The third round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and P5+1 is well under way in Geneva.\u00a0 Both proponents of peace, and of war, are looking to the outcome of these negotiations with abated breath.\u00a0\u00a0 Hope and fear abound, an understanding of the demands and expectations is a good indicator of the direction these talks are likely to take.<\/p>\n
Moreover,\u00a0 the key to the potential of these talks is to review why Iran\u2019s nuclear program is the subject of these negotiations in the first place.<\/p>\n
The Road to Sanctions \u2013 and Talks<\/i><\/strong><\/p>\n At the onset of the 1979 revolution, Iran abandoned its nuclear power program.\u00a0 However, the considerable damage to Iran\u2019s infrastructure during the Iran-Iraq war, and the demand by the growing population prompted the Iranian government to revisit and resume its quest for nuclear power.\u00a0 It announced these intentions in 1982.\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0Thereon, the United States made every attempt to stop Iran \u2013 unsuccessfully (see details HERE<\/a>).<\/p>\n In 2002, Israel provided the means to place further obstacles in Iran\u2019s path.\u00a0 It provided the MEK terrorist group a report indicating Iran had undertaken clandestine activities[i]<\/a>.\u00a0 Iran came under scrutiny for building nuclear sites\u00a0 (which it was entitled to as an NPT member).\u00a0 In 2003, as an act of goodwill, Iran voluntary suspended its enrichment program for two years and allowed intrusive inspections in order to alleviate concerns over its peaceful nuclear program (The Iran-EU Agreement<\/a>).<\/p>\n To understand what pursued, it is imperative to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) <\/a>\u00a0to which Iran is a signatory.\u00a0 The main pillars of the NPT are non-proliferation (Articles I & II), disarmament (Article VI), and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Articles III and IV). \u00a0\u00a0While Article IV reiterates the “inalienable right” of member states to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes, Article III demands that non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty \u201cundertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.\u201d\u00a0 Iran concluded such and agreement with the IAEA.<\/p>\n There is consensus that Iran has not proliferated. In other words, it has not weaponized or helped another state weaponize, nor has it received or delivered weapons material from or to another state.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 This much is indisputable.\u00a0 Furthermore, in 2005, the IAEA reported that all declared fissile material in Iran had been accounted for, and none had been diverted<\/a>.<\/p>\n Yet, contrary to its findings, and in direct conflict with the safeguard agreement it had concluded with Iran, specifically Article 19<\/a> (the Agency may refer Iran to the UN Security Council if it is \u201cunable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices\u201d), the IAEA reported that Iran \u201chad violated Tehran\u2019s IAEA safeguards agreement.\u201d<\/a><\/p>\n What led to this decision was a push by the United States<\/a>.\u00a0 This was made possible due to the fact that there is no definition of non-compliance. \u00a0As the prominent Arms Control Association<\/i> opines: \u201cSurprisingly, although the IAEA Board of Governors has determined on five occasions that a state was in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement-Iraq (1991), Romania (1992), North Korea (1993), Libya (2004), and Iran (2006)-there remains no established definition of noncompliance.<\/a>\u201d<\/p>\n Noteworthy that the United States contributes about 25% of the total IAEA Technical Cooperation budget.<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 The lack of definition allowed flexibility to enforce a political motivation.\u00a0\u00a0 America\u2019s ability to impose its will was not limited to the IAEA.\u00a0 As former Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation and International Security at the U.S. State Department, Stephen G. Rademaker confirmed: \u00a0“The best illustration of this is the two votes India cast against Iran at the IAEA<\/a>. I am the first person to admit that the votes were coerced.”<\/p>\n Iran\u2019s nuclear dossier was sent to the United Nations Security Council.\u00a0 \u00a0Politics and America\u2019s might prevailed at the expense of international treaties \u2013 and Iran. \u00a0\u00a0Sanctions — war by other means, were imposed on Iran.\u00a0 Numerous round of negotiations have only brought harsher sanctions \u2013 and progress in Iran\u2019s civilian program.<\/p>\n Current Demands<\/strong> <\/i><\/p>\n According to Western sources, there have been three demands placed on Iran<\/a>: 1) limiting the 3.5% enriched uranium, 2) suspension of 20% enriched uranium, 3) halting the construction of the Arak heavy water plant.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 It has also been reported that Iran is required to ratify the Additional Protocol.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Given that the talks hang on these issues, they must be explored.<\/p>\n Limitations on 3.5% enriched uranium<\/i> –\u00a0 Uranium enriched below 5% is strictly used for fuel. \u00a0\u00a0There are several reasons why Iran has \u2018drawn a red line\u2019 on its right to enrich uranium:<\/p>\n Bulletin 26<\/a> \u2013 Dual Use: Avoiding The Nuclear Precipice <\/i>of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation \u00a0(INESAP) confirms that Iran\u2019s share in the French uranium enrichment plant —Eurodif<\/a> , and France\u2019s refusal to supply Iran with [its own] enriched uranium for use in its power plants, which according to them, justifies Iran\u2019s desire to exercise her inalienable right under Article IV of the NPT to enrich uranium indigenously versus importing from any other country.<\/p>\n As important, if not of more concern to the Tehran, is the undeniable fact that prior to the Iranian revolution the United States had signed National Security Decision Memorandums \u00a0(NSDM) that demanded of Iran to be a hub for enriching and distributing uranium to profit the United States (see full article HERE<\/a>).<\/p>\n Furthermore, given the rising demand and cost<\/a> of uranium, Iran is being asked not to enrich its indigenous uranium, and instead be exploited in the same manner that Africans have been exploited with regard to their resources.\u00a0 As\u00a0 explained by Halifa Sallah: \u201cSo they getting the raw materials from Africa at very cheap prices and they were processing and selling it back to us at more expensive prices<\/a>.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 In the same vein, Iran is being asked to import its fuel needs at a higher cost to benefit the potential providers.<\/p>\n Suspension of 20% Enrichment<\/i> – \u00a020% enriched uranium is used to produce medical isotopes.\u00a0 \u00a0In a 1999 report by the Department of Energy<\/a> two important issues stand out — a coming shortage in medical isotopes, and a promise of new treatments such as ‘ isotopes for cancer therapy and pain control’.<\/p>\n There are simply not enough medical isotopes to meet demand.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 It is important to note that Iran uses LEU (low enriched uranium) of under 20% to produce medical isotopes.\u00a0 In sharp contrast, the United States supplies weapon-grade uranium (HEU, 90-percent 235U) to the Canadian radioisotope producers.\u00a0 Not only are there inherent dangers (and legal hurdles) in transporting weapons grade material, but also the conversion of HEU to LEU is a feat in itself.<\/p>\n Demanding a stop to the production of medical isotopes in the face of growing demand and shortage reflects the callous nature of the demands being placed on Tehran.<\/p>\n The Arak Heavy Water Plant<\/i> – The media, egged on by Western countries, has been quick to refer to Arak heavy water plant as a \u2018plutonium plant for making bombs\u2019. \u00a0\u00a0This is patently false.<\/p>\n Any reactor fueled by uranium can be used to produce Plutonium, including light water reactors. According to World Nuclear Association<\/a> \u201cPlutonium, both that routinely made in power reactors and that from dismantled nuclear weapons, is a valuable energy source when integrated into the nuclear fuel cycle.\u201d \u00a0Reactor grade plutonium is a by-product of typical used fuel from a nuclear reactor. Weapons grade plutonium is recovered from uranium fuel that has been irradiated 2-3 months in a plutonium production reactor.\u00a0 <\/i><\/p>\n It is worth mentioning here that Japan, a close American ally, has more plutonium than any other non-weapons state, with enough plutonium stored in Japan to build 1,000 weapons<\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0 In fact, the United States circumvented laws<\/a> to provide Japan with plutonium.<\/p>\n Arak is a heavy water reactor (HWR) of the type highly recommended by the IAEA.\u00a0 A 2002 IAEA publication<\/a> encouraged the use of heavy water reactors stating: \u201cHWR technology offers fuel flexibility, low operating costs and a high level of safety, and therefore represents an important option for countries considering nuclear power programmes. \u201c\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Contrary to NPT commitments, the Treaty is being used as a political tool \u2018doling out\u2019 assistance to chosen allies, while depriving others.<\/p>\n Geneva 3<\/i><\/strong><\/p>\n The current negotiations are said to be a \u2018beginning\u2019 in which Iran has to meet the above demands in exchange for \u2018some easing of sanctions\u2019, and with \u2018all options on the table\u2019.\u00a0\u00a0 This cowboy diplomacy has been in the making for years.<\/p>\n In 2007, while still a junior senator, Barack Obama had \u201ccrippling sanctions\u201d in mind for the Iranian people when he introduced S. 1430 in 2007<\/a>. \u00a0\u00a0His commitment caught the attention of AIPAC’s president and a major donor to his campaign: Lee Rosenberg.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 In 2008, during his presidential run, he addressed AIPAC:<\/p>\n