Burma: Grasping at Straws – ICG’s Latest Report is Ill-Informed, Unsubstantiated and Wrong-headed
ASIA--PACIFIC, 18 Apr 2011
The latest report from International Crisis Group (ICG), Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape, is one of the most extraordinary documents I have read in a long time. Rarely have I seen such naïve and ill-considered analysis from an otherwise highly-respected and intelligent organisation.
Riddled with inconsistencies and with no substantiation, ICG has surpassed even its own previous Burma reports in levels of idiocy. Its recognition at the beginning that the November 2010 elections “were not free and fair and the country has not escaped authoritarian rule” is welcome, but it is what then follows that stretches the boundaries of credibility.
ICG argues that “it would be a mistake to conclude that nothing has changed”. The top two leaders of the former military regime, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, have “stepped aside” and “a new generation has taken over”. Both points are wrong, as even ICG itself admits later in its report. Contradicting itself, ICG notes that Than Shwe “will continue to influence events from behind the scenes” and will “exert considerable influence”. His power of patronage, “accumulated wealth” and control of business cronies “will underwrite his ongoing influence”. Exactly – so he has not “stepped aside”.
The suggestion that “a new generation has taken over”, this is “a key moment of political transition” and that “the changes will have a profound impact” is absurd. Thein Sein, the new President, was prime minister under the old regime and was hand-picked by Than Shwe. Tin Aung Myint Oo, one of the new Vice-Presidents, was the number four in the old regime. Shwe Mann, the number three in the old regime, is the Speaker of Lower House of Parliament. Again, ICG contradicts itself by later noting that “these leaders have been groomed by Than Shwe not because they are necessarily the brightest and the best, but because they were the least threatening to him and his legacy”. Exactly – so where is this “new generation”? As a military intelligence officer in Rangoon told me recently, there is “no change, no change”.
Noting that “a number of technocrats have been brought into the cabinet,” ICG concludes that decision-making will be “less ad hoc, less idiosyncratic, potentially more coherent and possibly more effective”. Yet of the thirty members of the new cabinet, only four are genuine civilians – the cabinet is still dominated by military. And even if the regime will now be “more effective”, we need to ask ‘more effective at what’? Suppressing dissent and eliminating ethnic opposition, most likely. Coherency and effectiveness by themselves are no virtues if they increase the suffering of the people.
In another example of breath-taking contradiction, ICG has the audacity to state that in the sham elections last November, “few polling irregularities were reported”. This is patently false. There were widespread reports of ballot rigging and intimidation – as ICG then admits in its next breath, acknowledging “massive manipulation of the vote count”. You can’t have it both ways, ICG.
ICG’s core objective in policy terms is to argue for the lifting of sanctions. There is a legitimate debate to be had about the effectiveness of current sanctions measures, and the international community’s use of sanctions as a strategic tool. Yet as with so many critics of sanctions, ICG has framed the debate in the wrong terms.
First, they point to the West’s “failed policies of sanctions and isolation”. This is a tired and false characterisation of the purpose of sanctions. It is not about “isolation”. I don’t know anyone who wants to “isolate” Burma. The objective of sanctions is the opposite: it is to force the regime to open up, because the only language this regime understands is the language of pressure.
Second, ICG trots out the ancient myth about sanctions having “a negative impact on the population”. What is the evidence for this? Yes, the people of Burma are suffering economically – but it is more likely that their poverty is a result of the regime’s corruption, greed and mismanagement of the economy, than the impact of sanctions. When there has been foreign investment in Burma, particularly in the oil and gas sectors, the revenues have gone to line the Generals’ pockets and help them buy arms, not to help the people. The regime has stashed profits in offshore bank accounts in Singapore, spent almost half its budget on the military and less than a dollar per person per year on health and education combined.
ICG’s argument on aid lacks common sense. There are two aspects to the aid debate: development aid, through international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asia Development Bank (ADB), and humanitarian aid, in-country and cross-border, for medical care, livelihood provision, education, emergency relief and poverty alleviation. Most people, including myself, are passionately in favour of increased humanitarian aid to the people of Burma, who are among the poorest in the world, provided such aid goes both in-country and to refugees and internally displaced peoples along the borders and cross-border into the ethnic areas. However, the idea that international financial institutions should start funding development projects, enabling the regime to build more roads on which to move its troops and more dams to generate electricity to sell to neighbours, resulting in more displacement and human rights violations, is highly questionable.
The idea that sanctions impede humanitarian aid is nonsense. The United Kingdom has shown that it is perfectly possible to be pro-sanctions and pro-aid. The UK is among the strongest advocates of maintaining sanctions – yet it is the largest bilateral donor to Burma, having recently announced a significant increase in its aid. Over the next four years, the UK will give an average of £46 million ($75 million) a year in aid to Burma. So don’t say sanctions result in less aid.
ICG argues that “a new approach urgently needs to be adopted”, and on this point I agree. However, the approach needed is one that combines more effectively all the tools at our disposal – economic pressure, diplomatic and political initiatives, high-level engagement, and aid to the most vulnerable and to pro-democracy civil society groups, in-country and along the borders. In particular, we need a UN Commission of Inquiry to investigate the regime’s crimes against humanity, as recommended by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma and supported by 16 countries so far. We also need to end the badly-informed and polarised debate about sanctions, and recognise that sanctions can only be lifted when the regime shows meaningful signs of progress: the release of political prisoners, an end to military offensives against ethnic civilians, and the beginning of a dialogue with the democracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the ethnic nationalities. The ball is in the regime’s court. What we do not need is naïve and uninformed analyses and policies that amount to surrender and appeasement and grasp at straws. We do not need any more UN and EU bureaucrats telling us to “wait and see”. A senior EU official recently admitted to me: “I really don’t know. I just cross my fingers and hope for the best,” and it appears that is ICG’s approach too. Such an approach will only help the Generals. We need a well-informed, co-ordinated, creative and proactive international strategy that supports the desire of the people of Burma for change.
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