{"id":313605,"date":"2026-02-23T13:18:20","date_gmt":"2026-02-23T13:18:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=313605"},"modified":"2026-02-23T13:18:20","modified_gmt":"2026-02-23T13:18:20","slug":"anti-hegemonism-and-the-dynamics-of-relations-in-the-russia-india-china-triangle","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2026\/02\/anti-hegemonism-and-the-dynamics-of-relations-in-the-russia-india-china-triangle\/","title":{"rendered":"Anti-Hegemonism and the Dynamics of Relations in the Russia\u2013India\u2013China Triangle"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Russia\u2014for which constructing a stable security order in Eurasia remains the overriding priority\u2014is uniquely positioned to serve as a catalyst for understanding between Beijing and New Delhi, both in bilateral conversations and through multilateral platforms.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

19 Feb 2026\u00a0<\/em>–\u00a0The past year has witnessed a notable thaw in relations between Eurasia\u2019s two largest powers\u2014China and India. The process symbolically began with Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi\u2019s meeting at the BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024\u2014their first in five years\u2014and gathered further momentum when the Indian Prime Minister attended the SCO summit in Tianjin in August 2025. That gathering occurred mere days after Washington imposed 50% tariffs on select Indian imports, a move many observers interpreted as an additional catalyst for rapprochement between New Delhi and Beijing.<\/p>\n

Yet experts caution that this is not the first such warming in recent decades\u2014and emphasize its inherent fragility. The obstacles to genuine trust between India and China are deeply structural and cannot be dismantled overnight. Still, even a gradual build-up of confidence between the two Asian giants would carry profound implications for the broader international order, most notably by unlocking fresh possibilities for both BRICS and the SCO.<\/p>\n

For years Moscow has actively championed the RIC (Russia\u2013India\u2013China) format, convinced\u2014rightly\u2014that stronger ties within this trilateral configuration would bolster both organizations. While formal institutionalization of the RIC remains improbable, its value as an informal yet high-level platform for discussing critical global issues appears increasingly evident.<\/p>\n

Despite persistent and serious bilateral frictions between Beijing and New Delhi, Russia, India, and China converge on several fundamental principles of world order\u2014chief among them a shared rejection of hegemony, understood as the domination of one power at the expense of all others. The crucial difference lies in the target of this anti-hegemonic sentiment: for Russia and China it is unmistakably directed at the United States, whereas India\u2019s primary concern has long been\u2014and remains\u2014the prospect of Chinese regional dominance.<\/p>\n

Unlike the United States, none of the three RIC powers has historically sought global hegemony (even if Washington increasingly perceives China as a systemic peer competitor). Nevertheless, the ambition to exercise preeminent influence within their respective regions\u2014a posture critics often equate with a form of regional hegemony\u2014is deeply embedded in the strategic culture of all three states. This drive arises not merely from security imperatives tied to vast territories, but equally from each country\u2019s self-understanding as a distinct civilizational centre destined to organise and lead the space around it.<\/p>\n

Until very recently, explicit claims to regional primacy were largely kept outside the bounds of respectable political discourse. That changed with the November 2025 US National Security Strategy, which openly proclaimed the goal of \u201crestoring American primacy\u201d in the Western Hemisphere in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine\u2014a stance dramatically underscored by American military action against Venezuela in January 2026. While Washington\u2019s renewed exceptionalism denies other powers any comparable \u201cright\u201d to spheres of influence, its normalisation of the very concept of regional dominance can hardly go unnoticed by Moscow, Beijing, or New Delhi.<\/p>\n

The regional spheres claimed (implicitly or explicitly) by each RIC member are readily identifiable: the post-Soviet space for Russia, East Asia for China, and South Asia together with the Indian Ocean region for India. Any attempt by outside powers to assert dominance in these zones almost invariably triggers strong reactions from the respective regional heavyweight.<\/p>\n

The West\u2019s sustained refusal to acknowledge Russia\u2019s legitimate security concerns produced the gravest military-political crisis in Europe since 1945.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s strategic anxieties revolve around Taiwan on one side and Western efforts (joined by India) to construct a containment-oriented security architecture on the other. For India, Beijing\u2019s longstanding support for Pakistan and its expanding political and economic footprint across the Indian Ocean remain the most persistent challenges.<\/p>\n

This special role\u2014and the corresponding interests\u2014of the three powers in \u201ctheir\u201d regions is, on one level, a natural consequence of their sheer scale. On another level, however, it inevitably provokes apprehension and balancing behaviour among smaller and middle powers. Japan\u2019s entire post-war foreign policy has been shaped by the fear of Chinese dominance (which American military presence is meant to deter). Vietnam seeks to internationalise the South China Sea dispute while carefully avoiding outright confrontation with Beijing. Pakistan, for its part, defines its core strategic purpose as resisting perceived Indian hegemony in South Asia.<\/p>\n

In most of these relationships, a tacit understanding eventually emerges: the major power is a permanent fixture, and pragmatic long-term engagement with it is unavoidable\u2014a reality already visible across much of East Asia. Pakistan\u2019s situation is, in its own way, dramatic: perpetual confrontation with India drains resources that could otherwise fuel development, yet the overwhelming asymmetry of power and the need for dialogue are undeniable facts, continually reaffirmed by both countries\u2019 participation in the SCO and Islamabad\u2019s ambition to join BRICS.<\/p>\n

By contrast, a very different\u2014and far more confrontational\u2014logic has dominated the western edge of Eurasia since the Cold War\u2019s end. The collective West pronounced Russia \u201cstrategically irrelevant\u201d and systematically dismissed its security concerns\u2014an approach that directly contributed to the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. The triumphalism of NATO and the EU, combined with the belief among segments of Ukrainian society and elite that Russia\u2019s interests can be safely ignored because history has doomed it to decline, represents perhaps the most extreme modern example of miscalculation in great power\u2013smaller power relations\u2014with consequences reverberating across the European continent and offering a sobering lesson to the world.<\/p>\n

Returning to the RIC triangle, it becomes clear that the only current point of serious friction between historically justified regional ambitions and perceptions of hegemonic overreach lies between Beijing and New Delhi.<\/p>\n

Sustainable, mutually acceptable compromises are possible\u2014but only through sustained, serious strategic dialogue, including within the BRICS and SCO frameworks. Much will also hinge on the future trajectory of the \u201cfree and open Indo-Pacific\u201d concept\u2014specifically, whether Washington continues to invest in its confrontational dimension vis-\u00e0-vis China, and how closely India aligns with that vision. Washington\u2019s declared reorientation toward the Western Hemisphere does not erase the enduring strategic weight it continues to attach to the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n

Paradoxically, at this historical juncture it is the United States itself that is inadvertently fostering greater mutual understanding between Beijing and New Delhi. Trump\u2019s tariffs, combined with conspicuous trade and economic favours extended to Pakistan, have eroded New Delhi\u2019s confidence in Washington as a reliable strategic partner. India will likely continue to value the American naval presence in the Indian Ocean as a useful hedge against Chinese influence\u2014yet the broader pattern of US behaviour is pushing New Delhi toward regional solutions to regional security dilemmas. In this context, Russia\u2014for which constructing a stable security order in Eurasia remains the overriding priority\u2014is uniquely positioned to serve as a catalyst for such understanding, both in bilateral conversations and through multilateral platforms.<\/p>\n

___________________________________________<\/p>\n

Anton Bespalov is a Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Deputy Editor-in-Chief of valdaiclub.com. \u0415xpert in international relations and journalist based in Moscow. Candidate of Political Sciences, State Academic University for the Humanities in Moscow (2008), Master of Arts in Cultural Studies, Warsaw University (2005).<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original – infobrics.org<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

19 Feb 2026\u00a0–\u00a0Russia\u2014for which constructing a stable security order in Eurasia is overriding priority\u2014is uniquely positioned as a catalyst between Beijing and New Delhi, both in bilateral conversations through multilateral platforms.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":313606,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[180],"tags":[239,244,3160,759,278],"class_list":["post-313605","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-brics","tag-brics","tag-china","tag-eurasia","tag-india","tag-russia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/313605","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=313605"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/313605\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":313607,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/313605\/revisions\/313607"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/313606"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=313605"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=313605"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=313605"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}