Transformative Harmony and Inharmony in Nepal’s Peace Process


Bishnu Pathak – TRANSCEND Media Service


Two lines of thoughts: ‘first, the Maoist Army integration either into Nepal Army or society is an end of peace process and second, the integration is a part of it’ are available in Nepal. The parties empowered by power, politics and property argue as former and majority of general people and other forces believe on latter. The differing opinions split the Maoists into two: UCPN (Maoist) and CPN (Maoist). The UCPN (Maoist) tilts with India and CPN (Maoist) at China. The differences in them divide parties into “A”, “B” and “C” classes much similar to what the Rana rulers had practices for 104 (1846-1950) years. The dissident-cum-competitive viewpoints amongst parties shadowed accord, agreements and understandings initiated from New Delhi in 2005. Thus, previous harmonious relations within them transforms into inharmony. It endangers the entire peace process inviting more fearful armed conflict and social-cultural violence than a decade old People’s War in Nepal.

1. Setting

THE STUDY LEADS to theoretical (changes in institutional/ individual attitude), psychological (changes in self contextual understanding), convictional (changes in systems), and behavioral (changes in lifestyle) dimensions. It analyzes how the principal peace accord1 and agreements2 works as harmony3 and in some cases transform into inharmony in post-conflict society. It examines the scales and consequences of the various roles of former Maoist Army comparing and exploring some of the best and the least practices occurred in a transitional Nepal. Being an instructor to human security studies and training courses, researcher of various disciplines including civil-military relations and DDR-SSR4 militarized masculinity before, during, and after the armed conflict and secondary literatures, the study draws the harmonious and inharmonious attentions of learning from yesterday and interprets for coexistence and harmony for today identifying conflict transformative approach for tomorrow.

2. Introduction

Harmony is part of life that exits in self, society, nature and divine5. Harmony and peace go hand in hand. Peace is the process for perfection whereas harmony is a perfect relationship. Peace is experienced alone by a person whereas harmony is a systematic character between two or more persons or parties; harmony is always a plural condition. Peace enjoys alone; harmony is living together peacefully6. Peace implies calmness; harmony requires unity7.

Harmony is a joining of heart and spirit8. Leo Semashko focuses to individual in the society believing that individual harmony is only part of the social harmony. Without acknowledging the social harmony, individual harmony cannot be understood9. The value of peace and harmony is based on the human mindset, human rights, mutual respect and trust, cooperation, co-existence, and open mindedness10. Harmony is a social justice, fundamental human rights and freedom, coexistence, and fraternity. It is envision of individual and societal mindset for love without hierarchy. It is a discourse of what we observe; what we read; what we say; and what we do for world peace, justice, happiness, and humanity. Therefore, harmony is against all types of negative conflict, thoughtless debate and insensitive deliberation. Nepal’s peace process shall never be out of such principles.

The term harmonious in this study exhibits the accord for pleasant feeling in theoretical science. The harmonious concept means putting the people first aiming comprehensive, coordinated, sustainable and progressive development. Putting the people first take cares on people’s interests of starting point and grip of all of works, continuous efforts to fulfill the basic needs and freedom of the people and promotes an overall development of the people. The term inharmonious is just an opposite of harmonious word.

3. Theory of Peace-Conflict Lifecycle

Along with secession of erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Cold War ended the communist ideology in which the international power equation unilaterally shifted towards the USA alone. Owing to American’s unilateral superpower, the dissident ideological character of the countries initiated identity-based caste ethnic, linguistic, resource, geo-political, regional, and religious or sectoral politics to encounter capitalist and imperialist regimes in postcold war world. Poor and developing countries find more vulnerable to violent conflicts due to inequality in distribution of resources and opportunities, inadequate service delivery system, injustice to identities and beliefs, ineffective governance, inefficient socio-political transformation and intolerant leadership11.

Conflict is not new in Nepal. Roughly, in each decade, structural, INCB (identity, need, class-based) and politico-ideological conflict has occurred in Nepal. Thus, there had been Makai Parva in 1920; the Prachanda Gorkha episode in 1932; the Praja Parisad movement in 1940, the Anti-Rana movement in 1950; the banning of the multiparty system in 1961; the Jhapa uprising in 1971; the anti-Panchayat turmoil (referendum for democracy or monocracy) in 1980; the People’s Movement I in 1990; the People’s War, in full swing in 2000; and the Tarai-Madhes and ethnic conflict in 2009-11. Conflicts develop out of grievances and may escalate into violence12.

Conflict occurs in the emotional human mind13, and reaches a violent climax after passing through several stages: discussion, the appearance of conflict, escalation, segregation, the outbreak of violence, and destruction (see Pyramid I). From the violent climax, the conflict steps down towards peace in cases where one individual/group/ institution in the conflict triumphs over the other; where there is a stalemate or balance between the conflicting parties; where there is extreme pressure on societal and/or international levels; and falls down by itself without any external/internal forces or pressures.

The phases of de-escalation includes direct and indirect mediation (including facilitation, if need be); formal or informal dialogue (initiation of talks)14 or negotiation; establishing a code of conduct for bargaining for ‘do’ or ‘does’ and ‘don’t ‘or ‘does not’; participant or non-participant monitoring mechanism for signed understandings, agreements and accords; and reculturation.

We find many conflicts in the bottom of pyramid which gradually tapers off, disappears, and peace is achieved until conflict reappears. Not all conflicts reach at top of the pyramid, but many disappear itself on the way to go up in the changing dimensional context. Some disappear somewhere in the middle through mediation, negotiation or agreement, litigation, arbitration and adjudication on the course to respect truth and tolerance. Only a few conflicts reached at the top crossing the several stages in the peace-conflict lifecycle pyramid. Thus, peace-conflict has its own lifecycle rather like an ecosystem.

There have been cross-cuttings, direct, symmetrical, reciprocal, correlative and propositional relationships at each peace-conflict lifecycle phase. For instance, the conflict appearance phase may transform either to peace through mediation, talks, code of conduct, monitoring, agreement, reculturation and reciprocate relation of transitional peace phase too. Inverse, asymmetrical and crisscross relationships find in between the cause and effect dimensions in the lifecycle Pyramid. The lifecycle belongs to all structural, perpetual, manifest and latent dimensions. The lifecycle shall repeat each minute to hour, hour to day, week to month, month to year and so on in intra-and-inter-personal15, intra-and-inter societal, intra-and-inter regional and intra-and-international levels. The peace-conflict cycle unites at the central axis of the pyramid, call harmony. Conflict exists for longer time compared to peace and harmony.

The CPN (Maoist) initiated the People’s War on February 13, 1996 with the main objectives for sweeping away the constitutional monarchy, bureaucratic capitalism, feudalistic mode of society (semi-feudalism, semi-imperialism, and capitalism), and historical roots of social inequality put forwarding 40-point demands16 concerning nationality, democracy and livelihood to establish a patriotic, democratic, progressive, and prosperous People’s Republic of Nepal.

Among 9-point demands on nationality, eight are against the Indian power, politics and property. However, India (mainly Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Shyam Saran, Sitaram Yechury, SD Muni and a few others) played a pivotal role creating conducive environment for formal dialogue among the constitutional forces and the unconstitutional Maoist party of Nepal to sign 12-point understandings17 in New Delhi on November 21, 2005 to end a decade old armed conflict named People’s War.

4. Theory of Harmonious Reculturation

In general, the MA adopted the strategy and tactics of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in post-conflict Nepal against the Maoist wish of a Security Sector Reform (SSR). As there had not been taken any initiation to build a policy of democratization to the Nepal Army and professionalization to the MA, there has seen a great debate on post-conflict reculturation18. The protracted violence destroyed multi-culture19 (unity in diversity), ie, socio-economic culture, political culture20, and so forth. Reculturation, in broad term, is the urgency in Nepal.

The reculturation passes several stages: Disarmament (D), Demobilization (D), Reinsertion (R), Repatriation (R), Resettlement (R), Rehabilitation (R), Reconciliation (R) and Reintegration (R) or in short form 2D6R. It is applicable almost all post-conflict countries in the world. The 2D6R describes below adapting from Women and DDR in the World 2011.

D for Disarmament: Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also from the civilian population21. It is a development of arm management program (weapons survey, collection, storage, destruction, redistribution) for the national security forces. It also includes identification of mines and traps to mark them for further action. Due to the voluntary disarmament in Lebanon, Bosnia- Herzegovina and Haiti, the process remains very low.

D for Demobilization: Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or groups keeping individual combatants in temporary cantonments assembling into areas or centers22. Furthermore, it is a process of counseling, vocational training, economic assistance, etc. The fundamental steps lead to planning, encampment, registration, predischarge orientation, and final discharge of former combatants. It usually maintains the records verifying the former combatants’ status and provides nontransferable ID to each of them. It also provides the services of pre-discharge orientation to the combatants for transition to civilian life. Health screening, HIV/AIDS counseling and testing, and management of special needs to the female combatants, girls, and minors are the other initiatives of demobilization.

R for Reinsertion: Reinsertion is a short-term stabilization process to draw (former) combatants away from armed conflict or civil war or criminal roles until peace/political mission is deployed. It provides transitional income generating opportunities to all (former) combatants and their dependents to be supported for their immediate settlement. It ensures transitional assistance to the combatants’ dependents providing the fundamentals of basic rights such as food, shelter, clothing, health, education, etc.

R for Repatriation: Repatriation allows returning individual or group at his/her/their country of birth or origin after freeing from the hand of enemy or from a foreign country. Prisoners of war shall be released to return his/her or their native country of origin respecting the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

R for Resettlement: It is an act of being settled in another place or foreign land. In general, conflict induced Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs), immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees are settled in new places for the time beings. It provides shelters to women, children, girls, senior citizens, etc. who were suffering from conflict induced circumstances.

R for Rehabilitation: Rehabilitation leads into several steps. First, social rehabilitation is an act or process of rehabilitating the IDPs or former combatants at his/her/their native place in free from fear and discrimination. Second, psychosocial rehabilitation ensures a wide range of social, educational, vocational, etc. assistance and supports. Third, psychiatric rehabilitation restores community functioning through the wellbeing of an individual who were suffered by psychiatric disability namely mental illness or disorder etc. Fourth, cognitive rehabilitation is a therapy to connect memory that caused failure of personal relationship, anxiety, trauma, etc. because of the post-civil war. Thus, it is a multiple step beginning from social to end at cognitive rehabilitation.

R for Reconciliation: Johan Galtung says, “Reconciliation is a processed aimed at putting an end to conflict between two parties”23. Galtung introduces 12 approaches including reparation and restitution, apology and forgiveness, judicial and punishment, karma, truth commission and joint sorrow. Reconciliation is a complex term24. It begins at a different point in the post conflict transition. Reconciliation assists to include an end of hostile acts which provides healing and rehabilitation processes between victims and perpetrators. It usually requires a third party intervention.

R for (Re)Integration: Reintegration is the process by which former combatants acquires military or civilian status joining state security forces or gaining sustainable employment and income activities. Reintegration is a long term initiatives or long-term processes which shall apply in three local, regional, and national levels. Mark Knight in 2009 says that civilian reintegration and military (re)integration are sustainable. It is a transition of armed military group to state military positions similar to one they occupied during armed conflict including civil war or acquire civilian status.

Unlike many post-conflict African countries, Nepal did not follow the reculturation process. Nor Nepal supported to the families of combatants. Reconciliation process never became a fore front agenda against the ethics of peace accord.

The integration, on this study, is the process by which a number of combatants belonging to either the official armed forces/security forces or armed opposition groups in a country reintegrate either into civil life or security forces. In Nepal, the repatriation was focused just to six former MA joined from Indian during the people’s war and voluntarily retired in 2012.

Amongst many terminologies, integration is an opposite of individuation. Several writers such as Michael O‘Neill25, Ben Rosamond26, Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez27, Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Marika Lerch and Anne Faber have written theories of European Integration and politics, but none of them focus on army integration in the post-conflict situation. Morris J. MacGregor, Jr. wrote a book on Integration of the Armed Forces28, but it mostly addresses world war rather than individual, community and nation’s armed conflict.

The DDR is a complex and multi-faceted political process where economic, socio-cultural, psychological, and reconciliatory issues come to the forefront for achieving a just peaceful society or nation, thus reducing the possibility of renewed conflict. The process of DDR has been initiated in three ways: (i) negotiated settlement between the conflicting parties such as in Zimbabwe in 1979, Namibia in 1988 and South Africa in 1990s; (ii) one party defeated to the other militarily for instance Uganda in 1986s, Rwanda 1994, Ethiopia in 1991 and Angola in 2003; and (iii) external intervention in the name of their own security such as Angola in 1988, Mozambique in 1990s, Sierra Leon in 1999 and Cote d’Ivoire in 200229.

The DDR program was first initiated from Zimbabwe in 1979. Uganda became the second country to launch the DDR program in 1986s. Other countries are Namibia and Angola in 1988, South Africa and Mozambique in 1990s, Ethiopia in 1991, Rwanda in 1994, Sierra Leon in 1999, Cote d’Ivoire in 2002, Angola and Afghanistan in 2003 and so forth. In recent half-decade, DDR program was initiated in Nepal in January 2007, Durfar in July 2007, Chad in September 200730, DR Congo in July 2010 and South Sudan in July 2011. In Nepal, the DDR process initiated in 2007 and ended at the mid of 2013 only.

5. Theory of Harmonious Security

The mainstream political parties have mentioned their theoretical concepts on security in the Constituent Assembly election manifesto of 2008. The Commitment Paper of the CPN-Maoist of April 2008 prioritized for a new ideology and new leadership for a new Nepal with two armies NA and MA in Nepal. It focused to professionalize to its PLA and democratize to NA. A High Level Security Commission should be formed to restructure the security based on new democratic republic. Special plans should be developed to utilize the experience of the ex-army men from Nepal and Gurkhas from Indian and British armies. The border security disputes and infringes in Susta, Kalapani, and other places should be settled as soon as possible based on the facts”31.

The Nepali Congress manifesto stated that a National Security Policy should be adopted to protect the national border, geographical/ territorial integrity and natural resources, to promote social harmony, and to protect the life and property of the people. The border security and internal peace and security tasks should be the concern of the central government32.

As per the CPN UML manifesto, a National Security Policy should be developed for the sake of the security of the national border and to provide protection to geographical integrity and natural resources, social harmony, and protection of life33.

Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum asks, “Is there any significance for a professional army in the context of Nepal’s geographical reality? What should be its size even if it is deemed necessary? How relevant is the existing army structure and its size for the management of the country’s internal security?34The Nepal Army also presented its stand fearing of parties’ attitude towards them. The national security35 must be taken in a broad and comprehensive form to address the internal and external challenges by considering the state and the people as reference points36.

The CPN (Maoist) led the Government in two times more than two years in the past (2008-2013). Whatever they wrote on the manifesto namely democratizes the NA, professionalize the MA, all went vain in terms of implementation. Thus, the theory on harmonious security could not be reformed as per the needs and demands of the commoners.

6. Theory of Harmonious Consensus

Several understandings, agreements, and accords, including the Interim Constitution37 have been adopted to put the NA and the MA under democratic civilian control during 8 years (November 2005 to April 2013) tenures. Article 3 of the Twelve-point understanding signed on November 22nd, 2005 in New Delhi which tried to keep both State-and-Maoist armies under the United Nations or a reliable international to make free and fair CA elections. The CA should end the autocratic monarchy and involvement of a reliable international community even in the process of negotiation was also expected (Art. 3). The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 stated the Council of Ministers (CoM) shall control, mobilize, manage and democratize to the NA (Art 144.3) with inclusive character (Art. 144.4). However, the implementation of the constitutional has not been followed because of two reasons: first, the political parties do not have courage to urge the NA to follow the constitutional rights. Second, the NA has able to put the political parties into their fold either through informally supporting to the traditional political forces and the Maoists leadership or refuting to the proposal of the general people. Third, the “Political power grows out of barrel of gun” is still relevant in Nepal after the split38 of the Baidya faction.

The interim constitution put the equal footing to the Maoist Army similar to the NA making Nepal “a state with two armies”. The CoM formed a special committee to supervise, integrate, and rehabilitate the combatants of the MA after departure of the UNMIN39.

The House of Representatives (HoR) assembled on May 18th, 2006 where the Maoists first time joined the Parliament as a legitimate party. The first HoR meeting changed the name of the Royal Nepal Army to Nepal Army (Art. 3.1) and repelled the king’s provision to control, use, mobilize and function as a supreme commander to the NA under the recommendation of the Prime Minister (Art. 3.2 and Art. 3.4). However, that meeting failed to talk a single word on the Maoist Army except the role of king and the NA owing to profound voice of the Maoists and prejudice eyes of the then parliamentary parties. Moreover, the Maoist party was strongly backing by the Indian power, politics and property.

The Eight-point SPA-Maoists Agreement signed on June 16th, 2006, requested the UN to monitor them for a free and fair election of the Constituent Assembly (Art. 3). A letter signed by both the then PM and Prachanda was sent to UN General Secretary on August 9th 2006 seeking UN assistance in the “management of arms and armies of both sides” deploying qualified civilian officials to monitor and verify the confinement of MA and their weapons within designated cantonment areas (Art. 3) and the NA shall be monitored to ensure that NA remains in its barracks. The MA should be verified and monitored by the UN by keeping them in seven main (Kailali, Surkhet, Rolpa, Nawalparasi, Chitwan, Sindhuli and Ilam) and 21 satellite cantonments40.

The NA could store its arms in equal numbers to that stored by the Maoists, sealing the container with a single lock, a siren and camera (Art. 4.6). The CoM should prepare and implement a detailed action plan for democratization (Art. 4.7), but the detailed action plan for democratization is yet to be designed.

The Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) (December 8, 2006) outlines several provisions of Nepal Army on barracking, weapons storage, and control and similar provisions are also kept about the MA. Several safety measures of barracks and the cantonments of both armies were also managed. The weapons storage iron containers will be painted white. The system will be activated if the container door is opened without a “safe button” having been switched off in connection with regular inspections. Each main cantonment site will be allowed 30 weapons to the safety of its cantonment and satellite allowed 15 such weapons under the same conditions. These weapons will all be properly registered with serial number by the UN.

In AMMAA, both sides should assist each other to mark landmines and booby-traps used during armed conflict within 30 days and to defuse, remove, and destroy them within 60 days, however, Nepal became landmine free country on June 14, 201141 only. The Code of Conduct (CoC)42 also restricted the several measures of both armies. The AMMA restricted to harm or intimidate humanitarian and development workers. The use of children under 18 in the armed forces was restricted.

Under the compliance of human rights of the MA, the peace accord agreed to make public the status of the people taken in custody and release them within fifteen days; make public the information about the real name, surname, and address of the disappeared people within 60 days; carry out relief work for the conflict victims constituting a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission and a High-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission; operate donors-launched programs in a decent and respectable manner (Art. 5.2). It reconfirmed both armies commitment to respect and protect human rights measures and international humanitarian law (Art. 7).

The four-point Government-Maoists Agreement on September 13th, 2010, made several provisions on the MA alone and directed MA to keep under the Special Committee and proposed to extend the term of UNMIN43 for the last time for a period of four months44. The Maoists agreed in principle to dissociate their army from the party and put it under the Special Committee for supervision, integration, and rehabilitation (SIR) on September 16th, 2010 and a 12-member45 SIR committee was formed to control the MA46.

Nepal follows unique model of democracy due to two oppositive character armies for six years (2006-2012). The selection of the Maoist Army to integrate into the NA was carried out for 31 days, starting from september 6th to October 7th, 2012. On September 24, all 21 satellite cantonments were vacated on March 13th, 2012. The MA took over the command of 7 cantonments and weapons of the MA on April 10th, 2012. The harmonious consensus politics could not be implemented as agreed in the peace accord and the agreements because of four reasons: (i) number of Maoist Armies to be integrated into the NA; (ii) package to voluntary retirement; (iii) the ambitious Maoist leadership; and (iv) humiliation to the MA by foreign forces on the course to make Nepal unstable. The vested interest of foreign forces was to raise free Tibet movement from Nepal from the muddy water.

7. Theory of Inharmonious Integration

Amidst continuing intra-and-inter party conflict, the establishment faction of the Maoists delivered the key of the weapons containers to monitors of the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) for SIR of the Maoist Army at 28 main-and-satellite cantonments on September 1st, 2011. Senior Maoist vice chair Mohan Baidya stated the unilateral decision as a suicidal and against the party decision. The decision was protested at the Sixth Division cantonment in Surkhet stating “This is a decision to dissolve the PLA by first disarming it”47.

The seven-point agreement to integrate the MA into the NA of November 1st, 2011 further widened between establishment and dissident factions in the Maoists party48. However, the establishment claimed that it had been a landmark on MA integration and powersharing49.

The major points of the deal were:

  • Update the Maoist Army record;
  • Only 6,500 MA to be integrated into the NA establishing a separate directorate including 65 percent state security forces;
  • The MA to be followed the standard norms and rank harmonization of the NA on integration, but flexibility on age, education and marital status;
  • Weapons stored in the cantonments will automatically come under the security forces;
  • The voluntary retirement package of MA to be Rs 600,000 to Rs 900,000; and
  • The paramilitary YCL structure to be dismantled.

On updating records of the MA initiated on November 19th, the surveyors of the team faced lots of disturbances in many cantonments including Surkhet and Kailali stating the deal was for to deceive them, humiliate them. Against 19,602 UNMIN’s verification, a total of 13 per cent (2,526) were absent on MA regrouping phase (see Table 1).

Table 1: Voluntary Retirement, Integration and Rehabilitation  Phase I (November 19-30, 2011)
Name and no. of  Division Integration into NA Voluntary Retirement Rehabilitation Total Absent No. of MA
Chalachuli – I 796 705 0 1,501 421 1,930
Dudhauli – II 805 489 3 1,297 368 1,659
Shaktikhor – III 2,214 1,105 0 3,319 660 3,979
Jhyaltung Danda – IV 1,282 1,333 0 2,615 423 3,038
Dahavan – V 1,287 940 0 2,227 302 2,428
Dasarathpu – VI 1,559 1,375 0 2,934 413 3,106
Masuria –VII 1,762 1,358 3 3,123 198 3,321
Total 9,705 7,311 6(0%) 17,076 (87%) 2,526(13%) 19,602 (100%)
Source: Adapted from DDR-SSR in the World: Relevance to Nepal: April 2012 by Bishnu Pathak

A total of 9,705 (57%) MA showed their interest for integration into the NA. Prachanda and his favored commanders had a fear of that the integration number could be less than 6,500. Mohan Baidya led faction urged MA to boycott the regrouping process stating “The agreement of MA integration is against the peace process and it disrespects to the PLA”50. The regrouping process intended to complete within five-day, but it took 7 additional days because of protest.

Table 2: Voluntary Retirement, Integration and Rehabilitation: Phase II (April 12-19, 2012)

District Name &  Division Integration into NA (Phase I) No. of VR (a) Integration into  NA (b)
  1. Ilam
Chalachuli- I 796 548 248
2. Sindhuli Dudhauli – II 805 446 357
3. Chitwan Shakti Khor- III                   2,214              1,587                 626
4. Nawalparasi Jhyaltung Danda – IV                   1,282                  796                 484
5. Rolpa Dahavan – V                   1,287                  764                 523
6. Surkhet Dasarathpur – VI                   1,559                 987                 571
7. Kailali Masuria – VII                  1,762               1,448                 314
              9,705 (100%)          6,576 (68%)             3,123 (32%)
Source: Adapted from DDR-SSR in the World: Relevance to Nepal: April 2012 by Bishnu Pathak

The establishment Prachanda again failed to increase the assured MA integration number from 6,500 to 9,705 in which the Maoists-led government compelled to reinitiate regrouping phase process to reduce the number of MA. In phase II regrouping process (from April 12-19, 2012), a small number 3,123 (32%) MA agreed to integrate into the NA and most of the prominent commanders chose the option of voluntary retirement (see Table 2).

Prime Minister led Special Committee gave an order to NA and Armed Police Force (APF) to control of all MA Cantonments and other belongings on April 10th, 2012. That significantly gave an impact where large 68 per cent (6,576) MA chose voluntary retirement weakling Prachanda and strengthening to the dissident Baidya faction. In couples of hours, a company (roughly 150) led by a NA Major was reached at each main cantonment while a platoon (50 NA) under a command of Captain or APF under an inspector controlled at each satellite cantonment51.

The dramatic decision came while Prachanda favored commander and two deputies at division I in Ilam fled the cantonment fearing of possible physical action on April 9th52. The situation was also explosive at all Sindhuli, Shaktikhor, Nawalparasi, Surkhet and Kailai divisions. The irate MA burnt vehicles and vandalized the quarters of their commanders keeping the commanders hostage for a couple of days, ie, Sindhuli and Shaktikhor divisions.

Four days after the cantonments handover to NA and APF, the regrouping phase II started on April 14th, 2012. The Special Committee also agreed to a Lieutenant General to lead the General Directorate and appoint a Brigadier General to head each of the directorate, namely infrastructure development, industrial security, forest and environment security and disaster management. It also confirmed a ‘gentleman’s understanding’ on the issue of ranks, for instance, a colonel and two lieutenant colonels posts to the MA. Nine-month basic training to those selected in officer ranks and seven-month basic training to those in junior ranks53 shall be given. The selection team to officer rank shall be headed by Public Service Commission (PSC) chairperson or a member designated by him/her along 5 senior officers from NA and one from Ministry of Defense. The lower rank will be headed by 4 second-class officers of the NA and one representative from PSC.

On April 15th, 2012, the Special Committee enforced a 12-point Code of Conduct (CoC) to former MA “what to do and not to do” in particular and NA in general to apply similar military disciplines to both. It finally annulled all political MA relations with the mother Maoist party. The CoC finally ended the identity of two legal armies with two distinct uniforms in a nation Nepal.

The intra-party rift in the Maoist party brewed after the Dhobighat meeting in June 2011 where two distinct identity based leaders Mohan Baidya and Baburam Bhattarai united against Prachanda’s shaky-centrist politics. It is to be remarkable of that Bhattarai was educated and cared by Indian power and politics whereas Baidya believes on Chinese politics.

The rift of the Maoist further intensified while Prachanda formally agreed regrouping of the MA in the cantonment. The MA who were favoring to Prachanda and PM, most of them agreed for integration into the NA, but great majority of the dissident faction chose voluntary retirement. The dissident faction of the MA established an Ex-PLA Voluntary Retired Coordination Committee (PVRCC) and Discharged PLA Combatants Nepal (DPCN). The PVRCC and DPCN are headed by Dhan Bahadur, former battalion commander of the sixth division and Sagar Limbu, former Company commander of the MA respectively.

It is to be notwithstanding that the dissident Baidya faction formed a 17-member People’s Revolutionary Bureau (PRB) under the leadership of its party standing committee member Netra Bikram Chand. The long-term objective is to develop the Bureau into a People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The first-ever national gathering and meeting held on April 24th, 2012. Former MA division vice commanders and other senior MA associated under Chand’s command. The Bureau further stated that it will take action against smugglers, fraudsters and the corrupters.

The three day first general convention of the National People’s Volunteer (NPV) of the CPN Maoist was initiated from October 10th to 12th, 2012 in Kathmandu. The convention elected a 95-member central committee led by former Maoist commander Uday Bahadur Chalaune. The Maoist party General Secretary Ram Bahadur Thapa and Secretary Netra Bikram Chand gave training to the volunteers. The former People’s Revolutionary Bureau turned to the NPV where almost all former Maoist army commanders associate with the volunteers. It is known as the paramilitary forces which may convent as the Maoist army soon.

The Prachanda faction formed the Ex-PLA Association headed by former PLA Chief Nanda Kishor Pun on April 27th, 2012. Baidya faction was set up national gathering on June 16th to 18th, 2012 whereas Prachanda held plenum54 on June 29th. The CPN (Maoist) split on June 18th, 2012 from UCPN (Maoist). The vertical split was done not only on morale, political and ideology levels, but mainly on armed front.

First, Prachanda had been working as a supremo (General Secretary and later Chairperson) since 21 years without pursuing democracy practice in the party. He simply held national gatherings and plenums.

Second, the role of Prachanda finds shaky-centric. While Bhattarai put forward the concept of dialogue with the then parliamentary forces during the People’s War, he was kept into the Maoist detention center saying traitor, regressionist, right revisionist, etc shaking hand with Baidya. Prachanda improved his relations with Bhattarai on the advices of India but dissident of dialogue such as Baidya and CP Gajurel were arrested and taken into the custody in India. Prachanda adopted democratic republic line from party’s CC meeting held at Chunwang (Rukum) in September 2005. While Prachanda and Bhattarai bow down their heads in front of Indian Prime Minister, Foreign Ministers, RAW and Indian Intelligence Bureau and assured them that Nepal’s Maoists wouldn’t go against the India55, the dialogue was initiated with the parliamentary forces on the moral, political and financial strategic support of India. And India’s principal objective was fulfilled while the Nepal’s monarch was ousted.

Third, the 7-point MA agreement on MA integration was unilaterally done by the Prachanda alone without convincing Baidya faction or without holding CC meeting. There had no decision of rank harmonization to MA in integration process. Previously they had been demanding for Lieutenant General and later Major General at least. Finally they agreed on one colonel as the senior most position in integration. The forum of the Baidya faction enlarges as they severely criticized the deal. Besides, the voluntarily retired former MA threatened that they will raise weapons against their leadership. Fourth, the Maoists had demanded their representative in the NA selection secretariat, but it was vain.

In phase II regrouping, a total of 3,123 MA showed their interest for integration, but only 53.5 percent or 1,460 including 71 officers were selected for integration following the standard norms for recruitment of the Nepal Army. Some of the selected MA chose voluntary retirement before training of November 21, 2012 begins and 47 trainees MA also left the training56. Finally, only small number 1,395 (7% out of 19,602) are being trained. It is to be noted that most of the former voluntarily retired MA took the state-provided package and joined with the radical line CPN (Maoist) party. As a result, People could not come out fully from freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity whether the armed conflict resumed. Thus, inharmonious Maoist army integration into the Nepal Army left long-term debate, discourse and confrontation in the political and security history in Nepal57.

8. Theory of Harmony-Inharmony

The UNMIN served in Nepal from January 23rd, 2007 to January 15th, 2011, i.e. for 3 years, 11 months, and 3 weeks. The UNSC Resolution on September 15th, 2006 decided to stay in Nepal for a year initially. However, the tenure was extended six times on the request of the government. Finally, it was withdrawn with full humiliation in the middle of peace process. Madhav Kumar Nepal (who was defeated from two constituencies in the CA in 2008)-led government terminated UNMIN on the whisper of India, as he has been highly influenced by Indian power and politics since early 199058.

The AMMAA principally invited UN to make the CA elections free and fair and to seek UN assistance in monitoring the management of the arms and armies of both sides. UN civilian personnel confined both the MA and NA into cantonments and barracks respectively and their weapons were not used against each other59. The UNMIN had initially registered 32,250 MA personnel but only 19,602 (61% out of 32,250) were verified, comprising 15,756 (80%) men and 3,846 (20%) women (See Table 4). The verification mission had disqualified 8,640 (27%) MA personnel as they did not appear in the interview.

Most of the absentees were transformed to the YCL (Young Communist League), a politico-military force of the CPN (Maoist). Besides, twelve per cent (4,008) MA were disqualified labeling 2,973 minors 60and remaining 1,035 late recruits who joined the MA after May 25th 2006, the day of ceasefire announced (See Table 5). The UNMIN decided to discharge both verified minors and late recruits (VMLRs) from the cantonments.

However, the discharge action plan to the disqualified MA was signed on December 16th 2009 on the witness of Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy. The discharge of disqualified was begun late by 10 days on December 27th, but completed on 40 days scheduled time. The first group of VMLRs was initiated from the cantonment in Sindhuli on January 7, 201061 and completed at Dahaban, Rolpa on February 8th 2011. The was carried out in two steps.

Step 1: Pre-Discharge step led to agree on modalities, timeframes and CoC. The Maoist party confirmed the list provided by the UNMIN first and then discharge initiated. The Maoist party arranged for transportation to the VMLRs. The UN logistic teams deployed at the sites three day prior to the commencement starts.

Table 3: United Nations  Mission in Nepal (January 23, 2007-January 15, 2011)

Term From To Tenure
I January 23, 2007 January 22, 2008 One year
II January 23, 2008 July 23, 2008 Six months
III July 24, 2008 January 23, 2009 Six months
IV January 24, 2009 July 23, 2009 Six months
V July 24, 2009 May 14, 2010 Nine months & 3 weeks
VI May 15, 2010 September 15, 2010 Four months
VII September 16, 2010 January 15, 2011 Four months
Total 3 years 11 months & 3 weeks

Step II: All VMLRs were assembled in groups of 50 in each concerned division. The UN team screened and cross-checked them. A briefing overview session was organized. Photographs of the VMLRs were taken in civilian clothes for database and ID cards were provided. Each VMLR received Rs.10,000 by UN and Rs. 12,000 from the concerned party as transportation and transition allowances. All of them were transported by bus. The local organization of the Maoists welcomed the VMLRs at their concerned destinations. About one-third of the total numbers of those VMLRs were female62.

The rehabilitation packages for the reintegration of VMLRs were supported by the UN Integration Rehabilitation Program (IRP). From mid-2010 to June 2012, 2,689 (88%) of the 3,040 VMLRs had been contacted for rehabilitation options. Most of them (2,460) received career counseling of which 2,384 opted for one of the four vocational skills training: micro-enterprise development, health related training and education and formal or non-formal education. In June 2012, 485 participants enrolled for vocational skills training, 914 participants graduated for micro-enterprise training, 405 participants were studying choosing education options, and 47 had graduated from health training. It is to be noted that 56 per cent of graduated either found employment or established of their own business63.

It is remarkable that four-fifth (79%) of the VMLRs were above 18 years. The VMLRs are being involved in various activities. First, many VMLRs have been working continuously under the chain of (political) command of the CPN (Maoist) believing that the coalition government and the anti-Maoist elements in society treated them prejudicially.

Second, a few of them had joined the other revolutionary forces as the leaders made them gharkona ghatko (They neither go to home nor do suicide). This trend continued to increase.

Third, a section of them are trying to establish their own force in the name of retaliation against those (Maoists leaders in particular) who spoiled their normal life in the name of restoring People’s Republic of Nepal by eliminating semi-feudalism, semi-imperialism, and semi-extensionism. Most of them had a deep hope of that they would be recruited in state security forces for change once the People’s War settled by peaceful means. A few VMLRs are waiting for the right time for retaliation. Sirkaji Tamang, a former UNMIN’s branded VMLR arrested on the involvement of June 2, 2012 blast at a gathering addressing by the Maoist Finance Minister Barsa Man Pun in Sindhupalchowk64.

Table 4: Numbers of Maoist Army verified by the UNMIN (June 19 to December 23, 2007)
Region District Main Cantonment Satellite Cantonment No. of MA
Eastern Ilam Chalachuli -Division I (i)    Biplab-Srijana Smriti at Danabari, Ilam(ii) Ratna-Shakuntala Smriti at Tandi, Morang

(iii)         Chintang-Sukhani at Yangshila, Morang




Sindhuli Dudhauli –Division II (i)    Solu-Salleri Jana Kalyan, Sindhuli(ii) Bishal-Kumar Smriti at Tribeni, Udaypur

(iii)        Rambriksha Smriti at Kalijore, Sarlahi

Chitwan Shakti Khor –Division III (i)    Basu-Smriti, Tinchowk, Chitwan(ii) Bethan Smriti at Namobuddha, Kavre

(iii)        Pratap Smriti at Kamidanda, Kavre

Western  Nawalparasi Jhyaltung Danda – Division IV (i)    Paribartan Smriti at Thulokot, Kaski-Tanahun(ii) Basanta Smriti at Tingire, Palpa-Arghakhanchi

(iii)        Krishna Sen Smriti at Jhingamara, Rupandehi



Rolpa Dahavan –Division V (i)    Mangalsen First at Tila, Rolpa(ii) Jawahar Smriti at Chaupatta, Dang

(iii)        Dirgha Smriti at Holleri, Rolpa

Surkhet Dasarathpur –Division VI (i)    Jeet Smriti at Dasarathpur, Surkhet(ii) Ghorahi-Satbariya at Lek Pharsa, Surkhet

(iii)        Pili Smriti at Kalyan, Surkhet

Far Western Kailali Masuria –Division VII (i)    Lisne Gam at Masuriya, Kailali(ii) Bahubir Yoddha at Sahajpur, Kailali

(iii)        Lokesh Smriti at Chisapani, Kailali

Maoist Party HQ (security to leaders), defected and others 114
Total 19,602
Source: UNMIN:2008

Fourth, a small number of VMLRs have already spread their hands with criminal forces or have already formed criminal gangs. In some crimes, VMLR is found to involve. Fifth, a few VMLRs have chosen to go in foreign employment. Sixth, a small number of them are preparing for recruitment in the state security forces. Lastly, a few ofthem have reintegrated into their families.

Table 5: UNMIN Disqualified Maoist Army (January 7 to February 8, 2010)
Region District Main Cantonment Children (a) Late recruit  May2006(b) Unqualified (a+b)
Eastern Ilam Chalachuli- Division I 617 259 876
Central Sindhuli Dudhauli – Division II 277 95 372
Chitwan Shakti Khor- Division III 367 219 586
Western Nawalparasi Jhyaltung Danda – Division IV 424 198 622
Mid-Western Rolpa Dahavan – Division V 396 56 452
Surkhet Dasarathpur- Division VI 525 104 629
Far Western Kailali Masuria – Division VII 364 103 467
Maoist Party HQ 3 1 4
Grand Total 2,973 (74%) 1,035 (26%) 4,008 (100%)
Source: Civil Military Relations: Theories to Practices: November 2011

Many VMLRs had thrown their garlands in front of Prachanda, UN representatives, and other diplomats on February 8th, 2010, the concluding day of the ceremony of discharged in Dahaban, Rolpa district. That was an example of that the VMLRs were not satisfied with the concerned actors. The CPN (UML) led government had tried hard to retaliate them not providing any livelihood package programs. The Maoist party, on the other hand, tried nothing to provide them, thinking that once they receive handsome resettlement package, they would initiate their normal life, and the Maoist would lose its cadres. The Maoist party also fears that handsome package might influence them to work with other parties.

The VMLRs conducted a several protest programs against the state authorities. Also, they put forward 5-point demand to removal of the tag of ‘disqualified’ labeled to describe them; arrange employment to them; provide lump sum compensation and relief economic package; search for missing people; and disclose the misuse of fund that came from the UN at their name. The team along with the Sagar Limbu, President of DPCN submitted their demands with the Peace Minister Pampha Bhusal on August 19, 2011 and meeting was held the following day and agreed to fulfill their demands. While their demands could not be materialized, the PDCN organized strike in far western region closing down all educational institutions, transport services and business section demanding to implement the past agreements agreed in Dhangadi on December 30, 2011. They were severely irate expressing dissatisfaction that the state has dragged them out from the cantonments labeling ‘disqualified’ in an indecent and discriminatory manner. Bharat Rokaya, central secretary of DPCN said that the party used them for ten years to fight in the People’s War, but left them in the lurch after the party headed the peace process.

Table 6: Numbers of the Disqualified Discharged (January 7 to February 8, 2010)
# Development Region District Main Division/Cantonment Attended % Absent % Total no.
1 Eastern Ilam Chalachuli  I 471 11.75 402 10.03 885
2 Central Sindhuli Dudhauli  II 191 4.77 171 4.27 367
Chitwan Shakti Khor  III 253 6.31 328 8.18 587
4 Western Nawalparasi Jhyaltung Danda IV 357 8.91 261 6.51 627
4 Mid-Western Rolpa Dahavan V 265 6.61 187 4.67 459
Surkhet Dasarathpur VI 527 13.15 70 1.75 610
4 Far Western Kailali Kailali VII 330 8.23 134 3.34 472
Total 2,394 60.65 1,553 39.35 4,008
Source: UNMIN and Nepal : March 7, 2010


On January 5th, 2012, the ongoing CC meeting of the then ruling Maoist party was postponed two days owing to a bandh (strike) called by the DPCN. On February 5th, the DPCN disrupted the ongoing voluntary retirement process in Surkhet cantonment which also vandalized office of the special committee secretariat and similarly in Eastern Nepal on March 4th and 5th. They locked UCPN (Maoist) Bheri Karnali state committee office to pay attention on their demands on March 22nd. The VMLRs staged a sit-in protest at UCPN (Maoist)

headquarters, Parisdanda starting from April 19th, 2012. Rather to implement to agreed deal, the Maoist-led government suppressed the protest by force.

The VMLRs demanded to disclose the fund allocated to their names by the UN Peace Fund in May 2012. They publicly claimed that they just received material/equipment supports worth of NRs. 40,000 alone from allocation of NRs. 400,00065. The UN is silent to till date similar to many other donors do in Nepal. Opposition parties, mainly Nepal Congress leaders revealed a fact of that the Maoist commanders seized cheques issued by the AISC to the voluntarily retired MA demanding a certain percentage to the party on February 5th 2012. The establishment Prachanda faction tried to collect donation from the retired MA in the name to rehabilitate disqualified discharged and the YCL.

On February 6th, 2012, the YCL (young communist league), politico-military forces, and disqualified cadres padlocked the Maoist party offices in nine districts in the far-western region demanding similar financial assistance package provided to the voluntarily retiring MA. The following day, the YCL disrupted the discharge of the MA voluntary retirement process by obstructing the road that connects the division cantonment in Talbandi, Kailali. On March 16th, 2012 a meeting between the YCL leaders and Prachanda held and decided to provide NRs 180 million to the YCL, but decision was not implemented by the mid of 2013.

Box I

UNMIN’s disqualified discharged

Sarjit Budha Magar of Kapra VDC, Salyan district joined the Maoist People’s War at aged of 15 while he has been studying at grade 5 in June 2002. He attracted with the People’s War because of three reasons: to protect from the frequent harassing of the state-security forces, to escape from the hands of severe poverty, and to liberate the people who were in distress. At the begging, he was active on the cultural sections, for examples, dance, play music, and sing a song to provide recreation to the tired Maoist army. He used to work as a messenger for sometimes and received a hard military training at the Dirgha Smriti, 5th Division.

On January 31st, 2005, he first involved to capture the Palpa District Headquarters. They aimed to liberate their comrades from the district jail destroying the then Royal Nepal Army barrack, other administrative authorities. A total of 250 Maoist Army reached at Palpa at 6.00 PM. He was on the front line. While the Nepal Army alerted with bullet armor vehicles, they returned back. While two more 4th and 5th divisions with thousands of Maoist army arrived there at night “assembling the whole force for an action” approach, they first opened a fire at 10.30 PM. They kept under control to the district headquarters before dawn, but he was injured by several bullets in his both legs and head and became unconsciousness. When he awaked up, he was in the hospital bed at Lakhanau, India. He treated there for two years and came back in Nepal while the Maoist army was keeping into the cantonments with the help of UNMIN at early 2007.

He finally shocked while he was disqualified saying minor by the UNMIN. He hardly walked now. He ignored to participate on skill development training providing by the UNDP and boycotted the materials that the UNDP provides them for their livelihoods. He said, “The amount what UNDP provides NRs. 40,000 was severely misused from the allocation of NRs. 400,000”. Now he is a secretariat member of its newly formed Disqualified PLA Association and working closely with Baidya-led Maoist party.

Source: Interview with Sarjit Budha Magar at Ghorahi, Dang district on May 5, 2012

On July 18th 2012, about 500 retired former MA obstructed the ongoing plenum of the UCPN (Maoist) demanding to form the investigation team and take action to its leadership against those involved in misappropriating more than Rs. 1 billion funds in the cantonments. The corruption charge propounded within cantonments while 2,526 UNMIN’s verified combatants were not attended on the regrouping process phase I held from November 19th to 30th, 201166.

Three-member investigation committee headed by Prachanda’s trusted party secretary Post Bahadur Bogati formed, but the report has not been published till mid-2013. On September 21st, the Youth Association Nepal filed a corruption complaint at the CIAA67 on charges of embezzling state funds NRs 4 billion allocated for former Maoist Army against UCPN Maoist president and present Prime Minister68. No initiative is taken yet by the secretary of CIAA, as UCPN Maoist trusted man holds the position.

Some officials of the UNMIN were severely biased which showed in the verification process in 2007. A few of them desired to defame the Maoists negatively stating that large number of child soldiers were used during the People’s War (1996-2006) similar in African conflicts. It was done on the vested interest of USA and its allies.

UNICEF’s Sarah Crowe and Martin David Logan stated that a group of 200 former child soldiers left the Maoist army cantonment into  civilian life69. Stated child soldier is against the accord and agreements, but provision of VMLRs (for more see Box I). The UNMIN tried to secure their job in Nepal making Nepal more transitional country. It might not be coincidence that the Free Tibet Movement had been intensified in Kathmandu as long as the UNOHCHR and UNMIN stationed in Nepal70. Similarly, Nepal is the best place to “encircle the China” and “watch to India”.

Box II

Reference DCM’s query on the comments on the report on Global practices for security sector reforms by Dr. Bishnu Pathak of Conflict Study Center. The comments of the Defence Wing and Political Wing have been obtained and are attached at F/B. The paper greatly reflects on the civil and military relationship in Nepal due to its long feudal past autocratic system in Monarchy.

It also brings out that the SSR is a political phenomenon and not confined only to security institutions. The paper covers all the agreements on the issue in a fairly comprehensive manner talking into view points of various political parties. Examples of SSR and DDR in certain other countries have also been appropriately covered with the aim of guidelines to possible solution in the present context of Nepal. The coverage of SSR and DDR and other post conflict scenario are exhaustive and appear to be factual. Unique case of arms in Nepal has also been brought out clearly. However, we may suggest the following:

1. The author of the paper may be confused to focus on ways and means to amalgamate the ex-combatants into mainstream civil life and in forces which are of direct productive value to a developing society such as Nepal rather than various arms bearing job;

2. Re-integration to be referred as resettlement;

3. Explain whereabouts of 8,640 persons who were initially registered by UNMIN and later did not appear for verification;

4. Integration/resettlement to be done into civil society, new security forces like CISF, BSF, Civil Government Offices, police and NA in that order of preference;

5. Re-integration be as per the following criteria;

a) Choice of Individual;

b) Basic qualitative requirements of each security force with certain relaxations;

c) No unit/sub-unit wise integration;

d) No integration at leadership level in NA;

6. The report should also be made more coherent as in its present from it appears to be disjointed with different paragraphs taken from different sources.

(Apoorva Srivastava)

First Secretary (PIC)

28th August 2009

8. Concluding Analysis

To understand more on transformative harmony and inharmony in the MA (re)integration, two lines of struggles, liberal vs. radical within the party have been studied. During People’s War, Bhattarai led liberal opportunist approach while Prachanda-Baidya adopted radical revolutionary line. The CPN (Maoist) initiated the People’s War on February 13th 1996 against the constitutional monarchy, bureaucratic capitalism, and feudalistic mode of society and historical roots of social inequality to establish a patriotic, progressive, and prosperous Federal People’s Republic of Nepal. Most of the Maoists demands on nationality were against India; however, Nepal’s peace process formally initiated signing of 12-point understanding at New Delhi in November 2005 on the mediation of India.

While Prachanda changed Baidya to Bhattarai camp on the pressure of India after 12-point understanding, the revolutionaries led by Baidya line felt marginalized. Neither the revolutionary line was ready to dismantle alleged People’s Government and People’s Kangaroo court. Rather than home grown, Nepal’s peace process was brought from India. Prachanda-Bhattarai surrendered in front of Indian Prime Minister, Foreign Ministers, etc. on the craning up RAW and Indian Intelligence Bureau (Muni 2012:327). Besides, India wants to retaliate the MA Integration process to weaken India’s revolutionary forces. The integration model of Nepal did not follow otherwise than the desires of India (see Box II). Besides, the MA integration team of the UCPN (Maoist) was encircled and highly influenced through various gainful means by western countries via the so-called security advisers. Such advisers succeeded to implement of their grand-design to split party wedging establishment and dissident factions on the cause of Maoist Army integration and retirement.

Most of the leaders and cadres are behind Prachanda-Bhattarai who are empowered by 3C of command, commission and corruption. Three hierarchical “A”, “B” and “C” categories are found within the party much similar to what Rana rulers had been divisions within themselves which had imposed autocratic regime for 104 years (1846-1950) in Nepal. The lavish lifestyle, shaky-centrist and opportunists leaders-cadres are on the category of rich “A”, with moderate lifestyle in “B” and poor in the “C” echelons. Rather than political ideology in general, the Maoist party fission is between “haves” vs. “haves not” in particular, “opportunist” vs. “honest”, and “tactical strategy” vs. “long term vision” in general. Prachanda-Bhattarai heads the “haves” and Baidya “haves not.” Moreover, Prachanda-Bhattarai represents the crony capitalism in the name of social capitalism, but Baidya crony socialism in the name of communism.

The harmonious relation of the Maoists party transformed to inharmony while Prachanda-led the first Republican Government in Nepal after CA elections. The frustration, humiliation and exclusion among the MA intensified while the Prachanda did nothing to encourage them. Baidya faction wanted respectful presence of their armies on the integration but it was in vain. Prachanda-Bhattarai initiated the power politics “Maoist Army integration is an end of Nepal’s peace process”. That concept “end of peace process” was derived on the advice of India to please western foreign forces, transforming the MA into NA. It means India tends to integration to weaken the Maoist party before the conclusion of the Constitution making. The peace process shall only end when Nepal receives a new Constitution; the general elections holds following constitutional mandate and a new government is formed.

If we analyze the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration processes of 42 post-conflict countries, Nepal’s integration is unique. The countries where (re)integration succeeded in South Africa, Uganda, Angola, Ache, Mozambique etc, they gave attention on identity, respect and professional integrity (IRI) keeping the equal footing of all state-and-rebel armies. The (re)integration failed and violence resumed in most of the post-conflict countries including Afghanistan who tried to humiliate rebel armies neglecting IRI.

The resumption of violence in identity-form71 is likely in Nepal as integration severely disgraces the MA similar to what the MA was defeated by the NA. While all recruitment processes and norms of NA applied to all individual MA; it is a recruitment rather than integration. Moreover, the integration is a surrender or dissolution rather than harmonious transformation. It is inharmonious integration. Thus, Nepal waits for another type, communal violence in future. Ninety-three (93) percent Maoist Army refuted humiliating integration choosing voluntarily retirement option, moreover, the VMLRs ousted without any financial supports, the lives of fore-front leaders are in danger similar to Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Benazir Bhutto and others.

The intra-and-inter party transformative harmony is needed to avoid inviting armed conflict in Nepal. Transformative harmony is a general philosophy that responds to conflict positively adopting problem-solving, structural, and relational ideology rather than emotional strategy and tactics.

Thus, today’s Nepal’s urgent task is to transform the negative synergy into the positive one through the indirect/direct informal and indirect/direct formal peace talks (dialogue) among the conflicting parties to forge harmony coping with peace-conflict lifecycle approach.

For this, there is need of harmony at home, work, community and society; it is required in the nation72, in the region and on the earth. The fusion of social democracy in the countryside and market economy in the urban centers (Pathak: October 15, 2012) may soon be a role model for universal harmony, no less so for socially, culturally, economically, and politically sensitive and conflict-prone country like Nepal.

Notes and References:

1. Comprehensive Peace Accord, (Kathmandu: SPAM, November 22, 2006).

2. The main agreements are Six-point SPA-Maoists Agreement of November 8, 2006; Eight-point SPA-Maoists Agreement of June 16, 2006; Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies of December 8, 2006; etc.

3. Bishnu Pathak, ABC of Harmony (Book Review), TRANSCEND Media Service (October 15, 2012).

4. Bishnu Pathak and Devendra Uprety, “Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform in

Nepal: A Preliminary Sociological Observation,” TRANSCEND Media Service (March 7, 2010) and Bishnu Pathak, “Global Practices of DDR-SSR: SSR in Nepal,” Transcend Media Service (August 29, 2009).

5. Ananta Kumar Giri, Transformative Harmony: An Invitation for Harmony (Madras: Madras Institute of Development Studies, 2012), p. 1.

6. Bishnu Pathak, “Principles of Harmony”, Transcend Media Service (December 3, 2012), pp. 1-4.

7. Bishnu Pathak, “Principles of Interfaith and Religious Harmony”, Global Harmony Association (February 2013), p. 1.

8. Subhash Sharma, “Harmony Through Joining of Heart and Spirit (JHS): Towards JHS Vision for Social Harmony without Hierarchy”, Indus Business Academy (January 3, 2012), p.1.

9. Leo Semashko, The ABC of Harmony, (New Delhi: Global Association of Harmony and Gandhi Bidhya Mandir, 2012), p. 22.

10. Gandhi Vidhya Mandir, “International Seminar on Teacher Education for Peace and Harmony” (February 11-13, 2012).

11. Bishnu Pathak, Politics of People’s War and Human Rights in Nepal (Kathmandu: Bimipa Publications, 2005), p. 1.

12. Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution (London: Sage Publications, 2007), p. 272

13. J. A. Wall Jr. and Ronda Roberts Callister. “Conflict and its Management”, Journal of Management, No. 21 (1995).

14. Bernard Wood, Development Dimension of Conflict Prevention and Peace-building, (New York: UNDP, . 2003).

15. Intra-personal: For example, if “A” male person wants to do marriage with “B” female, the “A” may have multiple choices of “B”. The “A” finally attains the peace when “A” reaches on a conclusion whether to accept or reject the proposal of “B”. The undecided (accepted/rejected) movement within “A” is known as conflict. And another issue and/or activity come and the cycle repeats accordingly. Inter-personal: For example, if “A” and “B” became husband-wife and went to shopping to buy green vegetables; there may have a lot of options of choice. Once they decided or rejected the idea to buy the vegetables through consensus, both attain the peace. The indecisive movement between them is a period of conflict. Henceforth, another issue or activity comes and peace-conflict cycle repeats. 16. Baburam Bhattarai, et al, “Memorandum of Forth-point Demands”, Central Committee of the United People’s Front (February 2, 1996).

17. Twelve-Point Understandings, (New Delhi: SPAM, November 22, 2005).

18. Bishnu Pathak, “Women and DDR”, TRANSCEND Media Service (September 13, 2011).

19. E.B. Tylor, Primitive Culture (London: J. Murray, 1871).

20. Joseph Pearce, Can Christianity Inspire a Global Culture? (Florida: Ave Maria University, 2010).

21. UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, Overview: DDR Processes in Africa (Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa: Kinshasa, DR Congo, June 2007).

22. Albert Caramés and Eneko Sanz, Analysis of DDR Programmes in the World during 2007 (Spain: School of Culture for Peace, 2008).

23. Johan Galtung, Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (New York: United Nations, 2000).

24. David, Bloomfield, “On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation”, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berghof Report No. 14 (2006), p. 12.

25. Michael Neill, The Politics of European Integration (London: Routledge, 1996).

26. Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

27. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory (London: Oxford, 2005).

28. MacGregor and Morris J. Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces (1940-1965) (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1999)

29. Bishnu Pathak. “Modelling the Integration of the Maoist Combatants: DDR or SSR?”, Situation Update 80 (December 14, 2008).

30. Ibid

31. Nepal Communist Party (Maoist), Election Manifesto (Kathmandu, March 2008).

32. Nepali Congress, Election Manifesto (Kathmandu, March 2008).

33. Communist Party of Nepal (UML), Election Manifesto (Kathmandu, March 2008).

34. Geja Sharma Wagle, “National Security Policy and Role of National Council” in Changing Security Dynamics in Nepal (Kathmandu: Nepal Institute for Policy Studies and SAFERWORLD, 2009) and Madhes Janaadhkari Forum, Election Manifesto (Kathmandu, March 2008).

35. Bishnu Pathak, Understanding National Security Policy in Nepal, (Kathmandu: NISS, September 12, 2010).

36. Ibid

37. Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 (Kathmandu, January 2007).

38. Tika R Pradhan, “UCPN-M splits‚ CPN‚ Maoist born”, Himalayan Times (June 6, 2012)

39. UNMIN, Arms Monitoring, 2007, <> accessed on December 15, 2009

40. Three sub-cantonments shall be located around each main cantonment (Art. 4)

41. June 14, 2011. Nepal becomes landmine-free country as NA clears its last minefield.

42. Code of Conduct for Ceasefire, (Kathmandu: Government and the Maoists, May 25, 2006).

43. UNSC, Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process (New York: UNMIN, September 2, 2010).

44. Kiran Chapagain, “Government, Maoists sign 4-pt Accord”, Republica (September 13, 2010), p. 1.

45. Two members from each UCPN (Maoist), Nepali Congress, UML and Madhesi Allian and one each from NA, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and MA.

46. Kiran Chapagain, “PLA under Special Committee now”, Republica (September 16, 2010), p. 1 and Phanindra Dahal, “Special Panel Okays PLA directive”, Kathmandu Post (September 16, 2010), p. 1.

47. Kathmandu Post, Arms handover: Maoists hand over container keys to panel (September 2, 2011).

48. Five Madhesi groups are associated with the front.

49. Phanindra Dahal and Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “Parties join hands on peace process”, Kathmandu Post (November 2, 2011).

50., Nepal becomes landmine-free country as NA clears its last minefield, <> assessed on June 14, 2011.

51. Phanindra Dahal, “Army takes charge of PLA fighters, weapons”, Kathmandu Post (April 11, 2012).

52. Republica, Nepal Army Takes Charges of Cantonments (April 11, 2012).

53. The NA imparts 24-month training for officers and nine-month basic training for juniors.

54. Republica, Palungtar Plenum (November 28, 2010).

55. Sukh Dev Muni, “Bringing the Maoists down from the Hills: India’s Role”, In Nepal in Transition (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press), pp.227-229.

56. Kosh Raj Koirala, “Special Committee dissolved after completing tasks”, Republica (April 12, 2013), p.1.

57. S. Chandrasekharan, NEPAL: New Proposal of Nepal Army on PLA Integration: Strike while the Iron is hot”, South Asian Analysis Group, Update No. 249 (April 7, 2011).

58. Bishnu Pathak, “Nepal’s Peace Process towards Ambiguity”, TRANSCEND Media Service (May 13, 2010).

59. Pawan Bimali and Bishnu Pathak, “Child Soldiers: Crime against Humanity”, Situation Update 89 (December 16, 2009).

60. Op. cit. UNMIN, 2007.

61. UNMIN, Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of its Peace Process (New York:UN, January 7, 2010).

62. UNMIN, United Nations Press Release (Rolpa, February 8, 2010).

63. UNDP, UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (Kathmandu: June 2012).

64. Dhruba Dangal, “Former Maoist combatant involved in blast: Police”, Republica, (June 5, 2012), p. 2

65. Interview with Bikrant Budha Magar, Sarjit Budha Magar, Madan Lal Chopda and Bodharaj Pun Magar at Ghorahi, Dang district on May 5, 2012. They all were discharged by UNMIN saying disqualified Maoist Army.

66. Kathmandu Post, Ex-combatants raise ruckus, stall plenum (July 19, 2012), p.1.

67. Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority

68. Kathmandu Post, Correction charge against Dahal, PM, (September 22, 2012)

69. Sarah Crowe and Marty David Logan, Last group of Maoist child soldiers discharged in Nepal, (Kathmandu: UNICEF, January 8, 2010).

70. Bishnu Pathak, “Transitional Security” Transitional Justice, No. 5 (November 2012), p. 15

71. Seyom Brown and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Nepal, on the Brink of Collapse”, New York Times (June 5, 2012).

72. mainly into the parties


Bishnu Pathak is a Board Member and Professor of Human Security Studies at TRANSCEND Peace University, Germany. He, who holds a Ph.D. in Conflict Management and Human Rights, has been working at the Peace and Conflict Studies Center (PCS Center) as a President and Director. He is presently involved as a senior peace, security and human rights expert on International Evaluation of Support to the Peace Process in Nepal. He holds the Chief Coordinator of the Petition to the UN for Total Disarmament and Vice President at the Global Harmony Association. His book Politics of People’s War and Human Rights in Nepal is a widely circulated volume. His pioneer work on Peace-Conflict Lifecycle has first been published on a book in Experiments with Peace, Norway. He is the author of more than 150 research articles on human rights, UN, security, peace, civil military relations, community policing, and federalism including Nepal’s 2008 Constituent Assembly Elections: Converting Bullets to Ballots, East-West Center Bulletin, Washington DC. Dr. Pathak can be reached at email:


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