{"id":56194,"date":"2015-04-13T12:00:27","date_gmt":"2015-04-13T11:00:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=56194"},"modified":"2015-05-05T21:25:52","modified_gmt":"2015-05-05T20:25:52","slug":"brazil-uses-brics-presidency-for-key-foreign-policy-goals","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2015\/04\/brazil-uses-brics-presidency-for-key-foreign-policy-goals\/","title":{"rendered":"Brazil Uses BRICS Presidency for Key Foreign Policy Goals"},"content":{"rendered":"

24 Mar 2015 – <\/em>In what has undoubtedly been a tumultuous year for the world and for the country itself, Brazil took over the Presidency of the BRICS and hosted the sixth BRICS Summit <\/a>since the group of emerging economies formalized its existence in 2009. Much of the recent focus on the BRICS has centered on institutional developments, not least among which is the creation of the BRICS Development Bank \u2013 the New Development Bank \u2013 and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)<\/a>. Less optimistic commentary has raised concern regarding the arguably uncertain future of the group\u2019s economies, which have in the past year seen significant declines in their GDP growth rates \u2013 some, including Brazil<\/a>, more so than others.<\/p>\n

Yet, less has been written regarding the degree to which the Brazilian administration has capitalized on its Chairpersonship to promote key Brazilian foreign policy goals. It would indeed seem like a good opportunity to raise Brazil\u2019s foreign policy profile, particularly since President Dilma Rousseff has faced a hard task in succeeding President Lula\u2019s activist foreign policy. Rousseff, unlike her predecessor, has been criticized for giving less priority to foreign policy and for lack of voice in global security issues.<\/p>\n

\"President<\/a>

President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff at the 6th BRICS Summit in the Brazilian city of Fortaleza on 15 July 2014 [PPIO]<\/p><\/div>Forging stronger and more important trade and investment ties with the BRICS countries and their regions is undoubtedly among the priorities of the Brazilian government and has been since the inception of the group and since President Lula made the diversification of political and economic foreign relations<\/a> a main pillar of his vision of an autonomous and assertive Brazil. But beyond that, chairing the BRICS throughout these past months, has also given Brazil the opportunity to instrumentalise its membership of the group for the promotion of longstanding practical and normative goals of its global <\/a>and regional<\/a> aspirations.<\/p>\n

Regional integration <\/strong><\/p>\n

Brazil has long struggled with a balanced approach to its region. While keen on promoting integration, particularly for reasons related to trade and infrastructure development which also necessitate democratic stability, it has also repeatedly illustrated its reluctance to become a regional leader. Rather, it prefers to act as a bridge between the region and its \u201cemerging power\u201d partners. This was very successfully achieved by bringing together the leaders of UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations) and several of the leaders of CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) in the meetings organized during the BRICS Summit in Fortaleza in July<\/a>.<\/p>\n

As China is the key trade and investment partner for a growing number of South and Latin American countries<\/a>, the opportunity to meet with the Chinese leader and to deepen the region\u2019s ties with China because of Brazil\u2019s BRICS identity, undoubtedly worked in favor of Brazil\u2019s regional profile which has often suffered from criticisms of being given preferential treatment by global institutions (the lack of support of Brazil\u2019s claim to a permanent seat in the UNSC is indicative of such tendencies).<\/p>\n

It is also important to note that the BRICS bloc as a whole has become a key trading partner for some of the countries in the region, such as Venezuela<\/a>, whose commerce with the bloc increased by 72% from 2006 \u2013 2013.<\/p>\n

Development and South \u2013 South Cooperation<\/strong><\/p>\n

All throughout the government of the Worker\u2019s Party, since the first election of President Lula in 2002, development and south-south cooperation<\/a> have been quintessential pillars of Brazil\u2019s foreign policy rhetoric and practice.<\/p>\n

Brazil, as other emerging countries, aspires to a reform of the traditional sources of financing for development and a departure from Western- dominated models in this field.<\/p>\n

The BRICS Development Bank<\/a>, announced at the Fortaleza Summit and established throughout the Brazilian presidency, creates opportunities for Brazil to be a more active player in the field of development, in spite of economic slowdown, while challenging the northern paradigm.<\/p>\n

Brazil also sought to address development issues by including \u201cgrowth with social inclusion\u201d as one of the agendas set by the Brazilian Chairpersonship of the BRICS. In this area, the country capitalized in the promotion of its own success in improving income distribution through social spending in the past years<\/a>, a model that Brazilian foreign policy seeks to \u201cexport\u201d as one of the aspects of Brazilian normative power.<\/p>\n

The Symbolical Dimension<\/strong><\/p>\n

Brazil\u2019s foreign policy is driven by the aspiration to reconstruct the global order \u2013 represented by the global institutional architecture \u2013 into one characterized by the equal and democratic participation of all states.<\/p>\n

It envisions a multipolar order with dynamics which reduce hegemonic tendencies; new paradigms for development; the promotion of human rights. It also strongly endorsed the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in other states\u2019 affairs<\/a>, while acknowledging that difference between non-intervention and non-indifference.<\/p>\n

The promotion of this vision on the global agenda leads to normative divergence with Western countries \u2013 mostly the US and Europe \u2013 and the established global institutions.<\/p>\n

Looking back at the Brazilian Chairpersonship of the BRICS, we can identify a few symbolical acts of \u201ccounterweighing\u201d the West. The BRICS opposition to US and EU sanctions against Russia <\/a>and their insistence that the Russian President attend the G-20 Summit in Brisbane<\/a> illustrated the existence of multiple voices in terms of approach towards the Russian-Ukrainian issue (and a caution towards sanctions which is characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy).<\/p>\n

\"Working<\/a>

Working lunch hosted by President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff in honour of the leaders of BRICS and South American nations including Uruguay President Jose Mujica, Chile\u2019s Michelle Bachelet, Ecuador\u2019s Rafael Correa, Venezuela\u2019s Nicolas Maduro, Argentina\u2019s President Cristina Fern\u00e1ndez and Bolivia\u2019s, Evo Morales among others on 16 July 2014 in Brasilia [PPIO]<\/p><\/div>The establishment of the new bank and reserve fund challenged the monopoly of the existing institutional order (while not necessarily opposing it as has been rightly pointed out by Oliver Stuenkel<\/a>) and further deepened the evolving identity of the group as a player in the international setting, one that is an outsider from various West-driven processes such as the ongoing mega-trade negotiations in the Pacific and the Atlantic.<\/p>\n

A new BRICS MoU on Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation signed in Brasilia last week,<\/a> may further institutionalize intra-BRICS cooperation in fields that are extremely important to Brazilian foreign relations, such as intellectual property rights regimes.<\/p>\n

Brazil\u2019s BRICS Chairmanship has been consistent with Brazil\u2019s foreign pursuits and, among those, with the importance Brazil attributes to the BRICS. Yet, a big challenge that remains is to succeed in the balancing act of deepening ties with the BRICS, while repairing relations with the US and concluding unfinished trade arrangements with Europe, at a time where the Brazilian economy and politics are in desperate need of renewed vigor.<\/p>\n

_____________________________<\/p>\n

Elena Lazarou is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Funda\u00e7\u00e3o Getulio Vargas (FGV) in Rio de Janeiro. She is the editor of <\/em>Multilateralism in International Relations (in Portuguese), Elsevier 2014.<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 thebricspost.com<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In pushing for a multi-polar world order, Brazil’s foreign policy has been consistent with its BRICS leadership.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[180],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-56194","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-brics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/56194","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=56194"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/56194\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=56194"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=56194"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=56194"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}