Political Violence: General Overview in Nepalese Context
TRANSCEND MEMBERS, 21 Jun 2010
Devendra Uprety - TRANSCEND Media Service
Understanding Political Violence
Political violence is characterized by both direct and structural violence used by a state, political party, ethnic or regional group to achieve its objectives. It is conceptualized by Moser and Clark (2001) very succinctly as the collective sphere manifested in “guerrilla conflict, para-military conflict, political assassinations, armed conflict between political parties, rape and sexual abuse as a political act and forced pregnancy/sterilization. It is a collective effort to impose or resist power and it is driven by intention or the will to power of a specific group, class, religion, gender, etc.
Scholars who have written on political violence tend to accept that power, politics, and violence are interconnected phenomena (Galtung, 1969; Huntington, 1997; Kleinman, 2000; Moser & Clark, 2001; Apter, 1997; Kapferer, 1997; Wieviorka, 2003; Rosenblum, 2000; Travis, 2000; Gurr, 1997; Spencers, 2007; and Zarkov, 2001). Their literature makes clear that political violence is associated with political conflict – the perception of incompatible political motives and interests – it is clear that political violence has two principal forms: direct and structural. Two or more parties are in conflict over political goals. This political conflict may include direct violent responses. That is: various forms of armed conflict and behavior intended to do injury to others in the pursuit of political objectives. This is found within the social, political and economic systems of society.
Political violence is related to the large-scale social structure; it is embedded in society in the form of age-old discrimination and deprivation when privilege and opportunities are distributed asymmetrically. Harvard trained professor Arthur Kleinman (2000) writes “massive political violence must work through local worlds in which social and cultural violence is already a routine part of day-to-day living”. Political violence is differentiated from more general violence by its specific political goal – violent action is directed toward achieving power – and it has more collective rather than individual political actors. Collective political violence involves destructive/constructive attacks by groups within a political community against its regime, authorities, or policies. It is expressed through different means such as physical or mental attack, which involves a direct or indirect aggression against the structure, a group or an individual. Political violence is defined by the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, consciously or unconsciously, to obtain or maintain political power.
Sociologist/anthropologists and political scientists generally agree that political violence is a complex structural outcome and often see it as related to movements of social protest against established powers, which is considered a historic process. Pioneer peace and conflict expert, Johan Galtung, introduced the theory of “structural violence” that provides a useful framework for the understanding of entrenched Political violence in the world. In his view, the notion of structural violence is meant to encompass different forms of domination, exploitation, deprivation, and humiliation that emanate from societal structures, and not necessary that it is a form of violence that is a manifest exertion of physical force. Structural violence, as opposed to personal or direct violence, is indirect in that ‘there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and presents itself as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances (cited in Bonino & Donini, 2009).
With the line of Galtung, Apter (1997) writes that political violence is a constant pattern that has continued throughout history. He states, “…the overthrow of tyrannical systems and regimes, the desire for a separate and independent state, the tendency to impose one’s religious belief on others, to establish state religions and ideologies, to intrigue and gain access to power by devious as well as institutional means, are all as old as the human group. Structural violence has been used to designate the condition of people who experience violence owing to extreme poverty. Violence in this case includes the highest rates of disease and death, homelessness, hunger and bodily pain (Kleinman, 2000).
Political violence is rampant around the world at intra and interstate levels. Most of these conflicts have involved violence; homicide, arson, and destruction of property (Tambiah, 1996). Civilian riots have evoked action by security forces within nations though sometimes it has occurred in the opposite direction; from the mobs to the security forces (ibid). Mass killings of civilians by armed forces have occurred in Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan and Guatemala to the Middle East, Afghanistan to Nigeria and Zaire to Nepal. Political violence events of this nature may happen at any place or time in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia. These areas are the most sensitive and vulnerable because of the existence of multicultural social structure/composition.
Theoretical Debate
There is countless argument and counterargument about political violence in social sciences. [Classical] Marxist thought necessarily legitimates “political violence” in human history believing that “the history of all hither to existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx, 1848; cited in Abrahms 1994). In the Communist Manifesto, Marx explained why violent revolution is the only method of basic social transformations (Ebenstein et al, 1994). V.I. Lenin translated Marx’s revolutionary political ideology into practice in the early decades of the 20th century in the USSR. Influenced by Marxist ideology and Lenin praxis; Mao-Zedong had a strong belief in violent politics that is encapsulated through his popular slogan “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun (Chittum, 1996);” a poetic rephrasing of Clausewitz’s, “War is a mere continuation of politics by other means (Horning, 2009)”. Having Adopted Mao’s creed, communist guerrillas have been conducting guerrilla warfare in various locations of the world. A decade-long violent political upheaval in Nepal, waged by the CPN-Maoist, has been grounded in this philosophy.
Some scholars’ attempt to connect political violence with modern capitalism. Shiller & Fouron (2003) write that achievement of modern capitalism (globalization) is based on violence; therefore, there is a relation between the modern world system and recent history of political violence. They write “colonization that spawned the development and expansion of European capitalism was achieved through violence”. Therefore, the global processes of capital accumulation and violence are interrelated.
There is another theoretical debate about political violence, primarily advocated by Samuel P. Huntington and Ted Robert Gurr that states securing “cultural identity” is the central issue of national and transnational violent politics and that the fault lines betweens civilizations are becoming primary fronts of geo-political conflict. It further states that in coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family; that people rally to those with the similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones. Spurred by modernization, global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines (Huntington, 1997). He advocates that modernization and political violence are somehow connected (Huntington, 2009). According to him, development was directly related to the increasing political instability and violence in Asia, Africa and Latin America after the Second World War.
The upward trend in ethno-religion and region based political violence in both the international and intra-national level is a major reality of our time (Tambiah, 1996) and it has occurred due to identity. Ted Gurr writes the political fact is that large numbers of the world’s people do not share a commitment to the preservation of the state system as it is now constituted. They do not identify primarily with country or ideology but with people: they think of themselves first and foremost as Magers, or Tharus, Tamils, or Hutus, or Serbs, or Navahos, or Armenians. What unites such people is not a government, but a sense of identity rooted in a common culture, a common history, and often a memory or myth of conquest and oppression by outsiders (ibid).
Bases of Political Violence
What are the causes, motive, or bases of political violence? What makes politics violent? Is culture of violence a natural trait or an immutable condition in human society? These questions are very significant in social sciences. Most of the social scientists who write about the subject generally accept that inequality and injustice are the seeds of political violence (Kleinman, 2000; Moser & Clark, 2001; Apter, 1997; Kapferer, 1997; Gurr, 1997; Spencers, 2007; and Zarkov, 2001). Historically, modern capitalist society has suffered extremely high levels of inequality and injustice – what Galtung describes as “structural violence”. Ted Gurr, in his study of 114 countries, found deprivation to be the major causes for the magnitude of civil strife, and the 60 country study by Muller and Seligson suggests that inequality is a major cause of political violence (cited in Aditya, 2007).
There are at least two schools that have emerged to highlight the causes of political violence. As stated above, Marxists (communists) agree that unequal ownership of the mode of production is the base of political violence. Classical doctrine of communism states that armed politics is necessary to overthrow capitalism which is founded totally on exploitation. In Several countries in Latin America, Africa, and south Asia, such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, Nepal, and the Philippines violent movements have occurred on the basis of communist ideology. The motive of these movements has been to establish a classless society. Violent conflict arose in those countries through shocking levels of poverty, corruption, and unequal distribution of wealth and power reflected in significant class differences. These factors contributed greatly to the emergence of organized violent rebel groups such as the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) in Guatemala, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation and Democratic Revolutionary Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Contras and Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Shining Path in Peru, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia (Los Rios, 2004).
The other school argued that “Identity” politics can become the cause of political violence. Ethno-nationalism is a feeling of collective identity which sometimes is sufficiently strong and exclusive to lead to genocide, as in Sudan, Rwanda or elsewhere. Ethno-nationalist violence may be the most intense and frequent in modern days. The growing trend of ethno-nationalism over the world has sidelined the ideology and the boundaries of territory. The ethno-communal based political violence between Hutto and Tutsi in Rwanda; Greeks and Turks in Cyprus; Turks and Kurds in eastern Turkey; Sikh-Hindu and Muslim-Hindu in Kashmir; Sinhala and Tamil in Sri Lanka; Catholic and Protestant in Northern Ireland; Walloons and Flemings in Belgium; Uighurs and Han in China and recent political violence between Pahade and Madeshe inter-ethnics in Nepal are visible examples of identity based political violence.
Political Violence in Nepal
In recent years, there have been significant studies available conducted both by the native and foreign scholars on Maoist political violence and these studies lend credence to the concept that it is as an outcome of structural problems (Thapa, 2003; Hutt, 2004; Karki & Seddon, 2002; Mishra, 2004 and Muni, 2003). Within the last decade, “Maoist political insurgency” has become an agenda in the socio-political domain. Many development organizations prepare dozens of “conflict assessments” for donors and others for discussion. Several documentaries and films have been made on the impact of Maoist armed movement and a series of programs have been organized at local, national, and international levels.
There is an oft quoted mythical statement, from a structural-functionalist perspective, that Nepal is a country with harmonious social relations among its various caste and ethnic communities. However, this conceptualized social stability and harmony is a utopian narrative told by the dominant Hindu social groups for their political benefits (Hangen, 2007; Gurung & Subedhi, 2007; Neupane, 2000; and Tamang, 1997). They have created and sustained artificial harmony with the help of violent political pressure.
There is a wide-range of literature that acknowledges political violence in Nepal isn’t a recent cultural development but rather a historic phenomenon (Dahal & Rai, 2007; Pathak, 2005; Pathak & Uprety, 2009; Gurung & Subedhi, 2007; Pyakural, 2007; Bhhatachan, 2000; Aditya, 2000, 2007; Shah, 2002; Kumar, 2006; Lawati, 2005; Gurung, 2004; and Neupane 2000). These literatures claim that Nepali society has suffered extremely from political violence since the formation of modern Nepal. A study of Socio-political upheavals in the 20th century reveals that, at about each 10-year interval, Nepal has suffered either a violent armed struggle or a people’s movement, viz. Makai Parba (1920), Prachanda Gorkha Episode (1932), Praja Parishad (1940), Anti-Rana movement (1950), imposition of Panchyat system (1961), Jhapa uprising (1971), Anti-Panchyat turmoil and the Referendum (1980), People’s Movement (1990), People’s War in its full swing (2000) ( Pathak & Uprety, 2009). Political scientist Dhruba Kumar (2006) writes that every political change in Nepal had elements of violence of behind it . A complete review of this assertion is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the following historic glimpse of political violence in Nepal may shed light on the subject; that can divided as follows:
First Phase (—1940)
The past has been witness to dozens of violent political conflicts that occurred in different times and places in Nepal. However, the trend of violent politics was intensified after the Shah dynasty came into existence. Defeating Ghale Gurung, Drabya Shah became the king of Gorkha and his immediate descendant, Prithvi Narayan Shah, unified Nepal by annexing Baise state (twenty-two) and Chaubise state (twenty-four) principalities through violence. The most memorable and often cited example of the political violence of Prithvi Narayan Shah his slashing the tips of noses and ears off of the people of Kirtipur (Bhattachan, 2000). Such levels of cruelty are rarely found in the process of nation-state formation.
The political history of Nepal is a series of events of violence whether it is in the process of unification of modern Nepal or the process of regimes thereafter. It is difficult to pinpoint exact dates and events to succinctly answer to the question as to when and how the violence of politics in Nepal began (INSEC, 1997). However in the inception of modern Nepal, there were violent disputes between the ruling families generally known as ‘Vardars’ (Thapa, Basnett and Pandy) for sharing power and resources. The 14 September 1846 Kot massacre was a notorious event of political violence. Many leading nobles lost their lives and some were exiled (Karky, 1982). The ill-famed massacre eliminated all rivals of Jung Bhadur and that weakened power of Shah family and other Vardar- Thapas, Pandes and Basnets – the then ruling clans; and gave power to a Jung-Bhadur Rana (Bista, 2001). Plunging the country into bloodshed and chaos of Kotparba and Bhandarkhal Parba, Janga Bahadur Rana, the grand designer of both the massacres, imposed what turned into the hereditary, prime ministerial, autocratic, rule of 104 years (Pathak & Uprety, 2009:5). It was the first in a series of notorious events that gave Nepalese power politics decisive reversals. The tradition of murder, conspiracy and violence continued up to the end of the 104-year Rana rule (INSEC, 1997). During the Rana regime, violence was not limited to the boundaries of the autocratic ruling families; there were attempted armed movements against the regime, like those of Supati Gurung and Lakhan Thapa who revolted against the autocracy of Ranas (Gurung & Subedhi, 2007; Tamang, 1997).
Second Phase (1941-1990)
Within the last six decades, Nepal has experienced many instances of internal political violence, among them; anti-Rana armed revolution (1940s), “exterminate the class enemy” campaign (1970s), and royal abolishment violence (1980s) are significant.
The Nepali Congress led the anti-Rana movement against the 104-year, autocratic, hereditary Rana regime. Prior to the Nepali Congress anti-Rana movement, there were several revolts against the Rana regime. However, they were crushed. Inspired by the world wide waves of independence and democratization, the Nepali Congress waged an armed movement against the Rana regime resulting in the abolishment of Rana rule in 1950.
In the 1970s; one faction of the communist party (Marxist-Leninist) started armed struggle in eastern Nepal (Jhapa district) against “feudals.” They named it Barga Shatru Khatam Abhiyan (exterminate the class enemy campaign). It was inspired by Latin American revolutionary literature and the Naxlanbadhi Kisan Aandholan (known as Naxalbari Agricultural Movement) in India. However, the Indian Government crushed the movement. Jhapa’s revolutionaries killed the district elite with the guerrilla strategy and tactics of “one area, one unit, one action” and “one man, one contact”. (Pathak & Uprety, 2009). The then Panchyat government lunched a massive retaliatory operation and crushed the movement by killing many prominent figures such as Netra Gimire, Krishna Kuikel, Chandra Bhadur Dagi and Narayan Shrestha, etc. Most of these were killed while being brought into police custody or being transferred from one post to another. When the Panchyat government violently suppressed the armed communist movement in the eastern and central regions, it shifted towards the hills and mountains in the mid-western region (Pathak, 2005), especially Rolpa, Rukum and Pyuthan district; areas that later served as the base areas of Maoist movement in Nepal. However, it was not the first attempt as communist guided armed movement in Nepal. Mohan Bikram Shingh launched an armed peasants and worker movement in 1954, providing the guerrilla training to 150 youths for nearly three months in Pyuthan. The troops captured some of the members of local so-called ‘feudal’ and forced them to accept the right of sharing-cropping by 50 percent (INSEC, 1996).
In the midst 1970s; Ram Raja Prasad Singh established Nepal Janabadi Morcha (Nepal Democratic Front) had started armed politics. However, it failed after a short span. This party blasted bombs in different places of the country including one major bomb blast near the royal palace in June 20, 1985. At least eight people were killed; including one Member of Parliament. These events had a great impact on the political situation in the country (Shrama, 2007). This has been considered the first violent attack against the institution of monarchy by a civilian with the objective of a democratic republic in Nepal.
Third Phase (1990-2006)
The 1990s were a delightful decade for the capitalists of the world because of communism in Russia, along with the Berlin wall and the entire pro-communist regime having been reduced to ashes. However, the news of communism’s demise in western discourse seems to have been lost while traversing the Himalayas, as in the same decade Nepal sank into violent Maoist revolution. In February 13, 1996, under the leadership of Baburam Bhattarai, the United People’s Front (UPF) declared the beginning of what they called the ‘people’s war’ – an armed struggle dedicated to sweeping away the semi-feudal based social structure and establishing a new democratic people’s republic. The escalation of people’s war and the states corrosive response to it resulted in grave political violence. Both the nature and degree of (CPN) Maoist and state counter violence is unprecedented in the Nepal’s history (Shah, 2002). Dahal and Rai (2007) succinctly write, “the escalation of the Maoist insurgency and the state’s counterinsurgency in the aftermath of the Maoist ‘people’s war’ has made political violence and terror an everyday reality of Nepali society to the degree and scale never experienced before”.
With the combination of their military line and political strategy, the Maoists waged a ferocious war from that point onward. The Nepali Maoists launched the “people’s war” under the premise that an “objective revolutionary situation always prevails in oppressed countries” to which Nepal is not an exception. Baburam Bhattarai, major ideologue of the Maoist party, rationalized violent upheaval by saying that “the people’s war” is the inevitable instrument [for overcoming the oppressive situation in the process of the] historic new democratic revolutionary transformation (cited in Kumar, 2006). The “people’s war” in this sense has no more than transformed the existing political structure. One of the basic features of Maoist political violence is the collective experience of fear of the opposition. A collective experience of fear of the opposition, as result, has become a crucial element to expand their power in society. In addition to the creation of fear, violence was also used to suppress traditional forms of elite hegemony within the areas of Maoist influence, thus working to countermine forms of local structural violence, and win support of the marginalized. For instance, a Dalit (untouchable) who was prevented by a Brahmin village headman from accessing the village water supply would be allowed to do so with the support of militia (Horning, 2006).
Their violent campaign started systematically after the formal announcement of the people’s war (Muni, 2004). Theoretical premises for the historic initiation of the Maoist’s “people’s war” is an official statement of CPN (M) with regards to their plans for their “people’s war”. In particular, the two listed points were the political mandate of the party that supports, theoretically that they were clear about the role of armed politics. 1. “This plan of ours would be based on the lessons of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism regarding the revolutionary violence… encircling the city from the countryside… commitment to theory of people’s war developed by Mao… Marxist theory of war” (The Worker, No 2. 1996, cited in Basnett, 2009). 2 “… Our armed struggle will be conducted by taking agrarian revolution as the axis and by relying on the laboring masses…poor peasants (The Worker, No 2. 1996 cited in Basnett, 2009). The above first and second point clearly states that for a decade Maoist politics were based on (a) mobilizing poor peasants’ and (b) that political violence is imperative to transform the ‘semi- feudal and semi- imperial based social structure’(Basnett, 2009).
Statistics show that state violence in Nepal was more severe than that associated with rebellion within the insurgency period (1996-2006). INSEC, a Kathmandu based human rights defending organization, recorded that out of the total number of killings – 13347, the state has been responsible for 8377 deaths whereas the Maoists were for 4970. More than one thousand have been disappeared and more two hundred thousand have been internally displaced.
Fourth Phase (2007—)
A decade long socio-political insurgency led by the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) – working alliance of political parties, collective involvement and strong advocacy of national and international non-governmental organization (I/NGOs), international support for democracy, media and civil society and the mass movement of early 2006 significantly changed the political dynamics in Nepal. This historic civil movement ended the Maoist insurgency. However, Nepal, at present, is facing another kind of conflict – based on identity politics – that may possibly turn into prolonged political violence or regional and “ethno-political violence.” The emerging ethno-communal violence is in some ways more costly than ideological or class political conflict. it could shift into regional or ethno-political violence, ethno-communal or regionalization of political violence in Nepal.
Several native and exogenous scholars argue that ethno-political conflict in Nepal is not a recent phenomenon. Neupane (2000) writes that Thamangs revolted twice against King Rana Bhadur Shah and Girvan Bikram Shah in 1873, but they could not succeed. Maijh Kirant also revolted twice against the state in 1807 (Adikari, 2000). Caplan’s book, Land and Social Change in East Nepal (1970s) shows an asymmetrical relationship between the Brahmin and Limbus. However; the recent oriented ethno-political violence has developed after the Constituent Assembly elections and discourse about federalism. The ethno-regional based violence has intensified particularly in the Southern-Part of the flat-land “Tarai or Madhes’ that is notoriously known as the Gaur massacre and some violent ethno-based political conflict in eastern hills and mountains Nepal in 2009.
Violent Political Socialization and Culture of Militarization
Long practices of violent politics have socialized the common people to them. That violence is a normal element in politics has been taken for granted. The Maoist insurgency normalized violence at a societal level. That has made violence in politics more acceptable than before. The growing trend of using violence in the social sphere to achieve end goals, and the practice of “youth force formation” as militia of political parties have socialized the youth as a “fierce segment” of society. History shows that practices of routinenization and ritualization of violence creates tension and insecurity at a societal level. Political conflict fragments the society into several segments on the bases of clan, religion, region, ideology and so on. They start to form the own armed force (security force) to resist the opponent’s repression. Social resilience, as a consequence, has been severely disrupted by forcing the society to reluctantly accept violence as a legitimate mode of political behavior of the state and non state (Kumar, 2006). The outcome of long practices of political violence has created militarization of social spheres in Nepal.
Cynthia Enloe (2007) defines militarization as a step-by-step process by which persons or a thing gradually becomes controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well being on militaristic ideas. At its most overt, a militarized society is one in which the military has taken primacy over civilian institutions, and it is predominantly and visibly relied upon to police and regulate civilian movement, solve political problems, and defend or expand boundaries in the name of national security. It is through militarization that the ideology of militarism, which dispenses aggressive, hyper-masculine, militant solutions to conflict, and justifies violence and terror is ushered into our institutions and ways of thought (cited in Neloufer, 2007).
The current trend of militarization of Nepali society may be logical to analyze on the basis of the history of political violence. Sociologically, it can be said that Nepali society has had a tremendous experience of war (violence) since the 1800s when the Lahure (Nepal youths recruited into British and Indian armies) culture was started (Pathak & Uprety, 2009). The initial experience was outside the nation and indirectly affected Nepali society. The British East India Company recruited Nepali adults for a defense and expansion of United Kingdom’s colonial conquest. More than 27,000 soldiers were hired between 1886 and 1904. Roughly two hundred thousand (20 percent) of the adult male population in the country were drawn to India during World War I. Approximately the same number participated in World War II (Mishra, 2062). Therefore; war is not a new phenomenon to Nepalis, particularly the ethnic minorities. The meaning of Lahure connotes the symbol of both prestige and wealth. The cultural aspect of armed values has embedded in Nepali society for a long time, only to erupt recently.
The culture of militarization (CM) intensifies due to the growing trends of militancy and militarism in Nepal. The culture of militarization encourages military control over social life and process. It increases military values and army control upon society. The political role of the military destroys the democratic process and the domination of the army is paramount. Succinctly, militarization is defined “to suffuse of population with a spirit of militarism (Cathal, 2002). It is an ideology or “spirit of mind” that regards the “rigors and virtues” of military life as both an individual and national ideal by “infusing” the whole society with a martial spirit as well as “the ruler’s relationship to the state with institutional supremacy of the military to the civil order” (Kumar, 2006).
Emerging Militant Groups and Politics of Violence
More than one hundred armed groups have emerged (Kantipur, 2009) in recent times and the process of militarization has been common in a society that creates military values as superior to civilian values. Socio-psychologically, armed groups feel superior to the civilian in conflict and post conflict time. Dhruba Kumar (2006) writes that Nepal is a microcosm of militancy and militarism. The government of Nepal recorded that there are 109 armed, semi-armed, and criminal groups. Their military strength varies from 150 – 2000 in numbers. Dozens of violent armed groups emerged when the Government and the Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on November 22, 2006. Presently, they are intensifying their activities in Nepal and most of them are active in the Tarai-Madhes in porous 1,808 km border with India. These groups are active in nine out of 20 districts –Sunsari, Saptari, Siraha, Dhanusa, Mahottari, Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, and Nawalparasi and are advancing as regionalist and secessionist forces in favor of only the Tarain-Madhesis. As a result, many Pahade officials/inhabitants of those districts have either left or gone underground and a few of them have been killed. (Pahak & Uprety, 2009).
However, the armed movement of Tarai-Madhes has a long history. The leader J.K. Goit writes: “In 1956, Raghunath Thakur established the Madhesi Mukti Aandolan (Madhesi Liberation Movement) to oppose and fight discrimination and exploitation against Tarai residents…. He later formed the ‘Madhesi Janakrantikari Dal’ to continue Madhes Revolution…. indigenous people of Western Tarai established the “Tarai Liberation Front.” As the Tarai residents were deprived of citizenship and their lands were being taken by Nepalese from the hills, fighters from the Tarai Liberation Front were taking up arms against discrimination. They started an armed revolution with guerrilla war strategy (Pathak & Uprety, 2009).
Political Violence, Militarization, Social and Economic Cost
The intense process of militarization in Nepali society has further generated a more challenging atmosphere for the security system to cope with. With the advent of the Maoists’ armed movement across the nation, particularly in the rural regions in Nepal, the government had begun to incrementally increase defense expenditure in security institutions and recruit security personnel in the name of controlling the Maoists (Mishra, 2009). The security expenditure has never reached such a level in the history of Nepal. During the decade of conflict, the ranks of NA more than doubled from some 46,000 to 96,000. The Armed Police Force (APF) established an additional state security organ in between the Nepal Army and Nepal Police with 23,000 and Nepal Police 48,500 (Mishra, 2009; Kumar & Sharma 2005). In the time of armed conflict, the Maoists trained the more than 30,000 combatants and more then one hundred thousand paramilitary personnel and large numbers of militia. As a consequence, Nepali society was drawn toward a militarization process that exacted large economic and social costs. That the United Maoists, now the largest political party, has advocated mandatory military training to those above 18-years to both male and female is a crucial point to mention here, to understand how military values are the forefront in Nepali social (political) space.
Conclusion
Violence is a common process used to achieve particular ends which can be categorized into several forms; social, cultural, economic, and political that may be direct or structural. Will to power guides people in a violent direction. Unequal privilege and securing the identity in society are the seed of violence.
Violence has been a key indicator of Nepali politics for nearly the last three centuries. It is worthwhile to note here that two historic massacres shifted the political landscape of Nepal – the first is the nearly 163 year-old kot and the second the 9 year-old royal palace massacre. The Kot massacre is the historic fault line of political culture in Nepal. It demonstrated that to have power, violence is necessary. Dozens of violent political events occurred in series thereafter. The Palace massacre is just one event in the sequence of the kot legacy.
The political culture of Nepal is based on force rather than democratic norms and values. The Ranas came to power through the Kot massacre and they were abolished by the armed forces of the Nepali congress. The Panchayt regime was maintained by the king with the allegiance of the Royal Nepal Army. A Republican nation was made possible only by the historic mass movement combined with the decade long Maoist conflict that transformed Nepali society even further toward militancy and militarism. In a nutshell, power, politics and violence are interconnected and intertwined; like a cobweb and Nepal is not its exception.
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* Note: First published in SAMAJ: Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, Vpl.3, No. 1. 2010. Dept of Sociology and anthropology, Trichandra Multiple Campus.
** Mr Uprety is a Researcher of the CS Center and the member of the TRANSCEND International and can be reached at email: devenuprety@yahoo.com. The author is grateful to Mr. Neil Horning for his kind suggestion, reviewing, and editing this paper. The author is indebted to political analysts Ananda Adity and Dr. Bishnu Pathak for their kind suggestions during the entire process.
This article originally appeared on Transcend Media Service (TMS) on 21 Jun 2010.
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