{"id":52416,"date":"2015-01-12T12:00:44","date_gmt":"2015-01-12T12:00:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=52416"},"modified":"2015-05-05T21:27:04","modified_gmt":"2015-05-05T20:27:04","slug":"abolishing-nuclear-weapons-useful-and-not-so-useful-first-steps","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2015\/01\/abolishing-nuclear-weapons-useful-and-not-so-useful-first-steps\/","title":{"rendered":"Abolishing Nuclear Weapons \u2013 Useful and Not-So-Useful First Steps"},"content":{"rendered":"
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| Photo: Archive<\/p><\/div>\n

The most urgently-required negative security assurance (NSA) is a promise by all the declared nuclear weapon states never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state.<\/em><\/p>\n

5 Jan 2015 – <\/em>Last month saw a cascade of news on the nuclear weapons front. The Vienna\u00a0Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons was attended by 157 countries including the US and UK. After the conference, the third in\u00a0a series, host nation Austria issued a historic pledge to work \u2018to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the\u00a0prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons\u2019,\u201d and to cooperate with\u00a0all relevant parties \u2018to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear\u00a0weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and\u00a0associated risks\u2019. At least 42 countries will now begin the political\u00a0process of drawing up a treaty to ban nuclear weapons (joining the\u00a0Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention \u00a0of 1993).<\/p>\n

Also in December, the Marshall Islands, subjected to 67 nuclear tests by\u00a0the United States in the 1940s and 1950s, put forward written arguments in\u00a0the World Court, taking the eight declared nuclear weapon states \u2013 and\u00a0Israel \u2013 to task. The Pacific state (with a population of less than\u00a070,000) wants the World Court to order the nuclear weapon state\u00a0signatories to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to live up to\u00a0their promise in the NPT to end the arms race \u2018at an early date\u2019 and to\u00a0negotiate a treaty on \u2018complete disarmament\u2019.<\/p>\n

In December, India marked two major developments in its ground-based\u00a0nuclear weapons capability, with the first successful test of the\u00a02,500-mile-range Agni-IV, the first Indian ballistic missile able to\u00a0deliver nuclear warheads deep inside China; and testing of the delivery\u00a0platform for the Agni-V, with its range of up to 3,400 miles, bringing the\u00a0whole of China within range. (In 2016, as well as deploying the Agni-V,\u00a0India plans to bring its first nuclear missile-carrying submarines into\u00a0service, completing its nuclear air-land-sea \u2018triad\u2019.)<\/p>\n

As is well-known, India has fought several wars with its neighbours\u00a0(Pakistan and China) since its birth as an independent nation in 1947, and\u00a0war with Pakistan remains an ever-present threat.<\/p>\n

Less well-known is the fact that a \u2018limited\u2019 nuclear war between Pakistan\u00a0and India would create a massive injection of \u2018black carbon aerosol\u00a0particles\u2019 (soot) into the atmosphere that would reduce rainfall and\u00a0temperatures across the world \u2013 for a decade \u2013 with a devastating impact\u00a0on global agriculture. Studies assembled by International Physicians for\u00a0the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility in\u00a02013 indicate that: \u2018In addition to the one billion people in the\u00a0developing world who would face possible starvation, 1.3 billion people in\u00a0China would confront severe food insecurity.\u2019<\/p>\n

Other nuclear weapons news in December included the threat by Russia to\u00a0place nuclear weapons in Crimea, the province of Ukraine that it illegally\u00a0annexed in March 2014; a UN General Assembly vote calling on Israel to\u00a0renounce its nuclear weapons, sign the NPT, and place its nuclear\u00a0facilities under an international inspection regime; and reports of\u00a0China\u2019s deployment of long-range ballistic missiles on its Jin-class\u00a0submarines.<\/p>\n

Each situation is different, and each nuclear weapon state faces different\u00a0forces driving it to take part in the nuclear arms race. Thus, while\u00a0several Western media outlets tried to whip up fears of Chinese\u00a0submarine-launched nuclear strikes on the USA, it was pointed out several\u00a0years ago that the Jin-class submarine is noisier than Russian submarines\u00a0built in the 1970s, making them highly vulnerable to US anti-submarine\u00a0warfare if they ventured past Hawaii to bring the continental USA into\u00a0range. Hans M Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists observed\u00a0in 2009 that this vulnerability probably meant that the Jin ballistic\u00a0missile capability was being developed because of regional \u2018scenarios\u00a0involving India or Russia that have less capable anti-submarine forces\u2019.<\/p>\n

By the logic of the arms race, the development of the Jin\u00a0submarine-launched ballistic missile capability is one factor driving\u00a0India\u2019s push for its own submarine-launched ballistic missile force.\u00a0Given these many complex dynamics, it is impossible to find a single\u00a0measure that would reduce the threat of nuclear war across the world.<\/p>\n

However, there is one measure that would make a significant difference,\u00a0which ought perhaps to be the immediate focus of disarmament efforts.<\/p>\n

There have been many suggestions for short-term priorities. In the run-up\u00a0to the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,\u00a0some thoughts were offered on this score from an establishment perspective\u00a0by \u0141ukasz Kulesa, Research Director of the European Leadership Network, a\u00a0London-based foreign policy think tank. Kulesa scorned the idea that\u00a0\u2018total elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved by adopting treaties\u00a0without the presence of the main nuclear protagonists\u2019, describing such a\u00a0treaty text as a \u2018sand castle\u2019. He argued that \u2018we need ideas that do not\u00a0accept the division of the world among idealist disarmers and nuclear\u00a0realists but rather fashion an agenda that realist disarmers can get\u00a0behind\u2019.<\/p>\n

Kulesa put forward three priorities. Firstly, he noted that \u2018the\u00a0attractiveness of nuclear weapons seems to be on the rise, and it can be\u00a0significantly decreased only if the stability of the international system\u00a0as such is re-established\u2019. Secondly, he observed:<\/p>\n

\u2018Equally worrisome, some states have been developing both the nuclear\u00a0weaponry and the doctrine for nuclear weapon use on the battlefield, to\u00a0strike particularly valuable targets or to stop a conventional attack by\u00a0an opponent…. Exposing the dangerous delusion of \u201cbattlefield-only\u201d\u00a0nuclear weapons should be a priority, especially since even a single\u00a0low-yield detonation would have disastrous political, humanitarian and\u00a0environmental consequences.\u2019<\/p>\n

Finally, Kulesa pointed to the danger that the NPT Review Conference\u00a0meeting in April 2015 could lead to some members being tempted to withdraw \u00a0from the Treaty as a way to demonstrate their frustration with the glacial \u00a0pace of fulfilling nuclear disarmament obligations\u2019.<\/p>\n

There is one measure that would help to address all three of Kulesa\u2019s\u00a0concerns, which would be for all declared nuclear weapon states to sign up\u00a0to a legally-binding and comprehensive nuclear \u2018negative security\u00a0assurance\u2019. A positive security assurance is a promise to take action to\u00a0support another state\u2019s security if it is endangered. A negative security\u00a0assurance is a commitment not to engage in (specified) actions that could\u00a0endanger the security of another state. In relation to nuclear weapons,\u00a0the most urgently-required negative security assurance (NSA) is a promise\u00a0by all the declared nuclear weapon states never to use or threaten to use\u00a0nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state.<\/p>\n

This simple measure has been impossible to obtain. The United States has\u00a0gradually been forced to remove loopholes from its NSA, with the result\u00a0that in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review the text had been simplified to\u00a0this point: \u2018the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear\u00a0weapons\u00a0against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in \u00a0compliance with their\u00a0nuclear non-proliferation obligations\u2019. The US takes it upon itself to \u00a0decide whether a non-nuclear weapon state is in compliance with its NPT \u00a0obligations. It also explicitly gave itself the option of using nuclear \u00a0weapons to deter \u2018a conventional or CBW attack against the United States \u00a0or its allies and partners\u2019 by a nuclear weapon state, or a non-nuclear\u00a0weapon\u00a0state not in compliance with its NPT obligations (in the view of\u00a0the US).<\/p>\n

The British 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review also removed some\u00a0loopholes in its previous NSAs: \u2018the UK will not use or threaten to use\u00a0nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT….\u00a0this assurance would not apply to any state in material\u00a0breach of those non-proliferation obligations\u2019. The UK then made a wider\u00a0reservation than the US in relation to other WMD: \u2018We also note that while\u00a0there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from\u00a0states developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for\u00a0example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review this\u00a0assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these\u00a0weapons make it necessary.\u2019<\/p>\n

So the UK included chemical weapons as well as biological weapons in this\u00a0exception; appeared to threaten non-nuclear weapon states in compliance\u00a0with their NPT obligations who developed CBW; and explicitly mentioned CBW \u00a0threats against Britain\u2019s \u2018vital interests\u2019 (not just British territory) as a justification for the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

In contrast, China has from the outset offered an unconditional NSA to all\u00a0non-nuclear weapon states, whether party to the NPT or not (as well as a\u00a0no-first-use pledge towards nuclear weapon states), and has expressed\u00a0willingness to sign a legally-binding NSA treaty.<\/p>\n

The importance of a legally-binding no-loophole NSA treaty is that it\u00a0restricts the ability of nuclear weapon states to engage in nuclear\u00a0coercion or intimidation \u2013 what I called in an earlier essay nuclear\u00a0terrorism.<\/p>\n

This is an example of what in another context has been called\u00a0\u2018non-reformist reform\u2019. Promising not to use nuclear weapons against\u00a0countries that don\u2019t possess nuclear weapons appears completely\u00a0straightforward and simple to most folk. And yet Britain, France, Russia\u00a0and the US have been adamantly opposed to making a legally-binding\u00a0commitment to this effect.<\/p>\n

If the no-loophole NSA treaty were signed, it would reduce the\u00a0attractiveness of nuclear weapons and contribute to the stabilisation of\u00a0the international system; it would remove an important justification for\u00a0the US development of low-yield nuclear warheads; and it would give new\u00a0strength to the NPT (especially if the NSA were restricted to non-nuclear\u00a0weapon state members of the NPT \u2013 though in that case it should be made\u00a0clear that it would be the International Atomic Energy Agency that would\u00a0decide who was in compliance with their nuclear obligations, not the US or\u00a0UK unilaterally).<\/p>\n

It is possible that the NSA treaty could become part of what Austria calls\u00a0\u2018fill[ing] the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear\u00a0weapons\u2019. It\u2019s also possible that a no-loophole, legally-binding NSA\u00a0treaty could be the most useful short-term outcome of the pressure exerted\u00a0by the countries pursuing a nuclear abolition treaty. What is certain is\u00a0that if the world community cannot force the declared nuclear weapon\u00a0states to sign a legally-binding no-loophole NSA treaty, it will never be\u00a0able to force them to disarm. That is nuclear realism.<\/p>\n

___________________________<\/p>\n

Milan Rai, the anti-war activist, author and editor based in Hastings, England, first became politically active in the campaign against Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles – nuclear weapons scheduled to be deployed in Western Europe in the late 1980s. A <\/em>Peace News seller at his school, he’s now become co-editor of the monthly magazine. Milan is the author of <\/em>Chomsky’s Politics (Verso, 1995), <\/em>War Plan Iraq (Verso, 2002), <\/em>Regime Unchanged (Pluto, 2003) and <\/em>7\/7: The London Bombings and the Iraq War (Pluto, 2006), as well as a host of pamphlets including <\/em>Tactical Trident (1995) and <\/em>Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb (1993). For the first six months of 1991, he wrote and produced <\/em>Gulf Crisis Weekly. He is currently on the advisory board of <\/em>The Journal of Chomskyan Studies (Seoul).<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 telesurtv.net<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The most urgently-required negative security assurance (NSA) is a promise by all the declared nuclear weapon states never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[68],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-52416","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-weapons-of-mass-destruction"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/52416","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=52416"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/52416\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=52416"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=52416"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=52416"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}