The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Gaza: A Call for Direct Nonviolent International Action

TRANSCEND MEMBERS, 18 Aug 2025

Charles Webel, Ph.D. – TRANSCEND Media Service

16 Aug 2025 – In the shadow of war, the world often stumbles between paralysis and overreach. The ongoing crisis in Gaza presents just such a challenge—one of immense human suffering, political complexity, and international division. With over 60,000 people reportedly killed, the vast majority of whom are civilians—including thousands of children—Gaza today constitutes a textbook case for invoking the United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Yet amid this moral, political, and legal morass, R2P—if applied with integrity, nonviolence, and courage—could offer a path forward for protecting civilians without further fueling the conflict.

The Promise and Principles of R2P

Adopted unanimously at the 2005 UN World Summit, the Responsibility to Protect emerged from humanity’s collective failure to prevent genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. R2P is not a law but a normative framework intended to prevent mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. R2P claims that sovereignty is not a privilege but a responsibility, resting on three pillars: states must protect their populations; the international community must assist states in fulfilling this role; and when states manifestly fail, collective international action becomes necessary.

Crucially, R2P does not give countries license to intervene militarily at will. It insists on a careful sequence of efforts—prioritizing prevention, emphasizing multilateralism, and requiring that any action be proportionate, necessary, and respectful of international law. Too often, however, R2P has been interpreted and applied primarily through military means, as in Libya in 2011, with deeply problematic results. Gaza demands we think differently.

Gaza as a Test Case for Nonviolent Protection

The International Court of Justice has found a plausible case that Israel may be committing acts amounting to genocide—a matter of grave concern still under investigation. Simultaneously, Hamas’s attacks on Israeli civilians, including the October 7 massacre, constitute clear violations of international humanitarian law. Both parties have obligations under the Geneva Conventions, and both must be held accountable.

R2P is not meant to take sides—it is meant to protect civilians regardless of nationality, religion, or affiliation. It becomes particularly urgent when one party has overwhelming military superiority and when civilians are systematically deprived of the basic necessities of life, including food, water, shelter, and/or medicine. With entire neighborhoods in ruins, infrastructure decimated, and over a million people facing displacement and famine, Gaza presents both a moral imperative and a practical challenge: How can the international community fulfill its responsibility to protect the residents of Gaza without perpetuating cycles of violence?

As a political theorist and peace researcher, I believe the answer lies in reimagining R2P through comprehensive nonviolent action that addresses immediate humanitarian needs while building foundations for sustainable peace.

A Framework for Nonviolent International Action

1. Humanitarian Access as Non-Negotiable

The international community must treat humanitarian access as inviolable, employing coordinated diplomatic pressure and economic leverage to ensure aid reaches civilians. This means establishing internationally monitored humanitarian corridors, demanding unrestricted access for medical supplies, and using all available pressure points to ensure compliance. Air drops and maritime corridors, while problematic, may serve as interim measures, but ground access remains essential. The UN Security Council should authorize civilian protection missions composed of unarmed international observers whose presence alone might deter violence and document abuses.

2. International Civilian Protection Corps

While military intervention into Gaza remains politically untenable and ethically fraught, the deployment of unarmed international observers—human rights monitors, legal experts, and civilian protection teams—has proven effective in contexts from South Sudan to the West Bank. An International Civilian Protection Corps, trained in nonviolent intervention, conflict de-escalation, and humanitarian assistance, should be established and deployed as soon as possible. Their presence along humanitarian corridors could reduce attacks on aid convoys while providing transparent documentation of violations by all parties.

3. Accountability Without Impunity

When state or non-state actors commit mass atrocity crimes, there must be serious consequences for the perpetrators. The International Criminal Court and other judicial mechanisms must investigate all violations of international humanitarian law, regardless of perpetrator. The Security Council, General Assembly, or individual states can impose targeted sanctions on leaders and entities responsible for war crimes. However, this punitive approach must be complemented by truth and reconciliation processes that allow for humanization and the processing of collective trauma. Impunity breeds repetition; accountability deters—but reconciliation heals.

4. Conditional International Support

Countries with close ties to Israel, particularly the United States and such European Union members as Germany, bear special responsibility. Military aid, political backing, and economic cooperation must not be unconditional. Clear red lines—targeting civilians, denying humanitarian access, expanding illegal settlements—should trigger diplomatic and economic consequences. Likewise, states influencing Hamas or other militant groups must be pressed to uphold international norms. R2P requires that the international community use all forms of leverage to protect civilian populations.

5. Economic Justice and Civil Society Empowerment

Protection requires addressing root causes. The economic strangulation of Gaza fuels desperation and conflict. A nonviolent R2P approach must include targeted development aid, support for Palestinian economic and political sovereignty, and pressure to lift restrictions that serve no legitimate security purpose. Simultaneously, we must empower Palestinian and Israeli civil society organizations working for peace through funding, international accompaniment, and amplification of their voices. Sustainable protection comes not from external force but from empowered communities capable of holding their own leaders accountable.

Overcoming Political Paralysis: The “Uniting for Peace” Alternative

Skeptics rightly ask: Why hasn’t R2P been invoked more forcefully? The answers are sobering. The UN Security Council remains divided, with veto-wielding powers prioritizing strategic interests over humanitarian principles. Political will is often lacking, as states fear setting precedents that could be used against themselves. R2P lacks enforcement mechanisms—it is only as strong as collective commitment to uphold it.

Yet none of this absolves the international community from intervention. When the Security Council is deadlocked, the General Assembly can act under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.

The Uniting for Peace Mechanism

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), titled “Uniting for Peace,” was adopted on November 3, 1950, during the Assembly’s 302nd plenary meeting. The core operational paragraph states:

“Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor.”

The resolution was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions, and was initiated by the United States as a means of circumventing further Soviet vetoes during the Korean War.

Historical Applications and Lessons

Between 1951 and 2022, the United Nations drew upon the Uniting for Peace resolution on thirteen occasions, with eleven cases taking the form of emergency special sessions, addressing crises in Korea, Suez, Hungary, Congo, Afghanistan, Palestine, Namibia, and Ukraine. The outcomes reveal important patterns:

Clear Successes:

• Suez Crisis (1956): The most notable success occurred when both Britain and France complied with General Assembly demands for withdrawal following international isolation and superpower convergence against their action. This resulted in the creation of the first UN peacekeeping force (UNEF I).
• Korean War Continuation (1950-1953): The resolution enabled continuation of UN Command operations by circumventing Soviet vetoes.

Clear Failures:

• Hungary (1956): Despite five resolutions including mandating a commission of inquiry, Soviet stonewalling prevented any meaningful action, with “none of the suggested coercive action threatened by the General Assembly” being taken.
• Afghanistan (1980): The Soviet Union completely ignored Resolution ES-6/2 calling for immediate withdrawal, remaining for nine more years and demonstrating the mechanism’s impotence against determined major powers.
• Palestine (1997-ongoing) – Tenth Emergency Special Session: The tenth emergency special session, first convened in 1997 under the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism, has become the longest-running emergency special session in UN history, spanning “more than ten separate ‘meetings’ held by the Assembly” since 2000. Originally invoked by Qatar’s request (A/ES/10/1), the session was triggered by Israeli settlement construction in East Jerusalem (Har Homa project in Jebel Abu Ghneim). Despite numerous resolutions condemning Israeli settlement activities and demanding compliance with international law, Israel has “refused to comply with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly adopted during the tenth emergency special session, and has indeed expressed its contempt for those resolutions”. Even as early as 1997, the Assembly condemned “Israel’s failure to cease building of new settlement in East Jerusalem” by a vote of 131-3-14, demanding Israel “reverse immediately all illegal actions”, yet settlement expansion has continued unabated. While the session achieved some symbolic victories, such as the 2024 resolution upgrading Palestine’s UN observer status by a vote of 143-9-25, the fundamental objectives of stopping settlement construction and ending the occupation remain unfulfilled after nearly three decades, demonstrating the mechanism’s inability to compel compliance from a determined state with strong international backing.

Mixed Results:

• Lebanon/Jordan Crisis (1958): Some withdrawal occurred, but largely due to regional political changes rather than UN pressure.
• Congo Crisis (1960): Helped maintain UN presence but failed to resolve underlying crisis.
• Ukraine Crisis (2022-ongoing): Strong international condemnation (141 countries supporting) but no effect on Russia’s military conduct.

Legal Mechanisms and Limitations

While the Assembly’s powers under Articles 10-14 are generally considered recommendatory rather than binding, emergency sessions under Uniting for Peace serve to “crystallise a series of legal claims by the community of nations that can be used to support future actions.” However, fundamental limitations include:

1. Legal Constraints: The Assembly lacks authority to impose binding obligations on states
2. Enforcement Gap: Only recommendations, not binding resolutions, can be passed
3. Selective Application: Political considerations heavily influence implementation

The analysis reveals that effectiveness remains heavily dependent on the political constellation of major powers and the willingness of target states to comply with international pressure.

Regional and Civil Society Mobilization

Regional bodies and coalitions of willing states can also exert pressure. Civil society, diaspora communities, and global citizens must push governments to act. R2P is not merely a tool of diplomats—it is a call to conscience that demands whole-of-society engagement.

Moreover, we must expand our conception of who bears responsibility. Corporations profiting from occupation or conflict, academic institutions and multinational corporations invested in weapons manufacturing, and civil society organizations worldwide all have roles to play. The Responsibility to Protect should become a comprehensive framework for action rather than solely a state obligation.

The Transformative Potential of Nonviolence

Critics will argue that nonviolent approaches to R2P are naive given the intensity of violence in Gaza. Yet history demonstrates that nonviolent resistance and international solidarity have toppled apartheid regimes, ended colonial rule, and transformed seemingly intractable conflicts. The First Intifada’s (1987 until the Oslo Accords of 1993) largely nonviolent character garnered unprecedented international support for Palestinian rights. Israeli peace movements have shown that security through domination is ultimately self-defeating.

What we lack is not precedent but political will and moral imagination. The international community must find the courage to move beyond the failed paradigm of protective violence and instead mobilize toward creative, sustained nonviolent intervention. This means accepting that protection is not a one-time military operation but a long-term commitment to addressing structural violence and the root causes of conflicts.

Conclusion: Rising to Our Responsibility –

 Strengths, Weaknesses, and Pathways Forward

The Responsibility to Protect represents one of the most important normative advances in international relations—a recognition that state sovereignty cannot shield mass atrocity. In Gaza, where civilians pay the highest price for political failure, the world must not turn away.

Strengths of Implementing R2P and Uniting for Peace in Gaza

Normative Power: Both mechanisms carry significant moral and legal weight in international law, creating pressure for compliance even when enforcement is limited. The overwhelming support for Ukraine resolutions (141 countries) demonstrates potential for broad international consensus.

Bypass Mechanisms: Uniting for Peace provides a crucial workaround when Security Council vetoes block action, allowing the international community to speak with one voice through the General Assembly.

Documentation and Accountability: Emergency special sessions create official records of violations and establish legal foundations for future accountability measures, including ICC prosecutions and universal jurisdiction cases.

International Isolation: Even without immediate compliance, these mechanisms can isolate violators diplomatically, economically, and morally, as seen with South Africa’s apartheid regime.

Civil Society Mobilization: R2P’s normative framework empowers civil society actors globally to demand government action and creates legitimacy for nonviolent resistance movements.

Weaknesses and Challenges Given Israeli Obstruction

Enforcement Limitations: Both mechanisms lack binding enforcement power, making them ineffective against determined state actors willing to absorb international criticism.

Asymmetric Power Relations: Israel’s strategic relationship with the United States and other major powers creates protective barriers against meaningful international pressure.

Legal Loopholes: Israel’s claims of self-defense and security necessities provide political cover that complicates straightforward application of R2P principles.

Selective Application: The inconsistent application of these mechanisms undermines their credibility and effectiveness, particularly given the international community’s varied responses to different conflicts.

Time Constraints: Emergency sessions require procedural steps that may be too slow for rapidly evolving humanitarian crises.

Nonviolent Measures to Overcome Israeli Opposition

Economic Leverage Through Systematic Pressure:

• Conditional Aid: The United States provides approximately $3.8 billion annually in military aid to Israel. Making this assistance conditional on humanitarian access and civilian protection compliance would create immediate pressure.
• Targeted Sanctions: Individual sanctions on officials responsible for blocking humanitarian aid or targeting civilians, modeled on Magnitsky-style legislation.
• Corporate Accountability: International pressure on corporations profiting from the occupation through divestment campaigns and supply chain transparency requirements.

Legal and Institutional Strategies:

• ICJ Advisory Opinions: The General Assembly can request International Court of Justice advisory opinions on the legal consequences of Israeli policies, as successfully done regarding the separation wall.
• Universal Jurisdiction: Supporting domestic prosecutions in countries with universal jurisdiction laws for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
• International Criminal Court: Enhanced cooperation with ICC investigations and ensuring non-cooperation with any efforts to shield suspects.

Multilateral Diplomatic Isolation:

• Regional Body Coordination: Working through the African Union, Arab League, and other regional organizations to create coordinated diplomatic pressure.
• International Organization Exclusion: Suspending Israel from specific UN bodies or international organizations until compliance is achieved, as was done with South Africa.
• Third-Party Mediation: Engaging neutral countries like Norway, Switzerland, or Ireland to lead mediation efforts outside traditional U.S.-dominated frameworks

Civil Society and Bottom-Up Pressure:

• International Accompaniment: Deploying international civilian protection teams to Gaza and the West Bank to provide witness presence and protection.
• Sister City Networks: Encouraging municipalities worldwide to establish relationships with Palestinian communities and provide direct aid.
• Academic and Cultural Boycotts: Coordinated academic and cultural isolation until policy changes, modeled on successful anti-apartheid campaigns.
• Media and Information Campaigns: Systematic efforts to counter disinformation and ensure accurate reporting of humanitarian conditions.

Innovative Nonviolent Interventions:

• Freedom Flotillas 2.0: Coordinated international maritime efforts to deliver humanitarian aid, with multiple country participation to complicate Israeli responses.
• Digital Resistance: Using technology to document violations, coordinate international responses, and maintain communication with isolated populations.
• Economic Alternatives: Creating parallel economic systems that bypass Israeli controls, including cryptocurrency networks and alternative trade routes.

Long-term Structural Changes:

• UN Reform: Advocating for Security Council reform or alternative mechanisms that reduce veto power influence over humanitarian protection.
• Regional Protection Systems: Developing Middle Eastern human rights protection mechanisms independent of great power politics.
• Legal Framework Evolution: Strengthening international law regarding protection of civilians and reducing the gap between normative standards and enforcement capabilities.

The children of Gaza and Israel deserve more than temporary ceasefires between periods of devastating violence. They deserve an international community committed to their protection through patient, principled nonviolent action. Gaza can become either another failure of international protection or a testament to the transformative power of coordinated nonviolent intervention.

The tools of nonviolence, law, and diplomacy are not signs of weakness—they are the only legitimate means of protecting life in a conflict already soaked in blood. The international community must rise to its responsibility—not just to protest, but to protect. Not with bombs, but with bold and principled action.

Success will require unprecedented coordination among international organizations, civil society, and individual activists. It demands moving beyond the traditional state-centric approach to protection and embracing a comprehensive strategy that addresses immediate humanitarian needs while building foundations for lasting peace.

The question is not whether such an approach can work, but whether we have the moral courage and political will to try. The people of Gaza, and all those caught in the crossfire, deserve nothing less than our full commitment to nonviolent protection and the transformation of the systems that perpetuate their suffering.

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Charles Webel, Ph.D. is a member of the TRANSCEND Network for Peace Development Environment. He currently teaches at the University of New York in Prague, is a five-time Fulbright Scholar, and a research graduate of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California. he has studied and taught at Harvard University and the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his Ph.D. He is the author or editor of 13 books, including the standard work in the field, Peace and Conflict Studies (with David Barash); The Politics of Rationality; and Terror, Terrorism, and the Human Condition.

This article originally appeared on Transcend Media Service (TMS) on 18 Aug 2025.

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