What Germany Could but Didn’t Do for Peace
INTERVIEW, 13 Apr 2026
Petra Erler interviews Klaus Schlichtmann – TRANSCEND Media Service
Today’s interview with Dr. Klaus Schlichtmann gives a voice to an experienced scholar of Asian studies and peace researcher. If you search Wikipedia for an entry on Dr. Schlichtmann, you won’t find one. Born in Hamburg in 1944, he believes that the bombing of Hamburg and its devastating consequences left a deep impression on him at a very early age. This is why he was drawn to Buddhism, as well as the teachings of Gandhi, and it led him to Asia, initially to India. Later, he returned to Germany to study and earn his doctorate. In his search for a stable framework for world peace, Dr. Schlichtmann analyzed the Hague Peace Conferences, the development of international jurisprudence, the potential of the UN Charter, as well as specific constitutional provisions in individual countries—from Japan to Germany to Italy—that could pave the way for a global peace and security architecture. His connection to Asia stems from the realization that peace can only be achieved collectively and on a global scale.
Dr. Schlichtmann has lived and worked in Japan for many years. And yet, when speaking with him, one senses his unfulfilled longing for our country—which has brought so much misery upon the world in the past—to be among the first nations to open the door to a global security order that truly deserves the name. That is why Dr. Schlichtmann has not retired to a life of leisure; instead, he publishes his experiences and research findings, offers commentary, engages in debate, and strives to communicate well-known and existing solutions and viable paths to peace. Giving up is not an option for him.
You have been working for many years to make the United Nations the ultimate guardian of peace. So far, to no avail. Are you a Don Quixote?
No. I am one of many who oppose nationalism and advocate for international peace based on law and order. Germany has much to make amends for in this regard. This includes the founding of the First German Empire in 1871, which came about under questionable circumstances and fostered militarism and authoritarian trends worldwide. What is crucial today is to finally put into practice the peace mandate of the Basic Law and other European constitutions. Incidentally, this is not the sole responsibility of governments. As stated in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, it is also “We, the peoples” of the United Nations—that is, the citizens themselves.
How does the UN come into this?
Article 24 of the UN Charter explicitly states: “To ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recognize that in carrying out the duties arising from this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their behalf.” Article 24 of the German Basic Law should apply here!
Could you please explain that in more detail?
When the Basic Law was drafted, Article 24 of the Basic Law ensured that the Federal Republic of Germany could actively participate in the realization of this goal of the UN Charter. That was the express intention of the framers of the Basic Law. Article 24 of the Basic Law is innovative, revolutionary, and forward-looking. The League of Nations did not provide for such a possibility. But this was never truly implemented.
But hasn’t Germany ratified the UN Charter? What’s the problem?
That is correct. Although the Charter has been ratified, perhaps the most crucial provision of Article 24 of the Charter has not been implemented. In other words, the member states have not entrusted the United Nations with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.
Why wasn’t that implemented? Was it because of the Cold War? Or because of the founding of NATO?
The United Nations is failing because it is being deliberately kept weak. For 80 years, governments have been talking about reforms while simultaneously blocking any real transfer of power to the UN. The UN Charter obligates its members to transfer primary responsibility for peace and security to the organization. However, this obligation is not being fulfilled. And the blame for this lies primarily with the Europeans, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, whose constitutions provide for corresponding legislative measures, yet these are hardly taken seriously.
Could you elaborate on that?
One reason for this is that German international law scholars believe that the requirement of Article 24 of the UN Charter was, as it were, automatically fulfilled upon joining the UN. That is, of course, nonsense. In contrast, French international law scholars correctly argue—as the two-volume French commentary clearly demonstrates—that legislation transferring security sovereignty is necessary to establish genuine collective security.
Why is the German position nonsense?
The fundamental, generally accepted rules of legal interpretation must be applied here. These encompass the following four aspects: the wording of the provision, its context within the law, its legislative history, and, finally, its actual meaning and purpose. If one applies these criteria to Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, it becomes clear that Germany’s rejection of a peace settlement that restricts national sovereignty makes no sense. My professor of international law, Jost Delbrück, cited the reasons: German realpolitik was “primarily” guided by Hegel’s concept of power politics, which “viewed the idea of an ‘internationalist’ peace order with skepticism.” The chances for a “lasting change in the German attitude toward a global organization for peacekeeping” were therefore slim. (Delbrück 1991).
You once said that in 1949–50 there was a brief window of opportunity to get the United Nations’ collective security system off the ground. What could the young Federal Republic of Germany—which was not yet a member of the UN—have done to keep that window open?
Collective security also requires binding international jurisprudence. It is an essential component of this system. The Federal Republic of Germany should therefore have immediately submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. When I studied international law in Kiel—my alma mater, by the way—I learned that Article 24, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Basic Law are so-called discretionary provisions, whereas paragraph 3 is mandatory. But this was neglected. In this respect, the Federal Republic repeated the mistake that Imperial Germany made during the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899–1907. At that time, it rejected international jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, it is also forgotten today that in 1950, in the run-up to the Korean War, the USSR submitted a request that Article 106 (Transitional Provisions) of the UN Charter be implemented so that Russia could take action alongside the United Nations against the North Korean aggressor. Incidentally, this was unsuccessful. This article is one of the overlooked transitional provisions of the Charter when it comes to genuine collective security.
But that’s all ancient history. Aren’t you overestimating Germany’s international opportunities?
Given its history and constitution, Germany is ideally suited to take on a leading role and initiate the process of empowering the United Nations to ensure global security. I recently wrote letters to the Federal President and Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz, in which I proposed apologizing for the mistakes made at the Hague Peace Conferences and reviving the American-Russian proposals of 1961 (the McCloy-Sorin Declaration). They were based on the recognition that disarmament and collective security are two sides of the same coin. These far-reaching considerations were unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 20, 1960. The declaration aimed to “move forward together, step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament is achieved” and, as President John F. Kennedy further stated, thereby “challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race.” The goal was general and complete disarmament.
Wouldn’t a genuine collective security system within the framework of the UN render NATO obsolete, or place it under the authority of the UN Security Council in accordance with Article 47?
“Obsolete” may not be the right word. If the system of collective security originally planned by the United Nations were to be implemented, NATO would lose its significance. It could then effectively be abolished.
It seems to me that the UN Security Council has become highly politicized. Furthermore, the United Nations appears to be playing an increasingly minor role in U.S. policy. The latest U.S. National Security Strategy doesn’t even mention the UN anymore. What are your thoughts on this?
Perhaps highly politicized. The general public opinion is that it’s good the United Nations exists, but in reality it’s pretty ineffective. A coalition of the willing can decide on measures even without the Security Council’s approval—that is, without the United Nations having actually authorized those measures. The Europeans should empower the United Nations; the U.S. plays a relatively minor role in this regard.
Why do you think the U.S. is insignificant? It has veto power in the Security Council. And just recently, the U.S. pushed through a resolution on Gaza that some observers say has negated and erased decades of the Security Council’s work on Israel and Palestine.
Of course, as long as the Security Council has not been entrusted with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, all its decisions are arbitrary. Once the process of transition to genuine collective security and disarmament has been initiated, the plan outlined in Article 106 of the UN Charter takes effect, meaning that the five permanent members of the Security Council can assume the responsibility of deciding jointly and by consensus what measures should be taken against a potential threat to peace.
The current composition of the Security Council no longer reflects the evolving multipolar balance of power. Wouldn’t it be wise to reform the Security Council before even considering assigning it the decisive role in a global peace architecture?
We are at a historic turning point. Security Council reform is certainly necessary. Discussions are underway regarding the creation of new membership categories, a limitation of the veto power, and improvements to internal procedures. The “Uniting for Consensus” group, which includes Italy, Pakistan, and Mexico, proposes increasing the number of non-permanent members to better represent regions such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America. There are also efforts to suspend the veto power in certain cases. Calls are also being made for greater transparency through the involvement of non-permanent members in the preparation of resolutions, increased public debate, and a strengthening of the General Assembly’s role in security matters. These reforms do not require an amendment to the UN Charter. However, in my opinion, the number of permanent Security Council members should not be increased. A comprehensive reform of the Security Council, before assigning it a decisive role in a global peace architecture, should include giving it its own constitution, precisely defining its executive functions. Furthermore, the Security Council should be supported by a parliamentary assembly of non-state representatives. Proposals for this have already been made.
These are all very far-reaching considerations. At the beginning, you referred to “we, the peoples.” Undoubtedly, the Charter bears the imprint of the four victorious powers. Wouldn’t it be good if these reforms were discussed in a global convention?
In the early postwar years, the worldcitizens’ movement proposed a convention. I think an assembly of citizens from around the world has remained a modern idea.
What do you hope for in the future?
I hope (and hope for us) that Germany abandons its negative stance and that the Federal Government takes the initiative to finally implement the peace mandate in the Basic Law and initiate the transition to genuine collective security and disarmament by law. A good example is the Japanese constitution, which has already rejected war as a means of politics. The Federal Republic should follow this example and put the abolition of the institution of war on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. We must reject the notion that creating peace is unrealistic and abolishing the institution of war is impossible.
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For the original German interview:
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This interview was done by Petra Erler (born 1958). She was State Secretary in charge of European Community issues during the final phase of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1990, and worked as Head of Division for EC Policy at the Brandenburg Representation in Bonn. Since 2010, she has been Managing Director of a Potsdam-based strategy consultancy and works as a journalist.
Tags: Europe, Germany, United Nations
This article originally appeared on Transcend Media Service (TMS) on 13 Apr 2026.
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