

Beyond the End of Violence and Conflict Freezing: Looking for Conflict Resolution

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Abstract

First, a typology on conflict resolution processes, starting from Galtung's analytic categories, has been presented. Then, order has been defined as a government capability that has to be linked to some fixed values (the unity of measure), that in the four power arenas of post-'89 international relations are: (military) peace, (political) democracy, (economic) market and (cultural) national self-determination. As major powers usually prefer multi/cultural states, current world politics has been characterized by a near order. In the empirical part of the essay, post-'89 armed conflict resolution attempts have been analyzed. The main empirical evidence is the strong decrease of violence, together with many frozen or unstable conflict management processes. A specific section has been devoted to the analysis of the role of external actors (governments and the United Nations), together with the emphasis on some explanation hypotheses. Some proposals for a more successful conflict resolution, within the Peace Research tradition, have been advanced in the final part of the essay.

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ANALYTIC THEORY

The first part of this essay concerns the definition of conflict and the identification of a typology on resolution processes, starting from Galtung's (2002, 2008) analytic categories. Second, the definitions of sociological entities, such as nations and civilizations, will be advanced. Then, the concepts of world order, governance and anarchy will be defined, starting from Stoppino's (1994) definition of politics. In fact, after 1989 the concept of world order has been widely used by International Relations scholars, but elaborated efforts of definition have been rare; instead, there have been more contributions aimed at clarifying the concept of governance. Thus, pre and post-1989 world politics is eventually going to be labeled as ordered (or not). Concepts that are to be used must be as clear as possible; their empirical application cannot be too large, trying to avoid conceptual stretching (Sartori 1979). Let's take for example the definition of anarchy in world politics inherited by the realist philosophical tradition. If anarchy means the absence of authority in world politics, this assumption would lead to its application in 100% of the empirical cases. That definition of anarchy can be considered the mainstream example of conceptual stretching.

Conflict theory

It is necessary to introduce the basic concepts of conflict theory. The definition of conflict is the following: "a relationship among social groups and/or political actors whose objectives are incompatible". War is a violent conflict. Galtung (1987) identified two kinds of conflicts: latent conflict, in which groups/actors do not perceive the incompatibility of their ends; manifest conflict, in which groups/actors perceive that incompatibility, at the level of either (psychological) attitude or (violent or not) behavior¹. The first step in conflict analysis is the identification of actors and issues of incompatibility. The second step is the identification of two basic variables: the crystallization level and the resolution modalities. These two variables are strictly linked; a conflict crystallizes when no resolution is found. Thus, crystallization means the presence of a conflict. A lowly crystallized conflict does not last much time and sometimes manifests itself in a simple discord declaration that is not followed by behaviors. A highly crystallized conflict is not resolved immediately or manifests itself in a repeated manner, having partially been resolved (Fossati 1998).

A conflict may end in three ways: resolution of the incompatibility, avoidance or freezing - incompatibility remains- or mutual destruction. Starting from Galtung's (1987) typology, twelve modalities of conflict resolution or avoidance have been identified (Fossati 1998): 1) transcendence. Both actors simultaneously reach their objectives. 2) persuasion. Only one actor reaches its objective and the other renounces its own, whether through coercion or not. 3) compromise. Neither actor reaches its own objective; both agree on an alternative and complementary solution. 4) exchange. Each actor has two goals and only one is achieved. 5) separation. The actors cease to interact or divide the territory, object of their incompatibility. 6) integration. There is a fusion in which the actors unify their territory. 7) diversion. The actors overcome the conflict and start a new relationship: negative (second conflict) or positive (cooperation). 8) multilateralization. The actors forget their conflict and start to interact with a new actor: together (old two versus new one) or not (old one versus a new one and one old together). 9) segmentation. One actor divides the other one into two actors and has a positive interaction with only one of them. 10) subversion. One actor promotes a change of *élites* in the other one and has a positive interaction with the new *élite*. 11) incapacitation. One actor eliminates or physically neutralizes the other one, for example through "ethnic cleansing". 12) domination. One actor imposes its objective and the loser does not agree.

¹ If actors do not perceive incompatibility, the researcher must decide if there is conflict or not. This is the theory of the objectivists, while the subjectivists identify conflict only at the manifest level. This "conflict" may be resolved by identifying potential issues of incompatibility through previously defined indicators (latent level); the perception of incompatibility must be tested on the actors' actions and declarations (manifest level). Thus, the context of perceptual analysis is structural analysis, where the observer identifies potential incompatible objectives (Fossati 1998). On conflict resolution, see also: Wallensteen (2002), Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall (2005).

Conflicts over territories are usually resolved in two ways: either through *separation* (like between Czech Republic and Slovakia) or integration (see East and West Germany). *Symmetric separations* are compatible with the liberal ideology and the “ordered” principle of national self-determination, when the new states (like Slovenia, Eritrea and East Timor) are homogeneous according to the national identity of their citizens, according to the principle one nation = one state. *Asymmetric separations* (like in the other states of former Yugoslavia)² and integrations are coherent with the constructivist left political culture and the governance efforts aiming at realizing “politically correct” pluri/national states. Multi/cultural polities are hardly compatible with democracies, if majorities do not respect minorities’ rights. There are two modalities of *symmetric integration* and conflict prevention: federalism, like in Iraq (Horowitz 2002), or consensual (power-sharing) pacts, like in Afghanistan (Diamond, Plattner 1994, Lijphart 2002). If only autonomy is conceded to minorities (see Oslo agreement between Israel and Palestinians), an *asymmetric integration* materializes. Confederations represent a *compromise* between integration and separation, like former USSR, where member states had the right to secede. Shared sovereignty, the so-called “condominium”, is another compromise solution.

Inter-nations and inter-civilizations armed conflicts

It is important to understand the sociological actors who are involved in armed conflict, in order to identify the different resolution processes: nations and civilizations (Buzan 2000). Both inter-nations and/or inter-civilizations conflicts may be defined as “cultural”, because they involve collective identities. This cleavage is more relevant than the typical cleavage of domestic versus international politics. In fact, the empirical evidence shows as both foreign and domestic actors are involved in most of the contemporary armed conflicts.

Many post-’89 wars just involved different nations, like for example in Africa. The nation is a sociological concept, while the state is a juridical one. In Europe, most of the nations coincide with the same states, but that does not occur in other parts of the world especially in former colonies. Objective dimensions of nations are usually three: language, religion and race³. The subjective definition is linked to the self-perception, by a group of individuals, of sharing the same identity (Goio 1994). For example, Latin American nations have the same language (except Brazil), the same (Catholic) religion, the same biological dimension, but have different identities.

There are also two definitions of the concept of civilization. The objective one (Galtung 1981) has been anchored to the cosmologies, that is to say the common visions of the world by a group of nations. Galtung’s cosmologies are: conception of time (progress ideas or cycles and static trends), space conception (center/periphery or decentralization), knowledge foundations (atomistic or holistic, deductive or inductive, Aristotle’s principles of no contradiction and “third excluded” or *yin/yang* dialectics; person-person relations (individualism or collectivism; always verticalism); person/nature relations (exploitation or vegetarianism); person/god relations (one or a plurality of god(s); universalism or no universalism; transcendence or immanence; eternal soul or reincarnation-nirvana; “almost” always separation between political and religious spheres). Instead, Huntington (1996) has identified a subjective criterion: the highest level of collective self-perception of identity. In synthesis, for social and political researchers the identification of nations and civilizations is quite difficult, because they are not “static” concepts. However, the main civilizations seem: the Western (Christian, Jew, Islamic), the Hindu, the Eastern (Buddhist, Sinic, Japanese). It is doubtful if also the Eastern/Orthodox, the Latin American and the African are civilizations: probably yes according to the subjective criterion, but not to the objective one.

² The potential independence of Kosovo is an asymmetric separation, leading to a pluri/national state. The symmetric partition of Kosovo into two (one Albanian, one Serb) parts would be compatible with the national self/determination principle. Also asymmetric separations of Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro led to pluri/national states.

³ Ethnicity has different definitions. In this essay, the biological one will be proposed, assuming that ethnicity is a sub-category of race: for example hutu and tutsi, within black Africans. There is also another definition, by which ethnic groups almost coincide with nations, because of its cultural (and not only biological) nature. There seems to be some conceptual stretching in this last definition, and also some redundancy between two concepts (Fossati 1998).

The concept of politics

The starting point will be Stoppino's (1994) definition of politics. He refused the mainstream definitions that link politics with government or the allocation of values (Easton 1953), because that process does not fit in the international arena (without authority). He returned to the old conception of politics as power struggle (Morgenthau 1948), but further elaborated it. Politics is the action that breaks power exercise, that has limited time and space frontiers. Politics is the search for guaranteed compliance, which aims at both stabilization in time and generalization in space. Stoppino applied this definition to the "monetary" (domestic) arena, in which there are governmental institutions, and to the "natural" (international) one, in which there are none. In the model of monetary politics, the authority produces and distributes rights or dues, i.e. guaranteed compliance. Here is the scheme of domestic politics, where values are defined by governments: Actor: Resources ----> Compliance. In the model of natural politics, there is no authority defining the ultimate values of the actors. Here is his scheme: Actor: Resources --> Compliance --> Values.

The concept of governance

In the political science literature, a new concept has recently been elaborated, governance, for example by Rosenau (1992), in *Governance without government*. The author has distinguished "hierarchical" government -as it is used in domestic politics- from "governance", where the key decisions are accepted by the main powers: within a multilateral or "minilateral" arena (Kooiman 1993). Government concerns the subject level: who makes the decisions; governance deals with the compliance level. Politics is the search for that compliance; when politics succeeds, and compliance is stabilized, governance materializes⁴. The definition of order that has emerged in domestic politics -for example in developing countries' political systems (Huntington 1968)- is precisely government capability. The assumption of this essay is that this meaning is (instead) that of world governance.

The concept of anarchy

Huntington (1996) has described the current world politics as an order *in fieri*, that is going to be realized only if the spheres of influence of each civilization are respected. This emphasis on a sort of "political *laissez faire*" recalls the conception of order⁵/market (economic *laissez faire*) of Hayek (1949). Hayek stressed that economic order depended on unintentional factors; any (rightist conservative or leftist constructivist) intervention of the state would lead to disorder. However, starting from previous definitions, Huntington's order coincides with a sum of cultural (and regional) processes of political *laissez faire*; thus, with what could be considered (in order to avoid conceptual stretching) as world anarchy. In sum, anarchy cannot mean absence of a world authority, but rather absence of governance; it materializes when major powers follow political *laissez faire* and abstain themselves from intervening in (world) politics (Fossati 1999).

⁴ Rosenau (1992) gave a definition of order that solely concerns the routinized arrangements through which world affairs are conducted, that would not be linked to any "single array of patterns": thus, with a high heterogeneity among values, institutions and behaviors. Order would be different from governance because the latter implies also intentionality; thus, governance is order (routinized arrangements) plus intentionality (basic decisions).

⁵ In the literature (Fossati 1999), other three conceptions of order were advanced: the Leviathan the social contract and peace. The utopian promoters of the "World Order Model Projects" (WOMPs) aimed at overcoming the negative effects of state power through one world authority, able to guarantee the ultimate values of the humanity: peace, economic welfare, cultural identity, political participation (Mendlovitz 1975). This approach recalls the conception of order of the Roman Empire, in which compliance depended on the authority of one hegemon; the continental tradition of politics (Hobbes) linked order to the constraints of the absolute state: the Leviathan. In Bull's (1977) theory, order is linked to rules, even if within a wider definition of them: not only law, but also informal, moral norms... This definition was applied to all those cases with an incremental institutionalization of horizontal practices: the social contract among rational individuals (Locke). The political example is the ancient Greece and the modern Anglo-Saxon "limited" state. The fourth "image" of order was peace. It was used especially in the pre/modern phase of the Western civilization: in both Greek "eirene" and Roman "pax" (Gori 1970). This thesis was also supported by Gilpin (1981). Order and peace are to be realized through the hegemon's control of world politics; when he declines, there is war and anarchy. However, these three alternative definitions of order were criticized in Fossati (1999).

The concept of (world) order

In daily language, some objects (a list of books) can be ordered if they follow a unity of measure (the alphabetical listing of authors' surnames). What is the unity of measure in politics? Order is that governance which concerns the process of obtaining the compliance of the other actors on certain values, that is to say the unity of measure, the above-mentioned single array of patterns (Fossati 1999). In domestic politics, there is one authority that defines one (or more) values; this situation assures high levels of governance if the authority can stabilize compliance. In the international arena there's no single authority; thus, governance is less easily realized. There may be n processes of governance with n authorities, according to the different states (and values)⁶.

Before 1989 there was a complex mix of anarchy, governance and "two blocks" orders⁷. After the cold war, compliance must not be reached towards a single value. There must be one value (the unity of measure) for each power arena in post/1989 international relations: democracy (political), peace (military), market (economic) and national self/determination (cultural).

This concerns only developing and former communist countries, because in the "ordered" first world, the four values were already guaranteed. Democracy is a phenomenon embracing Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia. There are few exceptions (Cuba, Belarus and some African or Asian regimes), but the exceptions become the pattern in the Sinic civilization (China, Vietnam) and in the Arab/Islamic countries. Thus, there are several hybrid regimes or illiberal democracies. Market reforms are being introduced in many developing countries, with the coercion exercised by the IMF through the hierarchical foreign debt regime. Economic *laissez faire* is emerging also at the international level, by the strengthening of the parithetic trade regime through the WTO. However, some resistance to *laissez faire* is emerging at both international and domestic level. Then, after '89, there has been a hope that wars would have become an obsolete phenomenon in world politics, but in the following years wars continued with many "cultural" (inter nations and/or inter civilizations) armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the third world. There has been a generalized (and successful) attempt at reducing the level of violence and realizing peace (in the military arena), even if conflict resolution is more difficult (in the cultural arena). The empirical evidence showed that the fourth objective of world order, national self-determination -according to the principle one nation = one state-, has rarely been pursued by the major powers, which preferred pluri/national states. Thus, there was some disorder in the cultural arena. In sum, post-'89 international relations were characterized by a "near" order, with a higher stabilization of democracy, market and peace, and a lower guarantee of the cultural value of national self-determination.

Order materialized only in few symmetric separation scenarios, like for example in East Timor, where a referendum on national self-determination was managed by the United Nations. Other examples are Slovenia and Eritrea, with local referenda; another is the potential resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, becoming independent in Gaza and all West Bank.

⁶ Order and anarchy are two concepts, whose meanings are deeply different: almost opposite. Waltz (1979) started from the assumption of anarchy in international politics and equality among actors; then, he pictured a world order based on different configurations of (asymmetrical) power distribution. His analysis would be coherent if he were to assert that either ordered international systems are all hierarchical (and with different actors) or his conception of structure were based on the model of anarchy (and not of order) and equal actors. Waltz cannot assert the existence of anarchy and order at the same time. His conception of anarchy suffers from conceptual stretching, for the mentioned reasons, while his concept of order is tautological because it coincides with the concept of structure. Another example of tautology is Cox's (1996) definition of order, which is close to Marx's conception of economic structure. In fact, every economic institution (capitalist, socialist...) would be ordered.

⁷ Before '89, the values pertaining to the four power arenas were different in the two blocks.. There were two order scenarios in the political and economic arena: freedom (democracy and market) in the first world, centralization (communism and socialism) in the second world. The USSR applied order also in all his third world satellite states (Cuba, Vietnam...). The USA did not go so far; market and democracy were not always defended in the third world countries allied to the West; thus, governance prevailed. Most governments applied the ISI (import substitution industrialization) economic institutions and were authoritarian. Peace and national self-determination were not defended by the West, because of the USA/USSR confrontation (through the "traffic light" practice); thus, anarchy prevailed.

Governance, with the absence of the unity of measure (the guarantee of national self-determination), materialized in all pluri/national states, by integrations or asymmetrical separations. These ones have been ways of “freezing” (or avoiding) conflicts. Finally, if there are no attempts at resolving conflict, anarchy prevails, following the patterns of Huntington’s prescriptions. This scenario materialized in Tibet, Chechnya, Sri Lanka... (Fossati 1999).

Moreover, the three scenarios are compatible with each of the main democratic political cultures (Fossati 1999, 2006bis). Conservatives usually choose anarchy, because they realistically assume that nationalism leads to war, preferring states’ interests against nations’ ones (Shapiro, Hardin (1993). Instead, Wilsonian liberals have always defended national aspirations from state coercion power, promoting self-determination and order (Tir 2005). Finally, leftist constructivists have opted for “politically correct” conflict resolution processes that are to be exemplified pluri-national states; this multi/cultural scenario was supported by the promoters of cosmopolitan values (Held 1995) and by post-Marxists, whose criticism of nationalism has always been strong⁸.

THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Post-’89 armed conflict resolution attempts

There are some conflicts without resolutions at all, because there is still war, like in Sri Lanka among Buddhist Cingalese government and Hindu Tamil rebels. In Chechnya, after nearly 10 years of war, Russia is trying to provoke a segmentation of that Islamic nation, promoting an alliance with moderate Chechens. Al Qaeda is trying to enact a subversion attempt in many Islamic states: especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan (through Talibans), Iraq (through radical Sunnis) and Somalia (through Islamic courts). There is still some violence also in Colombia, Myanmar, Darfur, Chad, Uganda, Central African Republic, French and Belgian Congo.

Few conflicts have been resolved through “symmetric” separation, by the ordered scenario anchored to the liberal principle of national self/determination. Independence materialized in Eritrea (from Ethiopia in 1993), East Timor (from Indonesia in 1999), through popular referenda. In Kashmir, separation was the outcome of the 1963 inter-governments’ agreement between India and China. Independence declaration of Kosovo in 2008 did not follow the self/determination principle, as asymmetric separation benefited only Albanians; also Montenegro’s independence (from Serbia in 2006) materialized a pluri/national state⁹. Among Yugoslavia’s separations, only the Slovenian one was symmetric, while Croatian, Bosnian and Macedonian secessions were asymmetric.

Symmetric integration was realized through two scenarios. The former is *federalism*, that materialized in Bosnia (between Croats/Muslims and Serbs) after Dayton’s agreement in 1995, Iraq (among Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites, after 2005 referendum), Nigeria (after late 60s’ Biafra war), Ethiopia (since 1995), Somalia (among the various clans since 2003), India: in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Uttar Pradesh. The other scenario is *consensual pact*, with the guarantee of representation in governments of all groups in conflict. This occurred in Ulster (between Unionists and Catholics after 1998 Belfast agreement), Lebanon (after 1943 constitution), Afghanistan (among Tajiks, Uzbeks and Pashtuns since December 2001), Tajikistan (between Russians and Uzbeks in the north and Tajiks in the south since 1997), Burundi (since 2003), Sierra Leone (since 2002), Liberia (since 2005), Cote d’Ivoire (since 2007), Belgian Congo (from 2003 to 2006 elections), Kenya (after 2007 elections), Zimbabwe (after the summer 2008 agreement). In Central African Republic (in 2005) the pact was partial, as warlord Patassé was excluded from consensus.

⁸ Ikenberry (2001) did not identify national self/determination as one of the values of “post/victory” world order. Instead, he made reference to the cosmopolitan civic identity, that is compatible with the above mentioned governance. Thus, Ikenberry focused on the concrete ways by which governance was applied after ‘89, disregarding the evolution of political order in the West –where multi/cultural states were the exception to the prevailing pattern (Keating 2001).

⁹ Self-determination principle is respected if separation is symmetric; if Palestine would enclose all West Bank, and if Kosovo and Western Sahara would be divided into two parts (one Serb and one Albanian, one Moroccan and one Saraoui). Asymmetric separation leads to pluri/national states, if Israel would maintain part of West Bank and if all Kosovo and all Western Sahara would become independent. Post-’89 partitions of former USSR did not materialize separations, because confederations admit secessions; thus, conflicts did not crystallize (Pavkovic 2007).

Asymmetric integration consists in the concession of an administrative *autonomy*, like in Euskadi (within the Spanish constitution), in Croatia with Serbs (since 2005 negotiations with EU on enlargement), in Macedonia towards Albanians (since 2001), in Crimea with Russians (within the Ukrainian constitution), between Israel and Palestinians in Gaza (after 1993 Oslo agreements), in Pakistan -where federalism is only formal-, Bangladesh (in Buddhist Chittagong), Philippines (in Muslim Mindanao isle) and Indonesia (in Aceh) towards minorities, in Mali and Niger (after mid 90s peace agreements with Tuareg groups), in Sudan (after 2005 peace agreement between the Arab north and the African south)¹⁰. In Turkish Kurdistan (since 2005 negotiations with EU on enlargement), in Christian Casamance of Senegal and in indigenous Chiapas (since 2001), autonomy is partial and in progress, but violence almost ended.

A compromise between integration and separation is *confederation*, but the Bosnian one is just formal because single polities cannot declare independence; it is often perceived as an unstable scenario and people usually refuse it, like UN 2002 Annan plan's rejection in Cyprus.

Exchange is the modality of conflict resolution characterized by vast crimes against humanity; in fact, governments grant *amnesty* to criminals, asking for the end of violence. That occurred in late 90s in both Algeria towards Islamic groups and in Cambodia towards communist Khmer Rouges; in Colombia it is still a project (towards "mafia-communists"), while Peru's government has refused to grant it to communist terrorists of Sendero Luminoso. Persuasion materializes if a state accepts (for example) an *arbitrary trial*, like between Libya and Chad over the Aozou strip; in 1994 the International Court of Justice gave the territory to Chad. Transcendence can be realized if *democracy* resolves conflicts, like in post-apartheid Namibia and Mozambique, then in post-'89 Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador (after the very violent "bipolarism" wars of the 80s), in Nepal and Philippines (after the wars with domestic communist groups) and in Ukraine (after the Orange revolution in 2004/5, solving the conflict between its western and eastern part). In Dominican Republic, after the 1965 invasion of the Usa, democracy had emerged in late 60s. In Haiti there were two American military interventions (in 1994 and 2004); now that country has become a democracy, overcoming both patrimonial right and populist left illiberal regimes. However, if democracy is illiberal (in Haiti, Mozambique and Nepal), transcendence is potential. Conflict between Israel and Lebanon's Hezbollah was frozen thanks to UN multilateralization.

Other conflicts were resolved through asymmetric processes, like a *military victory*; thus a dominion materialized. That occurred to the UK towards Argentina in the 1982 Falklands war, to China against Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang (since Communist Party repression after 1945), to Albanians against Serbs in Kosovo (after 1999 Nato intervention), to Russians in Dagestan (in 1998) and Transnistria (against Moldavia), to Ossetians against Georgians in South Ossetia, to Israel towards Palestinians in West Bank (after the 1967 six days' war), to North against South Yemen in 1994, to Iran against Kurds, to Myanmar against different ethnic minorities, to Thailand towards Muslims in Pattani, to Laos against some minorities, to Indonesia towards Christian population of Western Papua Guinea, to Fijians towards Indian minorities, to northern Islamics against southern Christians in Chad (since the beginning of the 80s), to Nigeria against Cameroon in Bakassi, to Ethiopia against Eritrea in late 90s war over Badme, to Tutsi against Hutu in Rwanda (after 1994 genocide of Hutu against Tutsi), to governments of Guinea (with Conté repression), Angola (after governments' victory against Unita in 2002), Uganda (with Musuveni repression), Chad (after Deby's victory in 1990) and French Congo (after Sassou-Nguessou's victory in 1999) against the rebels, to Peru against communist terrorists of Sendero Luminoso.

When the military victory is coupled with "*ethnic cleansing*", there is incapacitation. That occurred in Abkhazia (Russians against Georgians), in the area (Lachin corridor) uniting Armenia to Nagorno/Karabach (against Azeris), in North Ossetia (in Prigorodny, against Islamic Ingushes in '92), in Golan heights (Israel against Syria) since 1967. In Cyprus, there was a reciprocal incapacitation, with the expulsion of Greeks from the north and Turks from the south after 1974.

¹⁰ Sometimes, autonomy is coupled with a minority participation in governments: through a consensual pact. Thus, this is a "gray" empirical evidence, somewhere in between two models, like in southern Sudan.

Sometimes, ethnic cleansing is partial and some minority populations remain: in Western Sahara of Morocco against Saraouis (in different phases after the withdrawal of Spain in mid 70s), in Darfur where Islamic Africans were expelled by Islamic Arabs in late 90s, in parts of Indian Kashmir where many Hindus were incapacitated by Muslims after 1989.

Many conflicts have a double dimension: one among the sociological (majority/minority) actors within a section of territory, another one among the involved states. The latter conflicts are living a freezing process, with a *de facto separation*, which is not recognized by international law. This is occurring in northern Cyprus after the 1974 war between Greece and Turkey, Kosovo (also with 2008 declaration of independence), TransNistria (after the 1992 war), Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (after the two wars in the 1992/3 and in 2008), Armenia and Azerbaijan (after the 1992/94 war in Nagorno/Karabakh), India and Pakistan (after the 1947 and 1965 wars over Kashmir) and “British” Somaliland (since 1991) –the rest of Somalia was an Italian colony.

The main empirical evidence stemming from the comparative analysis is that the various post-89 armed conflicts have lived a very violent phase in the 90s. In the new millennium, most of wars have ended (with some exceptions like Colombia, Darfur, Sri Lanka...), but only very few conflicts have been resolved; most of the incompatibilities have just been frozen or are living an unstable process. This is evident for the mentioned *de facto* separations, for all the asymmetric conflict avoidance processes (both dominion and incapacitation), for all the countries suffering Islamic fundamentalists’ terrorism (like in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Chechnya), and for many consensual pacts –that seem efficient only in the short term. What can explain this anomalous combination of the end of violence and many frozen conflicts?

The role of external actors and some explanation hypothesis

In order to try to explain these two empirical evidences, it is important to focus on the role of external actors. USA and major Western powers have militarily intervened in five conflicts: Kuwait (in '91), Bosnia (in '95), Kosovo (in '99), Afghanistan (in 2001) and Iraq (in 2003). However, only the Kuwait conflict has been resolved, by neutralizing Iraq’s dominion attempt; in Bosnia e Kosovo violence ended, but with some instability; Afghanistan and Iraq are both very violent and unstable cases. The USA is trying to mediate in the long lasting conflict between Israel and Palestinians, whose resolution is pursued in Annapolis negotiations since 2007. In the other conflicts, the mobilization of small and medium (especially European) powers has produced limited effects. Mediation capabilities of France and Great Britain, but also India, have been very limited. Being afraid of appearing as neo-colonialist, thus with a sort of post-imperial identity crisis, European governments have never made relevant conflict resolution proposals. They just promoted peace, only trying to “stop the blood”; the promotion of consensual pacts (especially in Africa) had some positive effect only in the short term. There were some single diplomats (for example from Canada or Norway) or United Nations functionaries (like Akashi in Cambodia) trying to mediate in some conflicts. Military interventions of France have been partisan (in Rwanda) o brutal (in Ivory Coast). Great Britain promoted the isolation of the most violent “*warlord*”, Sankoh, in Sierra Leone. The European Union only promoted conflict resolution in its enlargement candidates, but more as a collateral effect of the multiple citizenship perception of the new members (Tocci 2007). India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka led to an intensification of the conflict. An exception has been the promotion of the *referendum* on national self/determination in East Timor. The liberal ideological orientation of the Australian prime minister, Howard, who invoked the Western values, was not a marginal factor, ending the convergence between the conservative right and the left in the so-called not interference in the domestic politics of Indonesia. Russia intervened only to protect its allies in Eastern Europe and favor partisan and asymmetric conflict resolution (or, more often, freezing) of those conflicts: thus, without any neutral role. In sum, European governments have been very inconsistent in their diplomacy; thus, Europe is just a “civil impotence”. The cause of this empirical evidence has to be linked to the perverse effects of post-modernity and to the identity crisis that European countries have not still overcome in their post-colonial phase.

More successful UN missions were characterized by conflicts linked to bipolarism, like in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala), Namibia and Mozambique in Africa, and especially Cambodia. The latter is the most successful UN intervention, in a country with a power vacuum, because of the necessity to isolate Khmer Rouges, as no local actor had that power. Diplomatic capabilities of the head of the UN mission (Japanese Akashi) were crucial in favoring the end of the war. In other cases, UN played relevant mediation efforts, but they were less successful: in Cyprus, Western Sahara, Bosnia and Kosovo. In the former, the UN functionaries probably elaborated lowly coherent (and unsuccessful) proposals, like the 2002 Annan pact and the 2003 Baker plan, that were rejected by the main local actors. In Bosnia, there was the Daytona peace agreement, but it was implemented especially by the major powers' mediation. In Kosovo, there is no peace agreement yet; but the UN have promoted the asymmetric Ahtisaari plan in 2007. In Croatia, Afghanistan and Iraq, UN role was limited; military initiatives and cease-fire attempts were promoted by major powers. In Cyprus and in Kashmir, military inter-mediation efforts were successful, but an informal agreement for conflict freezing was reached (between India and Pakistan) only in the latter. In Yemen, military inter-mediation was a failure, while in Lebanon, it had a very partial success and the frequent Israel's attacks show UN incapability to guarantee peace.

In other cases, UN intervention was successful, but only after governments mobilization, like in East Timor and Sierra Leone. In the former, Indonesia has sent its troops to revert pro-independence *referendum*. In Sierra Leone, British military intervention was necessary in order to end violence and promote a peace agreement. In other cases, missions were successful, thanks to collaboration with regional or global organizations: in Eritrea (with the Organization of African Unity), in the Dominican Republic (with the Organization of the American States), in the conflict between Chad and Libya (with the trial of the International Court of Justice).

In Africa, the UN played a more relevant role, with an informal delegation of the major powers, unwilling to enact relevant governance efforts in such a marginal region. Three scenarios materialized. Some were evident cases of failure, like Somalia, Rwanda and Angola. In other cases, the UN made some mistakes, for example leaving countries with asymmetrical conflict resolution scenarios, like in Liberia, Central African Republic (and also in Haiti and in Macedonia). Then, the UN sent its peace-keeping missions only after violence had ended, that is to say where military risks were lower; that occurred in Sudan, in Burundi, in the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, in Belgian Congo and in Ivory Coast –in the latter two cases, wars continued after the deployment of UN troops. Finally, there was the anomalous mixed UN-OAU Darfur mission, but with very limited powers.

Anarchy prevailed when regional powers favored their allies, like Russia in TransNistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno/Karabakh, Tajikistan, or repressed rebels (Russia in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia; China in Tibet, Xinnian). UN did not intervene when Islamic fundamentalists were involved and they were repressing moderate Islamic people: Arabs, in Algeria; Africans, in Darfur -with the mentioned “anomalous” mixed mission with OAU. UN chose anarchy when strong African leaders were involved (Musuveni in Uganda, Conté in Guinea, Sassou-Nguessou in Congo, Deby in Chad), in Asian (India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Philippines...) countries -with a high cultural identity and some biases towards “western” global organizations like the UN-, in communist rebellions in Latin America (Chiapas, Peru and Colombia).

In sum, what can explain the mentioned combination of lower violence and unresolved conflicts? There are two possible explanations: one ideological and one rational. The conservative right has always been obsessed with an anti/liberal bias, against national self-determination and secessions: a sort of “domino effect syndrome”. National aspirations are considered a disease, leading to conflict, terrorism and wars. Thus, conflict prevention strategies have been linked to anarchy, that is to say to the political *laissez faire*, always avoiding governance and order attempts. The second ideological bias is related to the obsession of (moderate) leftist politicians in promoting pluri/national scenarios of conflict resolution (either integrations or asymmetric separations), with a (second) intellectual bias against national self-determination, that is considered as a sort of new apartheid and not politically correct scenario. This is the well-known “super-structure syndrome”.

Major powers did not support symmetric separation (into two parts: one Albanian and one Serb) of Kosovo, because it could have negatively affected Dayton's equilibria in pluri-national Bosnia. This is the "Dayton's paradox", within another "King Salomon's syndrome"¹¹. The UE never supported secessions, neither in Montenegro, with the only exception of Palestine (Tocci 2007).

The second hypothesis is anchored to rationality. Pluri/national states and frozen conflicts represent the *mini/max* option in prisoner's dilemma of game theory. National self-determination and order could resolve incompatibilities in the long period (option #I), but could lead to more violence in the short term (option #IV). Rational decision making is linked to the high probability that actors want to avoid that "scissors' choice": the best and especially the worst. Rational behavior will try to reach intermediate options, thanks to a (probably non intentional) convergence between promoters of conservative anarchy (the so-called political *laissez faire*: option #III) -like in Tibet, Chechnya, Sri Lanka-, and leftist political correctness, in favor of multi/cultural and not ordered governance (option #II) -with the promotion of pluri/national states (either by integrations or asymmetrical separations, like in Kosovo). Those polities were especially anchored to consensual pacts, that in the short period are easier to realize than federalism. In sum, states do not collaborate and apply a rational co-ordination, leading either to pluri/national states, or -if it fails- to anarchy.

In fact, it has to be admitted that electoral democracies have often led to war. When the winning majority has excluded the losing minority from power, the latter has often declared war. Power should be shared at all levels, but especially in public institutions (civil service, magistrature, armed forces, security forces, secret services...). This is the perverse effect of the post-'89 "near world order"; if many developing countries have not resolved the primary conflict among all the different national polities within them, they are going to remain unstable. Then, consensual pacts are not easy to be maintained in the medium period, and electoral democracy could lead again to conflict (and war), like for example in Belgian Congo, after the recent 2006 elections. The alternative is between a potential transcendence (with a power sharing agreement in the neutral institutions, but not in government) and dominion, with "the winner takes all" formula. Thus, federalism seems to be more compatible with consolidated democracies than consensual pacts. If after the elections all the main groups have to reach a pact someone could object: why wasting so much money to organize them if the outcome is more or less the same? Thus, elections seem to be able to facilitate only the elaboration of the percentages for the division of power. Federalism decentralizes power and thus can better prevent and manage conflict.

The hypothesis of the convergence between promoters of conservatism and leftist political correctness is compatible with the so-called sociologist reflective liberalism (Fossati 2006). Political cultures, being a mix between interests and ideas, would be the "building blocks" of international relations, influencing all actors: governments, regional alliances, global institutions, NGOs (Fossati 2006bis). This diagnosis is different from that of the orthodox realists, who would focus on power factors and the structural influence of the international system, by emphasizing that conflict with the major powers' (especially the USA) governance are going to be resolved (instead of the other ones). However, this hypothesis was not confirmed by the empirical evidence, as only the Kuwait conflict has been resolved. A third "rational liberal" hypothesis would focus on the positive role of global institutions like the UN, but many empirical failure cases do not confirm it. Also a fourth hypothesis (with even lower evidence) has to be mentioned, that is linked to the manichean vision of the world of radical leftists, that would emphasize the "palingenesis" role of NGOs (like *Comunità di Sant'Egidio*), instead of the "mean" states and inter-governmental institutions (like the UN).

¹¹ The so-called neo-conservatives have never supported national self-determination: for example after 2003 in Iraq. Radical leftists suggested separations only when under-privileged actors are involved, like in the Israel-Palestinians conflict, showing to have a manichean vision of the world. Nationalism is good if supported by a third world actor, and would become evil if consistent with a Western national aspiration. As researchers, we must just observe reality, and if there is some cultural violence, we cannot do "trials to intentions", and we should limit ourselves to advance some suggestions to solve those conflicts. European nations have made cultural wars among themselves for centuries; other people in the world should not repeat the same mistakes, but it is quite normal if they do. Before political correctness became the prevailing culture, it was widely accepted that people with a common identity could constitute a state.

“Preferred worlds”

In the modern phase of Peace Research (PR), there was still the hope of influencing politics, and Galtung (1985) launched the project of the preferred worlds, a sort of pacific engineering, in order to focus on those conflict resolutions, that would be closer to a positive sum game, being at the same time equal and feasible (and not totally unrealistic). However, peace researchers have been discouraged by the passage of Western societies to post/modernity (after 1968), that had strongly weakened rational projects, like PR¹². Then, some mistakes were probably made also by the researchers, with a sort of intellectual subordination to the “prevailing” ideology of post-modern societies: leftist politically correctness (Fossati 2006bis). For example, there was a permanent inclination towards supporting pluri/national states -either with integrations or with asymmetric separations-, while national self-determination was often considered as a new-apartheid scenario¹³.

Let's face now the typical conservative objection: why are intervening to promote conflict resolution? Everyone should be satisfied with the end of violence, even if sometimes wars start again (South Ossetia). If you try to resolve frozen conflicts, wars are probably going to start again. Anarchical conflict freezing represents the *mini-max* outcome: worse than a definitive solution, but better than war -that stem from governance or order attempts. The objection is reasonable, but single empirical solutions could suggest if there is room for some improvement or not, and if anarchy is the only strategy to be sought. In fact, anarchy is likely to lead to zero-sum conflict resolution processes, such as dominion, incapacitation or (in the best situations) asymmetric integrations. Then, most conflicts live peace negotiations phases, and it is better to have some creativity, otherwise violence will very often re-start: like in Lebanon, South Ossetia, Gaza...

In synthesis, liberal, conservative or leftist biases should not affect researchers, even if they naturally condition politicians; also national self-determination cannot become a *panacea*. Federations, more than power-sharing agreements or confederations (Galtung 2002, 2008), are probably the most equitable solutions. The choice of the preferred worlds is not easy to achieve; there are three difficult scenarios: population mixed together (Israel-Palestine), *enclave* (Armenia/Azerbaijan), immigration floods in close countries (Kosovo/Serbia).

Here are the “preferred worlds”, that must not be interpreted as rigid positions. The two conflicts of Kosovo and Western Sahara could find a solution with a symmetric separation, and the division of lands in two parts: the north under the sovereignty of Serbia and Morocco, and the south independent. The exact frontier could be drawn by the ICG. The long-lasting Israel-Palestinian conflict could find a solution, with an independent state in all Olp's West Bank; instead, as long as Hamas is not going to renounce the destruction of Israel, administrative autonomy has to remain in Gaza¹⁴. The only solution to Falklands' conflict is independence from both UK and Argentina. Kurds have the right to build their state too; that scenario is much more likely in Iraq, because there is already federalism. Separation between India and Pakistan in Kashmir should be also legalized.

¹² This essay will not touch the issue of the causes of conflicts and wars. The cultural (infra or inter civilization/s) dimension of conflict is not always the most important -it was not in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique-; sometimes, the economic resources or the presence of a charismatic leader were more relevant. But the empirical evidence always confirmed the existence of (stronger or weaker) cultural identities, with few exceptions: wars in 1994 in Yemen, and those with communist groups in Philippines and Nepal. Then, it is true that “ethnic hate” characterized genocides in Africa, Islamic fundamentalism, Serbian ethnic cleansing, but other times was absent. However, Huntington (1996) advanced a structural theory, that was independent from intentional perceptions. Cases of torture of some Western soldiers in Somalia, Afghanistan or Iraq showed that the West institutions wants to avoid the clash with Islam, but some subterranean latent conflict is existent. The economic theory was naturally over emphasized by post-Marxist scholars. The leaders' explanation was supported too; it can be accepted for Milosevic, Hussein, Taylor, Savimbi..., but not when leaders are 10, 100, 1000...: there, the main cause will probably be sociological.

¹³ Many peace researchers are naturally constructivist, but they also should remind the modern (appeal to rational “enlightening”), and not only the post-modern (politically correctness) values of the left. Then, many leftist researchers had often the above-mentioned ideological bias against nationalism, assuming (with a very utopian cosmology) that conflicts will be “transformed”, only when those “politically incorrect” collective identities are overcome.

¹⁴ Separate peace can be facilitated by some territories' exchanges (between Israel and Palestinians) inside and outside 1967 frontiers. Also some Arab neighbors could give some strips of land to the new Palestinian state.

In Africa, there are two cases that could lead to independence, not violating the 1963 OAU pact - maintaining colonial frontier in order not to provoke domino effect-: Somaliland and Southern Sudan, because these two polities were decided by imperial administrations: Italy and Great Britain.

In former USSR there are some anomalous scenarios, where some territories were offered as a gift to other states. The return of these lands to the “mother” nations seems the most equitable solution. Thus, Moldavian TransNistria should return to Ukraine; Ukrainian Krimea to Russia; Northern Ossetian region of Prigorodny to Ingushetia; Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Separation is inevitable in Nagorno-Karabakh; the memory of the genocide is alive for Armenians, that should return the Lachin corridor to Azerbaijan, with a UN (and not Russian) guarantee.

In Bosnia, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Irian Jaya referenda with a democratic choice between federalism and separation should promote a longer-lasting peace. The victory of secessionists could also lead to integrations: with Croatia and Serbia (together with an independent Islamic Bosnia); Greece and Turkey; Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; Papua New Guinea. A referendum should be proposed also in Kashmir to let the people choose the exact frontier between India and Pakistan. Asymmetric integration (with autonomy) is to be applied by authoritarian China: in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinnian. The same scenario would concern Iran and local Kurds, to minorities in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia (in Aceh). Autonomy should be strengthened in Chiapas. Confederation seems feasible in Georgia and Myanmar, which are a puzzle of too many nations, and also in Iraq between Shiites and Sunnis, with a rigid agreement to share oil exports revenues.

In Africa, federalism should be the solution, as consensual pacts seem feasible only in highly ethnically-mixed (between hutu and tutsi) Burundi and Rwanda –and in Fiji isles. Federalism is to be applied also in Yemen (between southern Sunnis and Northern Shiites), Lebanon: to avoid violence among the Christian and Islamic clans. Federalism is to be exported in Sri Lanka, by the imitation of India, and in Philippines, Laos and Thailand. That scenario is to be implemented also in Ukraine (between “orange” west and pro-Russia east), in the Islamic nations of Russia (Chechnya, Daghestan) -where the real federal entities are the provinces and not the republics, which only enjoy autonomy- and in Tajikistan (between the Russian/Uzbek north and the Tajik south).

In Ireland and Spain, a combination between federalism and consensual pacts could be implemented. On one hand, local governments should be managed by consensual pacts, to be exported from Ulster to Euskadi (after the renouncing of terrorism by ETA). On the other hand, federalism could be implemented between Eire and Ulster (with the parallel separation of Ulster from Great Britain) and among all the various nationalities in Spain, whose autonomies are already a sort of informal federalism. Currently, it is almost impossible to identify a conflict resolution modality with Al Qaeda, because Islamic fundamentalism has declared its incompatibility with the West and moderate Islamic actors, and its willingness to destroy its enemies, like Israel.

The diplomatic instruments to promote conflict resolution

Which could be the political actor able to support these preferred worlds and to play some mediation attempts? I would exclude the USA because since '45 it has become the “military arm” of the Western civilization. Americans make a lot, and probably they could not become good mediators, except some former president (Carter, Clinton...): for example, they are too close to Israel. After '45, the European Union has lost its capabilities in foreign policy and has become a “civil impotence”, with diplomacies mostly aiming at materializing a foreign economic policy, by supporting domestic public and private firms in the world market. How and why could this situation be changed? As history shows, cooperation is the outcome of a strong threat, like that of Islamic fundamentalism after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. First, European states and societies must perceive that threat because it is clear and strong for at least one century; second, they must redefine their identity overcoming postmodern collective feelings of guilty, living post-colonialism as a knowledge opportunity (and not only as a patron-client tool in foreign economic policy); third, they can help the USA to understand when violence is the only solution that cannot be avoided in the short period to avoid mass murders.

Only if this change of identity (first) and behaviors (second) occur, could the EU become a political actor able to promote conflict resolution; it cannot have military capabilities, unless it strongly decreases public expenditure in welfare state. A coordination with the USA could materialize the link between the political projects and the (threat of) military sanctions. The EU does not need a common foreign policy to become a good mediator. European governments should only try to promote bilateral or minilateral conflict resolution negotiations, even if they do not share the same preferred worlds. I assume that *tertium non datur* cosmology of knowledge have produced negative effects; negotiation attempts that have been carried on either by states and regional alliances (like the OUA), or by functionaries of global institutions (like the UN) and NGOs, have produced limited effects. It is probably better if the former -who have resources and may apply sanctions- promote the negotiations, and the latter -who are creative- mediate. Peace researchers, functionaries of global institutions, and leaders of international or local NGOs could be the specific mediators. Only inter/governative mediations often fail not because major powers' interests are not compatible, but because there are no relevant interests of those actors, and thus they do not want to be involved. In sum, Europeans must plan for themselves a political (and not military) role in post-'89 conflict management processes, for both selfish (cooperating with moderate Islam, in order to defeat radical terrorist Islam) and altruistic universal (preventing ethnic cleansing, mass murders...) scopes. Efforts aiming at managing and solving (through symmetric scenarios) conflicts -especially those involving Islamic actors- is the only way to defeat whichever anti-West fundamentalism.

Which are the principles that could be suggested in a mediation process, also according to some Galtung's (2002, 2008) suggestions? First, all "tolerant" (even if terrorist) actors must be invited to the negotiation process, except those who do not accept the right of other actors to exist, and thus have genocide orientations (like the PLO in the past and Hamas or Hezbollah now). Second, the mediator should communicate in a separate way with each actor, especially in the starting phase; only when common solutions may be envisaged, the minilateral table of negotiation can begin. Third, the mediator must have an objective, that is to say his "preferred world", but it cannot be managed in a rigid (even if not too flexible) way. Fourth, there must not be a rigid compromise orientation, always looking for fifty/fifty solutions that can be more favorable (even if not too much) to a single part: "equi-distance is not always a virtue". Fifth, the mediator cannot be ideological, always preferring either "leftist" pluri/national states (governance), or "liberal" self-determination (order), or conservative political *laissez faire* (anarchy).

Which are the concrete diplomatic steps that the European Union could promote¹⁵?

- Convoke a Helsinki II, within OSCE (with a high diplomatic status to Russia), in order to promote some collective formula for Eastern Europe conflicts, which live similar situations. A neutral tribunal should promote some revision of past "mistakes" of leaders like Stalin, who gave some territories as gifts to other nations. In those cases, popular referenda are not feasible solutions, because many (now majoritarian) people were deported within mass-ethnic cleansing. In synthesis, these territories (see previous sections) could be returned to their original states.
- Promote the organization of an Addis Abeba II in Africa, within OUA. That conference should implement federalism in all states -with the exceptions of Rwanda/Burundi (with consensual pacts) and Somaliland/Southern Sudan (with independence and symmetrical separations)-, coupled with limited consensual pacts for central governments. After that process, that is in the medium-term, regional confederations among culturally-close countries can be encouraged.
- In the Middle East there is already the Annapolis multilateral conference, sponsored by the USA, even if moderate Islamic actors prefer understatement to open conflict with

¹⁵ The role of the UN appears quite limited in these scenarios of conflict management; in fact, as many authoritarian governments are part of the Security council, there is not much to expect from that organization. The Secretary general could reinforce the UN role in conflict management through decision to delegate a neutral tribunal to enact not compulsory trials on each armed conflict in the world. Then, the major (democratic) powers could push the (post-communist and developing) states (or groups) to comply with the sentences of the UN tribunal. This process can be either autonomous (a sort of "plan B") or parallel to the EU initiatives, within the above mentioned "preferred worlds".

fundamentalists. The critical juncture in West *versus* radical Islam conflict is giving a state to the Palestinian nation. Conflict with Israel cannot be resolved until the genocide-orientation of PLO (in the past) and Hamas (now) survives; it is the only conflict where one part wants to destroy the enemy. The EU should build a stronger alliance with Israel (except Jew fundamentalists) and moderate Palestinians (Abu Mazen), abandoning whichever relation with Hamas. European governments have often been afraid of appearing as partisan of some groups, but equi-distance has always been the second-worst solution to a 100% partisan support of local allies: the Russian formula. Israel will have to grant independence to Olp's Palestinians only in (all) the West Bank; Hamas' Gaza should remain with autonomy. Only by applying positive sanctions, a learning process can be implemented and fundamentalism be weakened. Also Kurds should have their state, with Iraq becoming a confederation between Shiites and Sunnis. Only after these conflicts are resolved, some scenarios for overcoming the incompatibilities with Al Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalists (Hamas, Hezbollah, Talibans...) may be envisaged.

- Push India to organize a regional conference in order to export federalism in Sri Lanka and consolidate it in Punjab, Assam and especially in Kashmir.
- In relations with other Asian countries -in either Islamic (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia), or in Buddhist (Thailand, Laos, Myanmar) and Christian (Philippines)-, the EU could apply a new political conditionality to recipients in order to implement local autonomies or federalism. This aim could be reached by linking aid not to democracy but to conflict-prevention institution building. In the medium term political conditionality could be applied to democracy as well. The EU cannot manage bilateral development cooperation, which is linked to patron-client patterns of donors-recipients relations. Brussels institutions can centralize aid decisions, acting as a "traffic light" mechanism; political conditionality can work, only if donors are not divided.

CONFLICT	DIAGNOSIS	THERAPY
Ulster	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism+consensual pact
Falklands	dominion GB	separation with independence
Cyprus	freezing/reciprocal incapacitation	referendum --> ?
Euskadi	asymmetric integration/autonomy	integration/federalism+consensual pact
Croatia	asymmetric integration/autonomy	asymmetric integration/autonomy
Bosnia	integration/federalism	referendum --> ?
Kosovo	freezing/dominion UCK	symmetric separation
Montenegro	asymmetric separation	
Macedonia	asymmetric integration/autonomy	asymmetric integration/autonomy
TransNistria	freezing/dominion Russians	separation/integration with Ukraine
Ukraine (east/west)	transcendence with democracy	integration/federalism
Ukraine (Krimia)	asymmetric integration/autonomy	separation/integration with Russia
Abkhazia	freezing/incapacitation Ossetians	compromise confederation
South Ossetia	freezing/dominion Ossetians	compromise confederation
North Ossetia (Prigorodny)	incapacitation Ingushes	separation/integration with Ingushetia
Nagorno-Karabach	freezing/incapacitation Azeris	exchange: NK Armenia, Lachin Azerbaijan
Daghestan	dominion Russia	integration/federalism
Chechnya	segmentation Chechnyans	integration/federalism
Afghanistan	integration/consensual pact	referendum --> ?
Tagjikistan	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
Yemen	dominion North Yemen	integration/federalism
Israel-Palestinians (Gaza)	asymmetric integration/autonomy	asymmetric integration/autonomy
Israel-Palestinians (West Bank)	dominion	symmetric separation
Israel-Lebanon	multilateralization UN	?
Lebanon	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
Iraq	integration/federalism	compromise confederation
Kurdistan (Turkey)	asymmetric integration/autonomy	asymmetric integration/autonomy
Kurdistan (Iraq)	integration/federalism	separation with independence
Kurdistan (Iran)	dominion Iran	asymmetric integration/autonomy
Kuwait	separation after Iraq's dominion attempt	

CONFLICT	DIAGNOSIS	THERAPY
Western Sahara	dominion/incapacitation Saraouis	symmetric separation
Algeria	exchange with amnesty	
Tuareg (Mali, Niger)	asymmetric integration/autonomy	integration/federalism
Chad	dominion Islamic North	integration/federalism
Libya-Chad (Aozou strip)	persuasion Libya with Arbitrary Trial	
Sudan	asymmetric integration/autonomy	separation with independence
Darfur	dominion/incapacitation Islamic blacks	integration/federalism
Senegal (Casamance)	asymmetric integration/autonomy	integration/federalism
Liberia	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
Sierra Leone	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
Guinea	dominion Conté	integration/federalism
Ivory Coast	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
Nigeria	integration/federalism	integration/federalism
Nigeria-Cameroon	dominion Nigeria	persuasion Nigeria with arbitrary trial
Zimbabwe	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
Mozambique	potential transcendence with democracy	integration/federalism
Namibia	transcendence with democracy	integration/federalism
Angola	dominion Mpla	integration/federalism
Rwanda	dominion tutsi	integration/consensual pact
Burundi	integration/consensual pact	integration/consensual pact
Belgian Congo	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
Uganda	dominion Musuveni	integration/federalism
Central African Republic	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
French Congo	dominion Sassou-Nguessou	integration/federalism
Kenya	integration/consensual pact	integration/federalism
Eritrea	symmetric separation	
Ethiopia-Eritrea	dominion Ethiopia	persuasion Ethiopia with arbitrary trial
Somalia	integration/federalism	integration/federalism
Somaliland	freezing	separation with independence
Al Qaeda (Afg, Irq, Pak, Som)	(project of) subversion	?
Kashmir (India-China)	separation	
Kashmir (India-Pakistan)	freezing	separation by a referendum
Kashmir (in India)	federalism/incapacitation Hindus	integration/federalism
Pakistan (Mohair, Baluchi)	asymmetric integration/autonomy	autonomy with redesign of provinces
India (various conflicts)	integration/federalism	integration/federalism
Punjab (Sikh)	integration/federalism	integration/federalism
Sri Lanka	(war)	integration/federalism
Bangladesh	asymmetric integration/autonomy	asymmetric integration/autonomy
China (Tibet, Xinn., Inn- Mong.)	dominion China	asymmetric integration/autonomy
Nepal	potential transcendence with democracy	transcendence with democracy
Myanmar (various conflicts)	dominion government, (war)	compromise confederation
Thailand	dominion government	integration/federalism
Laos	dominion government	integration/federalism
Cambodia	exchange with amnesty	
Philippines	transcendence with democracy	
Philippines (Mindanao)	asymmetric integration/autonomy	integration/federalism
East Timor	symmetric separation	symmetric separation
Indonesia (Aceh)	asymmetric integration/autonomy	asymmetric integration/autonomy
Indonesia (Irian Jaya)	dominion Indonesia	referendum --> ?
Fiji Islands	dominion Fijians	integration/consensual pact
Dominican Republic	transcendence with democracy	
Haiti	potential transcendence with democracy	transcendence with democracy
Chiapas	asymmetric integration/autonomy	asymmetric integration/autonomy
Nicaragua, Salvador, Guatemala	transcendence with democracy	
Colombia	(war)	exchange with amnesty
Peru	dominion democratic government	exchange with amnesty

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