Fukushima Two Years Later: Lessons for India


Nityanand Jayaraman - CounterCurrents

Two years ago, an earthquake and tsunami devastated a fair section of Fukushima prefecture. If they were the only disasters, life could have been rebuilt after the waters receded and the debris cleared. The nuclear meltdown that followed may keep this region uninhabitable for decades, if not longer.

The Independent Commission appointed by the Japanese parliament to investigate the accident observed that while natural disasters may have triggered the nuclear events, the meltdown itself was “profoundly manmade.” The Commission concluded that “The. . .accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties.”

In India, as in Japan, the lack of governance and independent regulatory oversight was identified by the Comptroller Auditor General as crippling factors in the nuclear safety regime.

Take the case of Koodankulam. The only issue that seems to preoccupy our parliamentarians in this regard is the proposed date of its commissioning – as if this 1000 MW more than any other 1000 MW will bring this country out of the dark ages. Legislators periodically raise questions about this. And the PMO Minister Mr. Narayanasamy unembarassedly trots out a standard-format answer. Progress at the plant is reported as a precise percentage point to the fourth decimal; a prophesy is made that the reactor will go critical in 15 days, after the inevitable final nod by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). If AERB is indeed independent, how is Mr. Narayanasamy able to predict — not once, but 16 times in the last 18 months – that AERB will give its nod before this date or that?

But the PMO’s statements ignore a crucial fact. Koodankulam plants 1 and 2 do not have valid Coastal Regulation Zone clearances. Last November, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) grudgingly admitted to the Supreme Court that the desalination plant was an afterthought, and that it was constructed without the mandatory prior environmental clearance. No clearance was obtained for the already constructed dyke and seawall either.

The missing references in the PMO’s statements to the absent CRZ clearance exposes the scant regard that the nation’s highest office has for our environmental laws.

Unmindful of the supercession of the 1991 CRZ Notification by the 2011 Notification, NPCIL has applied post-facto for a prior clearance under the defunct 1991 rules. The application is legally untenable on many counts. The application for Plants 1 & 2 only contains an EIA report prepared by Engineers India Ltd for Plants 3 to 6. No studies for 1 and 2 were done. There’s more. Rules require EIAs to be carried out only by accredited consultants. Engineers India is not accredited to carry out EIAs for nuclear plants. Finally, there is the issue of invoking a dead law to issue a clearance.

The Tamil Nadu Coastal Zone Management Authority (TNCZMA), which is considering the application, has quietly tied itself into a legal pretzel. Echoing a Kafkaesque despondency, the Director of Environment has placed this application for consideration by the authority with the following note and a straw to clutch on: “The applicant has already completed constructions and no provision is available in the CRZ Notification 2011 for the ratification. However, the unit has established the installations for the above proposals based on exemptions obtained. . .during the year 1989. . .The Authority may consider.” The authority, it appears, is still “considering.”

The absence of CRZ clearance is not merely a technical formality. The Notification is supposed to protect the sensitive coastal region by prohibiting some activities and permitting others subject to conditions derived from a scientific scrutiny of the impacts of the proposed works. India’s east coast is characterised by massive movement of sediment up and down the shoreline. A September 2005 study for the proponents estimates that there is a net transport of 420,000 cubic metres of sediment towards east at the project site. This littoral drift is what nourishes beaches and maintains the coastline in equilibrium. Hard engineering structures – like the dyke and seawall already constructed by NPCIL – can cause severe erosion.

Idinthakarai’s shrinking coastline is proof of this. On Idinthakarai’s scant eastern beach, boats are parked cheek-by-jowl. Where the row of boats end, a small spit of land remains where fishermen crowd around sorting fish and mending nets. The houses are at spitting distance from here. At the eastern end of the village, the land reaches out into sea before turning towards Thomaiyarpuram. Just a few years ago, families would walk along the beach towards Thomaiyarpuram to picnic on the Arivikarai beach. Here a stream empties into the sea. That access is now gone. A hungry sea has consumed the beach and carved a cavern into the dune.

“It had to happen. The bridge [dyke] and seawall have eaten into our beach. Soon our houses will also be swallowed by the sea,” says Idinthakarai fisherman U.P. Rayappan. “During storms, there will be even more damage, because the walls will deflect the waves towards the village.”

Such common sense is scarce in licensing bodies and regulatory agencies. Generally speaking, regulators exhibit invertebrate tendencies when it comes to big projects.

Exceptions exist. In 2001, Tamilnadu Pollution Control Board (TNPCB) chairperson
Sheela Rani Chunkath warned NPCIL against commencing construction without obtaining a proper license. Despite the warning, NPCIL began construction and obtained a Consent two years later in 2004. By that time, Ms. Chunkath was gone.

The Pollution Control Board’s Consent to Operate is to environmental due diligence what AERB’s final nod is to radiological aspects. Legally speaking, a company can get this consent only after obtaining all other clearances. But the lack of CRZ clearance has not stopped the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (TNPCB) from issuing consents for units 1 and 2.

Legally speaking, the TNPCB should have revoked the Consent to Operate, and the PMO should have stated that the plant will be commissioned only after all clearances, including CRZ, are obtained.

But nobody is keen to make any pronouncements on Koodankulam’s legality. Perhaps, they are praying that AERB will give its final nod, and the plant commissioned. After that, all those who are “legally speaking” can deal with the fait accompli of a radioactive reactor.


Nityanand Jayaraman is a Chennai-based writer and volunteer with the Chennai Solidarity Group for Koodankulam Struggle.

Go to Original – countercurrents.org


Share this article:

DISCLAIMER: The statements, views and opinions expressed in pieces republished here are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of TMS. In accordance with title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. TMS has no affiliation whatsoever with the originator of this article nor is TMS endorsed or sponsored by the originator. “GO TO ORIGINAL” links are provided as a convenience to our readers and allow for verification of authenticity. However, as originating pages are often updated by their originating host sites, the versions posted may not match the versions our readers view when clicking the “GO TO ORIGINAL” links. This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond ‘fair use’, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

One Response to “Fukushima Two Years Later: Lessons for India”

  1. satoshi says:

    Regarding the above article, let me refer to the following four issues:

    First: On the real cause of Fukushima Daiichi reactors’ disaster: Some Koodankulam residents (and many other people) believe that Fukushima Daiichi was destroyed by tsunami. However, tsunami did not destroy Fukushima Daiichi. The truth is that the heat destroyed the Fukushima reactors. Let me explain: The earthquake of Magnitude 8.9 damaged the Fukushima reactors so that the reactors became uncontrollable. Then, the uncontrollable heat (the abnormally high temperature) melted the reactors. That is, the reactors caused meltdowns then. In other words, it was the uncontrollable heat that destroyed the Fukushima Daiichi, not tsunami. The buildings that encased the reactors were exceptionally well-built so that the buildings could allegedly be endured any conventional weapon attack. However, these encasing buildings were unable to endure an abnormally high temperature – almost the same temperature of the surface of the Sun. It is impossible for humans to construct a building that can endure the heat that is the same temperature of the surface of the Sun. Some Indian government officials claim that the Koodankulam reactors can endure tsunamis. Perhaps they do not know that it was the heat that destroyed the Fukushima reactors. Ask these government officials whether the Koodankulam reactors can endure the same temperature of the surface of the Sun. What will they answer, then? They might answer that question rhetorically but no rhetoric can manage the same heat of the surface of the Sun, generated by the uncontrollable nuclear reactor. In addition, if the heat of the reactor becomes uncontrollable, it also means that the radioactivity becomes uncontrollable at the same time.

    Second: On the mid-ocean ridges: The Koodankulam reactors are located in front of the Indian Ocean whose seafloors are divided by the mid-ocean ridges. Along these mid-ocean ridges, there are many (possible) epicenters of the earthquake. Earthquakes occur from (one of the possible epicenters of) these mid-ocean ridges. The movement of the plates of the seafloor can be caused from these mid-ocean ridges. See http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/380811/Mid-Indian-Ridge and http://www.decodedscience.com/large-mid-ocean-ridge-earthquake-occurs-indian-ocean/16398 . (Read a textbook of seismology, of geology or of physical geography.) On 25 July 2012, an earthquake of Magnitude 6.7 occurred from the Indian Mid-ocean Ridge. It could happen again anytime. There is no guarantee that an earthquake of M8.9 (= the earthquake in Fukushima) will never occur in the Indian Ocean. (8.9 – 6.7= 2.2 Only M2.2 difference.) Always keep in mind this fact: the Koodankulam nuclear reactors are facing the Indian Ocean. A possible massive earthquake in the Indian Mid-ocean Ridge might make the Koodankulam nuclear reactors uncontrollable. Then, one of the most possible consequences is the meltdown of the nuclear reactors, as mentioned above. Note that the meltdown is probably the worst possible consequence in any nuclear energy system. It is the state of the complete uncontrollability, both of the heat and of the proliferation of the radioactive contamination.

    Third: On the unmanageable emergency: No country in the world is ready to safely manage the sudden proliferation of an enormous amount of radioactivity. Who successfully managed the after-leaking situation of radioactivity in the case of Chernobyl, for instance? TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) has been struggling to manage the after-contamination situation of radioactivity since March 2011 but not successful. If there was any success in that situation, it was this: the Japanese government has “successfully” concealed some critical information, from the general public, on the radioactive leaks and the serious effects. If the radioactive contamination begins, nobody can actually control it. And the serious after-effect lasts for decades, perhaps a century.

    Fourth: On the democratic decision-making on energy issues: India needs reliable high power energy sources for its economic development. Note that the population of the State of Tamil Nadu (where Koodankulam is located) of India is “72 million”. Compare: The population of France is 65 million; that of the UK is 63 million; that of Spain is 47 million. As such, you can understand how the energy issue of Tamil Nadu is big and serious. How to provide the residents of Tamil Nadu with the necessary amount of energy is bigger and more serious, in terms of the population, than that of France, of the UK and of Spain. If India is a democratic country, let the people decide what to do with their energy problem. If the State of Tamil Nadu is a democratic State, let the local residents decide what to do with the energy problem. If the residents themselves make a decision on their energy problem, even if they have any complaint after their decision, to whom can they complain? Let the people make a decision on their problem and let them complain, if any, to themselves. That is what democratic decision is. In democracy, the people make a decision and they take the responsibility for the consequence of their decision. Koodankulam’s anti-nuclear movement occurred because the Indian government did not allow the local residents to participate in the decision-making process on the energy issues. Why did the Indian government not listen to the views of the 72 million people during the decision-making process on the introduction of the “nuclear fission power” – the powerful enough energy source ; at the same time, however, the permanently dangerous enough energy source? That was a critically important decision-making process. What would happen, for instance, if the President of France did not listen to the views of his 65 million people and decided something important? What and how would possibly the people react to it, then? What would happen, for instance, if the Prime Minister of the UK did not listen to the views of his 63 million people and decided something important? What and how would possibly the people react to it, then? What would happen, for instance, if the Prime Minister of Spain did not listen to the views of his 47 million people and decided something important? What and how would possibly the people react to it, then? Let me dare to ask: What happened after the Indian government did not listen to the views of the 72 million people and decided something important such as the introduction of the nuclear fission energy system to these people’s place? What and how are they reacting to it now? The government created the cause. The reaction of the people is the effect.