A Proposal to Revive the 1961 Mccloy-Zorin Plan as a Basis for Collective Security

UNITED NATIONS, 26 May 2025

Klaus Schlichtmann – TRANSCEND Media Service

Reactivation Under International Law within the Framework of Article 24 of Germany’s Basic Law and Article 106 of the UN Charter

“All proposed reforms of the United Nations converge on one theme. An indispensable item on any reform agenda is restriction of nation state sovereignty. It is also the most important item, since without this restriction no other reforms designed to make the UN more effective in realizing its professed goals can be meaningful.”  — Anatol Rapoport

24 May 2025 – The McCloy-Zorin Accords was an American-Soviet disarmament proposal from 1961, named after John J. McCloy (USA) and Valerian Zorin (USSR), who acted as negotiators. It was a significant attempt to achieve comprehensive disarmament within the framework of the United Nations. Its historical significance and status under international law could prompt Germany today—with reference to Article 24 (1) and (2) of the Basic Law and Article 106 of the UN Charter—to take the initiative to reactivate this disarmament framework in order to support a transition to genuine collective security under the authority of the UN. The Accords attracted a great deal of international attention and were welcomed by many countries in the Global South. On December 20, the Accords was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly.  (See also John F. Kennedy’s speeches!)

In light of current global tensions and crises, the Accords could take on new legal and political relevance. Developed within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the plan envisaged the gradual disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, control by an international authority and the transition to a genuine system of collective security. For the Federal Republic of Germany, which hardly took any notice of the McCloy-Zorin-plan, in retrospect, the matter proved to be a missed opportunity. The legal nature of the Plan as “soft law” or a mere declaration of intent made it seem unrealistic, despite its references to the UN Charter, in particular Article 11 (disarmament issues): Art. 11 (disarmament issues), Art. 26 (arms control by the Security Council), Art. 106 (transitional measures until the entry into force of Art. 43) and Art. 24. Article 24 of the Basic Law and Art. 24 of the UN Charter permits the transfer of sovereign rights to international organizations such as the UN in order to bring about a peaceful and just world order.

In the current situation, Germany could do well to initiate a UN resolution to reintroduce the McCloy-Zorin principles. This would most likely be supported by the BRICS+, the G77 and other groups. At a time of growing geopolitical tensions, increasing arms dynamics and diminishing authority of international institutions, The question of an effective system of collective security is once again moving to the center of international law and peace policy. New impetus is needed for disarmament and international cooperation. The U.S.-Soviet disarmament proposal of 1961 called for complete disarmament under international control and the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to a world organization in the process of reform.

This largely forgotten document from the Cold War era offers surprising points of departure for rethinking contemporary peace policy. Although the plan was not implemented, the system and goals it represents provide a normative framework that is still relevant today—especially in light of the UN Charter and national constitutions such as the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The goal of combining disarmament with a system of collective security would transform the United Nations Security Council into an effective executive authority—involving all states on an equal footing. In view of its special historical responsibility and constitutional obligation to promote peace, Germany should play an active role in the revival of the Plan—not as an end in itself, but as a contribution to the renewal of collective security in the 21st century.

The 1961 plan aimed at the gradual delegitimization of the national institutions providing for maintaining armed forces. Article 24 of the Basic Law, introduced in 1949, was intended to enable the Federal Republic to integrate itself into an international peace organization based on a system of collective security. The McCloy-Zorin Plan offered the opportunity to build a normative bridge on the international stage between the UN Charter and the German constitutional mandate to secure peace. And not only the German Basic Law, but also the French, Italian, Danish, Norwegian and many other mostly European constitutions are called upon and committed to help build this bridge.

Historically, after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, initiated by the GDR, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Plan lost its political traction. Despite its failure, the McCloy-Zorin Plan continues to provide a structured normative frame of reference. Subsequently it served as a guideline for disarmament conferences—for example regarding the establishment of a UN Disarmament Agency and in the drafting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). Its central idea—to understand disarmament not as an isolated process but as an integral part of a system of collective security—remains unfulfilled to this day, but is normatively viable. While “soft law” is seen as a form of international norm-building that is not legally binding, it can provide normative guidance. A German contribution—if Germany agrees to take the initiative—could help to re-evaluate the McCloy-Zorin Plan from the point of view of international law and to discuss its possible reactivation with recourse to Article 106 of the UN Charter and Article 24 of the German Basic Law. The McCloy-Zorin Plan contains principles that are still valid—both in the sense of customary international law and as an expression of lex ferenda, the desired law.

Disarmament is not an end in itself, but a component of a comprehensive and unified world order. Disarmament is only possible if it goes hand in hand with international control and collective security. In this respect, the McCloy-Zorin Plan is to be understood as the normative building block of an unfinished development—a development that began with the UN Charter in 1945, was structured by the Plan in 1961, and has been repeatedly postponed ever since. Today’s security crisis therefore gives the plan not only historical but also legal-political relevance.

Today’s security policy crisis makes the plan not only historically relevant, but also legally relevant. Several articles of the UN Charter provide direct points of reference for legal categorisation. According to Article 26 of the UN Charter member states are to disarm to the ‘minimum’ necessary for national defence, stipulating that in order “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security … the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources” must be achieved. In addition, the Security Council will be “responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee … plans … for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.”

This article shows that the Charter provides for the establishment of a centrally controlled disarmament regime, which the McCloy-Zorin Plan sought to implement. Articles 43 ff. of the UN Charter provide the basis for the direct transfer of military powers to the Security Council. This provision is intended to facilitate the transition from “army to police” (Margaret Mead) and thus implicitly touches on the part of the Charter that aims to shift responsibility for security from nation states to the United Nations. Article 106 of the UN Charter deserves special attention, since it authorises the then Allies (USA, Russia, Great Britain, China and France) to take “transitional measures” to maintain peace until the agreements provided for in Article 43 come into force. This article was intended as a transitional mechanism. The McCloy-Zorin Plan can be interpreted as a substantial fulfilment of this interregnum as a transitional mechanism.

A first step towards reviving the plan would be the political and parliamentary affirmation of the willingness to transfer sovereign rights to a reformed world organisation for peacekeeping—in accordance with Article 24 (1) of the Basic Law. Ideally, the Bundestag could declare in the form of an inter-party resolution that Germany is prepared to relinquish disarmament and security sovereignty rights within the framework of a multilateral process under UN supervision. At the same time, the German government could submit a resolution to the UN General Assembly with the aim of reactivating the McCloy-Zorin Plan as a historical frame of reference for a new disarmament initiative.

Article 24 of the United Nations Charter is the cornerstone of international law for any serious initiative for collective peacekeeping. This provision contains several normative elements that are decisive for reactivating the McCloy-Zorin Plan such as delegation of responsibility on a collective basis. In this the UN members do not only delegate competences to the Security Council, but a primary responsibility—this is more than a mere organisational delegation. It involves a legal relationship between the member states and the Security Council that is based on trust and effectiveness. The Security Council does not act in its own name, but as a subsidiary body of all UN members. This gives rise to a collective right to effective action—and, conversely, a collective right to reform or activation if this responsibility is not fulfilled. If Article 24 is considered a “constitutional norm of the international community,” then measures to ensure its implementation—such as the McCloy-Zorin Plan—are not only politically desirable, but required by international law. Article 24 of the United Nations Charter is the fundamental provision of international law on which a reactivation of the McCloy-Zorin Plan—including by Germany—can be based.

The Federal Republic of Germany has, so to speak, “mirrored” this norm of international law in Article 24 of the Basic Law. The parallel between Article 24 of the UN Charter (transfer of responsibility for peace to the Security Council) and Article 24 of the Basic Law (transfer of sovereign rights to intergovernmental institutions for the maintenance of peace) is striking and opens a special bridge of legitimation between international law and constitutional law. Article 24 can—in the light of its systemic position—also be read as a legitimizing framework for the application of Article 106. For if the Security Council has primary responsibility, then transitional measures under Article 106 must also serve that responsibility.

In the light of these provisions, the reactivation of the McCloy-Zorin Plan is not only legitimate, but also constitutionally required. Germany among others has the historical responsibility, the legal means and the political credibility to promote a new disarmament initiative in the spirit of this plan in multilateral forums.The current global security situation—characterized by a new nuclear arms dynamic, the erosion of existing arms control treaties and a blockade in the UN Security Council—calls for courageous, constructive proposals for a new architecture of collective security. Against this background, the McCloy-Zorin Plan offers a historically proven and legally compatible matrix that Germany could reactivate on the basis of its constitutional commitment to peace.

The proposal could also aim to establish an intergovernmental group of experts or a UN Special Committee on Disarmament and Collective Security to update the plan and translate it into concrete implementation steps. Invoking Article 106 would be a realistic power-political means of involving the five veto-wielding powers—especially Russia, China and the United States—in a coordinated interim responsibility for global security guarantees. Germany among others could also suggest that the Secretary-General appoint a high-level UN expert group to interpret and implement Article 24. Drawing on historic disarmament initiatives—including McCloy-Zorin—this group could also make proposals on how the Security Council can better fulfill its primary responsibility for world peace. The group of experts would do well to develop concrete recommendations on the use of Article 43 to implement disarmament agreements.

The reactivation of the Plan should not be in competition with existing mechanisms such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the TPNW and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), but should be complementary to them. The aim should be to create an overarching, coherent framework for disarmament and collective security, in which all sub-treaties and mechanisms are interlinked. The McCloy-Zorin Plan could serve as an umbrella concept, bringing together disparate initiatives under a comprehensive vision. Germany should cooperate specifically with countries that have historically pushed for disarmament—such as Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Costa Rica, Egypt or Ireland. Such a “coalition of the willing” could institutionalize the reform impulse in the UN General Assembly. In this way, Germany would recognize that it is not just an observer, but that it shares responsibility for the revival of this norm. Such a resolution could be based on Article 59 (2) of the Basic Law and at the same time allow for an open debate on disarmament initiatives.

Germany should also actively seek cooperation with other so-called “middle powers” that have a strong interest in disarmament and a reformed UN. Countries such as Canada, Sweden or New Zealand could act as partners in exerting pressure on the UN and in promoting the concept of collective security. The reactivation of the McCloy-Zorin Plan should be accompanied by a broad social debate. Academia, peace research, churches and civil society movements should be actively involved—For example, in the form of a “Round Table for Disarmament and World Order Policy” under the auspices of the German Bundestag or the Federal President. With these steps, Germany would not only carry a historic disarmament proposal into the 21st century, but would also actively fulfill its constitutional responsibility for peace and international understanding—in the spirit of the preamble to the German Basic Law and the United Nations Charter.

Conclusion: By reactivating the McCloy-Zorin Plan, Germany could also strengthen its own role as a responsible member state within the international community. In times of geostrategic tensions and unresolved challenges to global security, now is the time to revive the idea of collective security and disarmament. With this initiative, Germany among others could provide an impetus for a new collective security system.

The McCloy-Zorin Accords online: https://ratical.org/ratville/JFK/HWNAU/MZappIX.html

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Dr. Klaus Schlichtmann is author of numerous scholarly articles and several books, including Japan in the World. Shidehara Kijuro, Pacifism and the Abolition of War (Lexington 2009), and A Peace History of India. From Ashoka Maurya to Mahatma Gandhi (Vij Books 2016). Born in Hamburg, in the 1960s he traveled overland to India, and returning to Germany he became a peace activist and environmentalist. As a world federalist and a member of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) he participated in many international conferences. Having received a scholarship to do research in Japan, his Ph.D. dissertation on Shidehara and Article 9 was published in German in 1997.  He can be reached at unfor2007@hotmail.com – Contact: klaus.san@gmail.com

This article originally appeared on Transcend Media Service (TMS) on 26 May 2025.

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