{"id":49647,"date":"2014-11-10T12:00:48","date_gmt":"2014-11-10T12:00:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=49647"},"modified":"2015-05-05T21:29:32","modified_gmt":"2015-05-05T20:29:32","slug":"western-nuclear-terrorism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2014\/11\/western-nuclear-terrorism\/","title":{"rendered":"Western Nuclear Terrorism"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"armas-nucleares-4.jpg_1718483346<\/a><\/p>\n

The use of nuclear coercion by the US and its allies has long roots, going right back to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.<\/em><\/p>\n

The concept of \u201cterrorism\u201d is restricted, in Western academic and media discussion, to the threat or use of political violence by opponents of the current Western-dominated world order. Similarly, the concept of \u201cnuclear terrorism\u201d is restricted to the threat or use of nuclear weapons by opponents of the current Western-dominated world order.<\/p>\n

The main threat of nuclear terrorism comes from Pakistan, according to the dominant discourse, where the military and intelligence establishment has close ties with al-Qa\u201deda-type terror groups, there is a sustained terrorist campaign against the state (including\u00a0at least one attack on a base reputed to hold nuclear weapons<\/a>), and the state possesses nuclear weapons. There are indeed major risks in Pakistan, as we know of two independent nuclear proliferation networks that came out of the Pakistani nuclear establishment, run by two of the founding figures in the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme:\u00a0AQ Khan<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But if we use the official definitions of terrorism, we find that \u201cnuclear terrorism\u201d is not confined to theoretical future acts of barbarism by al-Qa\u201deda-type groups operating out of South Asia. It has an actually-existing history that takes in much of the world. Nuclear terrorism is not merely something that has happened in the past, it is the core of nuclear policy and doctrine for several nuclear weapon states, including the US and Britain.<\/p>\n

In Britain, the Terrorism Act (2000)\u00a0defines<\/a>\u00a0terrorism as the \u201cuse or threat of action\u201d to influence government or intimidate the public, with the aim of advancing \u201ca political, religious, racial or ideological cause,\u201d involving \u201cserious violence against a person,\u201d serious damage to a property, \u201ca serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or \u201cserious interference with or disruption to an electronic system.\u201d<\/p>\n

In the U.S., the U.S. Code\u00a0defines<\/a>\u00a0\u201dinternational terrorism\u201d as activities which involve illegal \u201cviolent acts or acts dangerous to human life\u201d, which occur outside the U.S. or transcend national boundaries, and which appear to be intended \u201c(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.\u201d<\/p>\n

If we take these definitions seriously, then we find that, to take just one example, Iraq has repeatedly been subjected to nuclear terrorism by Britain and the United States. There are three main cases: 1961, 1991 and 2003.<\/p>\n

In 1961, Britain was scaling down its military presence in the Persian Gulf, and releasing its hold on Kuwait, allowing it to become an independent state. However, British planners decided to accompany this withdrawal with a thumping message of intimidation. Britain claimed Iraq was poised to invade Kuwait, and sent in 6,500 British troops. According to an official history of the British strategic nuclear air force, the British government also \u201cplaced V-bombers at readiness in Malta. (Andrew Brookes,\u00a0The History of Britains Airborne Deterrent: Force V<\/em>, 1982, p 141) According to another account, a British aircraft carrier bearing a squadron of nuclear-capable Scimitar aircraft was also deployed to the Gulf. (Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander,\u00a0Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam\u2019s War<\/em>, 1991, p 33)<\/p>\n

British intelligence insider Anthony Verrier, once described as\u00a0\u201cthe writer closest to MI6 thinking\u201d<\/a>, later described the incident as an \u201cact of deterrence, in which the nuclear weapons system played a central, concealed role… directed against Nasser and, by extension, Russian ambitions in Arabia.\u201d (Verrier,\u00a0Through the Looking Glass<\/em>, 1983, p 171) The nuclear threat may have indirectly been aimed at the president of Egypt and the forces of Arab nationalism generally (decoding the phrase \u201cRussian ambitions\u201d), but it occurred in a confrontation with Iraq. This is a clear case of attempting \u201cto influence the policy of a government by nuclear intimidation or coercion.\u201d<\/p>\n

Incidentally, the senior RAF officer in the Middle East admitted that the Iraqi threat had been concocted. Sir David Lee, former Air Officer Commanding (Middle East), later wrote: \u201cHMG [Her Majesty\u2019s Government] did not contemplate aggression by Iraq very seriously.\u201d (Cited in Verrier, p 171)<\/p>\n

Turning to the second case, in 1991, the U.S. and British governments were determined to punish Iraq militarily for having disobeyed orders by invading Kuwait in\u00a0August 1990. They\u00a0refused to allow any diplomatic solution to the crisis<\/a>, and proceeded to launch a one-sided onslaught that indeed involved serious violence against a person; serious damage to a property; a serious risk to the health and safety of the Iraqi public; and serious interference with and disruption to several critical electronic systems.<\/p>\n

The one factor that gave the U.S.-U.K. invaders pause was their fear that Iraq might use chemical weapons to even up the military odds (Iraq had the most experienced army in the world at that point, in terms of using chemical weapons on the battlefield \u2013 weapons\u00a0built<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0used<\/a>\u00a0with US knowledge and support). Washington and London decided to deter Iraqi use of chemical weapons with nuclear threats; in other words, to threaten \u201cviolent acts transcending national boundaries intending to affect the conduct of a government by (threats of) mass destruction.\u201d<\/p>\n

On\u00a030 September 1990, the London\u00a0Observer<\/em>\u00a0had\u00a0reported<\/a>\u00a0on its front page the warning of a senior British officer that Iraqi chemical attacks would be met \u201cwith battlefield nuclear forces\u201d. On\u00a015 January 1991, the British Prime Minister, John Major, was asked in the House of Commons whether he would reserve the option to use nuclear weapons in response to an Iraqi chemical or biological attack. He\u00a0replied<\/a>: \u201cWe have made it very clear to the Iraqis that we would take a very serious view indeed of the use of any chemical or biological weapons, but I must say to my hon. Friend that we have a wide range of weapons and resources at our hands and I do not envisage needing to use the sanction that he suggests.\u201d This was not ruling out the nuclear option, merely \u201cenvisaging\u201d it to be unnecessary. Two weeks later, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd declared that a chemical attack on British forces in the Gulf would lead to a \u201cmassive response\u201d. The London\u00a0Guardian<\/em>\u00a0noted on\u00a04 February 1991\u00a0that this was \u201clanguage the US and Britain employ to leave open the option of using chemical or nuclear weapons.\u201d<\/p>\n

The US government made a number of similar nuclear threats, the most famous of which was the ultimatum from US President George H.W. Bush, handed by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to his Iraqi counterpart, Tariq Aziz, on\u00a09 January 1991\u00a0in Geneva. According to the\u00a0official U.S. version of the text<\/a>, Bush wrote that in the event of Iraqi chemical or biological attacks, \u201cThe American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable actions of this sort.\u201d Baker\u00a0wrote<\/a>\u00a0in his memoirs that he \u201cpurposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological weapons by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation.\u201d<\/p>\n

Once again, we see an attempt (successful, in this case) to \u201cinfluence the policy of a government by nuclear intimidation or coercion.\u201d<\/p>\n

In the run-up to the 2003 attack, there was another stream of nuclear threats issued against Iraq, including, in\u00a0December 2002, the\u00a0release<\/a>\u00a0by the White House of a document codifying the Baker threat as policy, accompanied by officials explicitly recalling the Baker precedent.<\/p>\n

In Britain, the Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon was even more explicit, telling the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, on\u00a020 March 2002, that states like Iraq \u201ccan be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons.\u201d Four days later, Hoon appeared on ITV\u2019s Jonathan Dimbleby show and\u00a0insisted<\/a>\u00a0that the government \u201creserved the right\u201d to use nuclear weapons if Britain or British troops were threatened by chemical or biological weapons. When asked about these nuclear threats in a House of Commons debate on\u00a029 April 2002, Hoon\u00a0said<\/a>: \u201cultimately, and in conditions of extreme self-defence, nuclear weapons would have to be used.\u201d He refused to clarify what the \u201ccertain specified conditions\u201d were in which \u201cwe would be prepared to use them\u201d.<\/p>\n

Yet another (successful) attempt to \u201cinfluence the policy of a government by nuclear intimidation or coercion\u201d.<\/p>\n

These are not aberrations from a more pacific Western norm. They are the norm, as an honest look at the record will show. The use of nuclear coercion by the US and its allies has long roots, going right back to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Western nuclear terrorism is central to the history of the nuclear age.<\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 telesurtv.net<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The use of nuclear coercion by the US and its allies has long roots, going right back to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[68],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-49647","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-weapons-of-mass-destruction"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49647","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=49647"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49647\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=49647"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=49647"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=49647"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}