{"id":316325,"date":"2026-05-18T12:00:20","date_gmt":"2026-05-18T11:00:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=316325"},"modified":"2026-05-17T15:04:16","modified_gmt":"2026-05-17T14:04:16","slug":"seniority-over-justice","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2026\/05\/seniority-over-justice\/","title":{"rendered":"Seniority over Justice"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cThere is suffering; there is a cause of suffering; there is a cessation of suffering; and there is a path leading to the cessation of suffering.\u201d<\/em> — Gautam Buddha<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Abstract<\/strong><\/h2>\n

This study investigates the shifting dynamics of judicial appointments in Nepal, focusing on the tension between seniority\u2011based succession and meritocratic selection. Historically, the judiciary privileged seniority as a mechanism of continuity, but the Constitutional Council\u2019s recommendation of Dr. Manoj Kumar Sharma as the 33rd Chief Justice\u2014despite his fourth\u2011place ranking in seniority\u2014marks a constitutional departure. His nomination, justified by academic and professional distinction, reflects broader societal demands for transparency, accountability, and institutional reform in an era of heightened civic activism.<\/p>\n

The analysis situates this development within competing philosophical frameworks: deontological justice<\/strong>,<\/strong> which emphasizes rule\u2011based adherence to seniority, and teleological justice<\/strong>, which prioritizes outcome\u2011oriented meritocracy. It further interrogates controversies surrounding judicial independence, political interference, and the Constitutional Council\u2019s role while drawing on corruption inquiries, such as the report from the committee led by former Chief Justice Hari Krishna Karki. Comparative insights from South Asia and global contexts demonstrate how merit\u2011based selection can enhance accountability and public confidence in judicial institutions.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, the study contends that privileging merit over seniority is essential to reinforce judicial legitimacy, safeguard fundamental rights, and prevent democratic backsliding in Nepal. The author embraces the philosophy of \u201cI know that I do not know,\u201d welcoming critique, feedback, dialogue\/discussion, and further\u00a0research to advance the discourse on seniority over justice.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In the official competition, six finalists\u00a0progressed to the\u00a0final\u00a0stage, overseen by six members of the recommendation committee. Traditionally, the candidate\u00a0with the\u00a0highest\u00a0seniority\u00a0always emerged victorious, while the\u00a0other\u00a0contenders\u00a0served mainly as symbolic participants to\u00a0maintain\u00a0the appearance of competition.\u00a0However, on this occasion,\u00a0the fourth-ranked contender\u00a0won\u00a0based\u00a0on\u00a0merit (Nepal News, March 10, 2026). Four selection committee members\u00a0prioritized ability over seniority, while two stuck to traditional views, arguing\u2014both\u00a0publicly\u00a0and within the legislature\u2014that seniority\u00a0should\u00a0be the sole\u00a0determinant of\u00a0the outcome. This\u00a0episode unfolded within Nepal’s judicial system, marking a significant departure from entrenched precedent or established norms.<\/p>\n

On May 7, 2026, the Constitutional Council,\u00a0led by Prime Minister Balendra Shah, recommended Dr. Sharma\u2014ranked\u00a0fourth in seniority\u00a0but distinguished by academic and professional accomplishments\u2014for\u00a0the position of\u00a0Chief Justice of Nepal. This decision\u00a0broke\u00a0the long-standing tradition of\u00a0promoting the most senior justice, bypassing Justice Sapana Pradhan Malla (Neupane, May 9, 2026), a former activist and parliamentarian of the Communist Party of Nepal (UML). This\u00a0move has\u00a0sparked discussions\u00a0across judicial, political, and civic circles,\u00a0indicating a shift from seniority-based succession to merit-based evaluation.<\/p>\n

The Shah\u00a0administration, elected in April 2026 amidst\u00a0Generation Z activism and sacrifice, was\u00a0driven by calls for corruption-free institutions and\u00a0transparent\u00a0governance with accountability (Pathak, September 22 and December 15, 2025). The judiciary, historically criticized for corruption and\u00a0lack of transparency, now faces\u00a0increased scrutiny. Judges implicated in irregularities, unexplained wealth accumulation, and questionable practices since 1990 shall\u00a0face\u00a0accountability under new judicial leadership.<\/p>\n

The Council’s recommendation\u00a0represents a constitutional\u00a0milestone\u00a0and a broader\u00a0change\u00a0in judicial philosophy. It challenges the balance between tradition and merit,\u00a0questions the role of political authority in judicial appointments, and tests the judiciary’s\u00a0ability to\u00a0address\u00a0entrenched\u00a0issues while embracing democratic reform in Nepal (Pathak, April 6, 2026).<\/p>\n

The\u00a0conflict of\u00a0seniority over justice represents a merit-based,\u00a0contemporary\u00a0approach to judicial appointments, directly contrasting with the traditional justice over seniority framework that prioritizes institutional stability. Critics argue that reliance on seniority invites political interference, as appointees may\u00a0show\u00a0loyalty to their nominators or old political institutions. Such deviations can introduce arbitrariness,\u00a0allowing executives to\u00a0choose\u00a0judges based on political alignment rather than objective merit. When political\u00a0expediency\u00a0replaces clear performance\u00a0criteria, the judiciary risks stagnation and compromised impartiality.<\/p>\n

The opposition between \u2018seniority over justice\u2019 and \u2018justice over seniority\u2019 encapsulates two divergent strands in modern political, legal, and judicial philosophy. The former\u00a0promotes a merit-based paradigm\u00a0that values\u00a0talent and accountability over hierarchical succession, while the latter defends continuity by elevating seniority even at the expense of merit. This dialectic\u00a0highlights the ongoing\u00a0tension between reformist impulses seeking excellence and traditionalist safeguards of stability,\u00a0illustrating how judicial appointments embody the broader struggle to balance independence, fairness, and democratic legitimacy.<\/p>\n

Seniority over justice reflects a deontological\u00a0conception\u00a0of justice,\u00a0grounded in duty, rules, and principles, where legitimacy\u00a0stems from adherence to established norms, regardless of outcomes.\u00a0In\u00a0contrast, justice over seniority aligns with the teleological justice notion, which defines fairness by ends, goals, and consequences\u2014prioritizing outcomes such as welfare, equity, and efficiency. This consequentialist\u00a0instrumental approach is essential to meritocracy and utilitarianism, maximizing independence, fairness, and efficiency while rejecting downward gerontocracy. It emphasizes justice as\u00a0an\u00a0outcome, seeking the most competent, hardworking, morally upright, upward, and intellectually capable individuals to\u00a0hold\u00a0positions of authority and deliver sound\u00a0judgments.<\/p>\n

While deontological justice may\u00a0seem inflexible in disregarding practical consequences, teleological justice justifies actions insofar as they produce beneficial ends (Kymlicka, October 1988 & Hutchinson, undated).\u00a0Therefore, seniority over justice seeks to select the most qualified individuals to enhance governance through efficiency and accountability, curbing backroom deals (setting) and legitimizing the choice of a more productive junior judge over a less effective senior one. This approach\u00a0strengthens the judiciary’s\u00a0potential\u00a0for reform across both horizontal and vertical dimensions. The study ultimately contends that justice must challenge seniority to enable excellence and talent to thrive through a bottom-up approach within democratic systems.<\/p>\n

Lastly, this study\u00a0places Nepal’s judicial\u00a0evolution within a comparative\u00a0context. The tension between\u00a0meritocracy\u00a0and\u00a0seniority\u00a0influences justice delivery and suggests paths toward a victim-centered and timely judiciary. Similar challenges of backlog and\u00a0lack of transparency persist in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, while global examples from the UK and South Africa demonstrate how merit-based selection processes can\u00a0improve accountability and public trust.<\/p>\n

As a result, the Nepali population as a whole view the competition\u00a0at the center\u00a0as a\u00a0question\u00a0of judicial governance and accountability, rather than as a\u00a0way to\u00a0protect partisan interests and safeguard\u00a0leaders and judges themselves.<\/p>\n

Ascension of Dr. Manoj Kumar Sharma <\/strong><\/h2>\n

Dr. Sharma, born in 1970 in the mid-Tarai region of Birgunj,\u00a0Nepal, is a legal professional with a diverse background. He holds an LLB from Nepal Law Campus, an\u00a0LLM in Commercial and Constitutional Law from Pune University,\u00a0India, and\u00a0a PhD in Labor Law\u00a0from\u00a0Tribhuvan University.\u00a0Sharma started his\u00a0career as an advocate in 1995\u00a0and\u00a0has worked\u00a0as a consultant in commercial law and as a lecturer (Nepal News, May 7, 2026, and Himal Press, May 7, 2026).<\/p>\n

In a departure from tradition, PM Balen-led\u00a0Constitutional Council recommended Sharma, the fourth most senior justice, for the position of chief justice of Nepal, bypassing three senior candidates. This decision has sparked discussions across various sectors. Despite not being known for significant constitutional rulings or extensive judicial writing, Sharma’s\u00a0nomination for Chief Justice has raised interest. With the expected endorsement by the Parliamentary Hearing Committee,\u00a0Sharma, at\u00a056\u00a0years\u00a0old, is\u00a0poised\u00a0to become Nepal’s 33rd chief justice\u00a0for\u00a0a full six-year term.<\/p>\n

Sharma,\u00a0the nephew of former Chief Justice Damodar Prasad Sharma, previously served as an\u00a0additional judge at\u00a0appellate\u00a0courts. His appointment to the Supreme Court in 2019 faced challenges but\u00a0was\u00a0ultimately upheld. His rise to the apex of the judiciary has prompted questions about the factors influencing his selection and the dynamics of power.<\/p>\n

Paradox of Seniority<\/strong><\/p>\n

On May 9, 2026, on the occasion of the 74th Law Day, Acting Chief Justice Sapna Pradhan Malla delivered a significant address concerning the institutional independence of the Nepalese judiciary. Against the backdrop of the Constitutional Council\u2019s controversial recommendation for the chief justice recommendation\u2014which bypassed established principles of seniority\u2014Malla raised rigorous constitutional questions. She expressed profound skepticism regarding whether insidious attempts were underway to engineer an “obedient judiciary” and cultivate an unequal application of the rule of law under the pretext of exercising statutory authority. She maintained a steadfast position that any propensity to transform the court into a facade for safeguarding political interests, rather than a definitive sanctuary for justice, remains entirely unacceptable (Setopati Reporter, May 9, 2026).<\/p>\n

Building upon this institutional critique, Malla openly censured the systemic pressures exerted upon the bench by political parties. Declaring that “<\/em>justice cannot be dispensed under fear or influence, whether it be the intimidation of a two-thirds majority government or the threat of impeachment,”<\/em> she unequivocally asserted that the judiciary would never capitulate to a powerful executive or threats of summary removal (Online Nepal, May 9, 2026). Consequently, she exhorted judicial professionals to rise above political constraints, urging them to adjudicate with elevated morale and unwavering impartiality.<\/p>\n

Central to her address was the assertion that no organ of the state, government, or public official can transcend the Constitution and the tenets of constitutional morality. Warning against institutional tendencies that subvert the rule of law, Malla issued a grave admonition: “One cannot guarantee that a tiger that devours one person will spare another; hence, actions executed by assassinating the rule of law ultimately culminate in authoritarianism.” She further posited that the manipulation and misinterpretation of statutes by rulers under the guise of political justification constitute absolute arbitrariness (Online Khabar, May 9, 2026).<\/p>\n

Furthermore, Malla directly addressed a contemporary institutional friction, responding to a query previously raised by the Speaker of the House regarding whether the judiciary could operate at the “speed of the government.” She clarified that the judiciary is fully prepared to operate in alignment with both the spirit of the Constitution and the operational velocity of the executive. However, she maintained that for this synergy to materialize, it is imperative for political leadership to abandon its inclination to control the bench and instead equip the institution with adequate resources, infrastructure, and human capital (Hamrakura, May 9, 2026).<\/p>\n

Concluding her address by recalling her lifelong commitment to combating discrimination and injustice since her tenure as a legal practitioner, Malla remarked that the crusade for judicial independence remains far from concluded. To sustain this vital democratic struggle, she issued a fervent appeal to the Nepal Bar Association, the media, and civil society to consolidate their efforts and stand resolutely in solidarity. Ultimately, she emphasized that such a united front is indispensable to safeguard the independence, dignity, and overarching institutional integrity of the judiciary, alongside the preservation of citizens’ fundamental rights.<\/p>\n

Judgments controversy<\/strong><\/h2>\n

During Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli\u2019s tenure, fifty\u2011two constitutional officials were appointed through executive ordinances in two phases. In the first phase, thirty\u2011two officials were recommended on December 15, 2020, and sworn in on February 3, 2021, bypassing mandatory parliamentary hearings. In the second phase, twenty additional officials were recommended on May 16, 2021, and sworn in on June 24, 2021, with the government citing parliamentary dissolution as justification for avoiding legislative scrutiny. After a protracted dispute lasting four and a half years, the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court delivered a landmark 3\u20132 split verdict on July 2, 2025, affirming the validity of both phases (BBC, July 3, 2025).<\/p>\n

The majority opinion, authored by Justices Malla, Dr. Sharma, and Dr. Kumar Chudal, dismissed the writ petitions by invoking institutional continuity and the Doctrine of Laches. They reasoned that retroactive annulment would create an administrative vacuum, as the appointees had actively served in critical state roles during the pendency of the petitions. Accordingly, they prioritized stability and institutional preservation over judicial nullification (Onlinekhabar, July 3, 2025; Himalaya Times, July 3, 2025).<\/p>\n

In dissent, Chief Justice Prakash Man Singh Raut and Justice Dr. Nahakul Subedi called for complete invalidation, citing grave procedural irregularities and violations of constitutional ethics. They argued that bypassing parliament, disregarding quorum requirements, and omitting mandatory hearings undermined democratic checks and balances. For them, executive overreach could not be legitimized retroactively through delay, warning that such validation fosters lawlessness and erodes the rule of law.<\/p>\n

On May 10, 2026, the Supreme Court issued two significant interim orders suspending government decisions to dissolve employee trade unions and prohibit student organizations. The constitutional bench, by majority opinion, halted the dissolution of trade unions, while a single bench suspended the ban on student organizations. These rulings underscore the judiciary\u2019s role in safeguarding fundamental rights and balancing executive authority with democratic accountability.<\/p>\n

The government had invoked Article 114 of the Constitution to deregister twelve employee unions, including those affiliated with major political parties and professional associations. In response, Bhawani Dahal, President of the Civil Service Employees\u2019 Organization, filed a writ petition. The Constitutional Bench, led by Acting Chief Justice Malla, split 3\u20132: the majority granted interim relief, while the dissent argued that ordinances retain legal force until Parliament decides otherwise (Shilapatra, May 11, 2026).<\/p>\n

In a parallel case, Justice Shrikant Paudel issued an interim order suspending the government\u2019s ban on student organizations, responding to a writ filed by ANNFSU President Deepak Dhami. The court held that the bans of March 26 and April 2 violated constitutionally guaranteed rights to association, directing that the University Coordination Committee\u2019s resolutions not be enforced pending review (Dulal, May 12, 2026).<\/p>\n

These interim orders highlight the judiciary\u2019s pivotal role in Nepal\u2019s democratic trajectory. They reveal tensions between executive reliance on ordinances, judicial protection of constitutional rights, and broader debates on governance, accountability, and legitimacy.<\/p>\n

The constitutional bench\u2019s division over trade union dissolution illustrates this dialectic. The majority\u2014Acting Chief Justice Malla, Justices Kumar Regmi, and Hari Phuyal\u2014emphasized constitutional guarantees of freedom of association (Article 17) and collective bargaining rights (Article 34(3)). They argued that the Civil Service Act, prior to amendment, explicitly safeguarded union representation and that the government\u2019s ordinance posed an immediate threat to fundamental rights. Their interim order thus underscored the judiciary\u2019s role as guardian of democratic freedoms (Hamropatro, May 12, 2026).<\/p>\n

Conversely, Justices Binod Sharma and Sharanga Subedi dissented, stressing procedural fidelity. They contended that ordinances under Article 114 carry the force of law until Parliament acts, and since Parliament had already convened, the petitioner faced no irreparable harm. For them, judicial restraint was necessary to avoid undermining constitutional processes. Their position reflects a deontological commitment to procedural legitimacy, contrasting with the majority\u2019s teleological emphasis on preventing rights violations.<\/p>\n

This division epitomizes Nepal\u2019s judicial dialectic: whether to prioritize substantive constitutional rights requiring immediate protection or to defer to procedural mechanisms that preserve institutional continuity. The majority\u2019s intervention situates the Court as an active defender of democratic freedoms, while the dissent underscores caution against judicial overreach. Together, these opinions illuminate the evolving contestation over judicial governance in Nepal, situating its constitutional trajectory within comparative South Asian debates on independence, accountability, and legitimacy.<\/p>\n

Historically, only a few judges supported merit\u2011based recommendations, while most favored seniority. This emphasis on hierarchical rank over qualifications reinforced institutional stability but marginalized meritocratic evaluation, raising concerns about judicial independence and transparency.<\/p>\n

When Acting Chief Justice Sapana Pradhan Malla was not recommended by the Constitutional Council on Law Day, she strongly opposed the decision of the two\u2011thirds majority government, framing it as a conflict between meritocracy and seniority. Her challenge underscored the importance of judicial independence and constitutional values. Yet her support, partly shaped by partisan alignments, has gradually weakened. At present, her principal allies are Justices Kumar Regmi and Hari Phuyal, ranked second and third in seniority, both positioned for future leadership as chief justice. This episode illustrates how Nepal\u2019s judiciary is negotiating the balance between tradition and reform, situating its struggle within broader debates on governance, independence, and legitimacy.<\/p>\n

Finally, it is important to note that judges designated as future chief justices are perceived differently by colleagues, government officials, and court staff, leading to persistent discrimination within the judiciary. These distinctions manifest in varying levels of cooperation and support extended to prospective Chief Justices compared to other judges, reflecting enduring institutional hierarchies.<\/p>\n

Critiques <\/strong><\/h2>\n

However, this public defense of judicial independence has drawn sharp criticism from political and legal commentators, who view such rhetoric through a lens of institutional skepticism. Critics invoke a pertinent vernacular adage: \u201cWhen ordered to sever the thief’s leg, the unidentified thief in the crowd reflexively retracts their own.\u201d In a similar vein, detractors argue that the current judicial leadership has overlooked its own historical trajectory, having previously ascended to the Supreme Court bench via the strategic machinations and quota allocations of the CPN (UML). Indeed, when the Constitutional Council executed these appointments a decade ago, it included individuals who were former members of Parliament directly representing partisan interests.<\/p>\n

It remains a matter of public record that these appointments were part of a long-term, calculated strategy designed to ensure that individuals aligned with the CPN (UML) and the Nepali Congress would sequentially occupy the office of chief justice until the year 2037. The widespread public and institutional backlash generated by the Constitutional Council’s decisions at that time remains fresh in the collective memory.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, analysts point out that if the current recommendation of Dr. Sharma were genuinely unconstitutional, the Nepal Bar Association would have launched a robust institutional resistance rather than merely issuing a routine press release. Aside from those visibly identified as political sycophants, virtually no credible voice has emerged to defend the outgoing judicial status quo. Consequently, recent public lamentations from the bench appear to stem not from a genuine defense of judicial sanctity, but rather from the disruption of entrenched, partisan networks.<\/p>\n

More critically, this institutional friction raises the question of whether such outbursts are fueled by a fear of legal reprisal and retroactive investigations into past collusive judgments and illicitly acquired assets. Ultimately, applying the psychological maxim that actors project their own structural flaws onto others, critics maintain that the broader public celebrates the appointment of the highly competent Dr. Sharma as a disruption of old networks.<\/p>\n

On May 10, 2026, constitutional expert Professor Bipin Adhikari\u00a0commented on the controversy surrounding Acting Chief Justice Malla’s recommendation, stating that the issue of seniority has sparked widespread discussion in\u00a0Nepalese media,\u00a0legal\u00a0circles, and civil society. This\u00a0debate is crucial for\u00a0the independence and\u00a0fairness\u00a0of the judiciary\u00a0and is likely to continue. However, Professor Adhikari advised that it would be\u00a0inappropriate for the acting chief justice to\u00a0personally\u00a0involve herself\u00a0in the\u00a0controversy.\u00a0Given her position as\u00a0the most senior jurist, she\u00a0should focus on discussing broader topics like\u00a0judicial independence, constitutional\u00a0norms, and the\u00a0court’s\u00a0institutional integrity. It would be wise for her to avoid making statements that could be seen as taking sides\u00a0in disputes\u00a0related to\u00a0her own seniority or recommendation.<\/p>\n

Corruption in Judiciary<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In response to growing concerns and public pressure regarding\u00a0corruption\u00a0within the judiciary, the Supreme Court of Nepal took a\u00a0significant\u00a0step in July 2020.\u00a0Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher Rana\u00a0established a high-level judicial committee\u00a0led by\u00a0former Chief Justice Hari Krishna Karki to investigate\u00a0complaints of corruption and irregularities within the courts. After a\u00a0thorough year-long investigation, the\u00a0committee submitted a\u00a0detailed\u00a0250-page report to\u00a0Chief Justice\u00a0Rana, who\u00a0publicly\u00a0committed to implementing the recommendations, acknowledging the corruption\u00a0within the institution (Ghimire, October 24, 2024).<\/p>\n

The committee’s mandate was to\u00a0investigate\u00a0potential\u00a0distortions, anomalies, irregularities, and\u00a0corruption\u00a0within the judiciary,\u00a0particularly related to\u00a0intermediaries, and propose measures to prevent\u00a0such issues. The\u00a0findings revealed systemic weaknesses rather than isolated incidents, with judges being\u00a0influenced by political parties, senior officials, and powerful individuals, compromising judicial independence and constitutional values.\u00a0The report highlighted how\u00a0personal connections, nepotism, and partisan\u00a0affiliations often influenced case adjudication, leading to unreliable\u00a0judicial decisions.<\/p>\n

Bribery and financial incentives further exacerbated these issues, eroding public trust in the judiciary. Internal dysfunction within the courts was also noted, with a lack of coordination between judges and staff\u00a0impacting administrative efficiency.\u00a0The report emphasized the crucial role\u00a0of the chief justice and the judicial council\u00a0in addressing deviations among judges. It also called for a review of\u00a0the chief justice’s role in the Constitutional Council\u00a0and\u00a0the effectiveness of the Constitutional Bench and\u00a0parliamentary hearings of judges (Mahara, July 30, 2021).<\/p>\n

Structural reforms were deemed\u00a0necessary,\u00a0starting from transparent judicial appointment processes to address distortions at the initial stage. The report recommended a transparent system for judicial\u00a0transfers\u00a0and disciplinary\u00a0actions to address frustrations\u00a0among court personnel. It also proposed implementing an automated cause list system to prevent corruption in bench formation and\u00a0case\u00a0assignment.<\/p>\n

Additionally, the report suggested establishing a separate mechanism involving the courts, the Bar, and investigative experts to\u00a0address issues of corruption and influence within the judiciary. It recommended maintaining\u00a0records of lawyers’\u00a0income to ensure accountability\u00a0and prevent additional payments for case allocation. Overall, the Karki report provided a comprehensive roadmap for reform for governance, addressing\u00a0constitutional, institutional, and procedural\u00a0aspects to combat corruption and restore public trust\u00a0in\u00a0the judiciary.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0assertion\u00a0that\u00a0“there is\u00a0collusion\u00a0in the courts and corruption\u00a0is prevalent” is not a new revelation. The committee led by Shrihari Aryal initially introduced the concept of intermediaries. It was identified that 29\u00a0different\u00a0types of intermediaries are operating within the judiciary. Subsequently, the committee\u00a0overseen\u00a0by Ram Prasad Shrestha also confirmed the existence of\u00a0corruption and\u00a0intermediaries\u00a0in the courts. The Bar Association’s report suggested that if the Chief Justice were honest, 60 percent of the judiciary’s\u00a0issues would be automatically resolved. Shrestha’s report\u00a0took it a step\u00a0further,\u00a0stating that\u00a0with an upright\u00a0chief justice, 80 percent of the problems\u00a0could be\u00a0resolved (Kantipur Reporter, July 30, 2021).<\/p>\n

As\u00a0reported by\u00a0Kantipur\u00a0on\u00a0July 30, 2021, the committee members were affiliated with various political parties,\u00a0illustrating\u00a0the politicization of judicial oversight.\u00a0However, the fundamental issue remains the need for integrity to be intrinsic. If the recommendations from\u00a0the Bar’s 2007 (2064 B.S.) report\u00a0had\u00a0been implemented, the judiciary would have\u00a0moved closer to\u00a0an ideal state of justice.\u00a0Unfortunately, the Supreme Court\u00a0did not adopt\u00a0these recommendations. The committee\u00a0led by Shrestha, which\u00a0included four Supreme Court justices and was\u00a0appointed by Chief Justice Anup Raj Sharma, produced a report that Sharma decided to make public on the last day of his tenure. Although the report was initially\u00a0approved\u00a0for\u00a0posting on the Court’s website\u00a0by spokesperson Shrikant Poudel, it mysteriously disappeared the next day. The incumbent\u00a0chief justice has\u00a0pledged to\u00a0release this report and others\u00a0prepared by Girish Chandra Lal, Anil Kumar Sinha, and\u00a0additional individuals, but in vain.<\/p>\n

It is widely\u00a0acknowledged by\u00a0Nepalis and even foreigners\u00a0with close ties\u00a0to Nepal that corruption is\u00a0rampant\u00a0in the judiciary. The\u00a0crucial\u00a0question\u00a0remains: who will\u00a0address this issue? There\u00a0is no independent body to\u00a0monitor\u00a0judicial assets,\u00a0and\u00a0successive chief justices\u00a0have not shown\u00a0the courage to investigate corruption. Efforts to\u00a0combat\u00a0corruption\u00a0are hindered by the fear that the chief justice\u00a0may\u00a0be implicated. When Dr. Sharma,\u00a0a candidate\u00a0for chief justice,\u00a0hinted at investigating corruption, it caused significant unrest\u00a0among judges and staff in the judiciary.<\/p>\n

Cost of Apportionment<\/strong><\/h2>\n

An academic and empirical analysis of these competing narratives demonstrates that the appointment of judicial officials through political machinations and quota\u2011sharing arrangements fundamentally undermines public trust in the judiciary. The case for a strict commitment to meritocratic principles\u2014as the only viable antidote to institutional decay\u2014can be articulated through five core dimensions:<\/p>\n