{"id":77119,"date":"2016-08-01T12:00:09","date_gmt":"2016-08-01T11:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=77119"},"modified":"2016-07-31T13:36:23","modified_gmt":"2016-07-31T12:36:23","slug":"the-real-secret-of-the-south-china-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2016\/08\/the-real-secret-of-the-south-china-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"The Real Secret of the South China Sea"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"pepeescobar\"<\/a>The South China Sea is and will continue to be the ultimate geopolitical flashpoint of the young 21st century \u2013 way ahead of the Middle East or Russia\u2019s western borderlands. No less than the future of Asia \u2013 as well as the East-West balance of power \u2013 is at stake.<\/em><\/p>\n

To understand the Big Picture, we need to\u00a0go back to\u00a01890 when Alfred Mahan, then president of\u00a0the US Naval College, wrote the seminal The Influence of\u00a0Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. Mahan\u2019s central thesis is that the US should go global in\u00a0search of\u00a0new markets, and protect these new trade routes through\u00a0a network of\u00a0naval bases.<\/p>\n

That is the embryo of\u00a0the US Empire of\u00a0Bases \u2013 which de facto started after\u00a0the Spanish-American war, over\u00a0a century ago, when the US graduated to\u00a0Pacific power status by\u00a0annexing the Philippines, Hawaii and Guam.<\/p>\n

Western \u2013 American and European\u00a0\u2014 colonialism is strictly responsible for\u00a0the current, incendiary sovereignty battle in\u00a0the South China Sea. It\u2019s the West that came up\u00a0with most land borders \u2013 and maritime borders\u00a0\u2014 of\u00a0these states.The roll call is quite impressive. Philippines and Indonesia were divided by\u00a0Spain and Portugal in\u00a01529. The division between\u00a0Malaysia and Indonesia is owed to\u00a0the British and the Dutch in\u00a01842. The border between\u00a0China and Vietnam was imposed to\u00a0the Chinese by\u00a0the French in\u00a01887. The Philippines\u2019s borders were concocted by\u00a0the US and Spain in\u00a01898. The border between\u00a0Philippines and Malaysia was drawn by\u00a0the US and the Brits in\u00a01930.<\/p>\n

We are talking about\u00a0borders between\u00a0different colonial possessions \u2013 and that implies intractable problems from\u00a0the start, subsequently inherited by\u00a0post-colonial nations. And to\u00a0think that it had all started as\u00a0a loose configuration. The best anthropological studies (Bill Solheim\u2019s, for\u00a0instance) define the semi-nomadic communities who really traveled and traded across\u00a0the South China Sea from\u00a0time immemorial as\u00a0the Nusantao \u2013 an Austronesian compound word for \u201csouth island\u201d and \u201cpeople\u201d.<\/p>\n

The Nusantao were not a defined ethnic group; rather a maritime internet. Over the centuries, they had many key hubs, from\u00a0the coastline between\u00a0central Vietnam and Hong Kong to\u00a0the Mekong Delta. They were not attached to\u00a0any \u201cstate\u201d, and the notion of \u201cborders\u201d didn\u2019t even exist.Only by\u00a0the late 19th century the Westphalian system managed to\u00a0freeze the South China Sea inside\u00a0an immovable framework. Which brings us to\u00a0why China is so sensitive about\u00a0its borders; because they are directly linked to\u00a0the \u201ccentury of\u00a0humiliation\u201d \u2013 when internal Chinese corruption and weakness allowed Western barbarians to\u00a0take possession of\u00a0Chinese land.<\/p>\n

Tension in\u00a0the nine-dash line<\/strong><\/p>\n

The eminent Chinese geographer Bai Meichu was a fierce nationalist who drew his own version of\u00a0what was called the \u201cChinese National Humiliation Map\u201d. In 1936 he published a map including a \u201cU-shaped line\u201d gobbling up\u00a0the South China Sea all the way down\u00a0to James Shoal, which is 1,500 km south of\u00a0China but\u00a0only over\u00a0100 km off\u00a0Borneo. Scores of\u00a0maps copied Meichu\u2019s. Most included the Spratly Islands, but\u00a0not James Shoal.<\/p>\n

The crucial fact is that Bai was the man who actually invented the \u201cnine-dash line\u201d, promoted by\u00a0the Chinese government \u2013 then not yet Communist \u2013 as\u00a0the letter of\u00a0the law in\u00a0terms of \u201chistoric\u201d Chinese claims over\u00a0islands in\u00a0the South China Sea.<\/p>\n

Everything stopped when Japan invaded China in\u00a01937. Japan had occupied Taiwan way back in\u00a01895. Now imagine Americans surrendering to\u00a0the Japanese in\u00a0the Philippines in\u00a01942. That meant virtually the entire coastline of\u00a0the South China Sea being controlled by\u00a0a single empire for\u00a0the fist time in\u00a0history. The South China Sea had become a Japanese lake.<\/p>\n

Not for\u00a0long; only until\u00a01945. The Japanese did occupy Woody Island in\u00a0the Paracels and Itu Aba (today Taiping) in\u00a0the Spratlys. After the end of\u00a0WWII and the US nuclear-bombing Japan, the Philippines became independent in\u00a01946; the Spratlys immediately were declared Filipino territory.In 1947 the Chinese went on\u00a0overdrive to\u00a0recover all the Paracels from\u00a0colonial power France. In parallel, all the islands in\u00a0the South China Sea got Chinese names. James Shoal was downgraded from\u00a0a sandbank into\u00a0a reef (it\u2019s actually underwater; still Beijing sees is as\u00a0the southernmost point of\u00a0Chinese territory.)<\/p>\n

In December 1947 all the islands were placed under\u00a0the control of\u00a0Hainan (itself an island in\u00a0southern China.) New maps\u00a0\u2014 based on\u00a0Meichu\u2019s\u00a0\u2014 followed, but\u00a0now with\u00a0Chinese names for\u00a0the islands (or reefs, or shoals). The key problem is that no one explained the meaning of\u00a0the dashes (which were originally eleven.)<\/p>\n

So in\u00a0June 1947 the Republic of\u00a0China claimed everything within\u00a0the line \u2013 while proclaiming itself open to\u00a0negotiate definitive maritime borders with\u00a0other nations later on. But, for\u00a0the moment, no borders; that was the birth of\u00a0the much-maligned \u201cstrategic ambiguity\u201d of\u00a0the South China Sea that lasts to\u00a0this day.<\/p>\n

\u201cRed\u201d China adopted all the maps\u00a0\u2014 and all the decisions. Yet the final maritime border between\u00a0China and Vietnam, for\u00a0instance, was decided only in\u00a01999. In 2009 China included a map of\u00a0the \u201cU-shaped\u201d or \u201cnine-dash line\u201d in\u00a0a presentation to\u00a0the UN Commission on\u00a0the Limits of\u00a0the Continental Shelf; that was the first time the line officially showed up\u00a0on an international level.
\nNo wonder other Southeast Asian players were furious. That was the apex of\u00a0the millennia-old transition from\u00a0the \u201cmaritime internet\u201d of\u00a0semi-nomadic peoples to\u00a0the Westphalian system. The post-modern \u201cwar\u201d for\u00a0the South China Sea was on.<\/p>\n

Gunboat freedom<\/strong><\/p>\n

In 2013 the Philippines \u2013 prodded by\u00a0the US and Japan \u2013 decided to\u00a0take its case about\u00a0Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in\u00a0the South China Sea to\u00a0be judged according to\u00a0the UN Convention on\u00a0the Law of\u00a0the Sea (UNCLOS). Both China and Philippines ratified UNCLOS. The US did not. The Philippines aimed for\u00a0UNCLOS \u2013 not \u201chistorical rights\u201d, as\u00a0the Chinese wanted\u00a0\u2014 to\u00a0decide what is an island, what is a rock, and who is entitled to\u00a0claim territorial rights (and thus EEZs) in\u00a0these surrounding waters.UNCLOS itself is the result of\u00a0years of\u00a0fierce legal battles. Still, key nations \u2013 including BRICS members China, India and Brazil, but\u00a0also, significantly, Vietnam and Malaysia \u2013 have been struggling to\u00a0change an absolutely key provision, making it mandatory for\u00a0foreign warships to\u00a0seek permission before\u00a0sailing through\u00a0their EEZs.<\/p>\n

And here we plunge in\u00a0truly, deeply troubled waters; the notion of \u201cfreedom of\u00a0navigation\u201d.<\/p>\n

For the American empire, \u201cfreedom of\u00a0navigation\u201d, from\u00a0the West Coast of\u00a0the US to\u00a0Asia \u2013 through\u00a0the Pacific, the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean \u2013 is strictly subordinated to\u00a0military strategy. Imagine if one day EEZs would be closed to\u00a0the US Navy \u2013 or if \u201cauthorization\u201d would have to\u00a0be demanded every time; the Empire of\u00a0Bases would lose \u201caccess\u201d to\u2026its own bases.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Add to\u00a0it trademark Pentagon paranoia; what if a \u201chostile power\u201d decided to\u00a0block the global trade on\u00a0which the US economy depends? (even though the premise\u00a0\u2014 China contemplating such a move\u00a0\u2014 is ludicrous). The Pentagon actually pursues a Freedom of\u00a0Navigation (FON) program. For all practical purposes, it\u2019s 21st century gunboat diplomacy, as\u00a0in those aircraft carriers showboating on\u00a0and off\u00a0in the South China Sea.The Holy Grail, as\u00a0far as\u00a0the 10-member Association of\u00a0Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is concerned, is to\u00a0come up\u00a0with a Code of\u00a0Conduct to\u00a0solve all maritime conflicts between\u00a0Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and China. This has been dragging on\u00a0for years now because mostly the Philippines wanted to\u00a0frame the Chinese under\u00a0a set of\u00a0binding rules but\u00a0was only ready to\u00a0talk until\u00a0all ten ASEAN members had agreed on\u00a0them first.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s strategy is the opposite; bilateral discussions to\u00a0emphasize its formidable leverage. Thus China assuring the support of\u00a0Cambodia \u2013 quite visible early this week when Cambodia prevented a condemnation of\u00a0China regarding the South China Sea at\u00a0a key summit in\u00a0Laos; China and ASEAN settled for \u201cself-restraint<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Watch Hillary pivoting<\/strong><\/p>\n

In 2011 the US State Department was absolutely terrified with\u00a0the planned Obama administration withdrawals from\u00a0both Iraq and Afghanistan; what would happen to\u00a0superpower projection? That ended in\u00a0November 2011, when then Secretary of\u00a0State Hillary Clinton coined the by\u00a0now famous \u201cpivot to\u00a0Asia\u201d<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u201cSix lines of\u00a0action\u201d were embedded in\u00a0the \u201cpivot\u201d. Four of\u00a0these Clinton nicked from\u00a0a 2009 report by\u00a0the Washington think tank CSIS; reinvigorating alliances; cultivating relationships with\u00a0emerging powers; developing relationships with\u00a0regional multilateral bodies; and working closely with\u00a0South East Asian countries on\u00a0economic issues. Clinton added two more: broad-based military presence in\u00a0Asia, and the promotion of\u00a0democracy and human rights.<\/p>\n

It was clear from\u00a0the start \u2013 and not only across\u00a0the global South\u00a0\u2014 that cutting across\u00a0the rhetorical fog the \u201cpivot\u201d was code for\u00a0a military offensive to\u00a0contain China. Even more seriously, this was the geopolitical moment when a South East Asian dispute over\u00a0maritime territory intersected with\u00a0the across-the-globe confrontation between\u00a0the hegemon and a \u201cpeer competitor\u201d.<\/p>\n

What Clinton meant by \u201cengaging emerging powers\u201d was, in\u00a0her own words, \u201cjoin us in\u00a0shaping and participating in\u00a0a rules-based regional and global order\u201d. This is code for\u00a0rules coined by\u00a0the hegemon \u2013 as\u00a0in the whole apparatus of\u00a0the Washington consensus.<\/p>\n

No wonder the South China Sea is immensely strategic, as\u00a0American hegemony intimately depends on\u00a0ruling the waves (remember Mahan). That\u2019s the core of\u00a0the US National Military Strategy. The South China Sea is the crucial link connecting the Pacific to\u00a0the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and ultimately Europe.And so we finally discover Rosebud\u00a0\u2014 the ultimate South China Sea \u201csecret\u201d. China under\u00a0Clinton\u2019s \u201crule-based regional and global order\u201d effectively means that China must obey and keep the South China Sea open to\u00a0the US Navy.<\/p>\n

That spells out\u00a0inevitable escalation further on\u00a0down the sea lanes. China, slowly but\u00a0surely, is developing an array of\u00a0sophisticated weapons which could ultimately \u201cdeny\u201d the South China Sea to\u00a0the US Navy, as\u00a0the Beltway is very much aware<\/a>.<\/p>\n

What makes it even more serious is that we\u2019re talking about\u00a0irreconcilable imperatives. Beijing characterizes itself as\u00a0an anti-imperialist power; and that necessarily includes recovering national territories usurped by\u00a0colonial powers allied with\u00a0internal Chinese traitors (those islands that The Hague has ruled are no more than \u201crocks\u201d or even \u201clow-tide elevations\u201d).<\/p>\n

The US, for\u00a0its part, is all about\u00a0Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny.\u00a0 As it stands, more than\u00a0Russia\u2019s western borderlands, the Baltics or \u201cSyraq\u201d, this is where the hegemon \u201crules\u201d are really being contested. And the stakes couldn\u2019t be higher. That\u2019ll be the day when the US Navy is \u201cdenied\u201d from\u00a0the South China Sea; and that\u2019ll be the end of\u00a0its imperial hegemony.<\/p>\n

_________________________________<\/p>\n

Pepe Escobar is a Brazilian independent geopolitical analyst. He is a frequent contributor to websites and radio and TV shows ranging from the US to East Asia. He is the former roving correspondent for Asia Times Online. He has been a foreign correspondent since 1985, and has lived in London, Paris, Milan, Los Angeles, Washington, Bangkok and Hong Kong. Even before 9\/11 he specialized in covering the arc from the Middle East to Central and East Asia, with an emphasis on Big Power geopolitics and energy wars. He is the author of \u201cGlobalistan<\/a>\u201d (2007), \u201cRed Zone Blues<\/a>\u201d (2007), \u201cObama does Globalistan<\/a>\u201d (2009) and \u201cEmpire of Chaos<\/a>\u201d (2014), all published by Nimble Books. His latest book is \u201c2030<\/a>\u201c, also by Nimble Books, out in December 2015.<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 uprootedpalestinians.wordpress.com<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The US is all about Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. As it stands, more than Russia\u2019s western borderlands, the Baltics or \u201cSyraq\u201d, this is where the hegemon \u201crules\u201d are really being contested. And the stakes couldn\u2019t be higher. That\u2019ll be the day when the US Navy is \u201cdenied\u201d from the South China Sea; and that\u2019ll be the end of its imperial hegemony.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[56],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-77119","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-asia-pacific"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77119","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77119"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77119\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77119"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=77119"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=77119"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}