{"id":34681,"date":"2013-10-07T12:00:48","date_gmt":"2013-10-07T11:00:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=34681"},"modified":"2015-05-06T08:58:58","modified_gmt":"2015-05-06T07:58:58","slug":"criticism-of-the-6th-un-report-presented-by-the-commission-of-inquiry-on-syria","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2013\/10\/criticism-of-the-6th-un-report-presented-by-the-commission-of-inquiry-on-syria\/","title":{"rendered":"Criticism of the 6th UN Report Presented by the Commission of Inquiry on Syria"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Susan<\/a>25 September 2013<\/i><\/p>\n

An Independent Commission of Inquiry was set up by the United Nations in August 2011 to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law in Syria. Much of the mainstream media and political discourse on Syria is presumably being determined by COI reports on Syria.\u00a0 What follows is a critical analysis of the COI\u2019s 6th<\/sup> report<\/a>. That 6th<\/sup> report is dated 16 August 2013. (See the bottom of this paper for the report\u2019s Summary<\/i>.)<\/p>\n

Some of the main criticisms of this COI report can be summarized as follows<\/b>:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. No information is given about the interviewees. Those directly quoted in the report all present accusations against the \u2018government and pro-government armed forces\u2019. This indicates that the sample of interviewees did not include a broad range of Syrian people, and so raises questions about the methodology and bias of the research.<\/li>\n
  2. No information is presented about researchers or interviewers involved in supporting the four Commissioners, which means it is impossible to check if there were any conflicts of interest.<\/li>\n
  3. It is not known who or what bodies funded the work of the Commission.<\/li>\n
  4. The majority of the sweeping charges in the report do not include tentative language although it is presumed they are based on the assertions of interviewees.\u00a0 There are many more charges levelled against the \u2018government and pro-government forces\u2019 than there are against \u2018anti-government armed groups\u2019; however, these charges must be taken on trust as there are no references given to any \u2018evidence\u2019 except occasionally to the hearsay of interviewees who all present one side.<\/li>\n
  5. There are strong grounds for considering the report to be politically biased. Firstly, as stated above, all the interviewees quoted make allegations against the \u2018government and pro-government armed forces\u2019. No interviewee is quoted alleging that an \u2018anti-government armed group\u2019 committed a crime.\u00a0 Secondly, despite the strong presence in Syria of anti-government armed groups with links to al-Qaeda or to other listed terrorist organizations and despite the presence of hundreds of different anti-government armed groups (many with foreign Muhajideen<\/i><\/a> among them) who are not accountable to any legitimate authority, the report principally blames the \u2018government and pro-government armed forces\u2019 for \u2018spreading terror\u2019. In addition, it declines to blame \u2018anti-government armed groups\u2019 for car or suicide bomb attacks although these are clear acts of \u2018terror\u2019 which almost invariably take place in areas controlled by government forces. \u00a0Moreover, despite the fact that the Syrian government and the army are made up of people from all religious backgrounds and the majority of government ministers and army officers and soldiers are Sunni Muslims, and despite the support \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019 receive from scores of extremist clerics across the region (eg Sheik Adnan Arour<\/a> and Sheik Yusuf Qaradawi<\/a>) who have encouraged the targeting of minorities and the killing of civilians, in the body of the report it is the government and pro-government armed forces which are chiefly blamed for sewing \u2018sectarianism\u2019. It is as if there has been no cry for a \u2018holy war\u2019<\/a>. Finally, in its conclusion, the report implies support for the \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019 by making only one direct recommendation solely to the anti-government armed groups, namely, \u201cThe Commission recommends that the anti-government armed forces reject extremist elements\u201d (page 24, 202.). This is after the report has made three precise recommendations to the Syrian Government (page 24, 201.).\u00a0 It infers that all the crimes committed by \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019 can be blamed on \u2018extremist elements\u2019, and it also infers that there are \u2018moderate elements\u2019 which the Commissioners believe are not guilty of any crimes. (We are not told who these groups target and kill, who they are allied with or who funds them. We are left to conclude that whoever these forces are, they themselves are blameless. Yet, there is reason to believe that the lines between \u2018extremists\u2019 and \u2018moderates\u2019<\/a> are very blurred on the ground. For example, was the presence of the head of FSA forces in the Latakia countryside<\/a> in early August a sign he condoned the massacre of hundreds of Alawi villagers<\/a> which occurred in Latakia the week or so before his visit?)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The conclusions of this analysis could be summed up thus:<\/p>\n

    The fluid merging of facts with hearsay discredits the COI report.\u00a0 Its reliance on anonymous \u2018interviewees\u2019 whose allegiances and situations are not known discredits it. Its bias toward interviewees who support the \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019 discredits it.<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

    The analysis which follows is not a thorough examination of the COI UN Report.\u00a0 A detailed response to the report is beyond the resources of AMRIS. However, it is hoped that it encourages serious questioning of all reports presented to the Human Rights Commission by the Commission of Inquiry on Syria. <\/b><\/p>\n

    ANALYSIS OF THE UN REPORT: <\/b><\/p>\n

    Questions raised by the UN report\u2019s Summary<\/i>:<\/b><\/p>\n

    How is the Guilt Spread?<\/b><\/p>\n

    The Summary<\/i> at the beginning of the COI report gives the impression that \u2018government and pro-government forces\u2019 are guiltier of war crimes than the \u2018anti-government forces\u2019 and newspaper reports of it confirm this.<\/a><\/p>\n

    There are approximately 60 words in the second paragraph, which presents a summary of the (alleged?) crimes of \u2018government and pro-government forces\u2019. Repetition is used to boost the word number, so for example, \u2018murder, \u2018torture\u2019, and \u2018rape, are repeated in separate sentences.<\/p>\n

    In contrast, there are no repetitions in the third paragraph which focuses on the crimes of \u2018anti-government armed groups\u2019.\u00a0 It is much more succinct and has fewer than 30 words.<\/p>\n

    Interestingly, the next paragraph adds another war crime committed by the \u2018anti-government armed groups\u2019. They have \u2018recruited and used child soldiers in hostilities\u2019. \u00a0Despite its seriousness, this crime is not highlighted.\u00a0 It is presented in a separate short one-sentence paragraph along with the first mention of \u2018Kurdish armed groups\u2019, which serves as a distraction for the reader.\u00a0 In the body of the report, there is also minimal attention given this crime and no general condemnation of it by the Commission (101 – 110).\u00a0 Furthermore, the report lists it under, \u2018Violation of children\u2019s rights\u2019.\u00a0 In that section, the list of crimes allegedly committed by the \u2018government and pro-government armed forces\u2019 against children outweighs that allegedly committed by the \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019, meaning the recruiting of children for the war<\/a> can be easily passed over.<\/p>\n

    The \u2018government and pro-government forces\u2019 are accused of committing three crimes not listed as crimes committed by anti-government armed forces, namely enforced disappearance, rape and pillage<\/i>. This adds to their being perceived as the guiltiest in this conflict, but does it present the reality on the ground for the people of Syria?<\/p>\n

    On Enforced Disappearance:<\/b><\/p>\n

    According to the U.N. Human Rights Commission definition of \u2018enforced disappearance\u2019<\/a> only the State or \u201cpersons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State\u201d can commit the crime of \u2018enforced disappearance\u2019.\u00a0 This could explain why it is not listed as a crime of the \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019.\u00a0 However, the U.S. and many of its allies recognize the Syrian National Coalition<\/a>, an external body as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.\u00a0 \u00a0 In that case, can armed forces in Syria receiving funding or direction from the SNC commit the crime of \u2018enforced disappearance\u2019?\u00a0 Many people have been ‘kidnapped’ by anti-government armed forces since the beginning of the conflict.\u00a0 Many of these may have returned home; the bodies of others may have been delivered to the victims’ families, but others have effectively ‘disappeared’, and these include clergymen<\/a>, journalists<\/a> and others<\/a>. \u00a0 As the SNC is an external body with some powerful backers, accusations that it has been directly linked to and so responsible for any such \u2018disappearances\u2019\u00a0 are not likely to gain traction.<\/p>\n

    On Rape: <\/b><\/p>\n

    The fact that there are no allegations of rape made against the \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019, which include tens of thousands of foreign fighters, raises questions regarding the selection of interviewees\u00a0 Did any<\/i> of the people interviewed present claims against \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019?<\/p>\n

    An article on a pro-government website in April 2013 quotes \u2018eyewitnesses\u2019 who reported rapes of Christians committed by Jabhat al-Nusra fighters<\/a>.\u00a0 Should such accounts be given the same weight as the claims of those anonymous interviewees for this UN study?<\/p>\n

    The story of Mariam<\/a>, a young Christian girl raped by at least 15 insurgents in Qusair was published in Agenzia Fides on 2\/7\/2013.\u00a0 This demanded investigation.<\/p>\n

    Mariam was a 15-year-old Christian from Qusair, a city of the governorate in Homs\u2026 While her family was able to escape, Mariam was taken and forced into an Islamic marriage \u2026..The commander of the battalion \u201cJabhat al-Nusra\u201d in Qusair took Mariam, married and raped her. Then he repudiated her. The next day the young woman was forced to marry another Islamic militant. He also raped her and then repudiated her. The same trend was repeated for 15 days, and Mariam was raped by 15 different men. This psychologically destabilized her and made her insane. Mariam, became mentally unstable and was eventually killed.<\/i><\/p>\n

    In April 2013, a period covered by the UN investigation, there were reports of fatwas by extremist clerics condoning the rape<\/a> of women. \u00a0Early in 2013, Sheik Qaradawi, one of the most prominent clerics in the Middle East, condoned the killing of civilians who support the Syrian government<\/a>. There is evidence that extremist clerics who incite violence in Syria have no regard for the lives of people who do not support the anti-government armed forces.<\/p>\n

    If a regular army soldier commits rape, it is a crime, without a doubt.\u00a0 However, in Syria, there are thousands of fighters who support an extremist ideology. They include Takfiris<\/a>, Salafi jihadists<\/a> as well as mercenaries<\/a> from other war zones.\u00a0 How many of them would believe the rape of women who support the \u2018regime\u2019 is not in fact a \u2018crime\u2019? \u00a0Could this ideology colour the views of any interviewees when reporting on cases of rape?\u00a0 This is one \u2018challenge\u2019 the investigators did not list.<\/p>\n

    There have been reports of what is termed \u2018sexual jihad\u2019 in Syria<\/a>.\u00a0 This is when a woman makes herself available for \u2018marriage\u2019 to any number of jihadists. For those men and women involved, it would not be classified as rape, but if not rape, at best it is a serious exploitation of impressionable young women and it deserves the attention of UN investigators.\u00a0 In July, it was reported that women in Ain Tarma<\/a>, a Damascus suburb allegedly affected by the chemical weapons attack, had been involved in \u2018sexual jihad\u2019. A recent report in a Tunisian newspaper details the problems young Tunisian women have encountered after participating in \u2018sexual jihad\u2019; many return home pregnant and others have AIDS<\/a>. Their futures are very uncertain.<\/p>\n

    Russ Baker, an American investigative journalist, studied the allegations made in 2012 of mass rape<\/a> being committed by the government forces in Syria.\u00a0 He traces the sources of claims to Saudi Arabia and the US.\u00a0 Baker writes,<\/p>\n

    One of the early and leading claimants for mass rape in Syria is Sen. Joseph Lieberman, a member of the Armed Services Committee and a strong supporter of US military interventions in Iraq and Libya. He, along with his friend John McCain, has been in the forefront of\u00a0pushing for US military participation<\/a>\u00a0in support of the uprising against Assad.<\/p>\n

    By his own account, though, he is often skeptical of the value of inquiries. He by statement or action\u00a0backed away from inquiries<\/a>\u00a0into Hurricane Katrina malfeasance and\u00a0refused to investigate<\/a>\u00a0the murders of civilians by Blackwater in Iraq.<\/p>\n

    And as Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Lieberman declared<\/a>: \u201cWe like to do legislation,\u201d Lieberman said. \u201cWe don\u2019t like investigating \u2026 just to see who is at fault.\u201d<\/p>\n

    Far fewer people who are reading the headlines about Assad being behind mass rapes are likely to read this caveat<\/a> on the Women Under Siege site:<\/p>\n

    The thing is, rape is nearly impossible to confirm. \u2026<\/i><\/p>\n

    [Snip]<\/i><\/p>\n

    When documenting rape, as in anything, you have to evaluate your source: Is this coming directly from the woman who was violated? From her cousin? Her cousin\u2019s friend? In the case of Syria, many stories are coming from that cousin\u2019s friend. Or from the cousin\u2019s friend who \u201cheard about\u201d a friend of his brother\u2019s sister\u2026etc. Right now, Syria is a convoluted black hole of second- and third-hand reporting<\/strong> that few conflict zones can rival in recent history.<\/i><\/p>\n

    On Pillage and Looting:<\/b><\/p>\n

    Regarding pillage, in December 2012, an article in The Guardian reported on the looting of the \u2018rebels\u2019<\/a>.<\/p>\n

    Looting has become a way of life.<\/i><\/p>\n

    “Spoils” have now become the main drive for many units as battalion commanders seek to increase their power.<\/i><\/p>\n

    The fact that there are no reports of the looting and pillage committed by anti-government armed forces again suggests the interviewees were supporters of these forces.\u00a0 As in Iraq, artefacts are being looted<\/a> in Syria. There is no reason to assume the looting stopped during this UN inquiry.<\/p>\n

    On Car Bombs and Terror: <\/b><\/p>\n

    In the Report\u2019s Summary<\/i>, there is no reference to car bombs and the terror they spread; it is as if they weren\u2019t occurring in Syria and so no one has to be held responsible for them. However, they are mentioned in the body of the report (114) and are placed neatly under a section headed \u201cUndetermined perpetrators\u201d.\u00a0 In the past,\u00a0\u00a0 Jabhat al-Nusra reportedly claimed responsibility for the majority of suicide attacks and car bombs, <\/a>However, according to the Blog of the Long War Journal<\/a>, they now choose not to claim responsibility.<\/p>\n

    At the end of April 2013, a car bomb targeted the Prime Minister, and at least one media report blames \u2018rebels\u2019<\/a> for it. \u00a0Five passers-by were killed. The next day there was another bomb attack in Damascus and 13 people were killed. Again, there was the suggestion in media reports that \u2018rebels\u2019 (or \u2018terrorists\u2019?) \u00a0were responsible<\/a>, but U.N. investigators appear to want to avoid adding another crime to the list of crimes committed by the \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019.\u00a0 If the target of the 11 June attack mentioned in the report<\/a> was a police station, isn\u2019t that sufficient evidence that \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019 were responsible for it? \u00a0It occurred in central Damascus and killed 14 people.<\/p>\n

    In regard to terror<\/b>, there is little to no suggestion that the \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019 use terror as a tactic of war. This is despite the fact that Jabhat al-Nusra has been designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. and its being one of the strongest fighting forces on the ground in Syria. Also despite it being well-known there are al-Qaeda affiliated groups operating in Syria<\/a>.\u00a0 Nevertheless, the COI report accuses the \u2018government and pro-government forces\u2019 of \u2018sewing terror among the civilian population\u2019 (67) and of spreading \u2018terror within society\u2019 (74) and no such accusations are levelled against anti-government armed forces.<\/p>\n

    Even when there is reference to the killing of a Catholic priest (46) the \u2018t\u2019 word is not used.\u00a0 There have been quite a number of priests and imams tortured and killed<\/a> since the beginning of the crisis, many of them involved in the work of mussalaha<\/i> (reconciliation).\u00a0 Two bishops from Aleppo were kidnapped on 22 April 2013 and their fate is still unknown, yet there is no reference to their kidnapping in the UN report.\u00a0 This writer was informed while on a visit to Beirut and Damascus in May 2013 that there was great pain being felt across the Christian and wider community. The kidnapping of two highly regarded bishops was a sign that anyone could be targeted by the anti-government armed fighters. No one was safe.\u00a0\u00a0 This is surely the aim of terrorists?<\/p>\n

    Who were the interviewees?<\/b><\/p>\n

    The findings of the COI report are \u201cbased on 258 interviews<\/b> and other collected evidence\u201d; however, the COI report provides no information about the interviewees. (It is not even clear if there were 258 interviewees<\/i> or simply 258 separate interviews.) There is no assurance that the UN investigators interviewed a cross-section of the Syrian population. Indeed, after a cursory study of the report, it is fair to conclude that the investigators may have only interviewed supporters and\/or members of the various armed groups fighting the government.<\/p>\n

    There is some but not a lot of evidence of personal testimonies presented by interviewees accusing the government and \u2018pro-government forces\u2019 of crimes. For example, in the section detailing \u2018enforced disappearance\u2019, there is reference to \u2018one interviewee\u2019 who related the story of his brother being arrested (70).\u00a0 Also, there is reference to a \u2018defector\u2019 who \u2018cited\u2019 orders he had received when working for the Air Force Intelligence (71).\u00a0 However, there is no direct claim from an \u2018interviewee\u2019 against \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019.\u00a0 There is reference to torture being committed by the \u2018anti-government armed groups\u2019, but the information is not presented by an interviewee<\/i>. For example, the incident of torture which occurred on July 19 when \u2018the Saddam Hussein Battalion beat and tortured a man using the dulah<\/i> method\u2019 (92) is not a quote from an interviewee, but rather something which is in the public arena and can be sourced easily from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights<\/a>, itself an anti-government webpage.<\/p>\n

    We do not know whether the interviewees are innocent bystanders or active players in the armed struggle. If they support the militarized opposition and\/or the overthrow of the secular state and the setting up of a caliphate in Damascus, what truths would they avoid telling?\u00a0 Would they lie for a cause?\u00a0 Or could fear perhaps motivate them to lie?<\/p>\n

    The fluid merging of facts with hearsay in the report discredits it.\u00a0 Its reliance on anonymous \u2018interviewees\u2019 whose allegiances and situations are not known discredits it. Its bias toward interviewees who support the \u2018anti-government armed forces\u2019 discredits it.<\/p>\n

    (The difficulty of establishing the truth in Syria must not lead to unprofessional short-cuts, particularly when millions of lives depend on the truth. \u00a08 years after Rafic Hariri\u2019s assassination, an international tribunal has yet to establish who was responsible for his death.)<\/p>\n

    There is an example online of a good survey report<\/a> commissioned by the UN and dated 2002. \u00a0It has a check list, whose questions include: \u2018Is the sample size large enough for appropriate precision?\u2019 \u2018Was the sample representative of the target population, i.e., nobody was left out in the sampling approach?\u2019 \u2018Has the survey questionnaire been provided in the report?\u2019 \u2018Are conclusions realistic (e.g., a solid interpretation of what the data can provide and what it can\u2019t)?\u2019\u00a0 Survey team members are listed, as are the people who funded the report.\u00a0 There are sections in this \u2018good survey report\u2019 model titled, \u201cEthics and Informed Consent\u201d; \u201cImplementation Schedule\u201d; and \u201cLogistics\u201d (see page 17).\u00a0 It is noted that under \u201cEthics and Informed Consent\u201d, people are assured that \u2018if you decide not to participate in the survey, nothing bad will happen\u2019 (page 42).\u00a0 All of these sections could be deemed relevant to a report on Syria, yet they are not presented.<\/p>\n

    If the COI report on Syria does not meet \u2018international standards\u2019 expected of U.N. reports, what damage can it cause and who will accept responsibility for that?<\/p>\n

    Knowing the answers to some if not all of the following questions could reassure readers of the objectivity and professionalism of the report:<\/p>\n