{"id":56949,"date":"2015-04-27T12:00:53","date_gmt":"2015-04-27T11:00:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=56949"},"modified":"2015-05-05T21:25:48","modified_gmt":"2015-05-05T20:25:48","slug":"how-the-u-s-contributed-to-yemens-crisis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2015\/04\/how-the-u-s-contributed-to-yemens-crisis\/","title":{"rendered":"How the U.S. Contributed to Yemen\u2019s Crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"

Washington’s support for Yemen’s former dictatorship \u2014 and of Saudi efforts to sideline the country’s nonviolent pro-democracy movement \u2014 helped create the current crisis.<\/em><\/p>\n

\"(Photo:<\/a>

(Photo: Al Jazeera English \/ Flickr)<\/p><\/div>\n

20 Apr 2015 – <\/em>As a Saudi-led military coalition continues to pound rebel targets in Yemen, the country is plunging into a humanitarian crisis. Civilian casualties are mounting.<\/p>\n

With U.S. logistical support, the Saudis are attempting to re-instate the country\u2019s exiled government \u2014 which enjoys the backing of the West and the Sunni Gulf monarchies \u2014 in the face of a military offensive by Houthi rebels from northern Yemen.<\/p>\n

None of this had to be.<\/p>\n

Not long ago \u2014 at the height of the Arab Spring in 2011 \u2014 a broad-based, nonviolent, pro-democracy movement in Yemen rose up against the U.S.-backed government of dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh. If Washington and Saudi Arabia had allowed this coalition to come to power, the tragic events unfolding in Yemen *could have been prevented.<\/p>\n

The movement had forged an impressive degree of unity among the various tribal, regional, sectarian, and ideological groups that took part in the pro-democracy protests, which included mass marches, sit-ins, and many other forms of nonviolent civil resistance. Leaders of prominent tribal coalitions \u2014 as well as the Houthis now rebelling against the government \u2014 publicly supported the popular insurrection, prompting waves of tribesmen to leave their guns at home and head to the capital to take part in the movement.<\/p>\n

These tribesmen, along with the hundreds of thousands of city dwellers on the streets, were encouraged to maintain nonviolent discipline, even in the face of government snipers and other provocations that led to the deaths of hundreds of unarmed protesters.<\/p>\n

The Obama administration, however, was more concerned about maintaining stability in the face of growing Al-Qaeda influence in rural areas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged that Washington had not planned for an era without Saleh, who had ruled the country for more than three and a half decades. As one former ambassador to Yemen put it<\/a> in March 2011, \u201cFor right now, he\u2019s our guy.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cThat\u2019s How It Is\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

Though the pro-democracy movement largely maintained a remarkably rigorous nonviolent discipline in its protests, some opposition tribes and rebel army officers added an armed component to the resistance movement. An assassination attempt against Saleh that June forced the severely wounded president to leave for Saudi Arabia for extended medical treatments.<\/p>\n

John Brennan, Obama\u2019s chief counterterrorism adviser and future CIA director, visited Saleh in a Saudi hospital in July and encouraged him<\/a> to sign a deal transferring power. Not only was the mission unsuccessful in convincing Saleh to resign, however, the regime \u2014 in a continuation of its efforts to use Saleh\u2019s close relationship with the United States to reinforce his standing \u2014 broadcast images<\/a> of the surprisingly healthy-looking president and emphasized his statesmanlike demeanor in meeting with a top U.S. official as a signal of continued U.S. support for the regime.<\/p>\n

As the pro-democracy struggle tried desperately to keep the movement nonviolent in the aftermath of the assassination attempt and a growing armed rebellion, the United States escalated its own violence by launching unprecedented air strikes in Yemen, ostensibly targeting Al-Qaeda cells. The Pentagon acknowledged<\/a>, however, that Al-Qaeda operatives often intermingled with other anti-government rebels.<\/p>\n

Indeed, U.S. policy allowed the CIA to target individuals for drone strikes without verifying their identity, resulting in some armed Yemeni tribes and others allied with pro-democracy forces apparently being attacked under the mistaken impression they were al-Qaeda. This scenario was made all the more likely by U.S. reliance on the Yemeni regime for much of its intelligence in determining targets. Complicating the situation still further during this critical period of ongoing protests, teams of U.S. military and intelligence operatives were continuing to operate out of a command post in the Yemeni capital.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s entirely possible, then, that the Yemeni government may have used the pretext of al-Qaeda to convince the U.S. government to take out its rivals.<\/p>\n

U.S. officials insisted that the violence between the pro- and anti-regime elements of the Yemeni armed forces did not involve U.S.-trained Yemeni special operations forces, and Brennan initially maintained that the unrest had not affected<\/a> U.S.-Yemeni security cooperation. By the end of the year, however, he acknowledged<\/a> that the \u201cpolitical tumult\u201d had led these U.S.-trained units \u201cto be focused on their positioning for internal political purposes as opposed to doing all they can against AQAP.\u201d<\/p>\n

That meant that Yemeni forces trained by the United States for the purpose of fight al-Qaeda were instead directly participating in the squelching of a democratic uprising. \u201cRather than fighting AQAP,\u201d an expos\u00e9<\/a> in The Nation <\/em>noted, \u201cthese U.S.-backed units \u2014 created and funded with the explicit intent to be used only for counterterrorism operations \u2014 redeployed to Sanaa to protect the collapsing regime from its own people.\u201d<\/p>\n

According to the well-connected Yemeni political analyst Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, these U.S.-backed units exist \u201cmostly for the defense of the regime.\u201d For example, rather than fighting a key battle against Al-Qaida forces in Abyan, al-Iryani told reporter Jeremy Scahill, \u201cThey are still here [in Sanaa], protecting the palace. That\u2019s how it is.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cKeeping Enough of the Regime Intact\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the end of July 2011, despite the ongoing repression of pro-democracy forces, a congressional committee approved more than $120 million in aid to the Yemeni government, primarily in military and related security assistance. The aid was conditional on the State Department certifying that the Yemeni government was cooperating sufficiently in fighting terrorism, but there were no conditions regarding democracy or human rights.<\/p>\n

As the repression increased, U.S. officials praised the Yemeni regime\u2019s cooperation with U.S.-led war efforts, with Brennan declaring<\/a> in September, \u201cI can say today the counterterrorism cooperation with Yemen is better than it\u2019s been during my whole tenure.\u201d<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the United States and Saudi Arabia, joined by the other monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), presented a plan whereby Saleh would step down. According to the deal, he and other top officials in the regime would be granted immunity from prosecution, and a plebiscite would be held within 60 days to ratify the transfer of power to Saleh\u2019s vice-president, Major General Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.<\/p>\n

Pro-democracy protesters largely rejected this U.S.-Saudi mandate for Hadi. It soon became apparent that despite occasional calls for Saleh to step down \u2014 such as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice\u2019s strong statement in early August \u2014 the Obama administration was deferring to its autocratic GCC allies on the peninsula to oversee a political transition.<\/p>\n

In mid-August, opposition activists formed a National Council, which they hoped would form a provisional government until multiparty elections could be held. It consisted of 143 members representing a broad coalition of protest leaders, tribal sheiks, South Yemen separatists, opposition military commanders, former members of the governing party, and the Houthi militia representing the Zaydi minority in the north.<\/p>\n

The Saudis and the U.S. government, however, kept pushing for Saleh to transfer power to his vice president. Supporters of the National Council denounced these foreign efforts as \u201conly a plot to foil the revolution.\u201d<\/p>\n

Following a meeting with Hadi in September, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman said<\/a>, \u201cWe continue to believe that an immediate, peaceful, and orderly transition is in the best interest of the Yemeni people. \u2026We urge all sides to engage in dialogue that peacefully moves Yemen forward.\u201d Pro-democracy protesters pushed ahead in their campaign of civil resistance, insisting that the National Council representing a broad array Yemenis not be circumvented.<\/p>\n

Shortly thereafter, government security forces fired into crowds during a massive pro-democracy protest in Sanaa. Dozens of protesters were killed and hundreds more wounded.<\/p>\n

The U.S. embassy, however, appeared to blame both sides<\/a> for the killings, saying the United States \u201cregrets the deaths and injuries of many people\u201d and calling \u201cupon all parties to exercise restraint. In particular, we call on the parties to refrain from actions that provoke further violence.\u201d Similarly, U.S. ambassador Gerald Feierstein criticized<\/a> a peaceful pro-democracy march from Taiz to Sanaa in December as \u201cprovocative.\u201d<\/p>\n

Soon afterwards, 13 more pro-democracy demonstrators were killed by government security forces, leading many activists to accuse the ambassador of preemptively giving Saleh permission to shoot civilians. Time<\/em> magazine, summarizing<\/a> the view of pro-democracy activists, noted, \u201cThe early intercession of foreign powers with a transition plan distracted attention from popular demands, they say, and allowed the president to cite ongoing talks in delaying his resignation. Many Yemenis believe the key interest guiding the U.S. has been keeping enough of the regime intact to combat al Qaeda, and that this has distorted the outcome.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cThis Revolution Has Been Stabbed in the Back\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

Eventually, U.S. officials bowed to international concerns and put forward a threat of United Nations sanctions against the regime, which finally forced Saleh to formally resign.<\/p>\n

In January 2012, the Obama administration allowed Saleh into the United States for medical treatment, rejecting calls for his prosecution. U.S. officials believed that doing so was the best way of finally forcing him to step down as president and finally make a peaceful transition of power possible.<\/p>\n

Pro-democracy activists in Yemen were outraged.<\/p>\n

Protest leader Tawakkol Karman, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the previous month, called on the United States to \u201chold Saleh accountable.\u201d She also observed<\/a>, \u201cThere shouldn\u2019t be any place for tyrants in the free world. This is against all international agreements, laws, and covenants. The entry of Ali Saleh into America is an insult to the values of the American people. This was a mistake by the administration, and I am confident he will be met with wide disapproval in America. This will tarnish the reputation of America among all those who support the Arab Spring revolutions.\u201d<\/p>\n

Saleh returned to Yemen the following month to oversee the transfer of power to his vice-president and has remained the country ever since. Now, he\u2019s making a bid to retake control, having formed an alliance with his former Houthi adversaries and, with the support of some allied army units, playing a critical role in their rise to power.<\/p>\n

This has greatly angered the pro-democracy movement, whose leaders twice petitioned the Obama administration for support but were rejected in favor of negotiations led by the Saudi regime and other autocratic GCC monarchies. This greatly set back the hopes for a genuine democratic revolution and alienated the very liberal youth who would otherwise be the West\u2019s most likely Yemeni allies.<\/p>\n

As Francisco Martin-Royal, an expert on counter-radicalization in the region, at that time, \u201cThe lack of U.S. support means that these young men and women, who effectively ousted Saleh and continue to call for democratic institutions, have broadly failed to have a voice in the formation of Yemen\u2019s new government or have their legitimate concerns be taken seriously.\u201d<\/p>\n

He continued, \u201cYemen\u2019s pro-democracy activists largely blame the U.S. for failing to live up to its rhetoric \u2014 a disillusionment that potentially makes them vulnerable to recruitment by other well-organized forces that are against the existing regime, namely extremist groups like AQAP and separatist movements. From their perspective, the only real changes in Yemen \u2014 the establishment of a semi-autonomous region by the Houthis and the propagation of sharia law in various cities in southern Yemen by Ansar al-Sharia \u2014 have come through violence.\u201d<\/p>\n

U.S. Ambassador Feierstein kept pushing the vague idea of a \u201cnational dialogue\u201d among elites and criticized ongoing protests within the government institutions, particularly military units<\/a>, on the grounds that \u201cthe problems have to be resolved through this process of dialogue and negotiations.\u201d By contrast, he castigated<\/a> the pro-democracy activists, saying \u201cWe\u2019ve also been clear in saying we don\u2019t believe that the demonstrations are the place where Yemen\u2019s problems will be solved.\u201d<\/p>\n

In February 2012, President Obama publicly endorsed<\/a> Hadi, claiming \u2014 despite Hadi\u2019s service as vice-president in a repressive regime and his distinction as the only candidate in the subsequent plebiscite \u2014 that his subsequent election was \u201ca model for how peaceful transition in the Middle East can occur.\u201d<\/p>\n

The pro-democracy movement thus largely gave up on the United States, with prominent young pro-democracy activist Khaled al-Anesi fuming<\/a>, \u201cThis revolution has been stabbed in the back.\u201d<\/p>\n

What Could Have Been?<\/strong><\/p>\n

This marginalization of Yemeni civil society \u2014 which had struggled for so many months nonviolently for democracy \u2014 and Washington\u2019s failure to accept the broad-based National Council to head an interim government created the conditions that led to the dramatic resurgence of the armed Houthi uprising, which until last year had only operated in the Zaydi heartland in the far northern part of the country.<\/p>\n

The Houthis were helped along by the Hadi government\u2019s lack of credibility, ongoing corruption and ineptitude at all levels of government, a mass resignation of Yemen\u2019s cabinet, and controversial proposals for constitutional change. They also received support from armed groups allied with the former Saleh dictatorship, which enabled the Houthis \u2014 who represent only a minority of Yemenis \u2014 to nevertheless emerge as the most powerful force in Yemen. They surprised the world by seizing the capital of Sanaa in August, consolidating power in January, and subsequently expanding southward.<\/p>\n

Most Yemenis strongly oppose the Houthi militia and, in Taiz and other parts of the country, have challenged their armed advance through massive civil resistance and other nonviolent means. Yet the Houthis have actually expanded their areas of control in some key regions, even where they\u2019ve faced armed resistance and Saudi air strikes.<\/p>\n

It would be much too simplistic to blame the current crisis in Yemen entirely on the United States. However, one still has to wonder: If instead of allying with Saudi autocrats to install another strongman in the name of stability, Washington had supported that country\u2019s nonviolent pro-democracy movement, what might have been?<\/p>\n

_______________________________<\/p>\n

Stephen Zunes is a professor of politics at the University of San Francisco, where he coordinates the Middle Eastern Studies program, and co-chairs the academic advisory committee for the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. He is the author, along with Jacob Mundy, of <\/em>Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution <\/em>(Syracuse University Press, 2010).<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 fpif.org<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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