{"id":65567,"date":"2015-10-26T12:06:09","date_gmt":"2015-10-26T12:06:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=65567"},"modified":"2015-11-01T13:29:21","modified_gmt":"2015-11-01T13:29:21","slug":"the-drone-papers-manhunting-in-the-hindu-kush-5-of-8","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2015\/10\/the-drone-papers-manhunting-in-the-hindu-kush-5-of-8\/","title":{"rendered":"The Drone Papers – Manhunting in the Hindu Kush (5 of 8)"},"content":{"rendered":"

[The Intercept has obtained a cache of secret documents detailing the inner workings of the U.S. military\u2019s assassination program in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The documents, provided by a whistleblower, offer an unprecedented glimpse into Obama\u2019s drone wars. The source said he decided to provide these documents to <\/em>The Intercept because he believes the public has a right to understand the process by which people are placed on kill lists and ultimately assassinated on orders from the highest echelons of the U.S. government.]<\/em><\/p>\n

Civilian Casualties and Strategic Failures in America\u2019s Longest War<\/em><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. The Assassination Complex<\/a><\/li>\n
  2. A Visual Glossary<\/a><\/li>\n
  3. The Kill Chain<\/a><\/li>\n
  4. Find, Fix, Finish<\/a><\/li>\n
  5. Manhunting in the Hindu Kush<\/a><\/li>\n
  6. Firing Blind<\/a><\/li>\n
  7. The Life and Death of Objective Peckham<\/a><\/li>\n
  8. Target Africa<\/a><\/li>\n
  9. The Alphabet of Assassination (Glossary of Terms)<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    From 2011 to 2013, the most elite forces in the U.S. military, supported by the CIA and other elements of the intelligence community, set out to destroy the Taliban and al Qaeda forces that remained hidden among the soaring peaks and plunging valleys of the Hindu Kush, along Afghanistan\u2019s northeastern border with Pakistan. Dubbed Operation Haymaker, the campaign has been described as a potential model for the future of American warfare: special operations units, partnered with embedded intelligence elements running a network of informants, pinpointing members of violent organizations, then drawing up plans to eliminate those targets from the battlefield, either by capturing or killing them.<\/em><\/p>\n

    15 Oct 2015 – <\/em>Intelligence community documents obtained by The Intercept<\/em>, detailing the purpose and achievements of the Haymaker campaign, indicate that the American forces involved in the operations had, at least on paper, all of the components they needed to succeed. After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, a robust network of intelligence sources \u2014 including informants on the ground \u2014 had been established in parts of the historically rebellious, geographically imposing provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. The operators leading the campaign included some of the most highly trained military units at the Obama administration\u2019s disposal, and they were supported by the world\u2019s most powerful electronic surveillance agencies, equipped with technology that allowed for unmatched tracking of wanted individuals.<\/p>\n

    Despite all these advantages, the military\u2019s own analysis demonstrates that the Haymaker campaign was in many respects a failure. The vast majority of those killed in airstrikes were not the direct targets. Nor did the campaign succeed in significantly degrading al Qaeda\u2019s operations in the region. When contacted by The Intercept<\/em> with a series of questions regarding the Haymaker missions, the United States Special Operations Command in Afghanistan declined to comment on the grounds that the campaign \u2014 though now finished \u2014 remains classified.<\/p>\n

    The secret documents obtained by The Intercept<\/em> include detailed slides pertaining to Haymaker and other operations in the restive border regions of Afghanistan, including images, names, and affiliations of alleged militants killed or captured as a result of the missions; examples of the intelligence submitted to trigger lethal operations; and a \u201cstory board\u201d of a completed drone strike. The targets identified in the slides as killed or detained represent a range of militant groups, including alleged members of the Taliban and al Qaeda \u2014 but also local forces with no international terrorism ambitions, groups that took up arms against the U.S after American airstrikes brought the war to their doorsteps.<\/p>\n

    An additional slide included in the materials charts mission statistics from September 2011 to September 2012 for Task Force 3-10, which was responsible for special operations across Afghanistan, breaking down in rare detail the more than 2,000 missions conducted by elite U.S. forces in the country over the course of a year.<\/p>\n

    Together, the materials offer an unprecedented glimpse into the kind of killing that has come to define the war on terror, underscoring the inherent limitations, and human cost, of those operations. With the Obama administration publicly committed to continuing campaigns like Haymaker \u2014 special operations missions focused on hunting down specific individuals, not only in Afghanistan but in nations around the world \u2014 the documents raise profound questions over the legacy of the longest foreign war in American history and its influence on conflicts to come.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A village security force commander and coalition special operations forces identify insurgent fighting positions during a daylong firefight in Nuristan province, Afghanistan, April 12, 2012.
    Photo: U.S. Department of Defense<\/p><\/div>\n

    ******<\/p>\n

    The frequency with which \u201ctargeted killing\u201d operations hit unnamed bystanders is among the more striking takeaways from the Haymaker slides. The documents show that during a five-month stretch of the campaign, nearly nine out of 10 people who died in airstrikes were not the Americans\u2019 direct targets. By February 2013, Haymaker airstrikes had resulted in no more than 35 \u201cjackpots,\u201d a term used to signal the neutralization of a specific targeted individual, while more than 200 people were declared EKIA \u2014 \u201cenemy killed in action.\u201d<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A summary of operations conducted from January 2012 through February 2013 as part of Operation Haymaker, a U.S. military campaign in northeastern Afghanistan aimed at rooting out elements of al Qaeda and the Taliban.<\/p><\/div>\n

    In the complex world of remote killing in remote locations, labeling the dead as \u201cenemies\u201d until proven otherwise is commonplace, said an intelligence community source with experience working on high-value targeting missions in Afghanistan, who provided the documents on the Haymaker campaign. The process often depends on assumptions or best guesses in provinces like Kunar or Nuristan, the source said, particularly if the dead include \u201cmilitary-age males,\u201d or MAMs, in military parlance. \u201cIf there is no evidence that proves a person killed in a strike was either not a MAM, or was a MAM but not an unlawful enemy combatant, then there is no question,\u201d he said. \u201cThey label them EKIA.\u201d In the case of airstrikes in a campaign like Haymaker, the source added, missiles could be fired from a variety of aircraft. \u201cBut nine times out of 10 it\u2019s a drone strike.\u201d<\/p>\n

    The source is deeply suspicious of those airstrikes \u2014 the ones ostensibly based on hard evidence and intended to kill specific individuals \u2014 which end up taking numerous lives. Certainty about the death of a direct target often requires more than simply waiting for the smoke to clear. Confirming a chosen target was indeed killed can include days of monitoring signals intelligence and communication with sources on the ground, none of which is perfect 100 percent of the time. Firing a missile at a target in a group of people, the source said, requires \u201can even greater leap of faith\u201d \u2014 a leap that he believes often treats physical proximity as evidence.<\/p>\n

    The documents include slides focused specifically on Haymaker operations from January 2012 to February 2013, distinguishing between raids, described as \u201cenabled\u201d and \u201ccombined\u201d operations, and airstrikes, which are described as \u201ckinetic strikes.\u201d In both cases, raids and airstrikes, the source said the target was always an individual person. \u201cEvery mission that\u2019s triggered begins as an objective to find one person for whatever reason,\u201d the source said, adding, \u201cEvery jackpot is one person off the list.\u201d<\/p>\n

    According to the documents, raids performed on the ground during Haymaker were far less lethal than airstrikes and led to the capture of scores of individuals. Research by Larry Lewis, formerly a principal research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses, supports that conclusion. Lewis spent years studying U.S. operations in Afghanistan, including raids, airstrikes, and jackpots, all with an eye to understanding why civilian casualties happen and how to better prevent them. His contract work for the U.S. military, much of it classified, included a focus on civilian casualties and informed tactical directives issued by the top generals guiding the war. During his years of research, what Lewis uncovered in his examination of U.S. airstrikes, particularly those delivered by machines thought to be the most precise in the Pentagon\u2019s arsenal, was dramatic. He found <\/a>that drone strikes in Afghanistan were 10 times more likely to kill civilians than conventional aircraft.<\/p>\n

    \u201cWe assume that they\u2019re surgical but they\u2019re not,\u201d Lewis said in an interview. \u201cCertainly in Afghanistan, in the time frame I looked at, the rate of civilian casualties was significantly higher for unmanned vehicles than it was for manned aircraft airstrikes. And that was a lot higher than raids.\u201d<\/p>\n

    The limited point of view of the drone\u2019s camera, what Lewis describes as the \u201csoda straw effect,\u201d together with the globally dispersed operational network that supports drone strikes, can lead to mistakes, he argues, including the loss of innocent lives. The materials obtained by The Intercept <\/em>make just one explicit mention of civilian casualties, in the Task Force 3-10 mission statistics from September 2011 through September 2012. The document<\/a> reveals the U.S. conducted more than 1,800 \u201cnight ops\u201d at a time when President Hamid Karzai was calling for an end to American involvement in controversial night raids. Of those operations \u2014 which resulted in 1,239 targets captured or killed and 709 \u201cassociates\u201d of targets captured or killed \u2014 the military reported \u201cshots fired\u201d in less than 9 percent of its missions, with a total of 14 civilian casualty \u201cevents\u201d for the year.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A breakdown of 2011 to 2012 mission statistics for Task Force 3-10, a U.S. special operations task force responsible for missions in Afghanistan at the time.<\/p><\/div>\n

    \u201cThe 14 civilian casualties is highly suspect,\u201d said the source, who reviewed after-action reports on raids and other operations in Afghanistan. \u201cI know the actual number is much higher,\u201d he added. \u201cBut they make the numbers themselves so they can get away with writing off most of the kills as legitimate.\u201d<\/p>\n

    The Haymaker documents reveal little about whether the deaths reflected in the materials were \u201clegitimate\u201d or not. They do, however, offer an illustrative window into how the killing has been done in the past \u2014 and how it may be done in the future.<\/p>\n

    \"U.S.<\/a>

    U.S. special operations personnel prepare to board a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter during a mission in Kunar province, Afghanistan, Feb. 25, 2012.
    Photo: U.S. Department of Defense<\/p><\/div>\n

    ******<\/p>\n

    The request was unambiguous. Dated October 30, 2012, and stamped with the seal of the United States Central Command, the title read, \u201cRequest for Kinetic Strike Approval.\u201d The \u201cdesired results\u201d listed at the top of the document<\/a> included just three words: \u201cKill Qari Munib.\u201d<\/p>\n

    Munib, whose objective name was \u201cLethal Burwyn,\u201d was described as a Taliban subcommander operating in the Pech district of Kunar province. He allegedly exercised command and control over a specific portion of the organization, was responsible for numerous attacks on both coalition and Afghan security forces, and communicated with Taliban officials in Pakistan. Specifically, the request reported, Munib had been implicated in recent plots to carry out improvised explosives attacks.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A 2012 U.S. military request for an airstrike targeting Qari Munib, an alleged Taliban subcommander operating in northeastern Afghanistan.<\/p><\/div>\n

    The Americans considered the consequences of taking Munib\u2019s life, including media coverage, possible political fallout, and potential \u201cpopulation blowback.\u201d In all three categories, it was determined that negative repercussions were \u201cunlikely,\u201d and that Munib\u2019s death would \u201cdecrease attacks on\u201d coalition and Afghan forces. Going through with the operation, the request asserted, would require a signals intelligence \u201ccorrelation,\u201d followed by a full motion video lock, visual identification within 24 hours of the strike, and a \u201clow\u201d probability of collateral damage. Two maps were featured in the document intended to seal Munib\u2019s fate, one of which included coordinates of his last known location. In the bottom right hand corner of the document was a bar, numbered one to 10, and fading in color from red to green. It was titled \u201cConfidence Level.\u201d A red triangle sat between the numbers nine and 10.<\/p>\n

    Less than a week after the briefing was completed, the kill mission was underway. Signals intelligence had been picked up from a compound where Munib was known to sleep, according to a storyboard detailing the operation. Images relayed from the scene revealed the presence of five military-age males in the area. Floating above the site, an MQ-9 Reaper drone, known as \u201cSkyraider,\u201d captured the image of a man dressed in a drab, flowing robe, with a white cap on his head, casting a long shadow in the dirt. According to the storyboard, the image was \u201ccorrelated\u201d to signals intelligence linked to Munib.<\/p>\n

    Skyraider loitered above as the man, joined by two others, walked up a ridgeline before heading back into the compound. The figure again emerged from the building. The drone\u2019s camera registered a positive identification. Skyraider \u201cengaged.\u201d A screen grab from the scene shows a cloud of smoke where the individual had been. Task force personnel watched as a group of people collected the target\u2019s remains.<\/p>\n

    \u201cRESULTS: JP \u2014 Pending EKIA, 1 x TOTAL EKIA,\u201d the storyboard reported. An enemy had been killed in action. Confirmation that he was indeed Munib, the jackpot, or JP, was still pending.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A storyboard detailing a 2012 U.S. drone strike targeting Qari Munib, an alleged Taliban subcommander.<\/p><\/div>\n

    On Friday, November 9, 2012, NATO issued one of its standard updates on missions around the country, including two short lines about an operation carried out the day before in eastern Afghanistan. \u201cAn Afghan and coalition security force killed Taliban leader Qari Munib during a security operation in Kunar province Thursday,\u201d the statement read<\/a>. \u201cQari Munib was responsible for directing attacks against Afghan and coalition forces and coordinating the movement of weapons and ammunition for the attacks.\u201d<\/p>\n

    The announcement appeared five days after the drone strike described in the intelligence community storyboard, which made no mention of Afghan forces involved in the operation. Was Munib killed in a unilateral U.S. drone strike, later obfuscated by NATO? Or did the drone strike fail to jackpot, resulting in a subsequent joint operation that succeeded in eliminating him? If so, who was it that Skyraider engaged that day? Whose body parts did the American analysts watch the first responders collect?<\/p>\n

    Those questions remain unanswered. A more fundamental question suggests itself, however. How did the most powerful military in history come to devote its elite forces and advanced technology to the hunt for a man like Qari Munib \u2014 a mid-level Taliban figure in a remote corner of the planet, half a world away from the White House and ground zero in Manhattan, more than 11 years after the September 11 attacks?<\/p>\n

    ******<\/p>\n

    When the americans set out to kill Qari Munib with a drone in 2012, an intelligence document<\/a> purporting to lay out his bona fides as a target listed local insurgency figures alongside regional actors. In a graphic titled \u201cLink Analysis,\u201d Munib\u2019s name appears under a generic cartoon of an Afghan male, surrounded by six other headshots. Half of them are described as \u201cSalafists,\u201d a conservative faction that has existed in Kunar for decades and, for a period, resisted Taliban presence in the province.<\/p>\n

    One of the Salafists pictured was Haji Matin, a timber trader from the Korengal Valley. In the early years of the war, one of Matin\u2019s business rivals wrongly fingered him as a militant to the Americans. U.S. forces responded by bombing Matin\u2019s home. While Matin survived, several members of his family were killed<\/a>. The Americans then appropriated one of his lumberyards as an outpost, thus turning one of the most powerful men in the area into a formidable insurgent leader. The transformation of men like Matin and the Salafists, once locally minded powerbrokers, into anti-U.S. fighters, was hardly unique.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A \u201cLink Analysis\u201d purporting to detail alleged Taliban subcommander Qari Munib\u2019s ties to other militant figures.<\/p><\/div>\n

    \u201cWhen viewed from absolutely the wrong metric, the Americans were very successful at hunting people,\u201d said Matt Trevithick, a researcher who in 2014 made more than a dozen unembedded trips<\/a> to some of Kunar\u2019s most remote areas in an effort to understand the province, and American actions there, through the eyes of its residents. The problem, he said, is that savvy, opportunistic strongmen maneuvered to draw U.S. forces into local conflicts, a dynamic that played out again and again throughout the war. \u201cWe knew nothing about who we were shooting at \u2014 specifically in Kunar,\u201d Trevithick said. He understands the frustration of conventional U.S. forces who were dropped in places like Kunar. \u201cI don\u2019t blame them,\u201d he said. \u201cThey\u2019re put in an impossible situation themselves. But what happens is everyone starts looking like the enemy. And that means you start shooting. And that means people actually do become the enemy.\u201d<\/p>\n

    In September 2010, nine years after the terrorist attacks in New York City, the U.S. military and coalition forces were working their way through a list of 744 people slated for death or capture in Afghanistan. According to the so-called Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL), provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, Kunar, with 44 targets, had the third-highest total in the country. Few of the Kunar targets represented core al Qaeda-linked figures, and many were associated with local groups like the Salafists, whose listed offenses typically included attacks on Western and Afghan government forces in the province. The targets on the 2010 list were prioritized with rankings of one to four, in terms their significance, with one being the most significant. In Kunar, a single target rose to the level of priority one, while more than 80 percent were designated priority three. Seven of the JPEL targets appear in the Haymaker slides, though just three had been linked to al Qaeda. Regardless of their associations, the U.S. ultimately devoted the same resources to picking off locally affiliated militants as it did to the campaign against the group responsible for 9\/11.<\/p>\n

    After nearly a decade of war, thousands of operations, and thousands of deaths, some within the special operations community began to question the quality of the United States\u2019 targets in Afghanistan. \u201cBy 2010, guys were going after street thugs,\u201d a former SEAL Team 6 officer told<\/a> the New York Times<\/em> recently. \u201cThe most highly trained force in the world, chasing after street thugs.\u201d Concerns that the U.S. was devoting tremendous resources to kill off a never-ending stream of nobodies did little to halt the momentum.<\/p>\n

    \"Cyber<\/a>

    Cyber and military intelligence specialists monitor Army networks in the Cyber Mission Unit\u2019s Cyber Operations Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia.
    Photo: U.S. Army Cyber Command<\/p><\/div>\n

    ******<\/p>\n

    The secret documents obtained by The Intercept<\/em>, which include a slide<\/a> on \u201cManhunting Basics,\u201d reflect the combination of U.S. military personnel and spies who have hunted targets along Afghanistan\u2019s border with Pakistan for years. According to one of the slides<\/a>, the Haymaker \u201cfunctional teams\u201d included the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the NSA, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Air Force\u2019s uniquely designed 11th Intelligence Squadron also played a role. The Florida-based squadron was reactivated<\/a> in August 2006 for the express purpose of supporting \u201cfind, fix, finish\u201d operations to capture or kill targets through analysis of aerial intelligence.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A slide detailing Operation Haymaker\u2019s \u201cfunctional teams,\u201d which included personnel from a range of U.S. military units and intelligence agencies.<\/p><\/div>\n

    The drone operations that supported campaigns like Haymaker also included personnel stationed at Camp Alpha, a secure facility at Bagram populated by teams from the military\u2019s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), as well as contractors manning stations at U.S. bases like Fort Gordon, a lesser-known though crucial node in the war on terror that supports tactical NSA operations abroad from Augusta, Georgia. The hunting and killing operations relied on advanced technology to zero in on targets, including the cellphone geolocation system known as GILGAMESH. As The Intercept<\/em> reported<\/a> in 2014, the GILGAMESH system employs a simulated cellphone tower to identify and locate targeted SIM cards.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A slide on \u201cManhunting Basics\u201d takes a lighthearted approach to the core mission of the Haymaker campaign: finding and killing specific individuals.
    ABI = Activity Based Intelligence; F3EA = Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze; HUMINT = Human Intelligence; IMINT = Imagery Intelligence; IPB = Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace; SIGINT = Signals Intelligence; SNA= Social Network Analysis<\/p><\/div>\n

    While signals intelligence and electronic surveillance clearly contributed to Haymaker\u2019s kinetic operations \u2014 like the drone strike that targeted Qari Munib \u2014 there was evidently more to the missions than advanced technology. Unlike some other arenas in which the war on terror has touched down \u2014 Yemen or Somalia, for example \u2014 the documents point to the robust presence of U.S. intelligence agencies and human sources on the ground in northeastern Afghanistan. In Nuristan\u2019s Waygal district, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA had \u201cmyriad complementary sources,\u201d a slide<\/a> laying out \u201ctargeting criteria\u201d in the district noted, \u201csome of whom may be able to trigger our operations.\u201d A third of the \u201cactive targets\u201d in Waygal had \u201cgood selectors\u201d \u2014 phones the Americans could target in the run-up to a raid or airstrike \u2014 and the NSA had \u201ctaken on [signals intelligence] development in Waygal, greatly enhancing our understanding of the [signals intelligence] environment.\u201d<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A slide reporting a robust presence of human intelligence sources (HUMINT or HI) in the district of Waygal, a \u201chistoric\u201d al Qaeda sanctuary in northeastern Afghanistan.<\/p><\/div>\n

    According to the slide, Waygal, described as a \u201chistoric\u201d al Qaeda sanctuary, included more than a half-dozen NAIs, \u201cnamed areas of interest,\u201d the identification of which was attributed to similarly \u201chistoric\u201d levels of human and signals intelligence cultivation, as well as surveillance provided by drones scanning the district. There were \u201cover a dozen active targets\u201d in three villages, the slide said, adding that most of the targets were already on a targeting list, or \u201ceasily could be.\u201d \u201cThe targets there are not only senior-level Taliban facilitators and hosts, but Arabs themselves,\u201d the slide noted, underscoring the presence of suspected foreign fighters in the district. \u201cElimination of these targets,\u201d it continued, \u201cwill provide demonstrable measures of success.\u201d<\/p>\n

    The documents indicate that U.S. forces launched just one airstrike as part of the Haymaker campaign in the early months of 2012, killing two people. In May 2012, however, the tempo of operations picked up dramatically, an increase that coincided with a strategic shift in Afghanistan emanating from the White House. As the military\u2019s focus shifted to hunting down specific targets from 2011 to 2012, drone strikes in Afghanistan increased<\/a> by 72 percent.<\/p>\n

    Over the course of five months, stretching through the summer of 2012, Haymaker operations included 27 raids and 27 airstrikes. The raids resulted in the capture of 61 people, 13 of them jackpots, the actual targets of the missions. A total of two people were reportedly killed in these ground operations. In the airstrikes, meanwhile, a total of 155 people were killed and labeled as enemies killed in action, according to a table<\/a> presented in the documents. Just 19 were jackpots. The table does not say whether the jackpots are reflected in the EKIA total. It does, however, appear to present a success rate: the number of jackpots divided by the number of missions. In the case of raids, a figure of 48 percent is presented; for airstrikes it\u2019s 70 percent.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A comparison of raids (described as \u201cenabled ops\u201d) and airstrikes (described as \u201ckinetic strikes\u201d) reveals significant differences in the total number of prisoners taken versus individuals killed during an intensified period of Haymaker operations.
    EKIA = Enemy Killed in Action; JP = Jackpot.<\/p><\/div>\n

    The scores of unnamed people killed in the hunt for jackpots, and the intelligence opportunities lost by failing to capture targets alive, do not appear to factor into the calculation. The apparent success rate, in other words, depends solely on killing jackpots, and ignores the strategic \u2014 and human \u2014 consequences of killing large numbers of bystanders.<\/p>\n

    While the source conceded there could be scenarios in which women and children killed in an airstrike are labeled as EKIA, in the case of the Haymaker strikes he believed it was \u201cmore likely\u201d that the dead included \u201cgroups of men or teenaged boys\u201d killed because \u201cthe intel says the guy JSOC is going after may be in that group of men.\u201d In the event that a target is identified in such a group, he said, \u201cThey\u2019ll go through with the strike.\u201d<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A quote attributed to an alleged Taliban detainee describes the psychological impact of living under the threat of U.S. airstrikes.<\/p><\/div>\n

    The materials also include a chart revealing that airstrikes killed 219 people over a 14-month period in 2012 and 2013, resulting in at least 35 jackpots. The document<\/a> includes thumbnail images of individuals, representing a range of groups, who were captured or killed during Haymaker \u2014 in total 30 men, 24 of them stamped EKIA, five detained, and one wounded in action. The deaths of just over half the individuals were noted in NATO\u2019s press releases or media reports.<\/p>\n

    ******<\/p>\n

    The Haymaker files also point to the psychological impact of living under the constant threat of death from above \u2014 an effect human rights workers have documented<\/a> among civilians living in areas populated by militants. A quote attributed to a Taliban detainee identified as \u201cAhmad,\u201d aka \u201cObjective Brandywine,\u201d features prominently on three of the documents<\/a>. \u201cHands down, the scariest\/most intimidating message for the Taliban, at any level, from fighter to Taliban senior leadership, is anything to do with drones or aerial bombings,\u201d Ahmad purportedly said. \u201cThe Taliban has no way to defend against them and they are certain to end in absolute destruction of whatever their target is.\u201d<\/p>\n

    Still, the documents\u2019 assessment of Haymaker\u2019s effectiveness was frank. A slide detailing the campaign\u2019s \u201ceffects\u201d from January 2012 through February 2013 included an assessment of \u201cObjectives & Measures of Effectiveness.\u201d The results were not good. Disruptions in al Qaeda\u2019s view of northeastern Afghanistan as a safe haven and the loss of \u201ckey\u201d al Qaeda members and enablers in the region were deemed \u201cmarginal.\u201d Meanwhile, a comparison<\/a> of Haymaker 1.0 (August 2011) with Haymaker 2.0 (February 2013) noted that al Qaeda faced \u201clittle to no local opposition\u201d and enjoyed \u201crelatively free movement\u201d to and from Pakistan. Kinetic strikes, the slide reported, \u201csuccessfully killed one [al Qaeda] target per year,\u201d allowing the organization to \u201ceasily\u201d reconstitute.<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A slide reveals the Haymaker campaign\u2019s limited strategic achievements.<\/p><\/div>\n

    By 2013, Haymaker was amassing a significant body count but making little headway against al Qaeda forces in the region. According to the \u201cSuccess Criteria\u201d slide, \u201csporadic reporting of concern over [the] viability\u201d of northeastern Afghanistan as a safe haven had been \u201covershadowed\u201d by the group\u2019s senior leadership discussing the establishment of a \u201cpost-2014 sanctuary.\u201d Individuals continued to return to Pakistan to support operations in and outside of Afghanistan, the slide asserted. While \u201cnascent developments in some valleys\u201d indicated that locals were \u201ctiring\u201d of al Qaeda\u2019s efforts to \u201croot out spies as a perceived method to stopping strikes,\u201d the strikes and raids themselves had \u201csucceeded in killing\/capturing few [al Qaeda] targets.\u201d As slides detailing its effectiveness noted, Haymaker\u2019s impact on al Qaeda and Taliban enablers in Kunar and Nuristan was \u201cconsidered temporary without a long-term, persistent campaign.\u201d<\/p>\n

    \"A<\/a>

    A wounded Afghan boy receives treatment at a hospital in Kunar province on Feb. 13, 2013, after a NATO airstrike killed 10 civilians.
    Photo: Namatullah Karyab\/AFP\/Getty Images<\/p><\/div>\n

    ******<\/p>\n

    On February 18, 2013, while Haymaker was still underway, Afghan President Hamid Karzai issued a decree<\/a>: Afghan military forces were barred from calling in U.S. airstrikes for support on missions. The order followed an operation in Kunar in which NATO and Afghan forces were blamed for the deaths of 10 civilians \u2014 including one man, four women, and five children. In 2012, the U.N. mission in Afghanistan had documented a number of other incidents involving civilian deaths resulting from U.S. operations, including a raid that left seven civilians dead, an \u201caerial attack\u201d that killed seven children and one adult, and a drone strike targeting \u201ctwo insurgents\u201d that killed a teenage girl.<\/p>\n

    The most recent date included in the Haymaker materials is February 28, 2013. Whether the date marked the end of the campaign is unclear. What does seem clear, however, is that Haymaker coincided with an increase in drone strikes and civilian casualties across Afghanistan. By the end of 2013, the U.N. reported the number of civilian casualties from drone strikes in Afghanistan had tripled from 2012, with \u201calmost one-third of the civilian deaths from aerial operations\u201d reported in Kunar, the heart of the Haymaker campaign. Records of condolence payments disbursed by the U.S. military, obtained<\/a> by The Intercept, <\/em>show more than $118,000 distributed in 45 disbursements to Kunar in fiscal years 2011 through 2013. In addition to numerous injuries, the payments also cover the deaths of 27 people, including at least four children. The records do not indicate whether the incidents were linked to the Haymaker campaign or whether they were the result of mistaken ground raids or airstrikes.<\/p>\n

    \"drone<\/a><\/p>\n

    Until recently, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan had largely receded from public conversations in the U.S. This month, an American airstrike on a hospital run by the international organization M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res, offered a forceful reminder that the war, despite the Obama administration\u2019s declaration in 2014, is far from over. Unleashed in the early morning hours of October 3, in the province of Kunduz, the U.S. attack killed at least a dozen members of the humanitarian group\u2019s medical staff and 10 patients, including three children. A nurse on the scene recalled seeing six victims in the intensive care unit ablaze in their beds. \u201cThere are no words for how terrible it was,\u201d the nurse said<\/a>. MSF denounced the strike as a war crime and demanded an independent investigation.<\/p>\n

    The Kunduz attack underscored<\/a> an ugly reality: After nearly a decade and a half of war, more than 2,300 American lives lost<\/a>, and an estimated 26,000 Afghan civilians killed<\/a>, the nature of combat in Afghanistan is entering a new, potentially bloodier, phase. In August, the United Nations reported<\/a> that civilian casualties in Afghanistan \u201care projected to equal or exceed the record high numbers documented last year.\u201d While most civilian casualties in the first half of 2015 were attributed to \u201canti-government\u201d forces, 27 deaths and 22 injuries were attributed to airstrikes \u201cby international military forces,\u201d a 23 percent increase over last year, most of them, unlike the air raid in Kunduz, carried out by drones.<\/p>\n

    Despite the rise in civilian casualties and the well-documented failure of drone strikes to achieve the military\u2019s broader objectives, there is every indication that unmanned airstrikes will play an increasing role in U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan, as they have in war zones across the world. Less than two weeks after the U.N. issued its report, Foreign Policy<\/em> revealed<\/a> that JSOC has drastically reduced the number of night raids it conducts in Afghanistan, while dramatically increasing its reliance on airstrikes, and is currently \u201con pace to double the rate at which it kills \u2018high-value individuals\u2019 using kinetic strikes, compared to how many it was killing that way five years ago.\u201d<\/p>\n

    Afghanistan\u2019s northeastern border with Pakistan remains an active area of focus for the remaining U.S. special operations forces in the country. The Pech Valley, once a hotspot during the Haymaker campaign, continues to host a constellation of armed groups. Al Qaeda, the organization used to justify both the invasion of Afghanistan and the Haymaker campaign, reportedly enjoys a more pronounced presence in the valley than ever. \u201cThe al Qaeda presence there now,\u201d according to a report <\/a>by the United States Institute for Peace, \u201cis larger than when U.S. counterterrorism forces arrived in 2002.\u201d<\/p>\n

    With JSOC and the CIA running a new drone war<\/a> in Iraq and Syria, much of Haymaker\u2019s strategic legacy lives on. Such campaigns, with their tenuous strategic impacts and significant death tolls, should serve as a reminder of the dangers fallible lethal systems pose, the intelligence community source said. \u201cThis isn\u2019t to say that the drone program is a complete wash and it\u2019s never once succeeded in carrying out its stated purpose,\u201d he pointed out. \u201cIt certainly has.\u201d But even the operations military commanders would point to as successes, he argued, can have unseen impacts, particularly in the remote communities where U.S. missiles so often rain down. \u201cI would like to think that what we were doing was in some way trying to help Afghans,\u201d the source explained, but the notion \u201cthat what we were part of was actually defending the homeland or in any way to the benefit of the American public\u201d evaporated long ago. \u201cThere\u2019s no illusion of that that exists in Afghanistan,\u201d he said. \u201cIt hasn\u2019t existed for many years.\u201d<\/p>\n

    _____________________________<\/p>\n

    Additional\u00a0reporting:\u00a0\u00a0Jeremy\u00a0Scahill<\/a> <\/em><\/p>\n

    Research:\u00a0\u00a0Margot\u00a0Williams<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

    Contact the author <\/em>Ryan Devereaux<\/em> – ryan.devereaux@\u200btheintercept.com<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

    Go to Original \u2013 theintercept.com<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Civilian Casualties and Strategic Failures in America\u2019s Longest War <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[197],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65567","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-special-feature"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65567","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65567"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65567\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65567"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65567"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65567"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}