{"id":89616,"date":"2017-04-03T12:00:40","date_gmt":"2017-04-03T11:00:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=89616"},"modified":"2017-03-28T12:38:35","modified_gmt":"2017-03-28T11:38:35","slug":"how-us-flooded-the-worlds-media-with-psyops","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2017\/04\/how-us-flooded-the-worlds-media-with-psyops\/","title":{"rendered":"How US Flooded the World\u2019s Media with Psyops"},"content":{"rendered":"

The mainstream U.S. media obsesses over Russian \u201cpropaganda\u201d yet the U.S. government created a \u201cpsyops\u201d bureaucracy three decades ago to flood the world with dubious information.<\/em><\/p>\n

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Image source Dees Illustration<\/p><\/div>\n

25 Mar 2017 – <\/em>Newly declassified documents from the Reagan presidential library help explain how the U.S. government developed its sophisticated psychological operations capabilities that \u2013 over the past three decades \u2013 have created an alternative reality both for people in targeted countries and for American citizens, a structure that expanded U.S. influence abroad and quieted dissent at home.<\/p>\n

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Walter Raymond Jr., a CIA propaganda and disinformation specialist who oversaw President Reagan\u2019s \u201cperception management\u201d and psyops projects at the National Security Council. Raymond is partially obscured by President Reagan and is sitting next to National Security Adviser John Poindexter.. (Photo credit: Reagan presidential library)<\/p><\/div>\n

The documents reveal the formation of a psyops bureaucracy under the direction of Walter Raymond Jr., a senior CIA covert operations specialist who was assigned to President Reagan\u2019s National Security Council staff to enhance the importance of propaganda and psyops in undermining U.S. adversaries around the world and ensuring sufficient public support for foreign policies inside the United States.<\/p>\n

Raymond, who has been compared to a character from a John LeCarr\u00e9 novel slipping easily into the woodwork, spent his years inside Reagan\u2019s White House as a shadowy puppet master who tried his best to avoid public attention or \u2013 it seems \u2013 even having his picture taken. From the tens of thousands of photographs from meetings at Reagan\u2019s White House, I found only a couple showing Raymond \u2013 and he is seated in groups, partially concealed by other officials.<\/p>\n

But Raymond appears to have grasped his true importance. In his NSC files, I found a doodle of an organizational chart<\/a>\u00a0that had Raymond at the top holding what looks like the crossed handles used by puppeteers to control the puppets below them. Although it\u2019s impossible to know exactly what the doodler had in mind, the drawing fits the reality of Raymond as the behind-the-curtains operative who was controlling the various inter-agency task forces that were responsible for implementing various propaganda and psyops strategies.<\/p>\n

Until the 1980s, psyops were normally regarded as a military technique for undermining the will of an enemy force by spreading lies, confusion and terror. A classic case was Gen. Edward Lansdale \u2014 considered the father of modern psyops \u2014 draining the blood from a dead Filipino rebel in such a way so the dead rebel\u2019s superstitious comrades would think that a vampire-like creature was on the prowl. In Vietnam, Lansdale\u2019s psyops team supplied fake and dire astrological predictions for the fate of North Vietnamese and Vietcong leaders.<\/p>\n

Essentially, the psyops idea was to play on the cultural weaknesses of a target population so they could be more easily manipulated and controlled. But the challenges facing the Reagan administration in the 1980s led to its determination that peacetime psyops were also needed and that the target populations had to include the American public.<\/p>\n

The Reagan administration was obsessed with the problems left behind by the 1970s\u2019 disclosures of government lying about the Vietnam War and revelations about CIA abuses both in overthrowing democratically elected governments and spying on American dissidents. This so-called \u201cVietnam Syndrome\u201d produced profound skepticism from regular American citizens as well as journalists and politicians when President Reagan tried to sell his plans for intervention in the civil wars then underway in Central America, Africa and elsewhere.<\/p>\n

While Reagan saw Central America as a \u201cSoviet beachhead,\u201d many Americans saw brutal Central American oligarchs and their bloody security forces slaughtering priests, nuns, labor activists, students, peasants and indigenous populations. Reagan and his advisers realized that they had to turn those perceptions around if they hoped to get sustained funding for the militaries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras as well as for the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, the CIA-organized paramilitary force marauding around leftist-ruled Nicaragua.<\/p>\n

So, it became a high priority to reshape public perceptions to gain support for Reagan\u2019s Central American military operations both inside those targeted countries and among Americans.<\/p>\n

A \u2018Psyops Totality\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n

As Col. Alfred R. Paddock Jr. wrote in an influential November 1983 paper, entitled \u201cMilitary Psychological Operations and US Strategy,<\/a>\u201d \u201cthe planned use of communications to influence attitudes or behavior should, if properly used, precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force. Put another way, psychological operations is the one weapons system which has an important role to play in peacetime, throughout the spectrum of conflict, and during the aftermath of conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n

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President Ronald Reagan leading a meeting on terrorism on Jan. 26, 1981, with National Security Advisor Richard Allen, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and White House counselor Edwin Meese. (photo credit: Reagan library)<\/p><\/div>\n

Paddock continued, \u201cMilitary psychological operations are an important part of the \u2018PSYOP Totality,\u2019 both in peace and war. \u2026 We need a program of psychological operations as an integral part of our national security policies and programs. \u2026 The continuity of a standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide psychological operations strategy is badly needed.\u201d<\/p>\n

Some of Raymond\u2019s recently available handwritten notes show a focus on El Salvador with the implementation of \u201cNation wide multi-media psyops\u201d spread through rallies and electronic media. \u201cRadio + TV also carried Psyops<\/u> messages,\u201d Raymond wrote<\/a>. (Emphasis in original.) Though Raymond\u2019s crimped handwriting is often hard to decipher, the notes make clear that psyops programs also were directed at Honduras, Guatemala and Peru.<\/p>\n

One declassified \u201ctop secret\u201d document<\/a> in Raymond\u2019s file \u2013 dated Feb. 4, 1985, from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger \u2013 urged the fuller implementation of President Reagan\u2019s National Security Decision Directive 130<\/a>, which was signed on March 6, 1984, and which authorized peacetime psyops by expanding psyops beyond its traditional boundaries of active military operations into peacetime situations in which the U.S. government could claim some threat to national interests.<\/p>\n

\u201cThis approval can provide the impetus to the rebuilding of a necessary strategic capability, focus attention on psychological operations as a national \u2013 not solely military \u2013 instrument, and ensure that psychological operations are fully coordinated with public diplomacy and other international information activities,\u201d Weinberger\u2019s document said.<\/p>\n

This broader commitment to psyops led to the creation of a Psychological Operations Committee (POC) that was to be chaired by a representative of Reagan\u2019s National Security Council with a vice chairman from the Pentagon and with representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency.<\/p>\n

\u201cThis group will be responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing psychological operations activities in support of United States policies and interests relative to national security,\u201d according to a \u201csecret\u201d addendum<\/a> to a memo, dated March 25, 1986, from Col. Paddock, the psyops advocate who had become the U.S. Army\u2019s Director for Psychological Operations.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe committee will provide the focal point for interagency coordination of detailed contingency planning for the management of national information assets during war, and for the transition from peace to war,\u201d the addendum added. \u201cThe POC shall seek to ensure that in wartime or during crises (which may be defined as periods of acute tension involving a threat to the lives of American citizens or the imminence of war between the U.S. and other nations), U.S. international information elements are ready to initiate special procedures to ensure policy consistency, timely response and rapid feedback from the intended audience.\u201d<\/p>\n

Taking Shape<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Psychological Operations Committee took formal shape with a \u201csecret\u201d memo<\/a> from Reagan\u2019s National Security Advisor John Poindexter on July 31, 1986. Its first meeting<\/a> was called on Sept. 2, 1986, with an agenda that focused on Central America and \u201cHow can other POC agencies support and complement DOD programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama.\u201d The POC was also tasked with \u201cDeveloping National PSYOPS Guidelines<\/u>\u201d for \u201cformulating and implementing a national PSYOPS program.\u201d (Underlining in original)<\/p>\n

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Then-Vice President George H.W. Bush with CIA Director William Casey at the White House on Feb. 11, 1981. (Photo credit: Reagan Library)<\/p><\/div>\n

Raymond was named a co-chair of the POC along with CIA officer Vincent Cannistraro, who was then Deputy Director for Intelligence Programs on the NSC staff, according to a \u201csecret\u201d memo<\/a> from Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Craig Alderman Jr. The memo also noted that future POC meetings would be briefed on psyops projects for the Philippines and Nicaragua, with the latter project codenamed \u201cNiagara Falls.\u201d The memo also references a \u201cProject Touchstone,\u201d but it is unclear where that psyops program was targeted.<\/p>\n

Another \u201csecret\u201d memo<\/a> dated Oct. 1, 1986, co-authored by Raymond, reported on the POC\u2019s first meeting on Sept. 10, 1986, and noted that \u201cThe POC will, at each meeting, focus on an area of operations (e.g., Central America, Afghanistan, Philippines).\u201d<\/p>\n

The POC\u2019s second meeting on Oct. 24, 1986, concentrated on the Philippines, according to a Nov. 4, 1986 memo<\/a> also co-authored by Raymond. \u201cThe next step will be a tightly drafted outline for a PSYOPS Plan which we will send to that Embassy for its comment,\u201d the memo said. The plan \u201clargely focused on a range of civic actions supportive of the overall effort to overcome the insurgency,\u201d an addendum noted. \u201cThere is considerable concern about the sensitivities of any type of a PSYOPS program given the political situation in the Philippines today.\u201d<\/p>\n

Earlier in 1986, the Philippines had undergone the so-called \u201cPeople Power Revolution,\u201d which drove longtime dictator Ferdinand Marcos into exile, and the Reagan administration, which belatedly pulled its support from Marcos, was trying to stabilize the political situation to prevent more populist elements from gaining the upper hand.<\/p>\n

But the Reagan administration\u2019s primary attention continued to go back to Central America, including \u201cProject Niagara Falls,\u201d the psyops program aimed at Nicaragua. A \u201csecret\u201d Pentagon memo<\/a> from Deputy Under Secretary Alderman on Nov. 20, 1986, outlined the work of the 4th<\/sup> Psychological Operations Group on this psyops plan \u201cto help bring about democratization of Nicaragua,\u201d by which the Reagan administration meant a \u201cregime change.\u201d The precise details of \u201cProject Niagara Falls\u201d were not disclosed in the declassified documents but the choice of codename suggested a cascade of psyops.<\/p>\n

Other documents from Raymond\u2019s NSC file shed light on who other key operatives in the psyops and propaganda programs were. For instance, in undated notes<\/a> on efforts to influence the Socialist International, including securing support for U.S. foreign policies from Socialist and Social Democratic parties in Europe, Raymond cited the efforts of \u201cLedeen<\/u>, Gershman<\/u>,\u201d a reference to neoconservative operative Michael Ledeen and Carl Gershman, another neocon who has served as president of the U.S.-government-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED), from 1983 to the present. (Underlining in original.)<\/p>\n

Although NED is technically independent of the U.S. government, it receives the bulk of its funding (now about $100 million a year) from Congress. Documents from the Reagan archives also make clear that NED was organized as a way to replace some of the CIA\u2019s political and propaganda covert operations, which had fallen into disrepute in the 1970s. Earlier released documents from Raymond\u2019s file show CIA Director William Casey pushing for NED\u2019s creation and Raymond, Casey\u2019s handpicked man on the NSC, giving frequent advice and direction to Gershman. [See Consortiumnews.com\u2019s \u201cCIA\u2019s Hidden Hand in \u2018Democracy\u2019 Groups.<\/a>\u201d]<\/p>\n

Another figure in Raymond\u2019s constellation of propaganda assets was media mogul Rupert Murdoch, who was viewed as both a key political ally of President Reagan and a valuable source of funding for private groups that were coordinating with White House propaganda operations. [See Consortiumnews.com\u2019s \u201cRupert Murdoch: Propaganda Recruit.<\/a>\u201d]<\/p>\n

In a Nov. 1, 1985 letter<\/a> to Raymond, Charles R. Tanguy of the \u201cCommittees for a Community of Democracies \u2013 USA\u201d asked Raymond to intervene in efforts to secure Murdoch\u2019s funding for the group. \u201cWe would be grateful \u2026 if you could find the time to telephone Mr. Murdoch and encourage him to give us a positive response,\u201d the letter said.<\/p>\n

Another document, entitled \u201cProject Truth Enhancement<\/a>,\u201d described how $24 million would be spent on upgrading the telecommunications infrastructure to arm \u201cProject Truth, with the technical capability to provide the most efficient and productive media support for major USG policy initiatives like Political Democracy.\u201d Project Truth was the overarching name of the Reagan administration\u2019s propaganda operation. For the outside world, the program was billed as \u201cpublic diplomacy,\u201d but administration insiders privately called it \u201cperception management.\u201d [See Consortiumnews.com\u2019s \u201cThe Victory of Perception Management.<\/a>\u201d]<\/p>\n

The Early Years<\/strong><\/p>\n

The original priority of \u201cProject Truth\u201d was to clean up the images of the Guatemalan and Salvadoran security forces and the Nicaraguan Contras, who were led by ousted dictator Anastasio Somoza\u2019s ex-National Guard officers. To ensure steady military funding for these notorious forces, Reagan\u2019s team knew it had to defuse the negative publicity and somehow rally the American people\u2019s support.<\/p>\n

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President Ronald Reagan meeting with Guatemalan dictator Efrain Rios Montt, who was later charged with genocide against indigenous populations in Guatemala\u2019s highlands.<\/p><\/div>\n

At first, the effort focused on weeding out American reporters who uncovered facts that undercut the desired public images. As part of that effort, the administration denounced New York Times correspondent Raymond Bonner for disclosing the Salvadoran regime\u2019s massacre of about 800 men, women and children in the village of El Mozote in northeast El Salvador in December 1981. Accuracy in Media and conservative news organizations, such as The Wall Street Journal\u2019s editorial page, joined in pummeling Bonner, who was soon ousted from his job. But such efforts were largely ad hoc and disorganized.<\/p>\n

CIA Director Casey, from his years crisscrossing the interlocking worlds of business and intelligence, had important contacts for creating a more systematic propaganda network. He recognized the value of using established groups known for advocating \u201chuman rights,\u201d such as Freedom House.<\/p>\n

One document from the Reagan library showed senior Freedom House official Leo Cherne running a draft manuscript on political conditions in El Salvador past Casey and promising that Freedom House would make requested editorial \u201ccorrections and changes\u201d \u2013 and even send over the editor for consultation with whomever Casey assigned to review the paper.<\/p>\n

In a \u201cDear Bill\u201d\u00a0letter<\/a> dated June 24, 1981, Cherne, who was chairman of the Freedom House\u2019s executive committee, wrote: \u201cI am enclosing a copy of the draft manuscript by Bruce McColm, Freedom House\u2019s resident specialist on Central America and the Caribbean. This manuscript on El Salvador was the one I had urged be prepared and in the haste to do so as rapidly as possible, it is quite rough. You had mentioned that the facts could be checked for meticulous accuracy within the government and this would be very helpful. \u2026<\/p>\n

\u201cIf there are any questions about the McColm manuscript, I suggest that whomever is working on it contact Richard Salzmann at the Research Institute [an organization where Cherne was executive director]. He is Editor-in-Chief at the Institute and the Chairman of the Freedom House\u2019s Salvador Committee. He will make sure that the corrections and changes get to Rita Freedman who will also be working with him. If there is any benefit to be gained from Salzmann\u2019s coming down at any point to talk to that person, he is available to do so.\u201d<\/p>\n

By 1982, Casey also was lining up some powerful right-wing ideologues to help fund the \u201cperception management\u201d project both with money and their own media outlets. Richard Mellon Scaife was the scion of the Mellon banking, oil and aluminum fortune who financed a variety of right-wing family foundations \u2013 such as Sarah Scaife and Carthage \u2013 that were financial benefactors to right-wing journalists and think tanks. Scaife also published the Tribune Review in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.<\/p>\n

A more comprehensive \u201cpublic diplomacy\u201d operation began to take shape in 1982 when Raymond, a 30-year veteran of CIA clandestine services, was transferred to the NSC. Raymond became the sparkplug for this high-powered propaganda network, according to an unpublished draft chapter\u00a0<\/a>of the congressional Iran-Contra investigation that was suppressed as part of the deal to get three moderate Republican senators to sign on to the final report and give the inquiry a patina of bipartisanship.<\/p>\n

Though the draft chapter didn\u2019t use Raymond\u2019s name in its opening pages, apparently because some of the information came from classified depositions, Raymond\u2019s name was used later in the chapter and the earlier citations matched Raymond\u2019s known role. According to the draft report, the CIA officer who was recruited for the NSC job had served as Director of the Covert Action Staff at the CIA from 1978 to 1982 and was a \u201cspecialist in propaganda and disinformation.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cThe CIA official [Raymond] discussed the transfer with [CIA Director] Casey and NSC Advisor William Clark that he be assigned to the NSC as [Donald] Gregg\u2019s successor [as coordinator of intelligence operations in June 1982] and received approval for his involvement in setting up the public diplomacy program along with his intelligence responsibilities,\u201d the chapter said. Gregg was another senior CIA official who was assigned to the NSC before becoming Vice President George H.W. Bush\u2019s national security adviser.<\/p>\n

\u201cIn the early part of 1983, documents obtained by the Select [Iran-Contra] Committees indicate that the Director of the Intelligence Staff of the NSC [Raymond] successfully recommended the establishment of an inter-governmental network to promote and manage a public diplomacy plan designed to create support for Reagan Administration policies at home and abroad.\u201d<\/p>\n

War of Ideas<\/strong><\/p>\n

During his Iran-Contra deposition, Raymond explained the need for this propaganda structure, saying: \u201cWe were not configured effectively to deal with the war of ideas.\u201d<\/p>\n

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President Reagan meets with publisher Rupert Murdoch, U.S. Information Agency Director Charles Wick, lawyers Roy Cohn and Thomas Bolan in the Oval Office on Jan. 18, 1983. (Photo credit: Reagan presidential library)<\/p><\/div>\n

One reason for this shortcoming was that federal law forbade taxpayers\u2019 money from being spent on domestic propaganda or grassroots lobbying to pressure congressional representatives. Of course, every president and his team had vast resources to make their case in public, but by tradition and law, they were restricted to speeches, testimony and one-on-one persuasion of lawmakers. But President Reagan saw the American public\u2019s \u201cVietnam Syndrome\u201d as an obstacle to his more aggressive policies.<\/p>\n

Along with Raymond\u2019s government-based organization, there were outside groups eager to cooperate and cash in. Back at Freedom House, Cherne and his associates were angling for financial support.<\/p>\n

In an Aug. 9, 1982\u00a0letter<\/a> to Raymond, Freedom House executive director Leonard R. Sussman wrote that \u201cLeo Cherne has asked me to send these copies of Freedom Appeals. He has probably told you we have had to cut back this project to meet financial realities. \u2026 We would, of course, want to expand the project once again when, as and if the funds become available. Offshoots of that project appear in newspapers, magazines, books and on broadcast services here and abroad. It\u2019s a significant, unique channel of communication\u201d \u2013 precisely the focus of Raymond\u2019s work.<\/p>\n

On Nov. 4, 1982, Raymond, after his transfer from the CIA to the NSC staff but while still a CIA officer, wrote<\/a> to NSC Advisor Clark about the \u201cDemocracy Initiative and Information Programs,\u201d stating that \u201cBill Casey asked me to pass on the following thought concerning your meeting with [right-wing billionaire] Dick Scaife, Dave Abshire [then a member of the President\u2019s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board], and Co. Casey had lunch with them today and discussed the need to get moving in the general area of supporting our friends around the world.<\/p>\n

\u201cBy this definition he is including both \u2018building democracy\u2019 \u2026 and helping invigorate international media programs. The DCI [Casey] is also concerned about strengthening public information organizations in the United States such as Freedom House. \u2026 A critical piece of the puzzle is a serious effort to raise private funds to generate momentum. Casey\u2019s talk with Scaife and Co. suggests they would be very willing to cooperate. \u2026 Suggest that you note White House interest in private support for the Democracy initiative.\u201d<\/p>\n

The importance of the CIA and White House secretly arranging private funds was that these supposedly\u00a0independent voices would\u00a0then reinforce and validate the administration\u2019s foreign policy arguments with\u00a0a public that would assume the endorsements were based on the merits of the White House positions, not influenced by\u00a0money changing hands. Like snake-oil salesmen who plant a few cohorts in the crowd to whip up excitement for the cure-all elixir, Reagan administration propagandists salted some well-paid \u201cprivate\u201d individuals around Washington to echo White House propaganda \u201cthemes.\u201d<\/p>\n

The role of the CIA in these initiatives was concealed but never far from the surface. A Dec. 2, 1982 note<\/a> addressed to \u201cBud,\u201d a reference to senior NSC official Robert \u201cBud\u201d McFarlane, described a request from Raymond for a brief meeting. \u201cWhen he [Raymond] returned from Langley [CIA headquarters], he had a proposed draft letter \u2026 re $100 M democ[racy]\u00a0 proj[ect],\u201d the note said.<\/p>\n

While Casey pulled the strings on this project, the CIA director instructed White House officials to hide the CIA\u2019s hand. \u201cObviously we here [at CIA] should not get out front in the development of such an organization, nor should we appear to be a sponsor or advocate,\u201d Casey said in one undated letter<\/a> to then-White House counselor Edwin Meese III as Casey urged creation of a \u201cNational Endowment.\u201d<\/p>\n

But the formation of the National Endowment for Democracy, with its hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. government money, was still months down the road. In the meantime, the Reagan administration would have to line up private donors to advance the propaganda cause.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe will develop a scenario for obtaining private funding,\u201d NSC Advisor Clark wrote to Reagan in a Jan. 13, 1983 memo, adding that U.S. Information Agency Director \u201cCharlie Wick has offered to take the lead. We may have to call on you to meet with a group of potential donors.\u201d<\/p>\n

Despite Casey\u2019s and Raymond\u2019s success in bringing onboard wealthy conservatives to provide private funding for the propaganda operations, Raymond worried about whether a scandal could erupt over the CIA\u2019s involvement. Raymond formally resigned from the CIA in April 1983,\u00a0so, he said, \u201cthere would be no question whatsoever of any contamination of this.\u201d But\u00a0Raymond continued to act toward the U.S. public much like a CIA officer would in directing a propaganda operation in a hostile foreign country.<\/p>\n

Raymond fretted, too, about the legality of Casey\u2019s ongoing role. Raymond confided in one memo that it was important \u201cto get [Casey] out of the loop,\u201d but Casey never backed off and Raymond continued to send progress reports to his old boss well into 1986.<\/p>\n

It was \u201cthe kind of thing which [Casey] had a broad catholic interest in,\u201d Raymond shrugged during his Iran-Contra deposition. He then offered the excuse that Casey undertook this apparently illegal interference in domestic politics \u201cnot so much in his CIA hat, but in his adviser to the president hat.\u201d<\/p>\n

Peacetime Propaganda<\/strong><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Reagan began laying out the formal authority for this unprecedented peacetime propaganda bureaucracy. On Jan. 14, 1983, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 77<\/a>, entitled \u201cManagement of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security.\u201d In NSDD-77, Reagan deemed it \u201cnecessary to strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of the various aspects of public diplomacy of the United States Government.\u201d<\/p>\n

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President Reagan meeting with Charles Wick on March 7, 1986, in the Oval Office. Also present: Stephen Rhinesmith, Don Regan, John Poindexter, George Bush, Jack Matlock and Walter Raymond (seated next to Regan on the left side of the photo). (Photo credit: Reagan library)<\/p><\/div>\n

Reagan ordered the creation of a special planning group within the National Security Council to direct these \u201cpublic diplomacy\u201d campaigns. The planning group would be headed by Walter Raymond and one of its principal outposts would be a new Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America, housed at the State Department but under the control of the NSC. (One of the directors of the Latin American public diplomacy office was neoconservative Robert Kagan, who would later co-found the Project for the New American Century in 1998 and become a chief promoter of President George W. Bush\u2019s 2003 invasion of Iraq.)<\/p>\n

On May 20, 1983, Raymond recounted in a memo that $400,000 had been raised from private donors brought to the White House Situation Room by U.S. Information Agency\u00a0Director Charles Wick. According to that memo, the money was divided among several organizations, including Freedom House and\u00a0Accuracy in Media, a right-wing media attack organization.<\/p>\n

When I wrote about\u00a0that memo in my 1992 book, Fooling America<\/em>, Freedom House denied receiving any White House money or collaborating with any CIA\/NSC propaganda campaign. In a letter, Freedom House\u2019s\u00a0Sussman called Raymond \u201ca second-hand source\u201d and insisted that \u201cthis organization did not need any special funding to take positions \u2026 on any foreign-policy issues.\u201d<\/p>\n

But it made little sense that Raymond would have lied to a superior in an internal memo. And clearly, Freedom House remained central to the Reagan administration\u2019s schemes for\u00a0aiding\u00a0groups supportive of its Central American policies, particularly the CIA-organized Contra war against the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Plus, White House documents released later revealed that Freedom House kept its hand out for funding.<\/p>\n

On Sept. 15, 1984, Bruce McColm \u2013 writing from Freedom House\u2019s Center for Caribbean and Central American Studies \u2013\u00a0sent<\/a> Raymond \u201ca short proposal for the Center\u2019s Nicaragua project 1984-85. The project combines elements of the oral history proposal with the publication of The Nicaraguan Papers,\u201d a\u00a0book that would disparage\u00a0Sandinista ideology and practices.<\/p>\n

\u201cMaintaining the oral history part of the project adds to the overall costs; but preliminary discussions with film makers have given me the idea that an Improper Conduct-type of documentary could be made based on these materials,\u201d McColm wrote, referring to a 1984 film that offered a scathing critique of Fidel Castro\u2019s Cuba. \u201cSuch a film would have to be the work of a respected Latin American filmmaker or a European. American-made films on Central America are simply too abrasive ideologically and artistically poor.\u201d<\/p>\n

McColm\u2019s three-page letter reads much like a book or movie pitch, trying to interest Raymond in financing the project: \u201cThe Nicaraguan Papers will also be readily accessible to the general reader, the journalist, opinion-maker, the academic and the like. The book would be distributed fairly broadly to these sectors and I am sure will be extremely useful. They already constitute a form of Freedom House samizdat, since I\u2019ve been distributing them to journalists for the past two years as I\u2019ve received them from disaffected Nicaraguans.\u201d<\/p>\n

McColm proposed a face-to-face meeting with Raymond in Washington and attached a six-page grant proposal seeking $134,100. According to the grant proposal, the project would include \u201cfree distribution to members of Congress and key public officials; distribution of galleys in advance of publication for maximum publicity and timely reviews in newspapers and current affairs magazines; press conferences at Freedom House in New York and at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.; op-ed circulation to more than 100 newspapers \u2026; distribution of a Spanish-language edition through Hispanic organizations in the United States and in Latin America; arrangement of European distribution through Freedom House contacts.\u201d<\/p>\n

The documents that I found at the Reagan library did not indicate what subsequently happened to this specific proposal. McColm did not respond to an email request for comment about the Nicaraguan Papers plan or the earlier letter from Cherne (who died in 1999) to Casey about editing McComb\u2019s manuscript. Freedom House did emerge as a leading critic of Nicaragua\u2019s Sandinista government and also became a major recipient of money from the U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy, which was founded in 1983 under the umbrella of the Casey-Raymond project.<\/p>\n

The more recently released documents \u2013 declassified between 2013 and 2017 \u2013 show how these earlier Casey-Raymond efforts merged with the creation of a formal psyop bureaucracy in 1986 also under the control of Raymond\u2019s NSC operation. The combination of the propaganda and psyop programs underscored the powerful capability that the U.S. government developed more than three decades ago for planting slanted, distorted or fake news. (Casey died in 1987; Raymond died in 2003.)<\/p>\n

Over those several decades, even as the White House changed hands from Republicans to Democrats to Republicans to Democrats, the momentum created by William Casey and Walter Raymond continued to push these \u201cperception management\/psyops\u201d strategies forward. In more recent years, the wording has changed, giving way to more pleasing euphemisms, like \u201csmart power\u201d and \u201cstrategic communications<\/a>.\u201d But the idea is still the same: how you can use propaganda to sell U.S. government policies abroad and at home.<\/p>\n

_____________________________________<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Investigative Reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s for the <\/em>Associated Press and<\/em> Newsweek. His book, <\/em>Neck Deep: The Disastrous Presidency of George W. Bush<\/a>, was written with two of his sons, Sam and Nat. His two previous books are <\/em>Secrecy & Privilege: The Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq<\/a> and<\/em> Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & ‘Project Truth’<\/a>.<\/em> You can buy his latest book, <\/em>America\u2019s Stolen Narrative,<\/em> either in\u00a0<\/em>print here<\/a>\u00a0or as an e-book (from Amazon<\/a> and barnesandnoble.com<\/a>).<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 consortiumnews.com<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

25 Mar 2017 – Newly declassified documents from the Reagan presidential library help explain how the U.S. government developed its sophisticated psychological operations capabilities that \u2013 over the past three decades \u2013 have created an alternative reality both for people in targeted countries and for American citizens, a structure that expanded U.S. influence abroad and quieted dissent at home.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[62],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-89616","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-media"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/89616","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=89616"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/89616\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=89616"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=89616"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=89616"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}