{"id":315875,"date":"2026-05-11T12:00:21","date_gmt":"2026-05-11T11:00:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=315875"},"modified":"2026-05-06T09:10:44","modified_gmt":"2026-05-06T08:10:44","slug":"us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2026\/05\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/","title":{"rendered":"US Sanctions and the Sharp Rise in Infant Mortality in Cuba"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4><a href=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/CUBA_Infant_Mortality.jpg\" ><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-315876\" src=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/CUBA_Infant_Mortality-1024x682.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"500\" height=\"333\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/CUBA_Infant_Mortality-1024x682.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/CUBA_Infant_Mortality-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/CUBA_Infant_Mortality-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/CUBA_Infant_Mortality.jpg 1400w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 500px) 100vw, 500px\" \/><\/a><\/h4>\n<h4>Executive Summary<\/h4>\n<p><em>27 Apr 2026 &#8211; <\/em>A country\u2019s infant mortality rate (IMR) is often considered a key barometer for a population\u2019s overall health as well as its access to quality health care.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn1\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">1<\/a><\/sup> In Cuba, where for decades the state has invested substantially in health care services, the IMR was, until recently, among the lowest in the Western Hemisphere and lower than in the US. Since 2018, however, Cuba\u2019s IMR has increased from an annual rate of 4.0 per 1,000 live births to a rate of 9.9 as of 2025,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn2\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">2<\/a><\/sup> representing an increase of 148 percent. If the rate of infant mortality had remained unchanged, then approximately 1,800 fewer babies would have died since 2018.<\/p>\n<p>This striking increase in Cuba\u2019s IMR, which is at variance with trends seen in other countries in the region, has taken place over a period (2017\u20132025) that has seen an unprecedented expansion and tightening of the US commercial and financial embargo that has been in place since the early 1960s. It is worth noting that, in the years following the global COVID-19 pandemic and again in contrast with nearly all of its regional neighbors, Cuba failed to experience a substantial economic rebound, averaging 0.4 percent annual per capita GDP growth between 2020 and 2024 versus 3.2 percent for the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn3\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">3<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Recent studies show a strong causal relationship between sanctions imposed and increased death rates. In August 2025, a <i>Lancet Global Health<\/i> study estimated, based on a panel regression incorporating data from 152 countries, that broad, unilateral sanctions resulted in approximately 564,000 deaths annually over the years 2012\u20132021.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn4\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">4<\/a><\/sup> The study also found that children under five years old accounted for 51 percent of these deaths. Infant mortality is generally about three-quarters of under-five mortality. These numbers therefore reflect a profound disproportionality in the impact of sanctions on infants and children under five years of age as compared with other age groups; infants are only about 1.6 percent of the world population.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn5\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">5<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Sanction measures adopted by US administrations since 2017 are designed to cause economic damage to Cuba by further reducing its access to foreign exchange and international financial markets; such measures can, and appear intended to, cause recessions, depressions, balance of payments crises, and higher inflation, even hyperinflation \u2014 as similar sanctions have done in other countries. A 2022 paper published by the Bank for International Settlements found that \u201cchild mortality rises in a highly significant way in recessions in EMDEs [emerging market and developing economies], by about 6 deaths per 1000 births.\u201d<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn6\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">6<\/a><\/sup> Again, these numbers are for mortality of children under five years old. As mentioned above, about three-quarters of this mortality in the world is infant mortality, so this study implies that a recession would increase mortality by 4.5 deaths per 1,000 births. This is most of the increase that the data show for Cuba (from 4.0 to 9.9, so an additional 5.9 deaths per 1,000 births).<\/p>\n<p>The unparalleled hardening of US sanctions against Cuba during the first Trump administration, the Biden administration\u2019s decision to largely maintain these policies, and the further expansion of sanctions during the second Trump administration, including a devastating fuel blockade, is very likely the primary cause of the current economic and humanitarian crisis in Cuba, which is widely considered to be the worst in the island\u2019s contemporary history.<\/p>\n<p>Among the most harmful measures imposed over the last eight years are the following:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>The Cuba Restricted Entities List<\/b>, prohibiting transactions with most of Cuba\u2019s major hotels and many other state-run businesses (created in 2017 by President Donald Trump).<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn7\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">7<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Reduction of the <\/b><b><i>de minimis <\/i><\/b><b>threshold on Cuba to 10 percent<\/b>, blocking all exports of foreign-made products to Cuba that include more than 10 percent US-origin content (tightened from 25 percent to 10 percent in October 2019).<\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Far-reaching restrictions on US travel to Cuba<\/b>, including ending the main travel license allowing travel to Cuba for individuals (June 2017) and for groups (June 2019; rescinded in 2022, reinstituted in 2025) and the banning of cruise and most private vessels\/aircraft from calling at Cuba (June 2019).<\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Re-inclusion of Cuba on the State Sponsor of Terrorism<\/b><b> list<\/b>,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn8\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">8<\/a><\/sup> triggering potential onerous fines for international financial institutions that do business with Cuban entities and blocking citizens of 42 Electronic System for Travel Authorization-applicable countries (EU, UK, Japan, Australia, South Korea, etc.) from traveling to the US visa-free if they travel to Cuba (instituted on January 12, 2021).<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn9\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">9<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>The nonrenewal of the presidential waiver on Title III of the Helms-Burton Act<\/b>, allowing US citizens and entities to sue third-party individuals and companies \u2014 including non-US companies \u2014 that engage in business with Cuban entities benefiting from nationalized properties (President Trump let the waiver expire in May 2019).<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn10\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">10<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Measures restricting the flow of remittances<\/b>, including caps on family remittances ($1,000 per quarter), bans of all donative remittances (ordered by President Trump on September 9, 2019; removed by Biden on June 9, 2022), and the addition of the Cuban firm that processes remittances for Western Union and other US companies to the Cuba restricted list in 2020. Operations resumed with a new Cuban partner in 2023, but this firm was also added to the list in January 2025, again closing the main channel for formal remittances and forcing reliance on costlier alternatives.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn11\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">11<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Sanctions and other pressure targeting officials of governments hosting Cuban international medical missions<\/b>, leading to the departure of many of these missions and the steady erosion of Cuba\u2019s primary source of foreign income (pursued by both Trump administrations).<\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>US fuel blockade<\/b> \u2014 by far the most damaging US unilateral measure to date \u2014 consisting in the blocking of nearly all oil shipments from Venezuela through the use of coercive tactics employed by the US military, including the interception of tankers destined to Cuba by the US Coast Guard,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn12\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">12<\/a><\/sup> as well as threats, including threats of tariffs directed at countries considering exporting oil to Cuba (pursued by President Trump since early January 2026).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In the aggregate, these measures have \u2014 by fueling steep reductions in export earnings from tourism, medical services, foreign investment, remittances, and so on and by cutting Cuba off from most international credit \u2014 stifled economic growth and significantly contributed to major balance of payments difficulties, leading to increased inflation, reduced imports of essential goods, and reduced economic growth. Given these conditions, it is unsurprising that Cuba is experiencing an acute economic crisis that has led to a major decline in living standards that has, in turn, resulted in an unprecedented number of departures from the island over the last few years. This crisis has been compounded by this year\u2019s fuel blockade, which has prompted increasingly frequent and prolonged power outages and brought many essential services and economic activities to a halt.<\/p>\n<p>While there aren\u2019t available data to begin measuring the impact of this year\u2019s fuel blockade yet, the other sanction measures cited above played a very large, sometimes predominant, role in the following developments:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Tourist arrivals in Cuba fell by 53 percent between 2018 and 2024<\/b>;<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn13\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">13<\/a><\/sup> neighboring countries with similar volumes of tourism experienced increases in arrivals or no significant change.<\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Income from tourism fell 59 percent<\/b>, from $3.2 billion in 2017 to $1.3 billion in 2024.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn14\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">14<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Export earnings from medical services (international medical missions) fell 23 percent<\/b>, from $6.4 billion in 2018 to around $4.9 billion in 2022, the last year for which there are data.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn15\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">15<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Remittances fell 42 percent from $4 billion in 2018 to just $2.3 billion in 2024.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn16\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">16<\/a><\/sup><\/b><\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\"><b>Domestic spending on goods imports fell from $11.5 billion in 2018 to $8.1 billion in 2024<\/b>,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn17\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">17<\/a><\/sup> a steep fall of 30 percent (or 19 percent in per capita terms) that is likely understated in the official data.<\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\">According to Cuba\u2019s National Statistics Office, <b>Cuba\u2019s population fell by 13 percent from 11.2 million in 2020 to 9.8 million in 2024,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn18\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">18<\/a><\/sup><\/b> a rate of out-migration that far surpasses all prior episodes of intense out-migration from Cuba (such as the Mariel Boatlift in 1980).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>These and other similar data reflect a rapidly deteriorating social and economic reality that has taken a major toll on the Cuban people. The human consequences of this decline include widespread undernourishment, a significant worsening of sanitary conditions, a rise in disease and sickness, and \u2014 as underscored above \u2014 an increase in deaths, particularly the deaths of infant children.<\/p>\n<p>CEPR staff has also observed <i>in situ<\/i> how US sanctions measures have directly contributed to the deterioration of Cuba\u2019s once exemplary health care sector, which is undoubtedly a factor that has contributed to the marked increase in Cuba\u2019s IMR. During a 2024 trip to Cuba to assess the impact of the hardening of US sanctions, CEPR visited Cuban health care facilities and spoke to numerous health care providers. The visit confirmed that, as a result of the reduction of the <i>de minimis<\/i> threshold in 2019, Cuban medical importers were no longer able to obtain at affordable prices many basic medical supplies, such as syringes, inhalers, and even saline solution; more sophisticated medical equipment, such as imaging and ultrasound systems; and inputs for the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals. The re-designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 2021 has made it extremely challenging to obtain financing for the purchase of these goods \u2014 at any price \u2014 or to simply execute international payments to purchase them. The end result of these multiple barriers generated by these sanctions has been massive shortages of medical goods \u2014 supplies, equipment, medicines \u2014 that had once been far more readily available in spite of the long-standing US embargo.<\/p>\n<p>The situation in Cuba has declined even further since last year and could devolve into an even more severe humanitarian crisis as a result of the US fuel blockade. As a number of recent media reports have noted, the blockade has had a particularly dire effect on Cuba\u2019s health care infrastructure, with frequent power outages interrupting the use of critical equipment for the treatment of patients, including incubators for premature babies and ventilators to help sick newborns breathe.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn19\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">19<\/a><\/sup> There is virtually no available fuel to transport sick patients, whether by ambulance or in private vehicles \u2014 NBC reported in March that 300 ambulances are sitting idle for lack of fuel or parts, leaving only 25 electric ambulances to serve the entire island.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn20\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">20<\/a><\/sup> Public transportation is paralyzed,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn21\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">21<\/a><\/sup> leading to an even greater absence of medical workers in key facilities.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn22\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">22<\/a><\/sup> None of this is surprising. In fact, these are precisely the consequences that could be expected from a fuel blockade targeting an island nation that only produces roughly 40 percent of the energy required to meet its domestic needs.<\/p>\n<p>Given the effects of the US energy blockade, it is highly likely that Cuba\u2019s infant mortality rate has increased significantly since December 2025 when it had reached 9.9 per 1,000 live births. Other key health indicators, such as life expectancy and maternal mortality, have also very likely deteriorated since the beginning of the year.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"adramaticincreaseincubaninfantmortality\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4>A Dramatic Increase in Cuban Infant Mortality<\/h4>\n<p>A country\u2019s infant mortality rate (IMR) \u2014 defined as the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births \u2014 is often considered a key barometer for a population\u2019s overall health as well as its access to quality health care.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn23\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">23<\/a><\/sup> Until recently, Cuba\u2019s IMR was among the lowest in the Western Hemisphere \u2014 lower even than the rate for the US \u2014 with, for instance, a rate of 4.3 in 2015 according to Cuba\u2019s health authorities, or 4.8 according to World Bank\/UN estimates versus an average regional rate of 15.6 and a US rate of 5.8.<\/p>\n<p>Cuba\u2019s exceptionally low rate, particularly for a country that has lagged behind the majority of the rest of the region economically, was attributable in part to significant public investment \u2014over many years \u2014 in health care. For decades, Cuba\u2019s government has spent proportionately more on health care than nearly all of its regional neighbors. Among other things, it greatly expanded preventive primary care services, increased the number of health care facilities, and trained large numbers of health care professionals, resulting in one of the highest rates of physician density in the world.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn24\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">24<\/a><\/sup> This robust and consistent investment in health care explains, at least in part, why Cuba has had, until recently, higher average life expectancy, much lower maternal mortality, and far lower infant mortality than the Latin American and Caribbean average (see <b>Table 1<\/b>). Table 1 uses internationally comparable World Bank data for these indicators to show how, in 2017, Cuba had superior results than the regional average as well as a sample of its neighbors.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-42675\" src=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 2352px) 100vw, 2352px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1.png 2352w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-300x149.png 300w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-1024x510.png 1024w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-768x383.png 768w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-1536x765.png 1536w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-2048x1021.png 2048w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-100x50.png 100w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-250x125.png 250w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-500x249.png 500w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-1000x498.png 1000w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-1500x747.png 1500w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/r6b5R-table-1-maternal-mortality-life-expectancy-health-expenditure-and-infant-mortality-in-2017-for-select-latin-american-and-caribbean-countries-3-1-2000x997.png 2000w\" alt=\"\" width=\"2352\" height=\"1172\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Since 2019, Cuba\u2019s IMR has increased dramatically \u2014 rising from a rate of 4.0 that year to 9.9 for 2025 (<strong>Table 2<\/strong>), an increase of 148 percent. If the mortality rate had remained at its 2018 level, then approximately 1,800 fewer babies would have died between 2019 and 2025. This is a very different trajectory to other countries in the sample. For the countries that have published recent infant mortality rates (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica), only Brazil saw an increase in the mortality rate, which rose by 3 percent from 11.9 in 2019 to 12.3 in 2024.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn25\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">25<\/a><\/sup> All of the others saw declines or stagnation in the rates.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn26\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">26<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>In Table 2 we use official government statistics \u2014 which, unlike the World Bank database, provide data for 2024 and 2025 \u2014 to provide a picture of the sharp increase in Cuba\u2019s IMR between 2017 and 2025.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-42674\" src=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths-.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1240px) 100vw, 1240px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths-.png 1240w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths--280x300.png 280w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths--956x1024.png 956w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths--768x823.png 768w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths--93x100.png 93w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths--233x250.png 233w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths--467x500.png 467w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/A9w8j-table-2-cuba-births-infant-mortality-rate-and-excess-deaths--934x1000.png 934w\" alt=\"\" width=\"1240\" height=\"1328\" \/>It\u2019s worth noting that, like most countries in the world, the Cuban economy underwent a severe COVID-related contraction; gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth was -10.7 percent in 2020, one of the worst in the region (<b>Table 3<\/b>). However, unlike most other countries in the region and around the world, Cuba did not subsequently experience a sizable post-COVID rebound during the years that immediately followed. Average annual GDP per capita growth from 2020 to 2024 was just 0.4 percent, as compared with the regional average of 3.2 percent. During this period, the quality of health care and access to health care services in Cuba sharply deteriorated amid widespread shortages of medicines and medical supplies and amid the departure of many health professionals.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-42684\" src=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1240px) 100vw, 1240px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1.png 1240w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1-292x300.png 292w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1-998x1024.png 998w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1-768x788.png 768w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1-97x100.png 97w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1-244x250.png 244w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1-487x500.png 487w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table3_1-975x1000.png 975w\" alt=\"\" width=\"1240\" height=\"1272\" \/><\/p>\n<p>In spring 2024, CEPR staff visited health care facilities in Cuba and observed firsthand some of the mounting challenges that the health care sector was experiencing. There were shortages of basic, critical medical supplies, such as syringes, inhalers, and even saline solution. At a cardiological center for children, we observed a toddler who needed to undergo a surgical operation that would have been avoidable had the center had access to catheters. We met a young doctor who lamented being the only graduate from his class that was still practicing medicine in Cuba, and he attributed this to the shrinking wages for doctors. At the National Oncological Institute we learned that medical staff were having great difficulty obtaining basic laboratory chemicals and were unable to access spare parts for radiotherapy equipment; as a result, they were unable to treat many cancer patients in a timely manner. The institute once had a total of 60 medical physicists (who were specialized in cancer treatment) and now had only 16. They previously had 16 anaesthesiologists and now had only five.<\/p>\n<p>Since then, reports indicate that the situation in the Cuban health care sector has grown far worse. Due to a continuous increase in fuel shortages and electricity blackouts around Cuba, many hospitals have been unable to provide critical services, and all but vital surgeries have been put on hold. Ambulances are often unavailable for urgent care due to a lack of sufficient fuel. Medical providers in pediatric clinics have reported having to take small children off of ventilators during power shortages and manually pump air into their lungs in order to try to keep them alive.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn27\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">27<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>The direct and indirect impact of the tightening of US sanctions on Cuba that began in 2017 very likely played a substantial role in the extremely large jump in Cuba\u2019s infant mortality rate.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"sanctionsandinfantmortalitywhatrecentstudiestellsus\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4>Sanctions and Infant Mortality: What Recent Studies Tells Us<\/h4>\n<p>Over the past decade, Cuba has been subjected to a dramatic increase in the scope and intensity of sanctions imposed by the United States. The resulting negative effects on the Cuban economy, which we will look at in greater detail in the next section, would be expected to lead to increased mortality. There is also considerable empirical and statistical evidence that economic sanctions of the type imposed and intensified in Cuba over the past decade can cause substantial increases in deaths in target countries.<\/p>\n<p>Most recently, an August 2025 study for <i>The Lancet Global Health <\/i>by economists Francisco Rodr\u00edguez, Silvio Rend\u00f3n, and Mark Weisbrot estimated that broad, unilateral sanctions \u2014 mostly imposed by the United States \u2014 increased deaths in sanctioned countries by approximately 564,000 annually, based on a panel regression including 152 countries.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn28\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">28<\/a><\/sup> This is comparable to worldwide annual deaths from armed conflict.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn29\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">29<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>This study incorporated a number of statistical methods to demonstrate the causal relationship between the sanctions imposed and the increased death rates that resulted.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn30\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">30<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p><i>The Lancet Global Health<\/i> study found that children under five years old accounted for 51 percent of the deaths caused by these sanctions. Infant mortality is generally about three-quarters of under-five mortality. So these numbers indicate a profound disproportionality in the impact of sanctions on infants as compared with other age groups; infants are only about 1.6 percent of the world population.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn31\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">31<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>This would indicate that a rise in infant mortality of the size that has taken place over the past decade in Cuba \u2014 or even greater \u2014 might be expected under the conditions that Cuba experienced during that period. There is other compelling statistical evidence that would also strongly indicate the sanctions that Cuba has been subjected to would cause a substantial increase in infant mortality. Some of this can be found in another study based on panel regressions and published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). It involves 180 countries and examines the relationship between recessions and mortality in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn32\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">32<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>These results are directly relevant to the relationship between sanctions and mortality. That is partly because economic slowdowns, recessions, depressions, and even hyperinflation \u2014 which is generally economically devastating \u2014 are among the most important types of economic damage from sanctions that increase death rates. In one of the most well-documented experiences of sanctions, Venezuela lost 74 percent of its GDP from 2012 to 2020,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn33\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">33<\/a><\/sup> more than three times the contraction of the US economy during the Great Depression. Most of this was due to economic sanctions. The first year of the Trump administration\u2019s sanctions on Venezuela (2017\u201318) saw an increase of 40,000 deaths,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn34\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">34<\/a><\/sup> with many more in the years that followed.<\/p>\n<p>Cutting a country off from most international financial markets, including normal levels of borrowing, would be expected to cause recessions. Fiscal and debt crises, balance of payments crises, and the loss of essential imports that are needed for production as well as for the maintenance of critical infrastructure often follow the loss of financial access. Direct restrictions on imports play a similar role in damaging the economy; in Cuba\u2019s case this has been seen most acutely following the near-total blockade of oil imposed by the Trump administration over the past few months. Restrictions on exports and remittances can also contribute to recessions and balance of payment crises.<\/p>\n<p>These ways in which sanctions cause, and worsen, recessions and crises mean that they will also spur higher levels of mortality through this economic impact. The statistical relationship between recessions and mortality therefore provides important statistical evidence for the impact of sanctions on mortality.<\/p>\n<p>Economists at the BIS found that \u201cchild mortality rises in a highly significant way in recessions in EMDEs, by about 6 deaths per 1000 births.\u201d<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn35\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">35<\/a><\/sup> The authors of the BIS paper define a recession for a country as a year in which the economy has negative growth.<\/p>\n<p>Again, these numbers are for mortality of children under five years old. As mentioned above, about three-quarters of this mortality in the world is infant mortality, so this study implies that a recession would increase mortality by 4.5 deaths per 1,000 births. This is most of the increase that the data show for Cuba (from 4.0 to 9.9 or 5.9 deaths per 1,000 births) (see Table 2).<\/p>\n<p>Of course there is considerable lethal impact of sanctions in Cuba that is not brought about through the impact of recessions: the lack of access to medicines and medical supplies; the breakdown of care that depends on electricity or fuel for transport; water, hygiene, and sanitation failures; and the loss of repair capacity or spare parts. Mosquito control, prenatal outreach, vaccination campaigns, and many other public health measures can be seriously weakened from the direct impact of sanctions, with or without a recession.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn36\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">36<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>It is worth noting the causal relationship between the sanctions inflicted on Cuba and the increase in infant mortality is pretty clear from observable, physical, medical, and other evidence \u2014 much of which is described below. Statistical studies, including the panel regressions cited here, provide further quantitative, empirical, and replicable evidence of the magnitude of deaths and harm caused by this economic violence, which has been accelerating in Cuba over the past decade.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"theeconomicandsocialimpactofrecentuscubapolicy\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4>The Economic and Social Impact of Recent US Cuba Policy<\/h4>\n<p>The United States has maintained an extensive economic embargo against Cuba since the early 1960s.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn37\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">37<\/a><\/sup> While the effects of this embargo were widely felt on the island, for decades they were largely offset by preferential trade access, credit on favorable terms, and subsidies from the Soviet Union.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn38\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">38<\/a><\/sup> The shock caused by the termination of Soviet economic support to Cuba in the early 1990s led to a deep and prolonged economic downturn.<\/p>\n<p>In the years that followed, the US sanctions regime against Cuba intensified and was more difficult to remove through the passage of two key pieces of legislation. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (or Torricelli Act) blocked US aid to any country giving \u201cassistance\u201d to the government of Cuba, barred foreign subsidiaries of US firms from transacting with Cuba, and prohibited any ship that made a stop in Cuba from docking in the US for 180 days thereafter.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn39\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">39<\/a><\/sup> The 1996 LIBERTAD (or Helms-Burton) Act codified the ongoing US embargo, which had mostly been imposed via executive action, into US law and, through Title III of the Act, included extraterritorial effects by creating potential liability for both US and foreign companies engaged in business with Cuban entities. In response to strong opposition from other countries, especially in Europe, President Bill Clinton and every subsequent US president blocked the application of Title III until, in 2019, President Donald Trump changed course and allowed it to be enforced.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn40\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">40<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>The sanctions regime began to be eased in the 2000s, a change that accelerated with the Obama administration\u2019s policy of progressive normalization of relations with Cuba, announced in December 2014. Over the following months, the US reestablished diplomatic relations; removed Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list; softened travel and remittances restrictions; and loosened restrictions on exports, imports, and financial transactions. For example, foreign-made exports to Cuba from third-party countries were subject to US export controls if more than 10 percent of their content by value is of US origin (the <i>de minimis <\/i>rule).<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn41\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">41<\/a><\/sup> President Barack Obama raised this threshold to 25 percent. However, in part due to the Helms-Burton Act, the decades-old US embargo largely remained in place.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"trump10anunprecedentedexpansionofussanctions\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4>Trump 1.0: An Unprecedented Expansion of US Sanctions<\/h4>\n<p>After taking office in 2017, President Trump began to reverse key aspects of Obama\u2019s normalization policy and progressively added new restrictive measures, leading to the most severe sanctions regime that Cuba had yet faced. First, a 2017 presidential memorandum created what came to be called the Cuba Restricted List, which identified Cuban entities for which all \u201cdirect or indirect\u201d financial transactions were banned.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn42\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">42<\/a><\/sup> It would be repeatedly expanded in the years that followed, with many of the sanctioned entities linked to Cuba\u2019s vital tourism sector, including most major hotels.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn43\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">43<\/a><\/sup> In 2019, the <i>de minimis<\/i> threshold was reduced back to 10 percent, significantly limiting Cuba\u2019s access to many imported goods. Travel was further restricted with the end of an Office of Foreign Assets Control general license for \u201cpeople-to-people\u201d educational trips in 2019 \u2014 resulting in an abrupt decline in US tourism to the island and the end of all cruise-line travel there \u2014 and the suspension of charter flights from the US in 2020.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn44\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">44<\/a><\/sup> Various restrictions on remittances culminated in Western Union, the only US entity authorized to manage private remittance flows, being forced to close its Cuban operations in 2020.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn45\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">45<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Potentially the two most damaging sanction measures were the lifting of the suspension of the Helms-Burton Act\u2019s Title III in May 2019 and the redesignation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SSOT) in 2021, just before President Trump left office.<\/p>\n<p>Title III entitles US citizens and entities (including citizens who were Cuban at the time of the nationalization) to sue third-party individuals and companies that have \u201ctrafficked\u201d in property that was nationalized after the revolution. While there have been relatively few cases filed since 2019 \u2014 although there are two cases currently before the Supreme Court<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn46\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">46<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 Title III increases the risks of investing and trading with Cuban firms and reportedly has had a major chilling effect by deterring potential investment and business partnerships from all over the world.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn47\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">47<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>The re-inclusion of Cuba on the SSOT list in early 2021 caused wide-ranging disruption as risk-averse firms closed their Cuba operations.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn48\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">48<\/a><\/sup> Many international financial institutions, which were already reluctant to engage with Cuba due to recent multibillion dollar fines against banks that violated sanctions, stopped processing transactions with Cuban entities and individuals.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn49\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">49<\/a><\/sup> According to the Cuban government, between August 2021 and February 2022, \u201ca total of 100 foreign banks were identified as being involved in 261 actions\u201d that included \u201cclosing accounts and established banking contracts, returning transactions, refusing to create accounts,\u201d and \u201ccanceling passwords for the exchange of financial information\u201d through SWIFT.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn50\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">50<\/a><\/sup> Even companies that conduct transactions permitted under US law, such as those engaged in exporting food to Cuba, can expect increased scrutiny from the US Securities and Exchange Commission because of the designation. Many businesses prefer avoiding the likely red tape they would encounter if they continued working with Cuban entities, even if doing so were entirely legal under US law.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn51\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">51<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Cuba\u2019s SSOT designation has also had a major impact on travel to Cuba. With the designation in place, foreign nationals from the 42 countries that qualify for visa-free travel to the US \u2014 through the US Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) \u2014 are required to apply for US visas if they travel to Cuba. This requirement deters tourism and business trips from ESTA-qualifying countries, including most European countries, the UK, Japan, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, and Qatar, among others. This measure, along with increased restrictions on US travel to Cuba, severely hampered Cuba\u2019s ability to recover from the COVID-19 shock that had decimated tourist arrival numbers and caused a proportional fall in tourist revenue, one of the primary sources of foreign income for the country.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn52\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">52<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-42685\" src=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1240px) 100vw, 1240px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1.png 1240w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1-300x252.png 300w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1-1024x859.png 1024w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1-768x644.png 768w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1-100x84.png 100w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1-250x210.png 250w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1-500x419.png 500w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Chart1-1000x839.png 1000w\" alt=\"\" width=\"1240\" height=\"1040\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Health services exports via international medical \u201cmissions\u201d have been another key target of US sanctions in recent years. Key Trump administration allies, President Jair Bolsonaro\u2019s Brazil and President Nayib Bukele\u2019s El Salvador, ended their countries\u2019 medical cooperation programs with Cuba in late 2018 and in April 2019, respectively.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn53\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">53<\/a><\/sup> From July 2019, the US began to impose visa restrictions on foreign officials involved in the programs.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn54\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">54<\/a><\/sup> The US Department of State issued a statement in September 2019 calling on all countries to stop using Cuba\u2019s medical missions.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn55\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">55<\/a><\/sup> Subsequently, the governments of Ecuador and Bolivia also ended their missions.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn56\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">56<\/a><\/sup> As the pandemic got underway, Senators Marco Rubio and Bob Menendez called on the Department of State to issue instructions to embassies encouraging governments to withdraw from these programs.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn57\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">57<\/a><\/sup> US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also pressured the Pan American Health Organization to investigate what he characterized as Cuba\u2019s \u201cslave trade in doctors.\u201d<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn58\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">58<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>The targeting of these medical missions by the US government causes harm not just to Cuba. The missions are directed at economically deprived and marginalized sectors of the populations of mostly poorer countries and the fees are based on solidaristic pricing, with some countries receiving the aid as donations.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn59\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">59<\/a><\/sup> The missions\u2019 work in West Africa during the Ebola crisis was particularly highly praised, including by the then-head of the World Health Organization (WHO) and by senior figures in the Obama administration.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn60\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">60<\/a><\/sup> This mutually beneficial trade has been an important contribution to Cuba\u2019s foreign currency revenues, and the attacks on the programs by the first Trump administration can be seen in the data, with medical services exports falling from $6.4 billion in 2018<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn61\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">61<\/a><\/sup> to just under $4 billion in 2020.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn62\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">62<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Income from tourism fell from $3.3 billion in 2017 to $2.6 billion in 2019,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn63\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">63<\/a><\/sup> and it then fell drastically during the pandemic to just over $400 million in 2021, but by 2024 it had only recovered to $1.3 billion \u2014 just 40 percent of its 2017 level.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn64\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">64<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>In <b>Chart 1<\/b>, we can see how, between 2018 and 2024, the number of foreign visitors to Cuba has fallen dramatically both in absolute terms and relative to neighboring countries whose economies are also heavily reliant on income from tourism. From receiving 4.6 million international tourists in 2017 and 4.7 million in 2018, Cuba\u2019s tourist arrivals fell sharply during the pandemic and had only partially recovered by 2024, with 2.2 million tourists arriving that year.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn65\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">65<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Remittances, which are one of the main financing channels for the private sector,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn66\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">66<\/a><\/sup> were restricted through caps, restrictions on recipients, and the addition of the main Cuban remittance processing firm to the State Department\u2019s Cuba Restricted List in June 2020.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn67\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">67<\/a><\/sup> The latter addition had the effect of forcing Western Union to exit the Cuban market, greatly complicating the sending of remittances to the island, causing a diversion toward informal and more costly channels.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn68\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">68<\/a><\/sup> Transaction costs from other remittance agencies in Miami reportedly reached as high as 40 percent after the closure of Western Union (which had charged fees of about 11 percent).<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn69\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">69<\/a><\/sup> Remittances peaked at just over $4 billion in 2018; they then fell to $2.8 billion in 2020 and to just $1.8 billion in 2022.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn70\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">70<\/a><\/sup> The remittances partially recovered \u2014 likely attributable to actions taken by the Biden administration \u2014 to $2.3 billion by 2024.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn71\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">71<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>A rough indicator of the economic decline since 2018 can be seen in import levels, changes in which can suggest changes in levels of domestic demand and, by implication, purchasing power. Imports of goods fell<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn72\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">72<\/a><\/sup> substantially from $11.5 billion in 2018 to $8.1 billion in 2024, a fall of almost 30 percent or 19 percent in per capita terms.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn73\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">73<\/a><\/sup> There is a lack of detailed balance of payments data that could show the drivers of these changes with more confidence,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn74\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">74<\/a><\/sup> but it is plausible that the hardening of US sanctions were a major factor as they reduced Cuba\u2019s access to foreign currency,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn75\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">75<\/a><\/sup> curtailed its access to credit, and raised the cost of imports. An econometric study of the period 1994\u20132020 found that the tightening of US sanctions against Cuba were associated with a statistically significant reduction in GDP and household consumption.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn76\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">76<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>The fall in Cuban imports is also likely understated in the official data. First, note that this is a nominal indicator; if adjusted for price inflation, the decline would be more dramatic. For example, if we deflate Cuba\u2019s food imports by a price index, then food imports, which increased in nominal terms by 19 percent over the period 2018\u20132024, actually fell in real terms by 6 percent.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn77\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">77<\/a><\/sup> Second, many of the sanctions raised the cost of international transactions. For example, the <i>de minimis<\/i> change has, in many cases, forced importers to source alternative, more expensive goods as the previously purchased imports contained more than 10 percent US-made components. Therefore, the volume of imports \u2014 data for which the Cuba National Statistics Office does not publish \u2014 could have fallen more sharply still.<\/p>\n<p>The rise in out-migration from Cuba beginning in 2021 (<b>Table 4<\/b>) is likely another result of the sharp decline in living standards. According to Cuba\u2019s statistics agency, the population fell by 13 percent,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn78\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">78<\/a><\/sup> from 11.2 million in 2020 to 9.8 million in 2024,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn79\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">79<\/a><\/sup> and this was led largely by a massive rise in net migration \u2014 which had ranged from 15,000 to 25,000 per year between 2015 and 2019, rising to hundreds of thousands annually from 2021.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn80\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">80<\/a><\/sup> As a point of comparison, every year since 2021 has surpassed the previous peak in 1980, when (on net) 142,000 Cubans left during the Mariel Boatlift.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn81\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">81<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-42686\" src=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1240px) 100vw, 1240px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1.png 1240w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1-300x200.png 300w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1-1024x682.png 1024w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1-768x512.png 768w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1-100x67.png 100w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1-250x167.png 250w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1-500x333.png 500w, https:\/\/cepr.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Table4_1-1000x666.png 1000w\" alt=\"\" width=\"1240\" height=\"826\" \/><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"effectsoncubashealthcaresector\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4>Effects on Cuba\u2019s Health Care Sector<\/h4>\n<p>Cuba\u2019s health care sector has been particularly hard hit by the \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d coercive economic measures imposed by US administrations since 2017. We previously noted the sharp degradation of health care services in the years that have followed. As we have seen, the expansion and tightening of US sanctions have played a substantial role in this deterioration of health conditions and services. In addition, during CEPR\u2019s fact-finding trip to Cuba in March 2024, we learned more about how these sanctions have directly hampered the provision of health care by blocking, or greatly limiting, the procurement of essential medicines, inputs, supplies, and equipment.<\/p>\n<p>For instance, not long before our 2024 visit to Cuba, the state enterprise MEDICuba \u2014 which imports and exports medicines and medical supplies for the state health care system \u2014 was forced to shut down a production line of vaccines for six months after a US company suspended the shipment of critical inputs. Similarly, Cuba has struggled to import many basic medical supplies, with formerly reliable suppliers suddenly halting shipments. The health care providers that we interviewed told us that in many cases this appeared to be the result of the Trump administration\u2019s 2019 decision to lower the <i>de minimis<\/i> threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent, thereby prohibiting the export to Cuba of any goods containing more than 10 percent US-origin content. Given that the vast majority of medication, medical equipment, and many medical supplies contain more than 10 percent US-origin content (including US-patented technology or components), MEDICuba has had to seek medical goods from distant locations, often at higher-than-market rates and in many cases has been unable to find alternatives with less than 10 percent US-origin components.<\/p>\n<p>Staff at Cuba\u2019s primary pharmaceutical manufacturer and research facility \u2014 BioCubaFarma \u2014 recounted how the German company Sartorius \u2014 one of the world\u2019s leading suppliers of lab equipment \u2014 abruptly stopped supplying the facility with filtration bags and other indispensable products once the 10 percent <i>de minimis<\/i> rule came into effect. They have struggled to find reliable alternative suppliers ever since.<\/p>\n<p>The staff of various medical institutions also described the extreme difficulty that they\u2019d had in obtaining credit lines to purchase essential medical goods following the Trump administration\u2019s decision to put Cuba on the SSOT list \u2014 a designation that, as we have explained above, has led to many international financial institutions refusing to engage with Cuban entities. Staff at Cuba\u2019s primary cardiological center for children recounted how, following the SSOT designation, it became extremely challenging to obtain financing for the purchase of supplies and medication. In another instance, medical practitioners recounted how there was suddenly a lack of HPV vaccines due to a foreign credit line having been suspended. Given how cash-strapped Cuba has become in recent years \u2014 in large part as a result of sanctions designed to reduce the country\u2019s access to foreign exchange \u2014 the financial embargo resulting from the SSOT designation has greatly constrained medical providers\u2019 ability to effectively meet the needs of their patients.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"trump20afurtherhardeningofsanctionsandafuelblockade\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4>Trump 2.0: A Further Hardening of Sanctions and a Fuel Blockade<\/h4>\n<p>The second Trump administration has taken additional measures designed to further debilitate the Cuban economy with the goal of achieving regime change. On his first day in office, President Trump reversed two of President Joe Biden\u2019s actions, one of which had begun the process for removing Cuba from the SSOT list and the other of which had eliminated the Cuba Restricted List. On January 29, 2025, Secretary of State Rubio withdrew Biden\u2019s waiver of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn82\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">82<\/a><\/sup> On February 6, 2025, the administration reactivated the Cuba Restricted List.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn83\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">83<\/a><\/sup> The list was also expanded with the inclusion of the main firm for processing remittances, which forced the exit of Western Union from Cuba and greatly complicated remittances to the island.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn84\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">84<\/a><\/sup> Then, in June 2025, the administration tightened restrictions on transactions with Cuban entities and on US travel to Cuba.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn85\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">85<\/a><\/sup> These measures further limited Cuba\u2019s access to international financial markets and further dampened the flow of US visitors \u2014 and US dollars \u2014 to the island.<\/p>\n<p>In addition, Secretary of State Rubio and other State Department officials have doubled down on their efforts to terminate Cuban medical missions abroad through sanctions or threats of sanctions on officials in host countries and other forms of pressure directed at host country governments. A senior Caribbean official told POLITICO that the State Department\u2019s campaign has generated \u201ca lot of fear\u201d in the region<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn86\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">86<\/a><\/sup> and that US pressure \u2014 which has included the cancellation of US visas of foreign officials<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn87\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">87<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 has \u201cnever been this open.\u201d As a result of this pressure campaign, Jamaica, Honduras, Guatemala, and Guyana have terminated decades-old Cuban medical missions, leading to the departure of well over 1,000 Cuban medical professionals who had been providing primary care services to primarily low-income communities in those countries.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn88\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">88<\/a><\/sup> After the US military intervention in Venezuela, the new Venezuelan government also began to send back Cuban doctors, after pressure from the US.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn89\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">89<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>But by far the most devastating President Trump policy has been the US de facto blockade on all Cuban imports of fuel, which has effectively been in place since the beginning of 2026. First, following the US military intervention in Caracas, Venezuela, on January 3, the US administration blocked oil shipments from Venezuela, which had been Cuba\u2019s primary fuel supplier for most of the past three decades.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn90\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">90<\/a><\/sup> Then President Trump signed an executive order declaring a \u201cnational emergency,\u201d identifying Cuba as an \u201cunusual and extraordinary threat\u201d to the national security of the United States and providing for economic retaliation \u2014 in the form of high tariffs \u2014 against countries supplying the island with oil, particularly Mexico, which reportedly overtook Venezuela as Cuba\u2019s largest supplier of oil in 2025.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn91\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">91<\/a><\/sup> Although the US Supreme Court barred the administration from imposing tariffs through national emergency declarations in February, the Trump administration has prevented oil shipments \u2014 except for one tanker from Russia at the end of March<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn92\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">92<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 from reaching the island, as the New York Times and other outlets have reported.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn93\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">93<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>These new President Trump measures, and particularly the current oil blockade, have had a dramatic effect on the economy and on basic services on the island. Given that the majority of Cuba\u2019s electricity generation is reliant on foreign oil products, the country has been wracked by increasingly frequent and prolonged power outages.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn94\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">94<\/a><\/sup> On March 16, the entire island experienced an electrical blackout.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn95\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">95<\/a><\/sup> Fuel shortages have led to rationing that has paralyzed much public transportation and caused long lines at gas stations.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn96\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">96<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>The health care sector has been particularly affected, with hospitals only performing emergency surgeries.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn97\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">97<\/a><\/sup> Five million Cubans \u2014 about half of the population \u2014 have chronic conditions and could have their medications or treatments affected, with oncology, cardiovascular care, and kidney disease already facing a heavy impact from the shortages of fuel.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn98\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">98<\/a><\/sup> NBC reported in March that 300 ambulances were sitting idle due to lack of fuel or spare parts for maintenance, leaving only 25 electric ambulances available for the entire country.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn99\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">99<\/a><\/sup> In February, one general practioner quoted in the <i>British Medical Journal<\/i> said:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The healthcare system is in total collapse. Working conditions are dreadful: healthcare staff are not provided with food, and sometimes not even drinking water; the bed linen is dirty; there are no fans in hot weather. In addition, there are no gloves, protective equipment, or face masks for staff. There is a shortage of doctors, nurses, and health technicians, as well as half of the basic medicines and essential medical supplies. There are power outages and no way to communicate by mobile phone or landline. It feels like a country at war.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn100\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">100<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>According to recent news reports, power outages are greatly limiting the use of X-ray machines, ultrasounds, CT scans, and other diagnostic imaging tools.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn101\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">101<\/a><\/sup> Many medicines, vaccines, and medical supplies such as blood require refrigeration or freezing; in March, the WHO\u2019s Director-General highlighted the emergence of problems in the cold chain for vaccines caused by the fuel blockade.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn102\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">102<\/a><\/sup> While hospitals have backup generators, which are usually diesel-run, there are delays of a few minutes before these kick in after power cuts, complicating vital life-support machines \u2014 for example, in neonatal units, nurses have to rush to manually pump ventilators for premature babies.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn103\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">103<\/a><\/sup> In late February, a young pregnant woman being treated for anemia in a maternal health clinic told the AP, \u201cthere\u2019s been a drastic change since January. . . . There\u2019s no bread, no milk for nutrition. . . , no medicines.\u201d<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn104\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">104<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>At the same time, reports suggest that the general health of the Cuban population has declined as a result of malnutrition and the sharp deterioration of sanitary conditions. These conditions stem in part from the lack of sufficient power to pump water into buildings and the accumulation of waste in public spaces, due to a shortage of fuel with which to operate sanitation vehicles.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn105\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">105<\/a><\/sup> Shortages of electricity affect food storage, increasing spoilage and the risk of foodborne illness. This latter risk is also raised by the lack of cooking fuels; as an alternative, Cubans are reportedly using wood and other more polluting fuels<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn106\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">106<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 even burning trash<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn107\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">107<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 which worsens air quality and can provoke respiratory illness, particularly for vulnerable populations such as infants.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn108\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">108<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Cuba is experiencing an unprecedented nationwide surge in mosquito-borne illnesses, such as chikungunya, Dengue fever, and oropouche.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn109\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">109<\/a><\/sup> One-third of the population is estimated to have experienced infection from an arbovirus such as these.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn110\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">110<\/a><\/sup> The severity of these outbreaks is likely a product of the sanctions. Shortages of fuel and insecticide have prevented the massive fumigation campaigns previously used to keep the mosquito populations carrying these diseases in check.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn111\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">111<\/a><\/sup> A typical response to disruption in the water supply is to store water in containers, which are ideal breeding spots for disease-carrying mosquitos.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn112\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">112<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Given the increasingly dire state of Cuba\u2019s health care system and the decline in the state of health of the general population, it is highly likely that Cuba\u2019s infant mortality rate has increased significantly since 2025 when it had reached 9.9 per 1,000 live births.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn113\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">113<\/a><\/sup> Other key health indicators, like life expectancy and maternal mortality, are highly likely to have also deteriorated since the beginning of the year.<\/p>\n<p>A recent New York Times report on the effects of the US fuel blockade on Cuba\u2019s energy sector noted that, in Cuba\u2019s leading maternity hospital,<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Doctors, nurses, cleaners and mothers all struggle to get to the hospital because of the lack of fuel. This translates into dirtier delivery rooms, fewer health workers to deliver babies and mothers arriving after labor is dangerously far along.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWe are receiving much more severe cases,\u201d [obstetrician-gynecologist] Dr. Delgado Peruyera said, noting that three newborns died in February, the most she could ever recall in one month.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn114\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">114<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"conclusion\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4>Conclusion<\/h4>\n<p>In early 2019, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof wrote that \u201can American infant is, by official statistics, almost 50 percent more likely to die than a Cuban infant.\u201d<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn115\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">115<\/a><\/sup> He noted that \u201cCuba achieves excellent health outcomes even though the American trade and financial embargo badly damages the economy and restricts access to medical equipment.\u201d Today, Kristof\u2019s observations are no longer valid. Last year, Cuba\u2019s IMR was 83 percent higher than the US\u2019s, and reports suggest that it has risen to even higher levels over the last few months. The Cuban health care system has been deeply affected by dire shortages of supplies, medicine, personnel, and \u2014 as of the last few months \u2014 fuel and electricity.<\/p>\n<p>As the evidence in this paper indicates, the primary cause of the unprecedented rise in Cuba\u2019s IMR, and the crisis in its once robust health care system, is almost certainly the hardening of US sanctions that began in 2017 and increased steadily in the years thereafter, with only a minor easing during the Biden administration. These measures, which have been imposed on top of the long-standing US trade and financial embargo, include the ever-expanding Cuba restricted entities list, the tightening of the <i>de minimis<\/i> threshold for imports to Cuba, the re-inclusion of Cuba on the SSOT list, the application of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, and sanctions targeting Cuba\u2019s medical missions, among other measures.<\/p>\n<p>Together, these \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d policies have vastly restricted Cuba\u2019s access to foreign exchange and to essential imports and have contributed to a severe decline in Cubans\u2019 standard of living and in the quality of basic services \u2014 especially health care. In these conditions, studies show that infant mortality \u2014 and mortality generally \u2014 can be expected to rise. For hundreds of thousands of Cubans, the only viable option has been to migrate to the US and other countries, in what has been the biggest wave of out-migration in Cuba\u2019s contemporary history. Others, including at least 1,800 children under the age of one, have died.<\/p>\n<p>The current US fuel blockade, which has prevented nearly all fuel shipments from reaching Cuba, has made an already dire situation much worse. More infants \u2014 more vulnerable people \u2014 can be expected to die as a result.<\/p>\n<p>Two US legislators who recently visited Cuba noted, \u201cthis is cruel collective punishment \u2014 effectively an economic bombing of the infrastructure of the country \u2014 that has produced permanent damage. . . . We do not believe that the majority of Americans would want this kind of cruelty and inhumanity to continue in our name.\u201d<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn116\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">116<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Legislators in both the US House and Senate have introduced legislation that would mandate the end of US participation in the current blockade on the grounds that it is illegal and unconstitutional under US law.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn117\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">117<\/a><\/sup> This is because it involves the US military in hostilities without congressional authorization.<\/p>\n<p>In international law, the US naval blockade of Cuba, which has been enacted through both threats exerted on third party states and corporations, and the physical interception of oil tankers en route to Cuba,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn118\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">118<\/a><\/sup> is clearly an unlawful use of force, as stipulated in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn119\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">119<\/a><\/sup> It also violates the Charter of the Organization of the American States\u2019s prohibition of coercive measures of an economic or political character (Article 20).<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn120\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">120<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Naval blockades are also typified in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 as acts of aggression (Article 3).<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn121\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">121<\/a><\/sup> The resolution defines aggression as \u201cthe use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of another State\u201d (Article 1). As a result of this use of armed force, the United States is now engaged in an armed conflict,<sup class=\"-fw:b -c:a2t\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/#fn122\" class=\"-as:0\"  aria-expanded=\"false\">122<\/a><\/sup> as defined under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. The Fourth Geneva Convention strictly prohibits the collective punishment of civilians in any armed conflict. This can be prosecuted as a war crime.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"references\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_wysiwyg -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<h4>References:<\/h4>\n<p>Acosta, Luis Jaime. 2019. \u201cColombia Bombing, Extradition Request Roil Already Stagnant Peace Talks.\u201d Reuters, January 23. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/world\/colombia-bombing-extradition-request-roil-already-stagnant-peace-talks-idUSKCN1PH2GM\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/world\/colombia-bombing-extradition-request-roil-already-stagnant-peace-talks-idUSKCN1PH2GM\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Albizu-Campos, Juan Carlos. 2025. \u201cCuba: \u00bfCrisis demogr\u00e1fica o sist\u00e9mica?\u201d Horizonte cubano, April 17. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/horizontecubano.law.columbia.edu\/news\/cuba-crisis-demografica-o-sistemica\" ><i>https:\/\/horizontecubano.law.columbia.edu\/news\/cuba-crisis-demografica-o-sistemica<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Associated Press. 2026a. \u201cConcern Grows as Cuba Restricts Public Transportation in Response to Oil Crisis Following Threats from the US.\u201d February 6. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/newsroom.ap.org\/editorial-photos-videos\/detail?itemid=d2ddc1d281d94d08aa262af276790c01&amp;mediatype=video\" ><i>https:\/\/newsroom.ap.org\/editorial-photos-videos\/detail?itemid=d2ddc1d281d94d08aa262af276790c01&amp;mediatype=video<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2026b. \u201cJamaica to End Decades-Long Agreement with Cuba over Medical Missions Criticized by U.S.\u201d March 5. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.greenfieldreporter.com\/2026\/03\/05\/jamaica-to-end-decades-long-agreement-with-cuba-over-medical-missions-criticized-by-us\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.greenfieldreporter.com\/2026\/03\/05\/jamaica-to-end-decades-long-agreement-with-cuba-over-medical-missions-criticized-by-us\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Augustin, Ed, and Jack Nicas. 2026. \u201cCuban Patients Are Dying Because of U.S. Blockade, Doctors Say.\u201d The New York Times, March 26, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/03\/26\/world\/americas\/cubas-health-system-us-oil-blockade.html\" ><i>https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/03\/26\/world\/americas\/cubas-health-system-us-oil-blockade.html<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Baggott, Rob, and George Lambie. 2019. \u201cHard Currency, Solidarity, and Soft Power: The Motives, Implications, and Lessons of Cuban Health Internationalism.\u201d<i> International Journal of Social Determinants of Health and Health Services<\/i> 49 (1): 19\u201334. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0020731418805378\" ><i>https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0020731418805378<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>BBC. 2026. \u201cBBC Looks at How Cubans Are Living with Fuel Shortages.\u201d Video, 1 min., 42 sec. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/videos\/cn0ewj0e7j1o\" ><i>https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/videos\/cn0ewj0e7j1o<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Beldarra\u00edn Chaple, Enrique, and Mary Anne Mercer. 2017. \u201cThe Cuban Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa: Lessons in Solidarity.\u201d <i>International Journal of Social Determinants of Health and Health Services<\/i> 47 (1): 130\u2013146. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0020731416681892\" ><i>https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0020731416681892<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Blanco, Silvia. 2026. \u201cCuba, al borde de la par\u00e1lisis: \u2018Siento que es el final de la pel\u00edcula\u2019.\u201d El Pa\u00eds, February 22. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/elpais.com\/america\/2026-02-22\/viaje-a-una-cuba-al-borde-de-la-paralisis-siento-que-es-el-final-de-la-pelicula.html\" ><i>https:\/\/elpais.com\/america\/2026-02-22\/viaje-a-una-cuba-al-borde-de-la-paralisis-siento-que-es-el-final-de-la-pelicula.html<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). 2026. \u201cFeb. 23, 10:20 AM entry.\u201d In <i>US Escalation in the Caribbean and Latin America \u2014 Live Updates<\/i>. February 23. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/americas-live-updates\/#feb231020am\" ><i>https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/americas-live-updates\/#feb231020am<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>CiberCuba Editorial Team. 2026. \u201cRemittances in Cuba: 7 Key Points to Understand What Changes and What Doesn\u2019t When Receiving Dollars at Cadeca.\u201d CiberCuba, April 7. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/en.cibercuba.com\/noticias\/2026-04-07-u1-e199370-s27061-nid325197-remesas-cuba-7-claves-entender-cambia-al-recibir\" ><i>https:\/\/en.cibercuba.com\/noticias\/2026-04-07-u1-e199370-s27061-nid325197-remesas-cuba-7-claves-entender-cambia-al-recibir<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Colom\u00e9, Carla Gloria. 2025. \u201cDengue, Oropouche y chikungunya: una crisis epidemiol\u00f3gica tiene en vilo a Cuba.\u201d El Pa\u00eds, October 16. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/elpais.com\/america\/2025-10-16\/dengue-oropouche-chikungunya-una-crisis-epidemiologica-tiene-en-vilo-a-cuba.html\" ><i>https:\/\/elpais.com\/america\/2025-10-16\/dengue-oropouche-chikungunya-una-crisis-epidemiologica-tiene-en-vilo-a-cuba.html<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Cubadebate. 2026. \u201cCuba 2025 cierra con una tasa de mortalidad infantil de 9.9 por cada mil nacidos vivos.\u201d January 2. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.cubadebate.cu\/noticias\/2026\/01\/02\/cuba-2025-cierra-con-una-tasa-de-mortalidad-infantil-de-9-9-por-cada-mil-nacidos-vivos\/\" ><i>http:\/\/www.cubadebate.cu\/noticias\/2026\/01\/02\/cuba-2025-cierra-con-una-tasa-de-mortalidad-infantil-de-9-9-por-cada-mil-nacidos-vivos\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, H.R. 5323, 102nd Cong. (1992). <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/102nd-congress\/house-bill\/5323\/text\" ><i>https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/102nd-congress\/house-bill\/5323\/text<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Delgado, Denisse. 2024. \u201cRemittance Behaviors Among Cuban Migrants in Miami and Madrid: Motivations, Practices and Experiences.\u201d PhD diss., University of Massachusetts Boston.<\/p>\n<p>Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estad\u00edstica (DANE). 2026. <i>Bolet\u00edn t\u00e9cnico: Estad\u00edsticas Vitales (EEVV). Nacimientos y defunciones no fetales. Cifras a\u00f1o acumulado 2025pr (enero-diciembre).<\/i> March 20. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dane.gov.co\/files\/operaciones\/EEVV\/2026\/20-mar-2026\/bol-EEVV-IIsem2025pr.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.dane.gov.co\/files\/operaciones\/EEVV\/2026\/20-mar-2026\/bol-EEVV-IIsem2025pr.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Diario Las Am\u00e9ricas. 2019. \u201cCuba retira misi\u00f3n de m\u00e9dicos en El Salvador tras negaci\u00f3n de permisos.\u201d April 24. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.diariolasamericas.com\/america-latina\/cuba-retira-mision-medicos-el-salvador-negacion-permisos-n4176181\" ><i>https:\/\/www.diariolasamericas.com\/america-latina\/cuba-retira-mision-medicos-el-salvador-negacion-permisos-n4176181<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Direcci\u00f3n de Estad\u00edsticas e Informaci\u00f3n en Salud (DEIS). 2026. <i>Estad\u00edsticas vitales: informaci\u00f3n b\u00e1sica \u2014 A\u00f1o 2024.<\/i> Serie 5, no. 68. Accessed April 10, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.argentina.gob.ar\/sites\/default\/files\/serie_5_nro_68_anuario_vitales_2024_v2.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.argentina.gob.ar\/sites\/default\/files\/serie_5_nro_68_anuario_vitales_2024_v2.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Doerr, Sebastian, and Boris Hofmann. 2022. \u201cRecessions and Mortality: A Global Perspective.\u201d <i>Economics Letters<\/i> 220 (November): 110860. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.econlet.2022.110860\" ><i>https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.econlet.2022.110860<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Dom\u00ednguez L\u00f3pez, Ernesto, Ariadna Cornelio Hitchman, and Seida Barrera Rodr\u00edguez. 2025. \u201cThe Activation of the Title III of the Helms-Burton Act: The Making of a Policy.\u201d <i>International Journal of Cuban Studies<\/i> 17 (1): 45\u201369. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/48829653\" ><i>https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/48829653<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Dur\u00e1n, Milexsy, and D\u00e1nica Coto. 2026. \u201cIslandwide Blackout Hits Cuba as Island Struggles with Deepening Energy Crisis.\u201d Los Angeles Times, March 16. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.latimes.com\/world-nation\/story\/2026-03-16\/islandwide-blackout-hits-cuba-as-island-struggles-with-deepening-energy-crisis\" ><i>https:\/\/www.latimes.com\/world-nation\/story\/2026-03-16\/islandwide-blackout-hits-cuba-as-island-struggles-with-deepening-energy-crisis<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 2023. \u201cRecommendations on Remittances.\u201d CIFFRA Policy Note no. 15. Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cepal.org\/sites\/default\/files\/project\/files\/ude-a2023-03-23-ndep-15-cuba-recommonremittances-eng.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.cepal.org\/sites\/default\/files\/project\/files\/ude-a2023-03-23-ndep-15-cuba-recommonremittances-eng.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Edelson, Ed. 2009. \u201cWood Fires Can Harm the Youngest Lungs.\u201d ABC News, November 6. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/abcnews.com\/Health\/Healthday\/wood-fires-harm-youngest-lungs\/story?id=9018497\" ><i>https:\/\/abcnews.com\/Health\/Healthday\/wood-fires-harm-youngest-lungs\/story?id=9018497<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Escobedo, Angel A., Cristians Auza-Santiv\u00e1\u00f1ez, Raisa Rumbaut, Maurizio Bonati, and Imti Choonara. 2021. \u201cCuba: Solidarity, Ebola and COVID-19.\u201d <i>BMJ Paediatrics Open<\/i> 5 (1): e001089. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC8136810\/\" ><i>https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC8136810\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Escobedo, Angel Arturo, Yaxsier de Armas, Paul Jonas, and Imti Choonara. 2026. \u201cImpact of Economic Sanctions on Child Health in Cuba.\u201d <i>BMJ Paediatrics Open<\/i> 10 (1): e004510. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/bmjpo-2026-004510\" ><i>https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/bmjpo-2026-004510<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2026. \u201cFAO Food Price Index.\u201d <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.fao.org\/worldfoodsituation\/foodpricesindex\/en\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.fao.org\/worldfoodsituation\/foodpricesindex\/en\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Ghebreyesus, Tedros Adhanom. 2026. \u201cThe situation in #Cuba is deeply concerning as the country struggles to maintain health service delivery.\u201d X, June 20. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/DrTedros\/status\/2036911681411178874\" ><i>https:\/\/x.com\/DrTedros\/status\/2036911681411178874<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Gonz\u00e1lez, Marlon. 2026. \u201cCuban Doctors Leave Honduras as Trump Pushes to Isolate the Island.\u201d Associated Press, March 5. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/honduras-cuban-doctors-e860064a52dfb79d5500d5b849e61066\" ><i>https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/honduras-cuban-doctors-e860064a52dfb79d5500d5b849e61066<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Gordon, Joy. 2024. \u201cCuba\u2019s Economic Crisis: US Sanctions and the Problem of \u2018Overcompliance\u2019.\u201d Le Monde diplomatique (English ed.), October 7. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/mondediplo.com\/outside-in\/cuba-overcompliance\" ><i>https:\/\/mondediplo.com\/outside-in\/cuba-overcompliance<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Government of Canada, Trade Commissioner Service. 2024. \u201cExporting to Cuba.\u201d September 4. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca\/en\/market-industry-info\/search-country-region\/country\/canada-cuba-export\/exporting.html\" ><i>https:\/\/www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca\/en\/market-industry-info\/search-country-region\/country\/canada-cuba-export\/exporting.html<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Hern\u00e1ndez-Cat\u00e1, Ernesto. 2001. \u201cThe Fall and Recovery of the Cuban Economy in the 1990s: Mirage or Reality?\u201d IMF Working Paper 01\/48. International Monetary Fund. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.elibrary.imf.org\/view\/journals\/001\/2001\/048\/article-A001-en.xml\" ><i>https:\/\/www.elibrary.imf.org\/view\/journals\/001\/2001\/048\/article-A001-en.xml<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2019. \u201cSwapping Petroleum for Doctors and the Impact of Cutbacks in Venezuelan Oil Deliveries.\u201d Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Economic Association, San Diego, January 2020. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aeaweb.org\/conference\/2020\/preliminary\/paper\/N8fA9f2Z\" ><i>https:\/\/www.aeaweb.org\/conference\/2020\/preliminary\/paper\/N8fA9f2Z<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat\u00edstica (IBGE). n.d. \u201cT\u00e1bua completa de mortalidade para o Brasil: an\u00e1lises e tabelas.\u201d Accessed April 10, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/biblioteca.ibge.gov.br\/index.php\/biblioteca-catalogo?view=detalhes&amp;id=73097\" >https:\/\/biblioteca.ibge.gov.br\/index.php\/biblioteca-catalogo?view=detalhes&amp;id=73097<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Instituto Nacional de Estad\u00edstica y Geograf\u00eda (INEGI). 2024. <i>Encuesta Nacional de la Din\u00e1mica Demogr\u00e1fica (ENADID) 2023: principales resultados.<\/i> July 19. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.inegi.org.mx\/contenidos\/programas\/enadid\/2023\/doc\/resultados_enadid23.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.inegi.org.mx\/contenidos\/programas\/enadid\/2023\/doc\/resultados_enadid23.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 1949. Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. \u201cArticle 33: Individual responsibility, collective penalties, pillage, reprisals.\u201d <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/ihl-databases.icrc.org\/en\/ihl-treaties\/gciv-1949\/article-33\" ><i>https:\/\/ihl-databases.icrc.org\/en\/ihl-treaties\/gciv-1949\/article-33<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2026. \u201cWorld Economic Outlook (WEO).\u201d IMF Data. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/data.imf.org\/en\/datasets\/IMF.RES:WEO\u2060\" >https:\/\/data.imf.org\/en\/datasets\/IMF.RES:WEO\u2060<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Jayapal, Pramila, and Jonathan Jackson. 2026. \u201cJayapal, Jackson Statement on Delegation to Cuba.\u201d Office of Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal, April 5. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/jayapal.house.gov\/2026\/04\/05\/jayapal-jackson-statement-on-delegation-to-cuba\/\" ><i>https:\/\/jayapal.house.gov\/2026\/04\/05\/jayapal-jackson-statement-on-delegation-to-cuba\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Kristof, Nicholas. 2019. \u201cWhy Infants May Be More Likely to Die in America Than Cuba.\u201d The New York Times, January 18. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2019\/01\/18\/opinion\/sunday\/cuba-healthcare-medicare.html\" ><i>https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2019\/01\/18\/opinion\/sunday\/cuba-healthcare-medicare.html<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Levine, Ally J., Travis Hartman, Tiana McGee, and Marianna Parraga. 2026. \u201cCuba Runs on Oil, and the Oil Is Running Out.\u201d Reuters Graphics, April 8. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/graphics\/CUBA-CRISIS\/OIL-EXPLAINER\/gkvlkjgxkpb\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/graphics\/CUBA-CRISIS\/OIL-EXPLAINER\/gkvlkjgxkpb\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Li, Yue-Zhen, Beth Peters, Stephen Propst, Deborah Wei, and Andrea Fraser-Reid. 2025. \u201cU.S. State Department Reinstates Cuba Restricted List.\u201d Hogan Lovells, February 19. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hoganlovells.com\/en\/publications\/us-state-department-reinstates-cuba-restricted-list\" ><i>https:\/\/www.hoganlovells.com\/en\/publications\/us-state-department-reinstates-cuba-restricted-list<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Marimow, Ann E. 2025. \u201cJustices Strike Down Trump\u2019s Tariffs.\u201d The New York Times, February 20. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/02\/20\/us\/politics\/supreme-court-trump-tariffs.html\" ><i>https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/02\/20\/us\/politics\/supreme-court-trump-tariffs.html<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Marsh, Sarah, and John Zodzi. 2020. \u201cFEATURE-Cuba Punches above Weight with \u2018White Coat Army\u2019 during Pandemic.\u201d Reuters, September 15. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/feature-cuba-punches-above-weight-with-white-coat-army-during-pandemic-2020-09-15\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/feature-cuba-punches-above-weight-with-white-coat-army-during-pandemic-2020-09-15\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res (MSF). n.d. \u201cBlockade.\u201d The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law. Accessed April 22, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/guide-humanitarian-law.org\/content\/article\/3\/blockade\/\" ><i>https:\/\/guide-humanitarian-law.org\/content\/article\/3\/blockade\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Menendez, Bob, and Marco Rubio. 2020. \u201cMenendez, Rubio Raise Concerns about Cuba\u2019s Forced Labor Scheme, Urge Pompeo to Direct U.S. Embassies to Engage Host Governments.\u201d United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 6. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.foreign.senate.gov\/press\/dem\/release\/menendez-rubio-raise-concerns-about-cubas-forced-labor-scheme-urge-pompeo-to-direct-us-embassies-to-engage-host-governments\" ><i>https:\/\/www.foreign.senate.gov\/press\/dem\/release\/menendez-rubio-raise-concerns-about-cubas-forced-labor-scheme-urge-pompeo-to-direct-us-embassies-to-engage-host-governments<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba (MINREX). 2022. \u201cUpdate to the Report of Cuba on Resolution 75\/289 of the United Nations General Assembly Entitled \u2018Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Blockade Imposed by the United States of America against Cuba\u2019.\u201d October 19. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cubaminrex.cu\/en\/update-report-cuba-resolution-75289-united-nations-general-assembly-entitled-necessity-ending\" ><i>https:\/\/cubaminrex.cu\/en\/update-report-cuba-resolution-75289-united-nations-general-assembly-entitled-necessity-ending<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Nicas, Jack, and Christiaan Triebert. 2026. \u201cA New U.S. Blockade Is Strangling Cuba.\u201d The New York Times, February 20.<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/02\/20\/world\/americas\/cuba-oil-blockade-trump.html\" ><i> https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/02\/20\/world\/americas\/cuba-oil-blockade-trump.html<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Novaes, Carolina, and C\u00e1ssio A. de Sousa. 2022. \u201cAedes Aegypti\u2014Insights on the Impact of Water Services.\u201d <i>International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health <\/i>19 (22): 15127. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC9682355\/\" ><i>https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC9682355\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Organization of American States (OAS). 1993. \u201cCharter of the Organization of American States (A-41),\u201d Articles 19 and 20. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.oas.org\/en\/sla\/dil\/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp\" ><i>http:\/\/www.oas.org\/en\/sla\/dil\/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>O\u2019Boyle, Brendan. 2018. \u201cThousands of Cuban Doctors Depart Brazil Leaving Millions without Medical Care.\u201d The Irish Times, November 23. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.irishtimes.com\/news\/world\/thousands-of-cuban-doctors-depart-brazil-leaving-millions-without-medical-care-1.3708043\" ><i>https:\/\/www.irishtimes.com\/news\/world\/thousands-of-cuban-doctors-depart-brazil-leaving-millions-without-medical-care-1.3708043<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Oficina Nacional de Estad\u00edstica e Informaci\u00f3n (ONEI). 2019. \u201c8.13 Valor del comercio exterior de servicios exportados por divisiones.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2018, Edici\u00f3n 2019.<\/i> Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-01\/aec_2018_0_compressed.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-01\/aec_2018_0_compressed.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2020a. \u201c8.3 Intercambio total y saldo comercial.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2019, Edici\u00f3n 2020. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-01\/anauario_2019_compressed.pdf\" >https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-01\/anauario_2019_compressed.pdf<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2020b. \u201c8.13 Valor del comercio exterior de servicios exportados por divisiones.\u201d<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-01\/anauario_2019_compressed.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" > I<\/a>n <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2019, Edici\u00f3n 2020. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-01\/anauario_2019_compressed.pdf\" >https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-01\/anauario_2019_compressed.pdf<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2022. \u201c15.15 Ingresos asociados al turismo internacional.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2021, Edici\u00f3n 2022. <\/i>Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-04\/aec-2021-edicion-2022_compressed.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2023-04\/aec-2021-edicion-2022_compressed.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2023a. \u201c8.10 Importaciones de mercanc\u00edas seg\u00fan secciones de la Clasificaci\u00f3n Uniforme para el Comercio Internacional (CUCI).\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2022, Edici\u00f3n 2023<\/i>. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2024-04\/aec-2022.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2024-04\/aec-2022.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2023b. \u201c8.13 Valor del comercio exterior de servicios exportados por divisiones.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2022, Edici\u00f3n 2023<\/i>. Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2024-04\/aec-2022.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2024-04\/aec-2022.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025a. <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024: Sector externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025.<\/i> Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-10\/08-sector-externo_aec2024_0.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-10\/08-sector-externo_aec2024_0.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025b. \u201c1.1.1 Poblaci\u00f3n residente por sexo. Tasa anual de crecimiento y raz\u00f3n por sexo seg\u00fan a\u00f1os calculados.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024, Sector Externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025<\/i>. Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.genero.onei.gob.cu\/static\/documents\/informes\/00-anuario-demografico-2024.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.genero.onei.gob.cu\/static\/documents\/informes\/00-anuario-demografico-2024.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025c. \u201c2.1 Nacidos vivos y tasa bruta de natalidad. Cuba, a\u00f1os 1966\u20132024.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024, Sector Externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025<\/i>. Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-07\/00-anuario-demografico-2024.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-07\/00-anuario-demografico-2024.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025d. \u201c3.1 Defunciones generales e infantiles por sexo, tasa de mortalidad general y tasa de mortalidad infantil, a\u00f1os 1970\u20132024.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024, Sector Externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025<\/i>. Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-07\/00-anuario-demografico-2024.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-07\/00-anuario-demografico-2024.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025e. \u201c6.2 Saldo migratorio externo por sexo y tasa de saldo migratorio externo. A\u00f1os 1969\u20132024.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024, Sector Externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025<\/i>. Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.genero.onei.gob.cu\/static\/documents\/informes\/00-anuario-demografico-2024.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.genero.onei.gob.cu\/static\/documents\/informes\/00-anuario-demografico-2024.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025f. \u201c8.4 Intercambio total y saldo comercial de mercanc\u00edas.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024, Sector Externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025<\/i>. Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-10\/08-sector-externo_aec2024_0.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-10\/08-sector-externo_aec2024_0.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025g. \u201c8.11 Importaciones de mercanc\u00edas seg\u00fan secciones de la Clasificaci\u00f3n Uniforme para el Comercio Internacional (CUCI).\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024, Sector Externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025<\/i>. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-10\/08-sector-externo_aec2024_0.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-10\/08-sector-externo_aec2024_0.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025h. \u201c8.14 Valor del comercio exterior de servicios exportados.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024, Sector Externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025<\/i>. Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-10\/08-sector-externo_aec2024_0.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-10\/08-sector-externo_aec2024_0.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025i. \u201c15.14 Ingresos asociados al turismo internacional.\u201d In <i>Anuario Estad\u00edstico de Cuba 2024, Sector Externo, Edici\u00f3n 2025<\/i>. Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-08\/15-turismo_aec2024.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.onei.gob.cu\/sites\/default\/files\/publicaciones\/2025-08\/15-turismo_aec2024.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>OnCuba Staff. 2026. \u201cMore than 96,000 Patients Await Surgery amid U.S. Oil Embargo, Warns Health Minister.\u201d OnCubaNews, March 14. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/cuba\/more-than-96000-patients-await-surgery-amid-u-s-oil-embargo-warns-health-minister\/\" ><i>https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/cuba\/more-than-96000-patients-await-surgery-amid-u-s-oil-embargo-warns-health-minister\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Ortagus, Morgan. 2019. \u201cVisa Actions Against Cuban Officials Exploiting Cuban Doctors.\u201d Press statement, US Department of State, September 30. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/2017-2021.state.gov\/visa-actions-against-cuban-officials-exploiting-cuban-doctors\" ><i>https:\/\/2017-2021.state.gov\/visa-actions-against-cuban-officials-exploiting-cuban-doctors<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Parraga, Marianna, and Dave Sherwood. 2025. \u201cCuba Struggles to Ease Power Cuts amid Reduced Fuel Supplies from Venezuela, Mexico.\u201d Reuters, November 20. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/cuba-struggles-ease-power-cuts-amid-reduced-fuel-supplies-venezuela-mexico-2025-11-19\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/cuba-struggles-ease-power-cuts-amid-reduced-fuel-supplies-venezuela-mexico-2025-11-19\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Pompeo, Michael R. 2020. \u201cSecretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability.\u201d Remarks to the Press, US Department of State, July 8. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/2017-2021.state.gov\/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-9\/?safe=1\" ><i>https:\/\/2017-2021.state.gov\/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-9\/?safe=1<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2021. \u201cU.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.\u201d Press release, US Department of State, January 11. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/2017-2021.state.gov\/u-s-announces-designation-of-cuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism\/\" ><i>https:\/\/2017-2021.state.gov\/u-s-announces-designation-of-cuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Reidpath, Daniel D., and Pascale Allotey. 2003. \u201cInfant Mortality Rate as an Indicator of Population Health.\u201d <i>Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health<\/i> 57 (5): 344\u201346. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC1732453\/pdf\/v057p00344.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC1732453\/pdf\/v057p00344.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Reuters. 2020. \u201cWestern Union Says Suspending U.S. Transfers to Cuba.\u201d November 14. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/western-union-says-suspending-us-transfers-cuba-2020-11-14\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/western-union-says-suspending-us-transfers-cuba-2020-11-14\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025. \u201cLas fuerzas de seguridad cubanas abandonan Venezuela mientras aumenta la presi\u00f3n de EE.UU.\u201d October 19. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/es-us.noticias.yahoo.com\/fuerzas-seguridad-cubanas-abandonan-venezuela-134243270.html\" ><i>https:\/\/es-us.noticias.yahoo.com\/fuerzas-seguridad-cubanas-abandonan-venezuela-134243270.html<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2026. \u201cGuatemala to Wind Down Cuban Doctors Program This Year.\u201d February 10. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/duke.fm\/2026\/02\/10\/guatemala-to-wind-down-cuban-doctors-program-this-year-2\/\" ><i>https:\/\/duke.fm\/2026\/02\/10\/guatemala-to-wind-down-cuban-doctors-program-this-year-2\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Rodr\u00edguez, Andrea, and Milexsy Dur\u00e1n. 2026. \u201cCuba\u2019s Health Care System Pushed to the Brink by US Fuel Blockade, Cuban Minister Says.\u201d Associated Press, March 14. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/cuba-health-care-us-energy-embargo-crisis-33ad8447dc4b442ea9b614eb91392be5\" ><i>https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/cuba-health-care-us-energy-embargo-crisis-33ad8447dc4b442ea9b614eb91392be5<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Rodr\u00edguez, Francisco, Silvio Rend\u00f3n, and Mark Weisbrot. 2025. \u201cEffects of International Sanctions on Age-Specific Mortality: A Cross-National Panel Data Analysis.\u201d <i>The Lancet Global Health<\/i> 13 (8): e1358\u2013e1366. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.thelancet.com\/journals\/langlo\/article\/PIIS2214-109X(25)00189-5\/fulltext\" ><i>https:\/\/www.thelancet.com\/journals\/langlo\/article\/PIIS2214-109X(25)00189-5\/fulltext<\/i>\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Rodr\u00edguez Rodr\u00edguez, Ra\u00fal. 2025. \u201cThe Impact of US Sanctions on Cuba\u2019s Economic Development.\u201d In <i>The Economic Impact of US Sanctions on Cuba: Past, Present, and Future<\/i>, 153\u201368. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/9781108915632.010\" ><i>https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/9781108915632.010<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Rotstein, Jason. 2019. \u201cThe Legacy of the Libertad Act: Defeating Title III Claims and Protecting International Comity.\u201d <i>Harvard International Law Journal<\/i> (blog), November 18. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/2019\/11\/the-legacy-of-the-libertad-act-defeating-title-iii-claims-and-protecting-international-comity\/\" ><i>https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/2019\/11\/the-legacy-of-the-libertad-act-defeating-title-iii-claims-and-protecting-international-comity\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Rubio, Marco. 2025a. \u201cExpansion of Visa Restrictions Policy for Individuals Exploiting Cuban Labor.\u201d Press statement, US Department of State, February 25. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/expansion-of-visa-restrictions-policy-for-individuals-exploiting-cuban-labor\" ><i>https:\/\/www.state.gov\/expansion-of-visa-restrictions-policy-for-individuals-exploiting-cuban-labor<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025b. \u201cRestoring a Tough U.S.-Cuba Policy.\u201d US Department of State, June 30. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/restoring-a-tough-u-s-cuba-policy\" ><i>https:\/\/www.state.gov\/restoring-a-tough-u-s-cuba-policy<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Shepardson, David. 2022. \u201cU.S. Lifts Cuba Flight Restrictions Imposed under Trump.\u201d Reuters, June 1. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/us-lifts-cuba-flight-restrictions-imposed-under-trump-administration-2022-06-01\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/us-lifts-cuba-flight-restrictions-imposed-under-trump-administration-2022-06-01\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Solis, George, Mary Murray, and Carmen Sesin. 2026. \u201cIn a Cuban Hospital, Patients and Doctors Are Hard Hit by Outages and Fuel Shortages.\u201d NBC News, March 18. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/world\/cuba\/inside-cuba-hospital-outages-hard-hit-blackouts-rcna264184\" ><i>https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/world\/cuba\/inside-cuba-hospital-outages-hard-hit-blackouts-rcna264184<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN). n.d. \u201cInfant Mortality Rate, Under Five Mortality Rate and Maternal Mortality Rate.\u201d In <i>Health Statistics<\/i>. Accessed April 10, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/statinja.gov.jm\/demo_socialstats\/health.aspx\" ><i>https:\/\/statinja.gov.jm\/demo_socialstats\/health.aspx<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Taylor, Ivan. 2025. \u201cWestern Union Suspends Money Transfers to Cuba Following U.S. Sanctions.\u201d CBS Miami, February 11. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/miami\/news\/western-union-suspends-money-transfers-to-cuba-following-u-s-sanctions\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/miami\/news\/western-union-suspends-money-transfers-to-cuba-following-u-s-sanctions\/<\/i>\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Taylor, Luke. 2025. \u201cCuba Hit by Surge of Dengue and Other Infectious Diseases.\u201d <i>BMJ <\/i>391: r2688. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/bmj.r2688\" ><i>https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/bmj.r2688<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2026. \u201cCuba Health Crisis: Blackouts and Fuel Shortages Following Trump Pressure.\u201d <i>BMJ<\/i> 392: s383. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bmj.com\/content\/392\/bmj.s383?hwshib2=authn%3A1775250496%3A20260402%253Ad4df3910-c111-44c7-bddc-7229fbacb4c4%3A0%3A0%3A0%3ADMkRNb8AXie1Ce%2FWnCEcQQ%3D%3D\" ><i>https:\/\/www.bmj.com\/content\/392\/bmj.s383?hwshib2=authn%3A1775250496%3A20260402%253Ad4df3910-c111-44c7-bddc-7229fbacb4c4%3A0%3A0%3A0%3ADMkRNb8AXie1Ce%2FWnCEcQQ%3D%3D<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Toosi, Nahal, and Eric Bazail-Eimil. 2026. \u201cCuban Doctors, U.S. Pressure.\u201d POLITICO, March 13. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2026\/03\/13\/cuban-doctors-us-pressure-00827683\" ><i>https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2026\/03\/13\/cuban-doctors-us-pressure-00827683<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Trotta, Daniel. 2026. \u201cCuban Doctors Endure Burnout, Blackouts as Once-Vaunted Healthcare Declines.\u201d Reuters, March 26. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/healthcare-pharmaceuticals\/cuban-doctors-endure-burnout-blackouts-once-vaunted-healthcare-declines-2026-03-26\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/healthcare-pharmaceuticals\/cuban-doctors-endure-burnout-blackouts-once-vaunted-healthcare-declines-2026-03-26\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>United Nations. 2026. \u201cHumanitarian Pressures Grow as Cuba Continues to Struggle with Energy Shortages.\u201d February 26. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2026\/02\/1167046\" ><i>https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2026\/02\/1167046<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/statinja.gov.jm\/demo_socialstats\/health.aspx?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" >. <\/a>1945. Charter of the United Nations.<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/about-us\/un-charter\/full-text\" ><i> https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/about-us\/un-charter\/full-text<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (UN DESA). 2024. <i>World <\/i>Population<i> Prospects 2024: Summary of Results<\/i>. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/population.un.org\/wpp\/assets\/Files\/WPP2024_Summary-of-Results.pdf.\" ><i>https:\/\/population.un.org\/wpp\/assets\/Files\/WPP2024_Summary-of-Results.pdf.<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/statinja.gov.jm\/demo_socialstats\/health.aspx?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" >. <\/a>2025. <i>World Fertility 2024<\/i>. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/development\/desa\/pd\/sites\/www.un.org.development.desa.pd\/files\/undesa_pd_2025_wfr_2024_final.pdf\" ><i>https:\/\/www.un.org\/development\/desa\/pd\/sites\/www.un.org.development.desa.pd\/files\/undesa_pd_2025_wfr_2024_final.pdf<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>United Nations General Assembly. 1974. \u201cDefinition of Aggression.\u201d A\/RES\/3314 (XXIX), December 14, 1974. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/A\/RES\/3314%20(XXIX)\" ><i>https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/A\/RES\/3314%20(XXIX)<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD). n.d. \u201cUNCTADstat Data Centre: Remittances.\u201d Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/unctadstat.unctad.org\/datacentre\/dataviewer\/US.Remittances\" ><i>https:\/\/unctadstat.unctad.org\/datacentre\/dataviewer\/US.Remittances<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>UN Tourism. n.d. \u201cUN Tourism Tourism Data Dashboard.\u201d Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.untourism.int\/tourism-data\/un-tourism-tourism-dashboard\" ><i>https:\/\/www.untourism.int\/tourism-data\/un-tourism-tourism-dashboard<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>US Department of State. 2025a. \u201cCuba Restricted List.\u201d January 16, 2025. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/division-for-counter-threat-finance-and-sanctions\/cuba-restricted-list\" ><i>https:\/\/www.state.gov\/division-for-counter-threat-finance-and-sanctions\/cuba-restricted-list<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025b. \u201cPublishing the State Department\u2019s List of Entities and Subentities Associated With Cuba (Cuba Restricted List).\u201d <i>Federal Register<\/i> 90, no. 24 (February 6): 9101\u20133. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2025\/02\/06\/2025-02282\/publishing-the-state-departments-list-of-entities-and-subentities-associated-with-cuba-cuba\" ><i>https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2025\/02\/06\/2025-02282\/publishing-the-state-departments-list-of-entities-and-subentities-associated-with-cuba-cuba<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>US Department of State, Office of the Historian. n.d. \u201c499. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom).\u201d In <i>Foreign Relations of the <\/i><i>United States, 1958\u20131960, Cuba, <\/i>Volume VI. Accessed April 13, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/history.state.gov\/historicaldocuments\/frus1958-60v06\/d499\" ><i>https:\/\/history.state.gov\/historicaldocuments\/frus1958-60v06\/d499<\/i><\/a><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p>Vidal, Pavel. 2025. \u201cImpact of Sanctions Policy Shifts: A Case Study of the United States and Cuba, 1994\u20132020.\u201d <i>Journal of International Development<\/i> 37 (2): 540\u2013553. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1002\/jid.3973\" ><i>https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1002\/jid.3973<\/i><\/a><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p>Webber, Jude. 2026. \u201cMexico Risks Donald Trump\u2019s Ire with Cuban Oil Shipments.\u201d Financial Times, January 6. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/f04088c3-66af-4d7c-b5fd-df0e423bd837?syn-25a6b1a6=1\" ><i>https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/f04088c3-66af-4d7c-b5fd-df0e423bd837?syn-25a6b1a6=1<\/i><\/a><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p>Weisbrot, Mark. 2025. \u201cRethink Sanctions. They\u2019re Killing as Many People as War Does.\u201d Los Angeles Times, July 24. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.latimes.com\/opinion\/story\/2025-07-24\/united-states-sanctions-deaths\" ><i>https:\/\/www.latimes.com\/opinion\/story\/2025-07-24\/united-states-sanctions-deaths<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Weisbrot, Mark, and Jeffery Sachs. 2019. \u201cEconomic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela.\u201d Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 25. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/economic-sanctions-as-collective-punishment-the-case-of-venezuela\/\" ><i>https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/economic-sanctions-as-collective-punishment-the-case-of-venezuela\/<\/i><\/a><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p>The White House. 2025a. \u201cFact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Strengthens the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba.\u201d June 30. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/06\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strengthens-the-policy-of-the-united-states-toward-cuba\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/06\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strengthens-the-policy-of-the-united-states-toward-cuba\/<\/i><\/a><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2025b. \u201cNational Security Presidential Memorandum\/NSPM-5.\u201d June 30. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/06\/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-5\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/06\/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-5\/<\/i><\/a><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. 2026. \u201cAddressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba.\u201d Executive order, January 29. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2026\/01\/addressing-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2026\/01\/addressing-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba\/<\/i><\/a><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p>Wilkinson, Bert. 2026. \u201cCuban Doctors to Leave Guyana as U.S. Applies Pressure over Island\u2019s Medical Missions.\u201d Associated Press, March 9. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/cuba-doctors-guyana-jamaica-honduras-trump-4b90e73c333d0513d017ecce61929a6b\" ><i>https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/cuba-doctors-guyana-jamaica-honduras-trump-4b90e73c333d0513d017ecce61929a6b<\/i><\/a><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p>World Bank. n.d.-a. \u201cGDP per Capita (Constant 2015 US$).\u201d World Development Indicators. Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD\" ><i>https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p><i>\u2014\u2014\u2014. n.d.-b. \u201cLife Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years).\u201d World Development Indicators. Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SP.DYN.LE00.IN\" >https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SP.DYN.LE00.IN<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. n.d.-c. \u201cMaternal Mortality Ratio (Modeled Estimate, per 100,000 Live Births).\u201d World Development Indicators. Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SH.STA.MMRT\" ><i>https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SH.STA.MMRT<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. n.d.-d. \u201cMortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 Live Births).\u201d World Development Indicators. Accessed April 9, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN\" ><i>https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. n.d.-e. \u201cPhysicians (per 1,000 People).\u201d World Development Indicators. Accessed April 10, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS?locations=CU\" ><i>https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS?locations=CU<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>World Health Organization (WHO). n.d.-a. \u201cDomestic General Government Health Expenditure (GGHE-D).\u201d Global Health Expenditure Database. Accessed April 10, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/apps.who.int\/nha\/database\/ViewData\/Indicators\/en\" ><i>https:\/\/apps.who.int\/nha\/database\/ViewData\/Indicators\/en<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u2014\u2014\u2014. n.d.-b. \u201cInfant Mortality Rate (Between Birth and 11 Months per 1000 Live Births).\u201d Indicator Metadata Registry, Global Health Observatory. Accessed April 10, 2026. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.who.int\/data\/gho\/indicator-metadata-registry\/imr-details\/1\" ><i>https:\/\/www.who.int\/data\/gho\/indicator-metadata-registry\/imr-details\/1<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Wulfhorst, Ellen. 2019. \u201cU.S. Says Cuban Medical Missions Are Trafficking Doctors.\u201d Reuters, September 27. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/world\/us-says-cuban-medical-missions-are-trafficking-doctors-idUSKBN1WC00W\/\" ><i>https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/world\/us-says-cuban-medical-missions-are-trafficking-doctors-idUSKBN1WC00W\/<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Wyss, Jim. 2025. \u201cWestern Union Halts Money Transfers to Cuba Citing New Sanctions.\u201d Bloomberg, February 10. <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2025-02-10\/western-union-halts-money-transfers-to-cuba-citing-new-sanctions\" ><i>https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2025-02-10\/western-union-halts-money-transfers-to-cuba-citing-new-sanctions<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>FOOTNOTES:<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"wrap1 component_footnotes -py:0 -my:2\">\n<div class=\"wrap1-inner -restrain\">\n<div class=\"body1 -contain -wx:5\">\n<div class=\"footnotes1\">\n<div class=\"footnotes1-main\">\n<ol class=\"-t:8 -as:3\">\n<li id=\"fn1\">It is \u201cstrongly related to those structural factors like economic development, general living conditions, social well being, and the quality of the environment, that affect the health of entire populations\u201d (Reidpath and Allotey; 2003). The World Health Organization also notes that infant mortality rates \u201creflect the social, economic and environmental conditions in which children (and others in society) live\u201d (WHO; n.d.-b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn2\">Cubadebate (2026); ONEI (2025c, 2025d).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn3\">World Bank (n.d.-b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn4\">Rodr\u00edguez, Rend\u00f3n, and Weisbrot (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn5\">There are about 132 million births per year, which is 1.6 percent of the 8.1 billion world population in 2024. UN DESA (2024, 2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn6\">Doerr and Hofmann (2022).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn7\">It was rescinded by President Joe Biden on January 14, 2025 and reinstituted by President Trump on January 20, 2025.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn8\">The Trump administration reinstored the State Sponsor of Terrorism designation without providing credible evidence that Cuba supports terrorism and despite a prior formal US Department of State review that concluded that there was no basis for maintaining the designation.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn9\">This was reversed by President Biden on January 14, 2025 but re-instituted by President Trump on January 20, 2025.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn10\">President Biden ordered the renewal of the waiver on January 14, 2025; the Trump administration reversed Biden\u2019s order on January 29, 2025<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn11\">Following the forced exit of Western Union in 2020, there are reports of transaction fees rising from 11 percent to as much as 40 percent. See Delgado (2024).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn12\">Nicas and Triebert (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn13\">UN Tourism (n.d.).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn14\">ONEI (2022; 2025i).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn15\">ONEI (2019; 2023b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn16\">UNCTAD (n.d.).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn17\">Excluding donated goods and goods acquired in ports by means of transport. ONEI (2025g).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn18\">ONEI (2025b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn19\">Augustin and Nicas (2026); Trotta (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn20\">Solis, Murray, and Sesin (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn21\">Associated Press (2026a).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn22\">L. Taylor (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn23\">It is \u201cstrongly related to those structural factors like economic development, general living conditions, social well being, and the quality of the environment, that affect the health of entire populations\u201d (Reidpath and Allotey; 2003). The World Health Organization also notes that infant mortality rates \u201creflect the social, economic and environmental conditions in which children (and others in society) live.\u201d (WHO; n.d.-b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn24\">World Bank (n.d.-e).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn25\">IBGE (n.d.).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn26\">DEIS (2026); DANE (2026); INEGI (2024); STATIN (n.d.).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn27\">Trotta (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn28\">Rodr\u00edguez, Rend\u00f3n, and Weisbrot (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn29\">Weisbrot (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn30\">These methods included entropy balancing, Granger causality, event-study, and instrumental variables.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn31\">There are about 132 million births per year, which is 1.6 percent of the 8.1 billion world population in 2024. UN DESA (2024, 2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn32\">Doerr and Hofmann (2022).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn33\">IMF (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn34\">Weisbrot and Sachs (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn35\">Doerr and Hofmann (2022).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn36\">See below for more detail and see also Escobedo et al. (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn37\">The goals and mechanisms of this emerging policy were laid out in a 1960 memorandum by the then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs:\u00a0 The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship. . . . it follows that every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba. If such a policy is adopted, it should be the result of a positive decision which would call forth a line of action which, while as adroit and inconspicuous as possible, makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government. (US Department of State, Office of the Historian [n.d.].)<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn38\">Hern\u00e1ndez-Cat\u00e1 (2001).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn39\">Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (1992).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn40\">Rotstein (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn41\">Government of Canada, Trade Commissioner Service (2024).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn42\">The White House (2025b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn43\">The list also includes ANTEX, which manages professional services including health-care exports in some countries; GAESA conglomerate, whose subsidiaries comprise a significant share of the Cuban economy; and FINCIMEX and (since 2025) Orbit S.A., which both process remittances. US Department of State (2025a).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn44\">This restriction was removed by Biden in 2022 and has not yet been reimposed by President Trump. Shepardson (2022).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn45\">Reuters (2020). Biden reduced restrictions on remittances in 2022, allowing Western Union to return in 2023 in cooperation with the Cuban firm Orbit, which processed the transactions. When Trump returned to office in 2025, Orbit was added to the reinstated Cuba Restricted List that also banned other financial services companies involved in processing remittances. This compelled Western Union to again close its Cuban operations. I. Taylor (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn46\">The two cases are Havana Docks Corp v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. and Exxon Mobil v. Corporaci\u00f3n CIMEX. The former is notable as Christopher Landau, current Deputy Secretary of State, was counsel for Havana Docks Corporation prior to his nomination. The Trump administration has filed briefings to the Supreme Court in support of Havana Docks. CEPR (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn47\">See Dom\u00ednguez L\u00f3pez, Cornelio Hitchman, and Barrera Rodr\u00edguez (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn48\">The redesignation was issued in large part on the grounds that Cuba had hosted members of the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) to conduct peace talks with the Colombian government and because \u201cciting peace negotiation protocols, Cuba . . . refused Colombia\u2019s requests to extradite ten ELN leaders living in Havana.\u201d Norway \u2014 which was a co-guarantor of the peace process \u2014 also opposed their extradition. Pompeo (2021); Acosta (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn49\">BNP Paribas, for example, was fined $9 billion in 2014. Gordon (2024).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn50\">MINREX (2022). The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is the main international payments network.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn51\">Rodr\u00edguez Rodr\u00edguez (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn52\">Gordon (2024).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn53\">O\u2019Boyle (2018); Diario Las Am\u00e9ricas (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn54\">Ortagus (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn55\">Wulfhorst (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn56\">Marsh and Zodzi (2020). The Bolivian mission was reinstated after the restoration of democracy in 2020.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn57\">Menendez and Rubio (2020).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn58\">Pompeo (2020).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn59\">Baggott and Lambie (2019), Escobedo et al. (2021), Marsh and Zodzi (2020).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn60\">Baggott and Lambie (2019), Beldarra\u00edn Chaple and Mercer (2017).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn61\">ONEI (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn62\">ONEI (2023b). There is a series break after 2022 (when these exports were $4.9 billion), with the \u201cServicios de salud humana y servicios de atenci\u00f3n social\u201d category appearing to be merged into \u201cServicios personales, culturales y recreativos,\u201d of which medical services appears to be the main contribution. This was $5.4 billion in 2024, the last year for which there is data. The recovery can be attributed to the restoration of the programs in Bolivia and Brazil. ONEI (2023b, 2025h).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn63\">ONEI (2022).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn64\">ONEI (2025i).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn65\">UN Tourism (n.d.).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn66\">ECLAC (2023, 2).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn67\">ECLAC (2023).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn68\">Delgado (2024).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn69\">Delgado (2024, 204).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn70\">UNCTAD (n.d.).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn71\">Ibid.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn72\">Excluding donated goods and goods acquired in ports by means of transport.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn73\">ONEI (2025f). There was also a significant goods import compression of about US$4.4 billion or 30 percent from 2013 to 2016. This is likely explained by the sharp fall in the price of oil over these years \u2014 and, from 2015, the decline in Venezuela\u2019s economy, which reduced exports to Cuba; the value of Cuba\u2019s oil imports fell by US$4.5 billion over the period. See Hern\u00e1ndez-Cat\u00e1 (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn74\">The latest statistical yearbook only has partial current account data until 2020, in which year a deficit emerged. It does not have capital account or reserves data. ONEI (2025a).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn75\">Exports fell by 32 percent over 2018\u20132024, with goods exports (which accounted for just 16 percent of total exports in 2024) falling somewhat faster (-38 percent) than services exports (-31 percent). ONEI (2020a, 2020b, 2025f, 2025h).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn76\">Vidal (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn77\">Deflated by authors using the FAO\u2019s Food Price Index, which is a measure of the change in international prices of a basket of food commodities. FAO (2026). Food imports data from ONEI (2023a; 2025g).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn78\">A research note by Albizu-Campos (2025) argues that the official data understates out-migration \u2014 the author\u2019s adjustments indicate that the population actually fell by 24 percent. While some of the adjustments suggested are reasonable, others \u2014 such as treating CBP encounters as individual migrants \u2014 seem to introduce a source of overestimation.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn79\">ONEI (2025b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn80\">ONEI (2025e).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn81\">Ibid.<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn82\">Rubio (2025b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn83\">US Department of State (2025b); Li et al. (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn84\">There are reports that Cuban-Americans who want to send money are having to rely on more costly and risky routes to send money, including cash carried by mules, cryptocurrency transactions, and transfers sent via third countries. CiberCuba Editorial Team (2026); Wyss (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn85\">The White House (2025a, 2025b).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn86\">Toosi and Bazail-Eimil (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn87\">Rubio (2025a).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn88\">Associated Press (2026b); Gonz\u00e1lez (2026); Reuters (2026); Wilkinson (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn89\">Reuters (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn90\">Webber (2026). There is disagreement in the reporting with Reuters noting figures that show Venezuela continued to be Cuba\u2019s main supplier over the first 10 months of 2025. Parraga and Sherwood (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn91\">The White House (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn92\">This shipment is insufficient to meet Cuba\u2019s oil needs, being equivalent to just 7\u201310 days of demand. The White House spokesperson said that they would treat future shipments on a case-by-case basis, and it is notable that Mexico, despite the stated desire of its president, has not restarted shipments. Levine et al. (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn93\">Marimow (2025); Nicas and Triebert (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn94\">United Nations (2026)<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn95\">Dur\u00e1n and Coto (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn96\">Associated Press (2026a).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn97\">OnCuba Staff (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn98\">Rodr\u00edguez and Dur\u00e1n (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn99\">Solis, Murray, and Sesin (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn100\">Taylor (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn101\">Rodr\u00edguez and Dur\u00e1n (2026); Taylor (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn102\">Ghebreyesus (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn103\">Trotta (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn104\">Rodr\u00edguez and Dur\u00e1n (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn105\">Eighty-four percent of water pumping is dependent on electricity, and 10 percent of the population rely on (gasoline-\/diesel-dependent) tanker trucks for potable water. United Nations (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn106\">BBC (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn107\">Blanco (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn108\">Edelson (2009).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn109\">L. Taylor (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn110\">Escobedo et al. (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn111\">Colom\u00e9 (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn112\">See Novaes and de Sousa (2022).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn113\">Preliminary figure. Cubadebate (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn114\">Augustin and Nicas (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn115\">Kristof (2019).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn116\">Jayapal and Jackson (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn117\">Weisbrot (2025).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn118\">Nicas and Triebert (2026).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn119\">United Nations (1945).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn120\">See Articles 19 and 20 of OAS (1993).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn121\">United Nations General Assembly (1974).<\/li>\n<li id=\"fn122\">ICRC (1949).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>________________________________________________<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><em>The Center for Economic and Policy Research promotes democratic debate on issues that affect people\u2019s lives, in the US and other parts of the world.\u00a0Through rigorous, independent research and analysis we strive to provide the general public and policymakers with the tools to better understand the problems and choices that they face. CEPR is committed to presenting issues in an accurate and understandable manner, so that the public is better prepared to choose among various policy options.\u00a0Toward this end, CEPR conducts both research and public education. Our research is oriented towards filling important gaps in the understanding of particular domestic and foreign policy issues, or the impact of specific policies. The public education portion of our mission presents the findings of research, both conducted by CEPR and others, in a manner that allows broad segments of the public to know exactly what is at stake in major policy debates.\u00a0CEPR was co-founded by economists <strong>Dean Baker<\/strong> and <strong>Mark Weisbrot<\/strong>. Our Advisory Board includes Nobel Laureate economist <strong>Joseph E. Stiglitz<\/strong>; <strong>Janet Gornick<\/strong>, Professor at the CUNY Graduate School and Director of the Luxembourg Income Study; and <strong>Richard B. Freeman<\/strong>, Professor of Economics at Harvard University.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/cepr.net\/publications\/us-sanctions-and-the-sharp-rise-in-infant-mortality-in-cuba\/\" >Go to Original &#8211; cepr.net<\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>PAPER OF THE WEEK STAYS POSTED FOR 2 WEEKS BEFORE BEING ARCHIVED<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>27 Apr 2026 &#8211; New Comprehensive Report Shows That Hardening of US Sanctions on Cuba Since 2017 Fueled a Sharp Increase in Cuba\u2019s Infant Mortality Rate<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":315876,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[241],"tags":[1473,417,1057,554,530,3281,541,1102,2159,923,249,70],"class_list":["post-315875","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-paper-of-the-week","tag-blockade","tag-bullying","tag-child-protection","tag-children","tag-cuba","tag-evil-empire","tag-latin-america-caribbean","tag-public-health","tag-rogue-states","tag-sanctions","tag-trump","tag-usa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/315875","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=315875"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/315875\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":315880,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/315875\/revisions\/315880"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/315876"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=315875"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=315875"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=315875"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}