Sep. On the same day, an official meeting was held between the President of China and the head of government of Nepal, highlighting Nepal as a high priority.<\/p>\n

During the meeting, Oli referenced the Sugauli Treaty of 1816, stating that all lands (Lipulek, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura) 56 km east of the source of the Mahakali River belong to Nepal as a sovereign country. He expressed objection to the agreement between India and China, designating Lipulek, a Nepali territory, as a trade route during his discussion with Xi Jinping. In response, the Chinese president said, “The border dispute between Nepal and India is a matter for the two sides to resolve. Our agreement was not intended to weaken Nepal\u2019s claim. Please understand” (Lamsal & Mishra, August 31, 2025). A press release from the Embassy of Nepal in Beijing reiterated Nepal\u2019s objection to the recent understanding between India and China on the Lipulek Pass.<\/p>\n

The Lipulek Pass is located\u00a0on\u00a0the Nepo-China border,\u00a0an ancient route for merchants and pilgrims traveling between Nepal and Tibet, China. During the Sino-India war (October 20-November 21, 1962)\u00a0(Hoffmann, 1990), Chinese military forces\u00a0pushed\u00a0Indian military forces up to the Lipulek Pass and\u00a0then\u00a0retreated.<\/p>\n

The Sugauli Treaty of 1816 led to the loss of more than 50 percent of Nepal\u2019s land to the British East India Company,\u00a0shrinking Nepal’s territory\u00a0from 267,000 sq. km to 147,000 sq. km. This loss included\u00a0a crucial route to Tibet through Kumaon\u00a0(Nepal News, January 27, 2025).<\/p>\n

Indian media extensively covered PM Oli\u2019s meeting regarding the Lipulek issue during his meeting with President Xi. They have portrayed Oli’s stance as nationalist, interpreting China\u2019s lack of response as ‘strategic silence.’ Despite this, Chinese media has not acknowledged Nepal\u2019s interest in Lipulek, which Nepal hopes to gain China’s support for. Nepal remains committed to\u00a0the\u00a0One China Policy, and China has expressed support\u00a0for\u00a0the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Ambitious-tactical Oli, in a 20-minute one-on-one meeting with the\u00a0politico-ideologue and business strategist\u00a0Xi, expressed support for the GSI, although Oli\u2019s courtiers have refuted China\u2019s claims.<\/p>\n

Nepal is\u00a0displeased with the agreement between India and China regarding the Lipulek territory, as it was done\u00a0without informing and consulting Nepal. In November 2019, India\u00a0added Nepal’s Lipulek\u00a0region to\u00a0its map,\u00a0sparking\u00a0a\u00a0dispute.\u00a0The issue dates back to 1962, when\u00a0Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru\u00a0sought\u00a0permission from Nepal’s King Mahendra to\u00a0station\u00a0troops in\u00a0Lipulek\u00a0temporarily to counter\u00a0China. However, this temporary arrangement\u00a0became\u00a0a permanent\u00a0Indian\u00a0occupation, leading to the ongoing\u00a0border dispute with Nepal. The\u00a0recent\u00a0trade agreement between India and China in\u00a0August 2025\u00a0has reignited the Lipulek Pass dispute, with Nepal strongly\u00a0asserting its sovereignty over the\u00a0area. The Lipulek Pass is a trijunction of Nepal, India, and China, with the historical context of Nehru’s agreement with King Mahendra adding complexity to the situation. This dispute underscores\u00a0the strategic\u00a0significance of Kalapani for India in the context of its border\u00a0dynamics\u00a0with China.<\/p>\n

Nepal\u2019s King Mahendra knew Indian forces\u00a0were\u00a0in Lipulek and remained silent,\u00a0not choosing to\u00a0contest India’s occupation for fear of\u00a0appearing to\u00a0side\u00a0with China. Former foreign minister Bhek Bahadur Thapa confirmed King Mahendra’s awareness of Indian troops entering Kalapani during the war. Thapa wrote in his book that\u00a0he\u00a0decided to raise the issue after the war to seek a solution. Despite Indian troops withdrawing from Kalapani, they remained there,\u00a0recognizing the strategic importance of the Lipulek Pass and established check-posts there. Besides, India has been increasing its presence and infrastructure in the area (Mishra, August 22, 2025).<\/p>\n

India\u00a0asserts\u00a0Lipulek as its own,\u00a0leading to\u00a0a border dispute\u00a0with Nepal. The\u00a0Sugauli Treaty\u00a0of\u00a01816 designates\u00a0that\u00a0Lipulek, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura\u00a0territories belong to\u00a0Nepal. During\u00a0a\u00a0meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on August 31, 2025, Modi hinted that Lipulek would not be\u00a0conceded\u00a0to India.\u00a0Modi emphasized the mutual benefits of\u00a0the India-China relationship,\u00a0benefiting\u00a02.8 billion people and contributing\u00a0to\u00a0global\u00a0well-being. President Xi underlined cooperation between the\u00a0two countries, calling New Delhi a significant friend of Beijing and advocating for\u00a0a strategic and long-term vision for their relationship.<\/p>\n

Nepal is\u00a0stuck\u00a0between the elephant, India and the dragon, China.\u00a0Whether\u00a0two bulls graze\u00a0peacefully\u00a0in a farmer’s mustard field or\u00a0engage in a fight, it is\u00a0the farmer\u00a0who suffers the loss.\u00a0Nepal’s\u00a0situation\u00a0is akin\u00a0to that of\u00a0the\u00a0farmer.\u00a0If China and India\u00a0cooperate harmoniously, Nepal will still be sandwiched in the middle. In the event of warfare, Nepal will bear the\u00a0brunt of the suffering.<\/p>\n

In this context,\u00a0“warfare”\u00a0refers to the intense pressure exerted by Nepal through eight diplomatic notes in ten years, protests in front of the India-China embassies in Kathmandu, political consensus, media campaigns, and civil societies towards both India and China to assert its claim. Warfare includes both positive and negative dimensions. Positive warfare is to use constructive methods to address and resolve conflicting issue applying both indirect and direct mediation as well as informal and formal dialogue, in order to reach a win-win or lose-lose conclusion. Negative warfare is turning a deaf ear to dissident voices, inviting human suffering-casualties through harmful consequences that can lead to lose-win or win-lose outcomes. Nepal strongly objects to India’s claim over the Lipulek Pass and surrounding areas, asserting its sovereignty and this dispute represents a new form of\u00a0diplomatic\u00a0warfare. \u00a0Nepal is now expecting positive warfare from India and China regarding the Lipulek issue.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0study\u00a0aims to\u00a0investigate how Indian troops,\u00a0initially seeking refuge from\u00a0China, established\u00a0a temporary settlement in the strategically\u00a0vital area of Lipulek, which later evolved into a permanent base. It also delves into the decision-making process that led Indian leaders to not only retain\u00a0control of\u00a0Lipulek but also\u00a0expand their presence to\u00a0Kalapani and Limpiyadhura\u00a0based\u00a0on the army’s\u00a0recommendations.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0general objective of the study is to comprehensively analyze the historical treaties, agreements, and protocols signed by Nepal and India, as well as\u00a0their compliance\u00a0trends. The\u00a0specific\u00a0objectives\u00a0include investigating\u00a0the\u00a0current status of territorial disputes between Nepal and India, uncovering historical facts and evidence, gathering perspectives from various stakeholders such as\u00a0commoners, civil society, intellectuals, and leaders of both countries.<\/p>\n

This study\u00a0provides\u00a0descriptive and explanatory insights\u00a0into the\u00a0Lipulek, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura areas. Information will be gathered\u00a0through networking and tracking methods,\u00a0drawing on the author’s\u00a0previous works\u00a0on\u00a0\u201cNegotiation\u00a0by Peaceful Means: Nepo-India Territorial\u00a0Disputes\u201d\u00a0(2022) and \u201cNepo-India Territorial Disputes Transformation by Dialogue Means\u201d (2021) between Nepal and India.<\/p>\n

This\u00a0state-of-the-art paper utilizes experiences, media, and archival literature reviews to explore drawing on past (yesterday) conflicts between Nepal and India, the axiomatic truth approach of territorial dispute in the present (today), and fostering hope by sharing knowledge on present understanding to promote\u00a0positive peace for the future\u00a0(tomorrow). The work is based on personal experiences\u00a0and\u00a0observations\u00a0accumulated over four decades, rather than relying solely\u00a0on theoretical concepts.<\/p>\n

Testimonies of Lipulek Belonging to Nepal<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The Nepo-India dispute was triggered on November 2, 2019, when India\u2019s Home Ministry issued a new official politico-administrative map changing the status of Jammu and Kashmir to a Union Territory. Additionally, the map included the Kalapani territories, causing uproar in Nepal (Dixit & Dhakal, May 19, 2020). The incorporation of Nepal\u2019s Kalapani, Lipulek Pass, and Limpiyadhura areas in\u00a0the map led to protests\u00a0at\u00a0all\u00a0levels\u2014central, provincial, and local\u2014against India. Nepal\u00a0requested\u00a0Foreign Secretary-level talks\u00a0by\u00a0sending notes on November 20, 22, and December 30, 2019, but received\u00a0no response from India (Mehta, June 26, 2020).<\/p>\n

A tension over the\u00a0map issue\u00a0escalated; Nepal grew incensed when Defense Minister Rajnath Singh virtually inaugurated a link road connecting the border with China\u00a0at the Lipulek Pass (Xavier, June 11, 2020). The\u00a0construction\u00a0of the road aimed\u00a0to\u00a0strengthen\u00a0India\u2019s defense supply lines and provide easier access for pilgrims to Kailash Mansarovar (Muni, May 22, 2020). Nepal claims that Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulek Pass are\u00a0territories of Nepal situated\u00a0in the Darchula district (Giri, May 8, 2020, & Thapa, May 13, 2020). The trade route agreement between China and India in August 2025 via Lipulek has further heightened stiffnesses in Nepal.<\/p>\n

The Kalapani territories has been a focus\u00a0of Indian military posts. Nepal\u00a0had\u00a0overlooked military posts in the Kalapani area\u00a0with\u00a0from 1961 to 1997. In September 1998,\u00a0a\u00a0coalition\u00a0government\u00a0in Nepal\u00a0reached an agreement\u00a0with India\u00a0on disputed border areas, including Kalapani. The agreement included resolving border disputes through mutual talks,\u00a0discussing\u00a0the 1950 Nepal-India security treaty, and\u00a0preparing\u00a0a report on the Mahakali Treaty and distribution of hydropower and water resources in\u00a0border areas\u00a0(Rose, 1999).<\/p>\n

While the Anglo-Nepalese War (November 1, 1814-March 4, 1816)\u00a0was ongoing, the Governor General of India sent a secret letter to the Secret Committee of the East India Company\u00a0in\u00a0London on June 1, 1815,\u00a0stating\u00a0that\u00a0the Kali River should\u00a0be the eastern boundary of East India with Nepal (Bhusal, March 2020). The secret letter stated, \u201cThe Kali forms a well-defined boundary from the snowy mountains to the plains, and though narrow, it is deep and rapid. The snowy range \u2026 touches the eastern confines of Kumaon. Hence,\u00a0this is the shortest, and consequently the most defensible line of frontier\u201d (Cox, 1824) (see\u00a0Figure\u00a01 & 2).<\/p>\n

Nepal, with a porous border with India, shares a complex relationship involving diplomatic, socio-cultural, cartographic, economic, and political\u00a0aspects due to their close proximity. India’s border disputes with\u00a0all its\u00a0neighboring countries,\u00a0namely Pakistan to the west, China and Nepal to the north, Bhutan to the northeast, and Bangladesh and Myanmar to the east,\u00a0have strained relations including Nepal. Reports\u00a0suggest\u00a0that India has\u00a0breached border demarcations\u00a0at 76 locations\u00a0in Nepal. A recent agreement between India and China to trade through Nepal’s Lipulek territory has sparked protests in\u00a0Nepal.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0agreement, signed\u00a0by India’s National Security Advisor and China’s Foreign Minister in\u00a0the presence of the Indian Foreign Minister on August 19, 2025,\u00a0has\u00a0raised concerns about potential conspiracy theories\u00a0targeting Nepal and its politics. While the agreement explicitly mentions Pulan-Gunji reopening\u00a0trading markets that pass through the Lipulek Pass. It is\u00a0evident\u00a0that PM Modi\u00a0delegated the authority to sign the agreement\u00a0to\u00a0his\u00a0much-trusted security advisor\u00a0to exert\u00a0influence and pressure\u00a0on\u00a0Nepal from a security point of view.<\/p>\n

Figure 1 & 2:<\/strong> Map of Kali (Kalee) River, Limpiyadhura, Lipulek, Kuti, Nabi, Gunj, and Kalapani<\/strong><\/p>\n

FIGURE 1:<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

FIGURE 2:<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Figure 1:<\/strong> Kali River as the international border between British-India and Nepal (www.davidrumsey.com).<\/td>\nFigure 2:<\/strong> The uppermost reach of Kali River serves as the western border between British-India and Nepal (pahar.in\/indian-subcontinent-pre-1899).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Note: <\/em>The map was published by the East India Company when British India and Nepal signed the Sugauli Treaty on December 2, 1815. Figure 2 shows the pictorial clarification of the secret letter written by Lord Moira in 1815 (Cox, 1824).<\/p>\n

Source<\/em>: Evolution of cartographic aggression by India: A study of Limpiyadhura to Lipulek, March 2020.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

On one hand, India has given a clear message that the agreement was made at the behest of the army, while on the other hand, India seems to be trying to indirectly pressure Nepal if Nepal makes a lot of noise, India tries to send a clear message that the army would be deployed against Nepal\u2019s dissident voices. This is a\u00a0form\u00a0of warfare diplomacy by the Indian political leadership, attempting to intimidate Nepal by promoting the security advisor. The absence of the Lipulek name\u00a0in the document\u00a0on China’s website\u00a0further adds to the complexity and conspiracy of the situation.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0construction of roads, schools, bridges, police stations, and health posts in\u00a0the villages of Budhi, Garbyang, Goonjee, Nabhee, Okutee, and Kuthee has brought comfort to the people. They now feel more connected to India\u00a0than Nepal, but are equally saddened by the transition from Nepali to Indian citizenship. It only takes them a couple of days to reach New Delhi, while reaching Kathmandu takes much longer due to the difficulties of connecting\u00a0roads in Nepal.\u00a0Despite their Nepali mindset and heritage in terms of language, food, dress, culture, and relationships, they are drawn to the convenience\u00a0provided\u00a0by India.<\/p>\n

It is important for the international community\u00a0to\u00a0understand why Nepal, a landlocked, least developed, and small country, is asserting that all lands east of the Kali River belong to Nepal, despite agreements between the world\u2019s two major\u00a0powers, India and China. It is crucial to grasp the rationale and testimonies behind Nepal’s claims.<\/p>\n

The territory is\u00a0situated in the\u00a0Kalapani River\u00a0basin, at elevations\u00a0ranging from 3600 to 5200 meters. Lipulek is\u00a0located at the top of the Kalapani valley,\u00a0a historic\u00a0trade\u00a0route for the Bhotiyas of Tibet, Kumaon in India, and the Tinker valley of Nepal\u00a0(Manzardo, Dahal & Rai, Undated). The Lipulek Pass\u00a0is strategically significant as it offers a vantage point to monitor both China and Nepal.\u00a0Despite Nepal’s claims since 1997 that Lipulek, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura belong to Nepal, the Indian Army has maintained control of the territories. India has unofficially\u00a0disregarded Nepal’s claims without\u00a0formal discussions or testimonies and has not engaged in any dialogue on the\u00a0issue.<\/p>\n

Bhairab Risal,\u00a0who led the Population Census in 1961,\u00a0recorded details of each household\u00a0in\u00a0all settlements,\u00a0including the villages of Kuti,\u00a0Nabi, and Gunji\u00a0located\u00a0east of\u00a0the\u00a0Kali River (June 11, 2015). Old records of land ownership rights in Kuti, Nabi, and Gunji villages are available in the Land Administration Office, Doti district, which proves that\u00a0Limpiyadhura belongs to Nepal (Bhusal, March 2020).<\/p>\n

India and China both\u00a0required Nepal’s\u00a0approval\u00a0to expand their border trade. On May 15, 2015,\u00a0Sitaram Yechury, a leader of\u00a0the Communist Party of India (Marxist),\u00a0criticized the Joint Communiqu\u00e9 of China and India,\u00a0arguing that both countries should have consulted Nepal before\u00a0finalizing\u00a0the trade route to Tibet and connectivity plan to Mansarovar (The Kathmandu Post, June 11, 2015).\u00a0This sentiment was echoed by many\u00a0leaders, intellectuals,\u00a0and\u00a0civil society\u00a0members in India. India claims that the Lipulek Pass\u00a0is at an altitude of 17,000 feet, with\u00a0Mansarovar\u00a0approximately 90 km\u00a0away\u00a0from Lipulek Pass (PTI, May 8, 2020 & PTI, May 8, 2020).\u00a0By allowing\u00a0vehicles to\u00a0travel\u00a05 km into\u00a0China across Lipulek,\u00a0the travel time\u00a0has been reduced\u00a0from 5 days to two days (Santhanam, August 12, 2019). The Indo-China Agreement of 1954 mentioned Lipulek for Indo-Tibetan trade (Nayak, June 9, 2015) and Kailash-Mansarovar pilgrimage traffic, which was reaffirmed in another trade agreement in 2015.<\/p>\n

Both India and China needed to\u00a0obtain Nepal’s consent to expand their border trade route. On May 15, 2015, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) leader Sitaram Yechury denounced the Joint Communiqu\u00e9 of China and India,\u00a0stating that both countries should have consulted Nepal before deciding on the trade to Tibet and the connectivity plan to Mansarovar (The Kathmandu Post, June 11, 2015).<\/p>\n

On February 4, 1817,\u00a0Acting Chief Secretary John Adams of the East India Company sent an order letter to\u00a0Commissioner G.W. Trail of Kumaon,\u00a0instructing\u00a0the surrender of the eastern side of the Kali\u00a0River to the Government of Nepal. A copy of the letter was also sent to Edward Gardner, the Resident Commissioner of British India in Kathmandu. A month later, on\u00a0March 2, 1817, John Adams directed\u00a0G. W. Trail\u00a0to acknowledge the receipt of all lands\u00a0situated to the\u00a0east\u00a0of the Kali\u00a0River for return. The borders between Nepal and India\u00a0are\u00a0demarcated\u00a0based on\u00a0Articles 3 and 5 of the Sugauli Treaty.\u00a0Article 3 specifies\u00a0the lowlands between the Rivers Kali and Rapti,\u00a0between\u00a0Rapti and\u00a0Gunduck,\u00a0between\u00a0Gunduck and Coosah,\u00a0between\u00a0Mitchee and\u00a0Teestah,\u00a0and\u00a0the territories within the hills eastward of the River Mitchee,\u00a0including\u00a0Nagree fort and\u00a0Nagarcote Pass (Manandhar & Koirala, June 2001).<\/p>\n

On March 8, 1817,\u00a0the\u00a0Kumaon Commissioner\u00a0reported that\u00a0villages\u00a0east of\u00a0the\u00a0Kali\u00a0River were\u00a0to\u00a0be attached to the Pergunnah of Dotee\u00a0in\u00a0Nepal.\u00a0Apart from\u00a0Tinkar and Changroo villages,\u00a0six other\u00a0villages\u00a0–\u00a0Boodhe, Gurbhuyan, Goonjee, Nabhee, Okutee,\u00a0and Kuthee- were\u00a0part\u00a0of Nepal. The Zamindars\u00a0lived on the west side of\u00a0the\u00a0Kali\u00a0River\u00a0in British India,\u00a0while\u00a0their tenants\u00a0resided on the east\u00a0side in Nepal. As a result, the Zamindars lost control of these six villages (Dhungel & Pun, August 2014).<\/p>\n

The Sugauli Treaty, signed in the past, resulted in territorial concessions\u00a0where\u00a0many parts of Nepalese lands were\u00a0ceded to British India.\u00a0This treaty\u00a0allowed Britain to recruit Nepalis, known as\u00a0Gorkhas,\u00a0for military service (www.timesnownews.com<\/a>, July 31, 2020), a practice that continues in small numbers to this day. As a result of the treaty, Nepal lost over 50%\u00a0of its territories, including\u00a0regions like\u00a0Darjeeling, Sikkim,\u00a0west of Kali River like\u00a0Kumaon, Garhwal (Uttarakhand),\u00a0parts\u00a0west of\u00a0the\u00a0Sutlej River (Himachal Pradesh),\u00a0and\u00a0various\u00a0Tarai\u00a0lowlands. Despite these territorial losses, cultural similarities such as shared meals, traditional attire, festivals, and customs related to death and\u00a0marriage ceremonies\u00a0can\u00a0still be observed in these regions. Additionally,\u00a0Nepali-speaking communities and ethnic groups from\u00a0Nepal’s lost territories\u00a0continue to exist.<\/p>\n

The Sugauli Treaty, created by the East\u00a0India Company without\u00a0Nepal’s\u00a0consent, did not include a map. Kalapani, Lipulek Pass, Nabi, Gunji, Kuti, and Limpiyadhura are\u00a0all\u00a0part\u00a0of\u00a0Nepali territory,\u00a0supported by\u00a0various\u00a0facts, evidence,\u00a0and testimonies.\u00a0Historical\u00a0boundary maps\u00a0from\u00a01819, 1827, 1850, 1856, 1879, and 1905 show that\u00a0the\u00a0Kali River\u00a0serves as Nepal’s western border. The\u00a0boundary\u00a0extends\u00a0from\u00a0the Kali River originating\u00a0at\u00a0Limpiyadhura (Shrestha, June 27, 2015), as outlined\u00a0in the Sugauli Treaty.\u00a0The\u00a0British Survey of India’s\u00a0historic maps\u00a0from\u00a01827 and 1856\u00a0clearly depict the Kali River.\u00a0India\u2019s 1856 map (Budhathoki, November 11, 2019) shows the Mahakali River originating at Limpiyadhura. A map published by Arrowsmith in London on January 2, 1816, also shows\u00a0the\u00a0river\u00a0originating from Limpiyadhura\u00a0(Manandhar & Koirala, June 2001).<\/p>\n

In the\u00a0section on “The Kingdom of Nepal”\u00a0in\u00a0Walter Hamilton’s book “A Geographical, Statistical, and Historical Description of Hindustan, and the Adjacent Countries”\u00a0(1971),\u00a0it is mentioned that\u00a0the Kali River is the western section of the Gogra River (Shah, November 13, 2019).\u00a0Several maps published by the Survey of British India in\u00a0various years from 1816 to\u00a01856\u00a0also\u00a0clearly show\u00a0the origin of\u00a0the\u00a0Kali River\u00a0to the\u00a0west of\u00a0the\u00a0Gogra River (Mulyankan, September\/October 1999).<\/p>\n

A map from the Old Atlas of China (1903) published during the Qing Dynasty shows Limpiyadhura as the source of the Kali River (Shrestha, June 22, 2015) in Chinese characters. Scholar S.D. Muni noted that British maps from 1816 to 1860 favored Nepal’s position, but later maps supported India’s claim, possibly due to strategic interests. Muni suggested that India could lease Kalapanis from Nepal. However, he later aligned with India’s stance (Pathak & Bastola, 2023).<\/p>\n

The Nepal-China Boundary Treaty of 1961 referenced Limpiyadhura and the Kali River.\u00a0Article 1 stated, \u201cThe Chinese-Nepalese boundary line starts from the point where the watershed between the Kali River and the Tinkar River meets the watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu (Karnali) River on the one hand and the Tinkar River on the other hand\u2026 passing through the Niumachisa (Limpiyadhura) \u2026\u201d (fall.fsulawrc.com\/collection\/LimitsinSeas\/IBS050.pdf). \u201cThe Head of Mahakali is Limpiyadhura\u201d (Naya Patrika, May 13, 2020).<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Kalapani issue garnered widespread attention from various segments of Nepalese society, including the\u00a0general public, students, teachers, bureaucrats,\u00a0professionals, civil society organizations,\u00a0human rights activists, and political leaders. On June 26, 1996, a 39-member\u00a0Public-level Border Encroachment Prevention Committee was\u00a0established to investigate the facts surrounding the Kalapani territories. Led by veteran human rights activist Padma Ratna Tuladhar, the Committee included prominent figures from different fields[*]<\/a>. They gathered extensive documentation\u00a0and testimonies, such as tax records from villagers in\u00a0Tinkar, Kunji, Bundi, Chhangru, and Nabi (Byas\u00a0Gorkha areas) paid at the Land Revenue Office\u00a0in\u00a0Darchula\u00a0until\u00a0December 1978 (Mulyankan, September\/October 1999).<\/p>\n

Residents of the Nabi, Gunji, and Kuti villages\u00a0in\u00a0the Kalapani area used to pay\u00a0land revenue\u00a0(Bali) to the\u00a0district authority of Darchula, Government of Nepal until 1978. Bhuwan Sharma\u00a0notes that the government has\u00a0records of land taxes paid by\u00a0individuals from these villages and that they also\u00a0obtained Nepali citizenship certificates (Sharma, May 30, 2020).<\/p>\n

During the Panchayat era from 1960 to 1990, the\u00a0understanding reached\u00a0between King Mahendra (1955-1972) and India’s first PM Nehru, regarding the Limpiyadhura triangle\u00a0was not\u00a0known to the Nepali population. This period was\u00a0marked by\u00a0a\u00a0closed administration, with government officials in the Darchula district reporting directly to the Narayanhiti Royal Palace, under the rule of both King Mahendra and his son King Birendra.<\/p>\n

The two\u00a0Kings remained silent\u00a0indefinitely. Democratic leaders\u00a0turned deaf ears having\u00a0the establishment of Indian military posts in the Kalapani territories. Their silence persisted\u00a0until the Mahakali Treaty (1995-1996) was ratified,\u00a0causing\u00a0the CPN (Marxist-Leninist)\u00a0to split\u00a0from its\u00a0parent\u00a0party CPN (UML) due to\u00a0allegations of\u00a0treason\u00a0(Shrestha, June 16, 2020). The terms Kali river and Mahakali river refer to the same river,\u00a0known as\u00a0Mahakali\u00a0in Nepal and Kali\u00a0in India. The\u00a0Kalapani\u00a0issue\u00a0was further\u00a0exacerbated by the\u00a0breakaway faction,\u00a0sparking a\u00a0contentious\u00a0debate on the Mahakali Treaty (Kafle & Baral, June 16, 2020).\u00a0Nepalis feel\u00a0betrayed\u00a0by the treaty, as the shared water resources have not been\u00a0fair and equal distribution. The river has dried up while India has\u00a0diverted all the water from the canal, leaving Nepal with\u00a0water\u00a0shortages in\u00a0winter and floods in\u00a0summer.<\/p>\n

The Nepali people should not\u00a0only blame India. If Nepali leaders had not favored India, India would not have gained control over major rivers for irrigation and hydropower in Nepal. Madan Bhandari, a\u00a0proponent\u00a0of people\u2019s multi-party democracy, opposed the Mahakali Treaty and was mysteriously killed along with Jeevraj Ashrit. Amar Lama, the\u00a0sole\u00a0surviving witness to Bhandari’s murder, was also chased up\u00a0to 2 km\u00a0and killed on the orders of the then CPN (Maoist) Secretary General Badal. It has been revealed that the current PM Oli met with Badal before the murder and sought his\u00a0help\u00a0in the killing.<\/p>\n

The author\u00a0is\u00a0willing\u00a0to investigate the murders of Bhandari and Ashrit without any payment from the Government of Nepal. In order to be granted the authority to investigate, the author has already made a public vow in front of prominent Nepalese media. The truth for justice for the families of Bhandari and Ashrit will\u00a0only be revealed\u00a0once a thorough investigation into the murders is conducted, with a specific focus on the potential involvement of Prime Minister Oli.\u00a0Many people are afraid to speak out against Oli\u00a0for fear\u00a0of retaliation or harm\u00a0to their lives, but\u00a0it is widely\u00a0discussed unofficially among the Nepalese people that Oli\u00a0is one of those implicated in\u00a0Bhandari’s and Ashrit\u2019s murder.<\/p>\n

PM Oli, who played a\u00a0principal\u00a0role in getting the Mahakali treaty ratified by Parliament, received\u00a0strong\u00a0support from India. With active backing from India’s RAW, he rose to become the chairman of the CPN-UML.\u00a0However,\u00a0his short-sighted tactics did\u00a0not last long. After assuming the presidency, he\u00a0changed his stance, shifting from\u00a0vehemently opposing\u00a0India during the day\u00a0but sought\u00a0refuge in RAW at night. Now, having been rejected by both RAW and India, Oli is claiming that Ram was not born in India, but in Ayodhya in Thori, Nepal, without providing any evidence. He stated, “We believe that we gave ‘Sita’ to the Indian prince Ram. We gave the Ram of Ayodhya, not to India. Ayodhya is a village west of Birgunj, Nepal\u201d (https:\/\/www.onlinekhabar.com\/2020\/07\/881495). Currently, he is making every effort and promising everything in favor of China to maintain his power against India\u2019s deception.<\/p>\n

Indian military Controversy <\/strong><\/h2>\n

On November 7, 1950,\u00a0Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, also known as\u00a0the Iron Man of India\u00a0and\u00a0Deputy The Prime Minister\u00a0and Home Minister wrote a letter to Prime Minister Nehru expressing concerns about India’s security in relation to China. In the letter, Patel emphasized the need for\u00a0political and administrative\u00a0measures\u00a0to strengthen\u00a0India’s\u00a0northern and north-eastern frontier, including\u00a0the\u00a0borders with\u00a0Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling, and\u00a0the\u00a0tribal territory of Assam (www.friendsoftibet.org\/sardarpatel.html<\/a>). As a result, the Indian ambassador\u00a0also\u00a0urged\u00a0Prime Minister Matrika Prasad Koirala to request the Indian Army’s assistance\u00a0to secure Nepal and its newly established multiparty democracy\u00a0from potential threats posed by China.<\/p>\n

After Nepal\u00a0declared itself\u00a0a democratic country, breaking\u00a0free\u00a0from the\u00a0104-year\u00a0rule of\u00a0the\u00a0Ranas, Matrika Prasad Koirala became\u00a0the\u00a0Prime Minister on\u00a0November 16, 1951, replacing Mohan Shumsher JB Rana.\u00a0Koirala\u00a0visited New Delhi on January 6, 1952 where he\u00a0requested PM Nehru’s assistance in\u00a0reorganizing, training, and\u00a0strengthening\u00a0the Nepal Army\u00a0(Pathak, September 15, 2014). Nehru accepted the\u00a0proposal\u00a0orally.<\/p>\n

On February 27, 1952,\u00a0101 days after Nepal’s request, the Indian Army Mission (IAM)\u00a0arrived in Kathmandu for a year.\u00a0Later, the IAM was renamed\u00a0the\u00a0Indian Military Training and Adventure Group (IMTAG). In addition to\u00a0training the\u00a0Nepal Army, the IMTAG moved to strategic\u00a0locations\u00a0in the\u00a0Northern Himalayas to monitor\u00a0Tibet\u00a0and\u00a0China. They established 18\u00a0military posts along the\u00a0Himalayan frontiers of Nepal, including\u00a0Tinkar Pass in Darchula,\u00a0Taklakot in Bajhang,\u00a0Muchu in Humla, Mugugaon in Mugu, Chharkabhot\u00a0in\u00a0Dolpa Kaisang\u00a0in Mustang,\u00a0Thorang in Manang,\u00a0Larkay Pass and Atharasaya Khola in Gorkha,\u00a0Somdang and Rasuwagadhi in Rasuwa,\u00a0Tatopani\u00a0in Sindhupalchowk, Lambagar in Dolakha,\u00a0Namche\u00a0in Solukhumbu,\u00a0Chepuwa Pass in Sankhuwasabha,\u00a0Chyangthapu in Panchthar, and\u00a0Olangchungola and Thechumbhu in Taplejung districts.<\/p>\n

At\u00a0each check-post, 20 to 40 Indian army officials\u00a0armed with\u00a0weapons\u00a0and\u00a0communication equipment\u00a0were\u00a0stationed, along with a few Nepali army and civilian officials (Shrestha, January 1, 2003). India increased its surveillance of various\u00a0military groups\u00a0at\u00a018 check-posts due to concerns about\u00a0the growing Chinese threat.\u00a0Tensions between India and China\u00a0escalated in March 1959 following the Tibetan uprising led by the Dalai Lama, who later sought refuge in India on March 30, 1959, with the assistance of the CIA (Whelpton, June 2016). Subsequently, the Dalai Lama established\u00a0a Government in\u00a0exile in Dharamshala, India\u00a0(Jackson, February 29, 2009). The relationship between India and China has\u00a0since\u00a0remained contentious and competitive,\u00a0impacting\u00a0Nepal.<\/p>\n

In his book\u00a0“Border Management of Nepal”\u00a0(January 1, 2003),\u00a0Buddhi Narayan Shrestha mentioned that the Indian Military\u00a0was\u00a0sent back to India by the Government of Nepal on April 20, 1969.\u00a0India was dissatisfied with this\u00a0decision\u00a0and\u00a0threatened to close the border. However, India was eventually forced to withdraw all check-posts by August 1970. This marked the return of\u00a0the Indian Army Mission\u00a0after\u00a0more than 18 years,\u00a0staying\u00a0an additional 17 years\u00a0beyond\u00a0the\u00a0initially agreed-upon\u00a0one-year\u00a0period. Nepal did not\u00a0object\u00a0to\u00a0the establishment of Indian troops\u00a0in Kalapani (Darchula) in 1960,\u00a0and India\u00a0did not seek\u00a0official permission from the Government of Nepal (Naya Patrika, May 20, 2020).<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Nepal\u00a0is in a complex situation where two influential nations, India and China, fluctuate between being adversaries and allies. These countries have contrasting ideologies\u2014India operates under a\u00a0competitive multi-party democracy\u00a0with disorderly under-governed, while China follows a non-competitive\u00a0people’s democracy\u00a0with strict\u00a0control and orderly over-governed.\u00a0China’s economy\u00a0is governed by proletarian politics, while India’s politics are influenced by economically affluent individuals.<\/p>\n

The Indian system of governance is\u00a0focused on business profits, dominating ideology, and security, while China is driven by political ambitions to dominate global trade, aiming to double its trade by day and quadruple it by night. The long-term trade relationship between India and China is unlikely to be positive warfare due to deep-seated mutual distrust. Indian people have a historical phobia of China, while\u00a0Chinese people\u00a0harbor\u00a0anti-Indian sentiment. China’s commercial addiction and aggressive trade goals make it difficult for India to compete on an equal footing.<\/p>\n

In this scenario, negative warfare is likely to arise between China and India. The current trade agreement between the two countries, which involves encroaching on Nepal’s Lipulek region, has been influenced by President Trump’s tariff policies. This situation is akin to a storm brewing. While Chinese goods will dominate the Indian market, the fragile relationship between China and India is bound to deteriorate. This imbalance means that Indian products will struggle to\u00a0compete in China. Since\u00a0the\u00a01990s, there has been a vacuum in global\u00a0political ideologies, with business interests taking precedence. Consequently, negative\u00a0warfare is inevitable as business interests have replaced age-old traditional ideologies. In the 21st century, conflicts over resource control are likely to lead to negative warfare on a global scale.<\/p>\n

Positive warfare and negative warfare are interconnected aspects of human society, much like two sides of a coin. They cannot be applied\u00a0simultaneously. When one ends, the other\u00a0emerges, similar to an ecosystem or the peace-conflict lifecycle. It is in the best interest of both countries to\u00a0exercise\u00a0patience and\u00a0avoid\u00a0encroaching on Nepal’s territory. Otherwise, Nepal could become a\u00a0transit\u00a0point\u00a0for a third party, which could then\u00a0act\u00a0as a watchdog and encircle both nations, potentially posing a threat to their interests from Nepalese territory.<\/p>\n

There is a proverb\u00a0among\u00a0Nepali elders\u00a0that says, “If it rains, take shelter under a big tree, and if you are in\u00a0trouble, follow a big person.”\u00a0However,\u00a0Nepal is\u00a0experiencing more losses than gains from the trade warfare between giant neighbors, India and China.\u00a0Nepal, like a shadow at the bottom of light, is caught between the superpower competition, hindering its development. Whether\u00a0China and India\u00a0cooperate or clash, Nepal is caught in the middle, under their control, being sandwiched, squeezed, and oppressed. The country struggles\u00a0to become a\u00a0true\u00a0partner in development, progress, peace, and harmony as\u00a0it seeks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Summary of positive warfare and negative warfare<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

Created by Professor Bishnu Pathak, PhD: September 2025<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

As individuals\u00a0and families migrate from\u00a0one place to\u00a0another, Nepal remains stationary, facing challenges. However, there is hope for Nepal to\u00a0progress\u00a0and for its people to\u00a0thrive. Additionally, the fluctuating moods and steep\u00a0tariffs imposed by US President Trump on China and India may encourage industrialists from both countries to consider Nepal as\u00a0a promising location to\u00a0establish their factories and businesses. In Nepal, the US tariff is only 10 percent.<\/p>\n

Nepal’s leaders must shoulder equal responsibility and accountability for the oppression, exploitation, stagnation, vulnerability, and\u00a0helplessness experienced by the country. They lack comprehensive plans for national development and prosperity, instead prioritizing personal gain, family interests, sycophancy, and party politics. Their focus is on serving themselves rather than the well-being\u00a0of\u00a0the\u00a0nation\u00a0and\u00a0its\u00a0people.<\/p>\n

During important high-level official meetings with neighboring countries like China and India, Nepal\u2019s top leaders, including prime ministers and ministers, prioritize personal projects for their constituencies over national interests. This undermines their ability to assert Nepal’s territorial claims, such as addressing encroachments in Lipulek Pass. Past treaties, agreements, and actions suggest a history of prioritizing Indian interests, effectively acting as agents of India rather than champions of Nepal’s sovereignty. Hence, the future of such leaders is also at risk in Nepal.<\/p>\n

During a pilgrimage to Mount Kailash and Mansarovar Lake, Nepalis are\u00a0prohibited from entering\u00a0the Kalapani area and the Lipulek Pass, which are part of their sovereign territory. The issues\u00a0related to\u00a0the Lipulek-Kalapani-Limpiyadhura areas have been\u00a0neglected by Nepali authorities due to concerns about India’s power, politics, property, and privilege. The dispute in the Kalapani territories has\u00a0been ongoing\u00a0since India gained independence from British colonial rule and\u00a0adopted Nehruvian socialism, but India has forgotten such socialism in practice.<\/p>\n

China’s pursuit of\u00a0unilateral benefits\u00a0raises\u00a0two\u00a0pressing\u00a0questions in Nepal: How long will China prioritize its own interests by signing a trade route warfare agreement with India through Nepal’s Lipulek\u00a0without informing and cooperating with Nepal? And how long will Nepal continue to support the \u2018One China Policy\u2019 and the GSI? These questions have become deeply rooted in the minds of the Nepalese people, and China must address these concerns sooner rather than later. Despite Nepal’s frequent\u00a0changes\u00a0in\u00a0government, the permanent force of resolution of\u00a0its\u00a0people\u00a0remains steadfast. If China fails to provide a satisfactory answer to\u00a0the Nepali people,\u00a0both\u00a0the \u2018One-China Policy\u2019\u00a0and Nepal’s alignment with the GSI are sure to be at great risk.<\/p>\n

References:<\/strong><\/p>\n

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            6. <\/a><\/a> (2020, June 15). \u201c’Serious diplomatic lapse’: Karan Singh slams government over Indo-Nepal border row\u201d. The New Indian Express<\/em>. New Delhi.<\/li>\n
            7. <\/a><\/a> (2020, May 8). \u201cRajnath Singh inaugurates strategically crucial road in Uttarakhand\u201d. The Times of India<\/em>. New Delhi.<\/li>\n
            8. Regmi, Avantika. (2019, November 29). Lipulekako Rananitik Mahatwa (The Strategic Importance of Lipulek)<\/em>. Kathmandu: Khabarhub.com.<\/li>\n
            9. <\/a><\/a> Rose, Leo E. (1999). Nepal and Bhutan 1988: Two Himalayan Kingdoms<\/em>. The Regents of the University of California.<\/li>\n
            10. <\/a><\/a> Santhanam, Radhika. (2019, August 12). \u201cIn Manasarovar, Chinese lend a helping hand to Indian pilgrims\u201d. The Times of India<\/em>. New Delhi.<\/li>\n
            11. <\/a><\/a> Sardar Patel’s Letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru<\/em>. (1950, November 7). Retrieved May 22, 2025 from friendsoftibet.org\/sardarpatel.html<\/a>.<\/li>\n
            12. <\/a><\/a> Shah, Dipta Prakash. (November 13, 2019). \u201cNepal: Sugauli Treaty-1816 & Breach of Recognized State Obligation\u201d. Telegraphnepal<\/em>. Kathmandu.<\/li>\n
            13. <\/a><\/a> Sharma, Bhuwan. (2020, May 30). \u201cResidents of Nabhi, Gunji, and Kuti used to pay land revenue to Nepal until 2035 BS\u201d. myRepublica<\/em>. Kathmandu: Nepal Republic Media.<\/li>\n
            14. <\/a><\/a> Shrestha, Buddhi Narayan. (2003, January 1). Border Management of Nepal<\/em>. Kathmandu: Bhumichitra Co.<\/li>\n
            15. <\/a><\/a> Shrestha, Buddhi Narayan. (2015, June 22). \u201cYam indeed\u201d. The Kathmandu Post<\/em>. Kathmandu: Kantipur Media Group.<\/li>\n
            16. <\/a><\/a> Shrestha, Buddhi Narayan. (2015, June 27). Authenticity of Lipulek border pass<\/em>. Nepal Foreign Affairs.<\/li>\n
            17. <\/a><\/a> Shrestha, Hriranya Lal. (2020, June 16). \u201cMatribhumiko Aastha Ra Antaraatmako Aawaj Sunera Whip Ullanghan Garyou (We\u00a0violated the\u00a0party’s whipby\u00a0listening to the\u00a0voices of\u00a0the motherland’s\u00a0faith and\u00a0inner\u00a0soul)\u201d. Naya Patrika<\/em>. Kathmandu: New Publication.<\/li>\n
            18. <\/a><\/a> Thapa, Gaurab S. (2020, May 13). \u201cNepal confronts India in Lipulek border dispute\u201d. Asian Times<\/em>.<\/li>\n
            19. <\/a><\/a> The Kathmandu Post<\/em>. (2015, June 11). \u201cIndian Communist leader Yechury denounces India-China statement\u201d. Kathmandu: Kantipur Media Group.<\/li>\n
            20. Tuladhar, Padma Ratna, et al. (1999, September\/October). A Report Prepared by Pubic-level Border Encroachment Prevention Committee, Nepal<\/em>. Kathmandu.<\/li>\n
            21. <\/a><\/a> Whelpton, John. (2016, June). A History of Nepal<\/em>. Cambridge University Press.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              45.\u00a0 www.timesnownews.com. (2025, July 31). Gurkha recruitment legacy of past, says Nepal; calls 1947 tripartite agreement ‘redundant’<\/em>. Retrieved September 3, 2025, from https:\/\/www.timesnownews.com\/india\/article\/gurkha-recruitment-legacy-of-past-says-nepal-calls-1947-tripartite-agreement-redundant\/630297<\/a>.<\/p>\n

                \n
              1. <\/a><\/a> Xavier, Constantino. (2020, June 11). Interpreting the India-Nepal border dispute<\/em>. Retrieved June 7, 2025, from https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blog\/up-front\/2020\/06\/11\/interpreting-the-india-nepal-border-dispute\/<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                NOTE:<\/strong><\/p>\n

                [*]<\/a> (1) Prof. Chaitanya Misra, (2) Bhairab Risal, (3) Prof. Om Gurung, (4) Prof. Kapil Shrestha, (5) Prof. Krishna Bhattachan, (6) Prem Bahadur Bhandari, (7) Prof. Surendra K.C., (8) Dr. Bidor Osti, (9) Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, (10) Prof. Mangal Siddhi Manandhar, (11) Chandreswar Shrestha, (12) Sindhu Nath Pyakurel, (13) Chandra Raj Dhungel, (14) Maheswarman Shrestha, (15) Shyam Shrestha, (16) Pramesh Hamal, (17) Shanta Shrestha, (18) Dr. Sarad Onta, (19) Dr. Ram Man Shrestha, (20) Prof. Rajesh Gautam, (21) Ninu Chapagai, (22) Shyam Krishna Koji, (23) Buddhi Narayan Shrestha, (24) Ramesh Sharma, (25) Narayan Krishna Nhunchhe Pradhan, (26) Dr. Saroj Dhital, (27) Prof. Kalyan Dev Bhattarai, (28) Dr. Narayan Pokhrel, (29) Suresh Ale Magar, (30) Prof. Govinda Bhatta, (31) Prem Krishna Pathak, (32) Chaitanya Sharma, (33) Krishna Ram Khatri, (34) Khagendra Sangroulla, (35) Rameshwarman Amatya, (36) Jiwan Sharma, (37) Chatendra Jung Rimal, and (38) Manik Lal Shrestha (Mulyankan, September\/October 1999).<\/p>\n

                _______________________________________________<\/em><\/p>\n

                \"\"<\/a> Prof. Bishnu Pathak was a former Senior Commissioner at the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), Nepal who has been a Noble Peace prize nominee 2013-2019 for his noble finding of Peace-Conflict Lifecycle similar to the ecosystem. A Board Member of the <\/em>TRANSCEND Peace University<\/em><\/a> holds a Ph.D. in interdisciplinary Conflict Transformation and Human Rights in two decades. Arduous Dr. Pathak who is an author of over 100 international paper-book publications has been used as references in more than 100 countries across the globe. Immense versatile personality Dr. Pathak\u2019s publications belong to Human Rights, Human Security, Peace, Conflict Transformation, and Transitional Justices among others. He can be reached at ciedpnp@gmail.com<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                The Sugauli Treaty of 1816 led to the loss of more than 50 percent of Nepal\u2019s land to the British East India Company.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":94888,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[40],"tags":[240,1509,1876,244,120,2374,759,1458],"class_list":["post-302939","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-transcend-members","tag-asia","tag-british-colonialism","tag-british-empire","tag-china","tag-conflict","tag-himalayas","tag-india","tag-nepal"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/302939","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=302939"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/302939\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":302949,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/302939\/revisions\/302949"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/94888"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=302939"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=302939"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=302939"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}