{"id":53034,"date":"2015-01-26T12:00:47","date_gmt":"2015-01-26T12:00:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=53034"},"modified":"2015-05-05T21:26:11","modified_gmt":"2015-05-05T20:26:11","slug":"how-al-qaedas-biggest-enemy-took-over-yemen-and-why-the-u-s-government-is-unlikely-to-support-them","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2015\/01\/how-al-qaedas-biggest-enemy-took-over-yemen-and-why-the-u-s-government-is-unlikely-to-support-them\/","title":{"rendered":"How Al Qaeda\u2019s Biggest Enemy Took Over Yemen (and Why the U.S. Government Is Unlikely to Support Them)"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"attachment_53035\" style=\"width: 550px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/01\/yemen-houthis-sanaa.jpg\" ><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-53035\" class=\"wp-image-53035 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/01\/yemen-houthis-sanaa.jpg\" alt=\"yemen houthis sanaa\" width=\"540\" height=\"359\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/01\/yemen-houthis-sanaa.jpg 540w, https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/01\/yemen-houthis-sanaa-300x199.jpg 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 540px) 100vw, 540px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-53035\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Photo: EPA\/Landov<\/p><\/div>\n<p><em>22 Jan 2015 , Sanaa<\/em> \u2013 Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, his prime minister and entire government cabinet resigned en masse today, just 24 hours after Houthi rebels occupied the presidential compound in Sanaa. The resignations give unprecedented power to the Houthis, a Shiite minority from the country\u2019s isolated northern highlands.<\/p>\n<p>The political crisis also opens the door to an all-out war over control of the Yemeni capital, involving Sunni political factions and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP. The conflict could also draw in Saudi Arabia, the United States and Iran.<\/p>\n<p>The streets in Yemen\u2019s capital are now a maze of checkpoints, a few still manned by government forces wearing military uniforms, but most these days are controlled by Houthis. Unlike government forces, the Houthis are typically dressed in tribal garb\u2013a shawl wrapped around their face and a skirt known as a ma\u2019awaz.<\/p>\n<p>Armed with AK-47s, the Houthis are primarily looking for members of AQAP.<\/p>\n<p>The Houthis, however, are quickly proving that the old adage, \u201cThe enemy of my enemy is my friend,\u201d is not always true. While they are bitter enemies of AQAP, the Houthis manning the checkpoints often adorn their AK-47s with stickers bearing the group\u2019s motto: \u201cDeath to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory to Islam.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>For the West, this labyrinth of Yemeni politics underscores the complexity of trying to find a reliable ally to fight Al Qaeda\u2019s Yemen affiliate, which claimed credit for the deadly attack earlier this month against the offices of <em>Charlie Hebdo<\/em> in Paris. While the U.S. government had continued to back Hadi as a close partner in the war on terror, it\u2019s the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, who have been battling AQAP on the streets of Sanaa.<\/p>\n<p>AQAP launched a series of car bomb and suicide attacks against the Houthis starting in late September. At checkpoints around Sanaa, the Houthis are mostly searching for AQAP members trying to smuggle bombs and bomb-making materials into the city. It\u2019s often a losing battle, since smuggling explosives can be as simple as placing a Houthi placard\u2014which have the same motto as the stickers on the AK-47s\u2013on a car dashboard to slip through checkpoints.<\/p>\n<p>In a recent AQAP video, which <em>The Intercept<\/em> translated from Arabic to English, Nasser bin Ali al Ansi, a senior AQAP official, said the group was making steady progress against the Houthis and asserted that AQAP was working on \u201cexpanding the geographical area\u201d of its attacks against the Houthis. The AQAP official said that group depends on \u201cbooty\u201d it seizes from its enemies, because it lacks sufficient funds to effectively take on the Houthis. He also called on \u201cMuslims to support those Jihadists\u201d fighting the Houthis.<\/p>\n<p>But the Houthis oppose American involvement in Yemen\u2014even to fight al Qaeda\u2014and this helps explain why the Obama administration is unlikely to embrace the new power structure anytime soon. Another reason is that they are seen as aligned with Iran.<\/p>\n<p>For years, the Yemeni government attempted to inflate Iran\u2019s influence over the Houthis in the hopes of winning U.S. permission to use counterterrorism funds and assistance to fight the Houthis. According to diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, senior Bush administration officials consistently rebuffed such requests from the Yemeni government, saying the U.S. government saw the battle against the Houthis as a domestic issue.<\/p>\n<p>The Obama administration has shied away from taking a clear stance on Iran\u2019s support for the Houthis.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWe\u2019ve remained troubled by the history of work between the Houthis and the Iranians,\u201d State Department Thursday spokesperson Jen Psaki said Thursday. \u201cNow we don\u2019t assess that there is, or have, new cooperation on that front.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Saudi Arabia has also portrayed the Houthis as an Iranian proxy, and the kingdom has carried out a number of airstrikes against the movement\u2019s strongholds.<\/p>\n<p>One clear source of support for the Houthis come from former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is from the same Shiite sect. Saleh is long suspected of playing a direct role in the Houthis\u2019 stunning seizure of the capital. This week, several Arab TV networks aired a purported recording of a phone call between Saleh and a senior Houthi leader, with the former president advising on the group\u2019s military and political operations.<\/p>\n<p>During his time in power, Saleh often shifted his alliances; he waged six wars against the Houthis from 2004-2010, but at times used the Houthis to crush political opponents. Given that history, many doubt the new power structure, dominated by the Houthi-Saleh alliance, will last.<\/p>\n<p>Saleh and the Houthis \u201care in love,\u201d said Asham, a student at Sanaa University, who asked that his last name not be used because of the political situation. \u201cBut their marriage will end in divorce. They can\u2019t live together forever because they both want the same thing\u2013power.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>While the U.S. State Department initially resisted calling this week\u2019s events in Yemen a coup, the power shift had already tilted to the Houthis. The rebel group\u2019s control was cemented earlier this month, when Hadi quietly signed presidential decrees handing over the security apparatus, which has traditionally functioned as a source of government salaries for leaders\u2019 families, friends and tribesmen.<\/p>\n<p>After signing a power-sharing agreement late Wednesday, Hadi had effectively handed over power to the Houthis, who launched a coup earlier this week that culminated in a shootout between presidential guards and Houthi militia. The agreement was expected to make official the Houthis\u2019 de facto control over the capital, and today\u2019s mass resignation all but ensures the group\u2019s takeover.<\/p>\n<p>An AQAP spokesperson welcomed the fall of the government, telling <em>The Intercept<\/em>: \u201cwe operate better in such circumstances.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI believe that both Houthis and Saleh are picking their posts,\u201d said Fernando Carvajal, a Yemen specialist and a long-time consultant to non-governmental organizations in the country. \u201cBy taking over the police now Houthis and Saleh can recruit militias.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Shortly after taking over the security posts, the Houthi police chiefs used their new powers to arrest a close aide to Hadi. The government called the arrest a kidnapping.<\/p>\n<p>Hadi\u2019s government, in the meantime, was already in a state of retreat; Houthis this week secured control of Yemen state media.<\/p>\n<p>Many see this week\u2019s coup as the final culmination of a series of events that started to unfold in January 2014, when Hadi initiated a ceasefire to the months-long battle between Houthis and Sunni Salafists outside the city of Sa\u2019dah, the provincial capital of the Houthi movement. Hadi\u2019s mediation resulted in the eviction of about 15,000 Salafist students from Sa\u2019dah Province\u2014a victory for the Houthis.<\/p>\n<p>The Houthis began their takeover of Sanaa in September and started filling newly vacant leadership positions at police headquarters. That was followed by this week\u2019s coup, and what now appears to be a near total seizure of power.<\/p>\n<p>While Sanaa has experienced a series of ground-shaking artillery shells, explosions, and semi-automatic gunfire in the past week, businesses outside the immediate fighting areas have remained open, and Yemenis have greeted this latest power play with equanimity. Hisham Al-Omeisy, an information and communications consultant in Sanaa, says that most Yemenis had simply lost faith in government rhetoric. \u201cWhen speaking of current status quo nowadays in Yemen we say [it\u2019s like] the blind trying to apply mascara to the unstable and agitated crazy.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>__________________________<\/p>\n<p><em>Email the author: <a href=\"mailto:jeremy.scahill@theintercept.com\">jeremy.scahill@theintercept.com<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/firstlook.org\/theintercept\/2015\/01\/22\/yemens-de-facto-coup-detat\/\" >Go to Original \u2013 firstlook.org<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>22 Jan 2015 &#8211; Yemen\u2019s president, his prime minister and entire cabinet resigned, giving unprecedented power to the Houthis, a Shiite minority from the country\u2019s northern highlands.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[66],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-53034","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-middle-east-north-africa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53034","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=53034"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53034\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=53034"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=53034"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=53034"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}