PM Shigeru Ishiba on Japan’s Failure to Avoid War

ASIA--PACIFIC, 13 Oct 2025

The Asahi Shimbun – TRANSCEND Media Service

On the 80th Anniversary of the End of the World War II

10 Oct 2025 – Outgoing Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba today released a statement of personal reflections to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II by posing a tantalizing question: “Why couldn’t Japan avoid that war?”

A former defense minister, Ishiba clearly wanted his name associated with the historic milestone–albeit after the fact–just as his predecessors did on key anniversaries.

(Read full text of Ishiba’s statement at the end)

Building on the historical perspectives of past Cabinet-approved statements issued every decade since the 50th anniversary, Ishiba took it upon himself to offer his own historical review and outline key lessons learned.

Titled “On the occasion of the 80th year since the end of the war,” the document spanned approximately six A4 pages, exceeding the length of previous anniversary statements.

This refers to the “Murayama Statement” on the 50th anniversary in 1995, the “Koizumi Statement” 10 years later and the “Abe Statement” marking the 70th anniversary of the war’s end in 2015.

Ishiba released his perspective during a news conference held at the prime minister’s office.

In his message, Ishiba acknowledged that he “also inherits” the historical understanding expressed in past statements that referred to Japan’s “colonial rule and aggression,” “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology.”

He then addressed a topic not thoroughly explored in previous statements: “Why couldn’t Japan avoid that war?”

He noted that in the past three anniversary statements, “little mention was made of why that war could not have been avoided.” He said he decided to offer personal reflections to examine this question “together with the people of Japan at this 80-year milestone.”

Ishiba first pointed out a structural flaw in the prewar Imperial Constitution, which lacked the principle of “civilian control”—the idea that politics must be superior to the military.

He then analyzed three key areas: “politics,” “parliament” and “media,” citing specific historical examples.

Regarding politics, he referred to the 1935 controversy over the “Emperor organ theory” proposed by constitutional scholar and House of Peers member Tatsukichi Minobe.

This theory, under the Imperial Constitution, held that sovereignty resided in the state as a legal entity, and the emperor governed as “the highest organ of the state” in accordance with the Constitution.

Ishiba noted that the Keisuke Okada Cabinet at the time “yielded to military demands and rejected the previously mainstream Emperor organ theory,” stating that “the government lost control over the military.”

Regarding parliament, Ishiba cited the 1940 expulsion of Lower House member Takao Saito after he delivered an “anti-military speech” criticizing the war.

Ishiba emphasized that “parliament also lost its function to control the military.”

Regarding the media, Ishiba stated that from around the time of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the press “shifted to actively supporting the war.”

He pointed out that “newspapers widely reported” the Kwantung Army’s occupation of Chinese territory, “which mesmerized many citizens and further fueled nationalism.”

Based on this analysis, the prime minister summarized the “lessons for today.”

He acknowledged that postwar Japan had established civilian control, but warned that “it is merely a system, and without proper implementation, it is meaningless.”

He wrote, “We must not repeat a history

where emotional and spiritual judgments are prioritized over calm and rational decisions, causing the nation to err in its course.”

Go to Original – asahi.com

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Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan

On the 80th Anniversary of the End of the World War II [in the Asia-Pacific Theater]

(Introduction)

Eighty years have passed since the end of the last war.

For these 80 years, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation and devoted itself to global peace and prosperity. Japan’s peace and prosperity today is built on the precious lives and history of hardships of all those involved, including those who died in the war.

I visited Iwo Jima in March, the Philippine War Dead Memorial in Caliraya, Philippines in April, attended the Okinawa Memorial Service for All War Dead and the Himeyuri Peace Memorial Museum in June, attended the Atomic Bomb Victims Memorial Ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, and attended the National Memorial Service for the War Dead on the Anniversary of the End of the War. Through these experiences, I have once again pledged to deeply etch in my heart the remorse and lessons of the last war.

To date, statements by the Prime Ministers of Japan have been issued on the 50th, 60th, and 70th anniversaries of the end of the war, and I have inherited the positions of previous Cabinets regarding historical recognition.

In the past three statements, little reference has been made to why the war could not be avoided. Even the statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the war includes a passage stating that Japan “attempted to resolve the diplomatic and economic impasse through the use of force. The domestic political system was unable to stop this,” but no further details are provided.

Why was the domestic political system unable to stop it?

After World War I, the world entered an era of total war, and according to predictions such as the “Total War Research Institute” established by the Cabinet before the outbreak of war and the so-called “Akimaru Institute” established by the Ministry of the Army, defeat was inevitable. Many experts also felt that waging war would be difficult. Even though the government and military leaders recognized this, why did they fail to make the decision to avoid war and instead rush into a reckless conflict, ultimately resulting in the loss of so many innocent lives both at home and abroad? Former Prime Minister Mitsumasa Yonai warned, “We must be careful not to end up in a huge dire situation by trying to avoid a gradual decline,” so why was a major reassessment of course not possible?

On this milestone of 80 years since the end of the war, I would like to reflect on this issue together with the people of Japan.

(Problems with the Constitution of the Empire of Japan)

First, there are institutional problems at the time. Prewar Japan lacked a system for properly integrating politics and the military.

Under the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, supreme command, the authority to command the military, was considered independent, and the principle of “civilian control,” which requires that politics, i.e., civilians, always have priority in the relationship between politics and the military, did not exist within the system.
The Prime Minister’s authority was also limited. Under the Imperial Constitution, the Prime Minister and other ministers of state were considered equals, and while the Prime Minister was recognized as the head of state, he was not institutionally given the authority to command and lead the cabinet.

Even so, until the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the Genro played a role in integrating diplomacy, military affairs, and finances. Having served in the military as samurai, the Genro had a deep understanding of military affairs and were able to control them. In the words of Maruyama Masao, “the intermediary of supra-constitutional figures such as the Genro and senior vassals” played an important role in unifying national will.

After the Genro gradually passed away and this informal system declined, political parties under the Taisho democracy attempted to integrate politics and the military.
Amid the great upheaval in the world following World War I, Japan became one of the main players in international cooperation and gained a permanent seat on the League of Nations. Government policy in the 1920s, as reflected in the Shidehara diplomacy, restrained imperialist expansion. In the 1920s, public opinion was unfavorable to the military, and political parties called for large-scale disarmament. Military personnel felt uncomfortable, and the backlash against this is said to have been one of the reasons behind the rise of the military during the Showa period.

Traditionally, supreme command was limited to military orders related to operational command, and military administration related to budgets and organizational development was interpreted and applied as a matter for the advice of Ministers of State, who were members of the Cabinet. I believe that the institutional problem of the absence of civilian control was, in a sense, covered up through application of this power by the Genro, and then by political parties.

(Government Issues)

However, the meaning of supreme command was gradually broadened, and the military began to use its independence as a means to eliminate government and parliamentary involvement and control over overall military policy and budgets.
During the era of party cabinets, political parties competed to expose scandals in order to gain power, and they lost the trust of the people. In 1930, the opposition Rikken Seiyukai party teamed up with a section of the navy to destabilize the Rikken Minseito cabinet. They launched a fierce attack on the government over the ratification of the London Naval Treaty, claiming that it was an infringement of supreme command. The government narrowly managed to ratify the London Naval Treaty.

However, in 1935, the Rikken Seiyukai party criticized the Emperor Organ of the Armed Forces theory proposed by constitutional scholar and House of Peers member Tatssukichi Minobe as a means to attack the government, escalating the issue into a political issue that also involved the military. The then-presidential cabinet of Prime Minister Keisuke Okada attempted to distance itself politically from the issue, stating that “there is no choice but to leave the doctrinal issue to scholars.” However, it ultimately succumbed to the military’s demands and issued two declarations clarifying the national polity, rejecting the previously accepted position that the Emperor was an organ of war. Minobe’s works were banned.

In this way, the government began to lose control over the military.

(Parliamentary Issues)

The Diet, which was supposed to exercise control over the military, also began to lose its function.

A prime example of this was the expulsion of House of Representatives member Saito Takao. At a plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 2, 1940, Saito criticized the war for becoming a quagmire and harshly questioned the government about its aims. This was known as an anti-military speech. The Army strongly opposed the speech, claiming it was an insult to the Army, and demanded Saito’s resignation. Many Diet members agreed, and Saito was expelled by an overwhelming majority of 296 votes in favor and 7 votes against. This was a rare example of a Diet member fulfilling his role within Parliament, but two-thirds of the minutes from that time remain deleted to this day.

Even during budget deliberations, which are extremely important as Parliament’s control function over the military, it is difficult to say that the Diet at that time was fulfilling its function as a check on the military. A special account for extraordinary military expenses was established in 1937, and from 1942 to 1945, almost all military expenses were allocated to this special account. When deliberating on this special account, no breakdown was provided in the budget documents, and deliberations in both the House of Representatives and the House of Peers were generally held in secret sessions. The deliberation time was extremely short, hardly worthy of being called a deliberation at all.

Even as the war situation worsened and finances became increasingly strained, the Army and Navy fought fiercely over budgets, putting their organizational interests and reputations on the line.

In addition, we must not forget that from the late Taisho period to the early Showa period, over a 15-year period, many politicians, including three serving prime ministers, were assassinated by nationalists and young officers. All of the assassins placed importance on international cooperation and sought to control the military through politics.

Needless to say, these incidents, including the May 15 Incident and the February 26 Incident, greatly hindered the environment in which civilians, including members of the parliament and government, could freely discuss and act on military policy and budgets.

(Media Issues)

Another issue that should not be overlooked is the media.

In the 1920s, the media was critical of Japan’s overseas expansion, and as a journalist, Tanzan Ishibashi argued for the abandonment of Japan’s colonies. However, around the time of the Manchurian Incident, the media’s tone shifted to an active support for the war. This was because war reporting “sold,” and newspapers saw a significant increase in circulation.

The Great Depression of 1929 in the United States severely damaged the Western economies, and high tariff policies adopted to protect domestic economies dealt a major blow to Japan’s exports.

One of the backdrops of this severe recession was the rise of nationalism, leading to the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the Fascist Party in Italy. Among the major powers, only the Soviet Union seemed to be developing, and within intellectual circles, a growing view was emerging that the era of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism, as well as the era of the United States and Britain, was over. This created an environment in which totalitarianism and national socialism were accepted.

Under these circumstances, elements of the Kwantung Army launched the Manchurian Incident, occupying an area several times the size of mainland Japan in just a year and a half. Newspaper coverage of this incident was extensive, leaving many citizens deluded and further fueling nationalism.

There was some sharp criticism of Japanese diplomacy, such as Sakuzo Yoshino’s criticism of the military’s actions during the Manchurian Incident and Kiyoshi Kiyosawa’s harsh criticism of Yusuke Matsuoka’s withdrawal from the League of Nations. However, from around the fall of 1937, stricter censorship of speech prevented criticism of policies, and only opinions actively supporting the war were conveyed to the public.

(Issues with Information Gathering and Analysis)

We must reexamine whether the government and our country correctly understood the international situation at the time. For example, while Japan was negotiating a military alliance with Germany targeting the Soviet Union, the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed in August 1939. The Kiichiro Hiranuma Cabinet, at the time, resigned, citing “a new and strange situation had arisen in Europe.” Questions arose as to whether sufficient information had been collected about the international and military situation, whether the information had been analyzed correctly, and whether it had been shared appropriately.

(Lessons for Today)

In postwar Japan, civilian control has been institutionally established. The Constitution of Japan stipulates that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians. Furthermore, the Self-Defense Forces Act places the Self-Defense Forces under the command of the Prime Minister.

The Constitution of Japan clearly stipulates that the Prime Minister is the head of the Cabinet and that the Cabinet is jointly responsible to the Diet, institutionally ensuring the unity of the Cabinet.

Furthermore, the National Security Council was established, strengthening overall coordination of foreign and national security issues. The government’s intelligence gathering and analysis systems have also been improved. Further developments are required in line with the times.

Institutional adjustments have been made in response to the bitter past experience of the military acting independently in the name of independent command authority due to a lack of a mechanism for properly integrating politics and the military. However, these are merely systems, and are meaningless without proper implementation.

Politicians must possess the ability and insight to fully utilize the SDF. They must correctly understand the current system of civilian control and make constant efforts to implement it appropriately. They must have the pride and sense of responsibility as politicians who do not succumb to irresponsible populism or go with the flow.

The SDF is required to actively explain and express its opinions to politicians from the perspective of a group of experts regarding the international military situation surrounding Japan, as well as its equipment and unit operations.

Politics has a responsibility to overcome organizational silos and achieve integration. We must not allow organizational divisions and conflicts to lead to a loss of sight of Japan’s national interests. We must learn from history, when the Army and Navy were at odds, each prioritizing its own organizational logic, and even within each organization, military orders and military administration lacked coordination, leading to a failure to unify the nation’s will and leading to war.

Politics must always consider the interests and welfare of the entire nation and strive to make rational decisions from a long-term perspective. When responsibility is unclear and the situation reaches an impasse, brave voices and bold solutions tend to be accepted, even if they involve high risks and little chance of success. Navy Chief of the Naval General Staff Osami Nagano likened the outbreak of war to surgery, saying, “Though there are considerable concerns, the only way to cure this serious illness is to make a great resolve and resolve to eliminate this national crisis.” He also said, “The government has decided that failure to fight would mean the fall of the nation, but fighting may also lead to the fall of the nation. However, if a country were to perish without fighting, it would be truly lost, losing even its soul.” Army Minister Hideki Tojo is also said to have urged Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, “Humans sometimes need to close their eyes and jump off the stage at Kiyomizu Temple.” We must not repeat the history of the country’s erroneous course due to mental and emotional judgment being given more importance than calm, rational judgment.

The Diet and the media play the role of restraining the government from making erroneous decisions.

The Diet is required to exercise the powers granted to it by the Constitution to appropriately check government activity. Politics must never pander to temporary public opinion, pursue populist policies, or be driven by party politics and self-preservation that harms the national interest.

We need a healthy space for free speech, including journalism with a sense of mission. During the last war, the media inflamed public opinion, leading the people into a reckless war. We must not fall into excessive commercialism, and we must not tolerate narrow-minded nationalism, discrimination, or xenophobia.

We cannot tolerate the trampling of politics through violence, including the incident in which former Prime Minister Abe lost his precious life, or discriminatory rhetoric that threatens free speech.

The foundation for all of this is an attitude of learning from history. What is most important is true liberalism, with the courage and honesty to face the past squarely, and the tolerance to humbly listen to the arguments of others, as well as a healthy and resilient democracy.

As Winston Churchill clearly stated, democracy is by no means a perfect political form. Democracy requires cost and time, and sometimes mistakes are made.

This is why we must always remain humble before history and take its lessons to heart.

Maintaining military forces is extremely important for self-defense and deterrence. I cannot be in a position to deny the theory of deterrence. In the current security environment, this is the reality of pursuing a responsible security policy.

At the same time, democracy is fragile and can collapse in an instant if a country’s unparalleled military forces go out of control and exceed democratic control. On the other hand, it is not impossible for civilian politicians to make poor decisions and plunge the country into war. The necessity and importance of civilian control and appropriate civil-military relations cannot be overemphasized. This must be constantly recognized by the government, parliament, military forces, and the media.

In his anti-military speech, Representative Takao Saito argued that world history is a history of war, and that war is not about the victories of justice, but about the strong conquering the weak. He argued that we must not ignore this and hide under the glorious pretext of a holy war, leading to a lapse in the nation’s long-term plans. He stressed the importance of policies based on realism, and was expelled from the House of Representatives.

The following year, at the House of Representatives Air Defense Law Committee, the Army Ministry denied this, stating that allowing civilians to evacuate during an air raid would undermine the will to continue the war.

While both events are from the distant past, they more than adequately convey the horrors of parliamentary dereliction of its responsibilities, the rampant prevalence of spiritualism, and disregard for human life and human rights. A bright future cannot be carved out without facing history head-on. The importance of learning from history must be reaffirmed, especially now, as Japan faces its most severe and complex security environment since the war.

As the number of people who remember the war decreases year by year and there is a risk that these memories will fade, I believe that the foundation of our nation as a peaceful nation will be further strengthened if each and every citizen, including the younger generation, actively thinks about the last war and the nature of peace and applies this knowledge to the future.

Together with the people of Japan, I will make every effort to ensure that such a tragedy is never repeated, based on the various lessons learned from the last war.

10 October, 2025

Prime Minister,  Shigeru ISHIBA

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Translation:  Satoshi Ashikaga – Google Translate

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Original in Japanese:   〈全文〉石破茂首相が所感「戦後80年に寄せて」表明　「過去を直視する勇気と誠実さを持ったリベラリズムが大切」：東京新聞デジタル

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