{"id":38689,"date":"2014-01-20T13:02:44","date_gmt":"2014-01-20T13:02:44","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=38689"},"modified":"2015-05-05T22:20:04","modified_gmt":"2015-05-05T21:20:04","slug":"nafta-at-20-a-model-for-corporate-rule","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2014\/01\/nafta-at-20-a-model-for-corporate-rule\/","title":{"rendered":"NAFTA at 20: A Model for Corporate Rule"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><i>NAFTA gave multinational corporations the right to sue governments to block regulations they don&#8217;t like, undermining democracy and local sovereignty.<\/i><\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_38690\" style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/01\/nafta-chapter-11.jpg\" ><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-38690\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-38690\" alt=\"NAFTA and treaties like it grant transnational companies total freedom of movement for capital, goods, and services, coupled with the ability to sue countries in secret courts when governments attempt to get in their way. (Image: Hern\u00e1n Garc\u00eda Crespo \/ Flickr)\" src=\"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/01\/nafta-chapter-11-300x198.jpg\" width=\"300\" height=\"198\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/01\/nafta-chapter-11-300x198.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/01\/nafta-chapter-11.jpg 700w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-38690\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">NAFTA and treaties like it grant transnational companies total freedom of movement for capital, goods, and services, coupled with the ability to sue countries in secret courts when governments attempt to get in their way. (Image: Hern\u00e1n Garc\u00eda Crespo \/ Flickr)<\/p><\/div>\n<p><i>Foreign Policy In Focus is partnering with Mexico\u2019s\u00a0<\/i><a href=\"http:\/\/www.jornada.unam.mx\/2013\/11\/16\/delcampo.html\" title=\"La Jornada del campo\"  target=\"_blank\">La Jornada del Campo<\/a><i>\u00a0magazine, where an earlier version of this commentary appeared, to publish a series of pieces examining the impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 20 years since its implementation. This is the third in the series.<\/i><\/p>\n<p>Twenty years since the notorious North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect, much has been written about its harsh impacts on <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/fpif.org\/nafta-20-state-north-american-worker\/\" title=\"workers\" >workers<\/a> and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/fpif.org\/nafta-20-state-north-american-farmer\/\" title=\"farmers\" >farmers<\/a> across Mexico, the United States, and Canada. But NAFTA also rewrote the rules of international investment \u2014 and that may turn out to be its most insidious legacy of all.<\/p>\n<p>NAFTA\u2019s investment rules were ostensibly about ensuring that investors in the United States and Canada had a means to address conflicts with the government of Mexico, since the pact\u2019s authors argued that the Mexican legal system was poor and corrupt.<\/p>\n<p>But after a series of NAFTA lawsuits against both Mexico and Canada, it is apparent that the agreement\u2019s investment dispute resolution process \u2014 a version of which has been included in thousands of subsequent international trade and investment treaties \u2014 is a powerful tool corporations can and will use to blackmail states out of implementing more socially and environmentally responsible policies.<\/p>\n<p><b>Changing the Rules<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Chapter 11 of NAFTA not only deregulated the movement of capital and facilitated the relocation of production across borders; it also included a powerful investor-to-state dispute settlement system (ISDS) that let multinational corporations directly enforce their ample protections under the agreement. These protections include so-called minimum standards of treatment and a prohibition on \u201cindirect\u201d expropriation of existing or future investments.<\/p>\n<p>ISDS cases consist of claims by North American investors from one country against a decision, policy, law, or regulation in any other that the investor believes to have violated NAFTA investment protections. Effectively, this dispute settlement process has allowed companies or investors to force democratically elected governments to account for public policy decisions before investment arbitration panels like the one at the World Bank\u2019s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).<\/p>\n<p>For example, if a government implements a labor or environmental regulation that a multinational corporation doesn\u2019t like, even if the regulation is legal and applied to all companies equally, that corporation can nonetheless sue for damages at the World Bank.<\/p>\n<p>Canada and Mexico have so far been the biggest losers in this scheme. The U.S. government has faced several Chapter 11 lawsuits but has not lost a case. But all three countries have had to pay huge sums in legal costs, or in fees paid to arbitration courts. In all cases, the losers are ordinary citizens, because the money to placate corporations and pay these expenses comes from the public purse. And forever more, policymakers will have to think twice about passing any law to protect the public from corporate excesses.<\/p>\n<p>Mexico has lost at least five disputes under Chapter 11, totaling more than $200 million in penalties, and many more cases may result from the privatization of mining concessions in the country. According to the Mexican Ministry of Economy, today there are 857 mining projects planned or in operation \u2014 of which two thirds are destructive gold and silver operations, which can badly pollute soil and drinking water. Any future legislation to halt or curb any of these projects could incur a claim under NAFTA rules, since the great majority of foreign mining companies in Mexico are of U.S. or Canadian origin.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, as the Institute for Policy Studies noted in the report \u201c<a href=\"http:\/\/www.ips-dc.org\/reports\/mining_for_profits_update2013\" title=\"Mining for Profits in International Tribunals\"  target=\"_blank\">Mining for Profits in International Tribunals<\/a>,\u201d extractive industries are increasingly using investment protection rules under free trade or bilateral investment agreements to sue governments when public resistance, environmental assessments, or legal decisions interfere with destructive mega-projects. More than half of these ISDS cases, under NAFTA and other agreements, have been filed against Latin American countries. (Mexico itself has so far avoided this fate, since its government is notoriously permissive about issuing operating permits to extractive industries, but the rules don\u2019t make finding the political will to resist them any likelier.)<\/p>\n<p>The government of Canada, meanwhile, has lost or settled five NAFTA Chapter 11 cases, totaling over $157 million in compensation paid to foreign companies. Billions of dollars remain in dispute.<\/p>\n<p>Two recent cases are instructive. In the first, Lone Pine Resources is asking for $250 million to compensate investors for Quebec\u2019s publicly supported partial moratorium on fracking for natural gas under the St. Lawrence River. In the second, Eli Lilly is demanding $500 million for twice failing Canada\u2019s more stringent test for proving a patent\u2019s utility, resulting in the company losing patents (albeit at the end of their lifespans) for blockbuster anti-depression drugs. The Eli Lilly case is a direct attack on the independence of Canadian courts, and the Lone Pine Resource case wages war on the ability of Canadians to protect their environment.<\/p>\n<p><b>A Global Export\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Chapter 11 has served as a model for more than <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iisd.org\/investment\/law\/treaties.aspx\" title=\"3,000 bilateral investment\"  target=\"_blank\">3,000 bilateral investment<\/a> treaties existing today. Many of them are contained under other free trade agreements, and the number of investor-state cases is soaring rapidly. There are today at least 500 pending corporate lawsuits against government decisions, and corporations are continually discovering how to use the ISDS to extract huge sums from public treasuries without even having to make tangible investments.<\/p>\n<p>The \u201cchilling effect\u201d that these rules put on governments is now undeniable. The mere threat of an investment lawsuit can be enough to discourage new public interest legislation that could interfere with a corporation\u2019s expected profits.<\/p>\n<p>The effect on development is also pronounced, forcing local governments to give \u201cnational treatment\u201d to multinational companies when they might prefer to support local small- and medium-sized businesses. Supporters will call this \u201cleveling the playing field,\u201d but the reality is that NAFTA has created an extremely imbalanced set of rules that favor multinational investors but ask nothing of them in return. Requirements, for example, that a multinational company in a certain jurisdiction agree to operate for a certain period of time, or source a portion of its inputs locally, have been prohibited as illegal \u201cperformance requirements\u201d by NAFTA. Chapter 11 therefore created a set of rights, but no responsibilities, for foreign investors and corporations.<\/p>\n<p>In many ways, NAFTA is more of a corporate power grab than a trade agreement, and nowhere is this more obvious than in its investment chapter. NAFTA and treaties like it grant transnational companies total freedom of movement for capital, goods, and services, coupled with the ability to sue countries in secret courts when governments attempt to get in their way.<\/p>\n<p>The failure of this monolithic model is obscured by the boosterism of all three NAFTA governments, but this failure is increasingly apparent to the growing number of people who are challenging the expansion of corporate trade rules through transpacific and transatlantic free trade and investment agreements. The outcome of this new fight is uncertain. With courage and perseverance, we may one day be able to roll back the NAFTA legacy and introduce new ways of trading and investing that make the health and wellbeing of people and our planet their primary objectives.<\/p>\n<p>Until then, we\u2019re stuck with a model that puts corporations first and gives secret courts the last word.<\/p>\n<p>_________________________<\/p>\n<p><i>Manuel\u00a0P\u00e9rez Rocha is a Mexican national and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C.\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n<p><i>Stuart Trew is the trade campaigner for the Council of Canadians. They are both contributors to\u00a0Foreign Policy In Focus.<\/i><\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/fpif.org\/nafta-20-model-corporate-rule\/\" >Go to Original \u2013 fpif.org<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>NAFTA and treaties like it grant transnational companies total freedom of movement for capital, goods, and services, coupled with the ability to sue countries in secret courts when governments attempt to get in their way.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[169],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-38689","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-trade"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38689","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=38689"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38689\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=38689"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=38689"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=38689"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}