{"id":56608,"date":"2015-04-20T12:00:53","date_gmt":"2015-04-20T11:00:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=56608"},"modified":"2015-05-05T21:25:50","modified_gmt":"2015-05-05T20:25:50","slug":"the-us-carried-out-674-military-operations-in-africa-last-year-did-you-hear-about-any-of-them","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2015\/04\/the-us-carried-out-674-military-operations-in-africa-last-year-did-you-hear-about-any-of-them\/","title":{"rendered":"The US Carried Out 674 Military Operations in Africa Last Year. Did You Hear About Any of Them?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The US military publicly insists its presence in Africa is negligible. Is that why they call it an American \u201cbattlefield\u201d behind closed doors?<\/em><\/p>\n

\"Brigadier<\/a>

Brigadier General James Linder and other military officials at the closing ceremony for a US-led international training mission for African militaries. (Reuters\/Joe Penney)<\/p><\/div>\n

April 14, 2015\u00a0– <\/em>For three days, wearing a kaleidoscope of camouflage patterns, they huddled together on a military base in Florida. They came from US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and US Army Special Operations Command, from France and Norway, from Denmark, Germany, and Canada: 13 nations in all. They came to plan a years-long \u201cSpecial Operations-centric\u201d military campaign supported by conventional forces, a multinational undertaking that\u2014if carried out\u2014might cost hundreds of millions, maybe billions, of dollars and who knows how many lives.<\/p>\n

Ask the men involved and they\u2019ll talk about being mindful of \u201csensitivities\u201d and \u201ccultural differences,\u201d about the importance of \u201ccollaboration and coordination,\u201d about the value of a variety of viewpoints, about \u201cperspectives\u201d and \u201cpartnerships.\u201d Nonetheless, behind closed doors and unbeknownst to most of the people in their own countries, let alone the countries fixed in their sights, a coterie of Western special ops planners were sketching out a possible multinational military future for a troubled region of Africa.<\/p>\n

From January 13th to 15th, representatives from the United States and 12 partner nations gathered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa for an exercise dubbed Silent Quest 15-1. The fictional scenario on which they were to play out their war game had a ripped-from-the-headlines quality to it. It was an amalgam of two perfectly real and ongoing foreign policy and counterterrorism disasters of the post-9\/11 era: the growth of Boko Haram<\/a> in Nigeria and the emergence of the Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL. The war game centered on the imagined rise of a group dubbed the \u201cIslamic State of Africa\u201d and the spread of its proto-caliphate over parts of Nigeria<\/a>, Niger<\/a>, and Cameroon<\/a>\u2014countries terrorized by the real Boko Haram, which did recently pledge its allegiance to the Islamic State.<\/p>\n

Silent Quest 15-1 was just the latest in a series of similarly named exercises\u2014the first took place in March 2013\u2014designed to help plot out the special ops interventions of the next decade. This war game was no paintball-style walk in the woods. There were no mock firefights, no dress rehearsals. It wasn\u2019t the flag football equivalent of battle. Instead, it was a tabletop exercise building on something all too real: the ever-expanding panoply of US and allied military activities across ever-larger parts of Africa. Speaking of that continent, Matt Pascual, a participant in Silent Quest and the Africa desk officer for SOCOM\u2019s Euro-Africa Support Group, noted that the United States and its allies were already dealing with \u201cmyriad issues\u201d in the region and, perhaps most importantly, that many of the participating countries \u201care already there.\u201d The country \u201calready there\u201d the most is, of course, Pascual\u2019s own: the United States.<\/p>\n

In recent years, the United States has been involved in a variety of multinational interventions in Africa, including one in Libya that involved both a secret war<\/a> and a conventional campaign<\/a> of missiles and air strikes, assistance<\/a> to French forces in the Central African Republic and Mali, and the training and funding of African proxies to do battle against militant groups like Boko Haram<\/a> as well as Somalia\u2019s al-Shabab<\/a> and Mali\u2019s Ansar al-Dine<\/a>. In 2014, the United States carried out 674 military activities across Africa, nearly two missions per day, an almost 300% jump in the number of annual operations, exercises, and military-to-military training activities since US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established in 2008.<\/p>\n

Despite this massive increase in missions and a similar swelling of bases, personnel, and funding, the picture painted last month before the Senate Armed Services Committee by AFRICOM chief General David Rodriguez was startlingly bleak. For all the American efforts across Africa, Rodriguez offered a vision of a continent in crisis, imperiled from East to West by militant groups that have developed, grown in strength, or increased their deadly reach in the face of US counterterrorism efforts.<\/p>\n

\u201cTransregional terrorists and criminal networks continue to adapt and expand aggressively,\u201d Rodriguez told committee members. \u201cAl-Shabab has broadened its operations to conduct, or attempt to conduct, asymmetric attacks against Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and especially Kenya. Libya-based threats are growing rapidly, including an expanding ISIL presence\u2026 Boko Haram threatens the ability of the Nigerian government to provide security and basic services in large portions of the northeast.\u201d Despite the grim outcomes since the American military began \u201cpivoting\u201d to Africa after 9\/11, the United States recently signed an agreement designed to keep its troops based on the continent until almost midcentury.<\/p>\n

Mission Creep<\/strong><\/p>\n

For years, the US military has publicly insisted that its efforts in Africa are negligible, intentionally leaving the American people, not to mention most Africans, in the dark about the true size, scale, and scope of its operations there. AFRICOM public affairs personnel and commanders have repeatedly claimed no more than a \u201clight footprint\u201d on the continent. They shrink from talk of camps and outposts, claiming to have just one base<\/a>anywhere in Africa: Camp Lemonnier in the tiny nation of Djibouti. They don\u2019t like to talk about military operations<\/a>. They offer detailed information<\/a> about only a tiny fraction of their training exercises. They refuse<\/a> to disclose the locations where personnel have been stationed or even counts of the countries involved.<\/p>\n

During an interview, an AFRICOM spokesman once expressed his worry to me that even tabulating how many deployments the command has in Africa would offer a \u201cskewed image\u201d of US efforts. Behind closed doors, however, AFRICOM\u2019s officers speak quite a different language. They have repeatedly asserted that the continent is an American \u201cbattlefield<\/a>\u201d and that\u2014make no bones about it\u2014they are already embroiled in an actual \u201cwar<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

According to recently released figures from US Africa Command, the scope of that \u201cwar\u201d grew dramatically in 2014. In its \u201cposture statement,\u201d AFRICOM reports that it conducted 68 operations last year, up from 55 the year before. These included operations Juniper Micron and Echo Casemate, missions focused on aiding French and African interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic; Observant Compass, an effort to degrade or destroy what\u2019s left<\/a> of Joseph Kony\u2019s murderous Lord\u2019s Resistance Army in central Africa; and United Assistance, the deployment of military personnel to combat the Ebola crisis<\/a> in West Africa.<\/p>\n

The number of major joint field exercises US personnel engaged in with African military partners inched up from 10 in 2013 to 11 last year. These included African Lion<\/a> in Morocco, Western Accord<\/a> in Senegal, Central Accord<\/a> in Cameroon, and Southern Accord<\/a> in Malawi, all of which had a field training component and served as capstone events for the prior year\u2019s military-to-military instruction missions.<\/p>\n

AFRICOM also conducted maritime security exercises<\/a> including Obangame Express<\/a> in the Gulf of Guinea<\/a>, Saharan Express in the waters off Senegal, and three weeks of maritime security training scenarios as part of Phoenix Express 2014<\/a>, with sailors from numerous countries including Algeria, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.<\/p>\n

The number of security cooperation activities skyrocketed from 481 in 2013 to 595 last year. Such efforts included military training under a \u201cstate partnership program\u201d that teams African military forces with US National Guard units and the State Department-funded Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance, or ACOTA, program through which US military advisers and mentors provide equipment and instruction to African troops.<\/p>\n

In 2013, the combined total of all US activities on the continent reached 546, an average of more than one mission per day. Last year, that number leapt to 674. In other words, US troops were carrying out almost two operations, exercises, or activities\u2014from drone strikes<\/a> to counterinsurgency instruction<\/a>, intelligence gathering to marksmanship training\u2014somewhere in Africa every day. This represents an enormous increase from the 172 \u201cmissions, activities, programs, and exercises\u201d that AFRICOM inherited<\/a> from other geographic commands when it began operations in 2008.<\/p>\n

Transnational Terror Groups: Something From Nothing<\/strong><\/p>\n

In 2000, a report prepared<\/a> under the auspices of the US Army War College\u2019s Strategic Studies Institute examined the \u201cAfrican security environment.\u201d While it touched on \u201cinternal separatist or rebel movements\u201d in \u201cweak states,\u201d as well as non-state actors like militias and \u201cwarlord armies,\u201d there was conspicuously no mention of Islamic extremism or major transnational terrorist threats. Prior to 2001, in fact, the United States did not recognize any terrorist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa and a senior Pentagon official noted<\/a> that the most feared Islamic militants on the continent had \u201cnot engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia.\u201d<\/p>\n

In the wake of 9\/11, even before AFRICOM was created, the United States began ramping up operations across the continent in an effort to bolster the counterterror capabilities of allies and insulate Africa from transnational terror groups, namely globe-trotting Islamic extremists. The continent, in other words, was seen as something of a clean slate for experiments in terror prevention.<\/p>\n

Billions of dollars have been pumped into Africa to build bases, arm allies, gather intelligence, fight proxy wars, assassinate militants, and conduct perhaps thousands of military missions\u2014and none of it has had its intended effect. Last year, for example, Somali militants \u201ceither planned or executed increasingly complex and lethal attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia,\u201d according to AFRICOM. Earlier this month, those same al-Shabab militants upped the ante by slaughtering<\/a> 142 students at a college in Kenya.<\/p>\n

And al-Shabab\u2019s deadly growth and spread has hardly been the exception to the rule in Africa. In recent testimony<\/a> before the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM commander Rodriguez rattled off the names of numerous Islamic terror groups that have sprung up in the intervening years, destabilizing the very countries the United States had sought to strengthen. While the posture statement he presented put the best gloss possible on Washington\u2019s military efforts in Africa, even a cursory reading of it\u2014and under the circumstances, it\u2019s worth quoting at length\u2014paints a bleak picture of what that \u201cpivot\u201d to Africa has actually meant on the ground. Sections pulled from various parts of the document speak volumes:<\/p>\n

The network of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents continues to exploit Africa\u2019s under-governed regions and porous borders to train and conduct attacks. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is expanding its presence in North Africa. Terrorists with allegiances to multiple groups are expanding their collaboration in recruitment, financing, training, and operations, both within Africa and trans-regionally. Violent extremist organizations are utilizing increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive devices, and casualties from these weapons in Africa increased by approximately 40 percent in 2014\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

In North and West Africa, Libyan and Nigerian insecurity increasingly threaten United States interests. In spite of multinational security efforts, terrorist and criminal networks are gaining strength and interoperability. Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitun, Boko Haram, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and other violent extremist organizations are exploiting weak governance, corrupt leadership, and porous borders across the Sahel and Maghreb to train and move fighters and distribute resources\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

Libya-based threats to United States interests are growing\u2026 Libyan governance, security, and economic stability deteriorated significantly in the past year\u2026 Today, armed groups control large areas of territory in Libya and operate with impunity. Libya appears to be emerging as a safe haven where terrorists, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-affiliated groups, can train and rebuild with impunity. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is increasingly active in Libya, including in Derna, Benghazi, Tripoli, and Sebha\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

The spillover effects of instability in Libya and northern Mali increase risks to United States interests in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, including the success of Tunisia\u2019s democratic transition\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

The security situation in Nigeria also declined in the past year. Boko Haram threatens the functioning of a government that is challenged to maintain its people\u2019s trust and to provide security and other basic services\u2026 Boko Haram has launched attacks across Nigeria\u2019s borders into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

\u2026both the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo are at risk of further destabilization by insurgent groups, and simmering ethnic tensions in the Great Lakes region have the potential to boil over violently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<\/em><\/p>\n

All this, mind you, is AFRICOM\u2019s own assessment of the situation on the continent on which it has focused its efforts for the better part of a decade as United States missions there soared. In this context, it\u2019s worth reemphasizing that, before the United States ramped up those efforts, Africa was\u2014by Washington\u2019s own estimation\u2014relatively free of transnational Islamic terror groups.<\/p>\n

Tipping the Scales in Africa<\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite Boko Haram\u2019s pledge<\/a> of allegiance to the Islamic State and scare<\/a>headlines<\/a> lamenting<\/a> their merger or conflating those or other brutal terror outfits operating under similar monikers<\/a>, there is currently no real Islamic State of Africa<\/a>. But the war game carried out at MacDill Air Force Base in January against that fictional group is far from fantasy, representing as it does the next logical step in a series of operations that have been gaining steam since AFRICOM\u2019s birth. And buried in the command\u2019s 2015 Posture Statement is actual news that signals a continuation of this trajectory into the 2040s.<\/p>\n

In May 2014, the United States reached an agreement\u2014it\u2019s called an \u201cimplementing arrangement\u201d\u2014with the government of Djibouti \u201cthat secures [its] presence\u201d in that country \u201cthrough 2044.\u201d In addition, AFRICOM officers are now talking<\/a> about the possibility of building a string of surveillance outposts along the northern tier of the continent. And don\u2019t forget how, over the past few years, United States staging areas, mini-bases, and airfields have popped up in the contiguous nations of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and\u2014skipping Chad<\/a> (where AFRICOM recently built temporary facilities for a special ops exercise)\u2014the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. All of this suggests that the United States military is digging in for the long haul in Africa.<\/p>\n

Silent Quest 15-1 was designed as a model to demonstrate just how Washington will conduct \u201cSpecial Operations-centric\u201d coalition warfare in Africa. It was, in fact, designed to align, wrote Gunnery Sergeant Reina Barnett in SOCOM\u2019s trade publication Tip of the Spear<\/em>, with the \u201c2020 planning guidance of Army Maj. Gen. James Linder, commander of Special Operations Command Africa.\u201d And the agreement with Djibouti demonstrates that the United States military is now beginning to plan for almost a quarter-century beyond that. But, if the last six years\u2014marked by a 300 percent increase in United States missions as well as the spread of terror groups and terrorism in Africa\u2014are any indicator, the results are likely to be anything but pleasing to Washington.<\/p>\n

AFRICOM commander David Rodriguez continues to put the best face on United States efforts in Africa, citing \u201cprogress in several areas through close cooperation with our allies and partners.\u201d His command\u2019s assessment of the situation, however, is remarkably bleak. \u201cWhere our national interests compel us to tip the scales and enhance collective security gains, we may have to do more\u2014either by enabling our allies and partners, or acting unilaterally,\u201d reads the posture statement Rodriguez delivered to that Senate committee.<\/p>\n

After more than a decade of increasing efforts, however, there\u2019s little evidence that AFRICOM has the slightest idea how to tip the scales in its own favor in Africa.<\/p>\n

This article originally appeared at TomDispatch.com<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 thenation.com<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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