Torture as a Jus Cogens Norm

SPECIAL FEATURE, HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, UNITED NATIONS, 10 Jun 2019

Law Teacher – TRANSCEND Media Service

Everybody Is Doing It! Torture as a Jus Cogens Norm Following the September 11 Attacks

Introduction

“If ever a phenomenon was outlawed unreservedly and unequivocally it is torture”; a statement that should have no trouble gaining wide support on an international plain. Yet following the tragedies of September 11 there has been a marked increase in the number of states prepared to use instruments of interrogation that would, in the eyes of the innocent bystander, amount to torture, in order to gather information that allows them to prevent acts of terrorism and save lives. Indeed, Jeremy Waldron notes how Unites Sates Justice Department lawyers have advocated such acts of torture and how “at least one scholar has suggested that the United States might institute a system of judicial torture warrants, to permit coercive interrogation in cases where it might yield information that will save lives” However, a myriad of provisions exist within international law, all of which predate the aforementioned events of September 11, which prohibit the use of such methods. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment both of which allow for no qualifications or limiting factors. These provisions prohibiting torture are seen as non-derogable rights. Furthermore, there exists argument that the prohibition of torture forms a peremptory norm making it jus cogens and bestowing upon the entire international community an obligatio erga omnes to refrain from such acts.

This paper will examine the claims, prior to September 11, that torture prohibition is a jus cogens norm and whether or not the actions of the international community after this date can justifiably support such a contention. Part I of the essay will critically evaluate the sources of international law, specifically demonstrating how the law relating to the prohibition of torture applies to the international community. Part II of the essay will focus on the concept of jus cogens, in particular the requirements for such norms and obligations, which will then be evaluated against the international instruments prohibiting the use of torture, demonstrating a strong argument in favour of the norm. Finally, the Part III of the essay will turn to the reaction of the international community, particularly allegations that the United States under the Bush administration have engaged in acts of torture and other coercive interrogation techniques, and will examine such practises vis-à-vis their public security justifications. This section will draw on specific examples, for instance the treatment of the Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib detainees as well as other reported acts of torture worldwide, so as to assess whether or not it can still be argued that the instruments in place for the prohibition of torture still satisfy the criteria of a jus cogens norm. It is the belief that, if the international sources of law prohibiting the use of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment amount to being a peremptory norm binding on the entire international community, then the actions of states in response to the September 11 attacks will be rendered a breach of an international law that amounts to a norm of jus cogens, rather than removing the laws from the scope of such norms.

Sources of International Law

One cannot just proclaim that torture is a form of jus cogens and be done with the matter. The means by which a norm or law becomes jus cogens, will be examined in Part II of this essay, but the existence of international law and the debate around how to determine such laws precludes any such debate on jus cogens. Indeed, the Latin translation of the phrase is ‘compelling law’, thus it must be agreed that before such a norm can be created, it must first be recognised as a law. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is widely regarded as the accepted statement of the sources in international law:

“the Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contracting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decision and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”

As such, Part I of this essay will begin by giving a brief explanation of how each source of law operates before explaining how each source relates to torture. While only descriptive in nature at this stage, such understanding is necessary to grasp the debate that follows regarding jus cogens and the prohibition of torture. Moreover, while, it will be shown, judicial decisions and scholarly writings form merely law determining – rather than law creating – instruments, specific note should be paid to this branch if international law as it is in this arena that, following the attacks, scholars and academics are shaping the way in which the international community view acts of torture. Thus, discussion in Part I of the essay on judicial decisions and academic writings will be limited to decisions and writings that pre date the Attacks.

As it stands, all treaty laws relating to torture predate the September 11 attacks and have been accepted, ratified and entered into force. There is no question as to the validity of these treaties and there is, therefore, no need for comment on the creation and manifestation of binding treaties, save for mention of their definition and reference to reservations.

Treaties

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines a treaty in Article 2 as:

“…an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”

Article 26 VCLT further sets out the principle of pacta sunt servanda. That is “[e]very treaty in force is binding on the parties to it and must be performed in good faith”.

A number of international instruments exist with the aim of prohibiting and eradicating acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This essay will first pay note to the international treaties that provide general provision for the prohibition of torture. Firstly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was drafted by the Commission on Human Rights and was accepted by the General Assembly in Resolution 217 A (III). It was the first document to cover human rights in such a vast scope and Article 5 of the Declaration provided that “no on shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” As a declaration, its provisions were not binding on States, but the passing of time, and the status of the Declaration as forming the constitution of the human rights movement, has seen many of its provisions being accepted as customary international law. Two treaties stemmed from the Declaration which developed the protection of human rights, enshrining them in a legally binding set of international documents which have now been accepted and ratified by the entire international community. These are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which came into force in 1976. Article 7 of the ICCPR uses the very same language as the UDHR to prohibit acts of torture. However, Article 4 provides a general derogation clause relating to the provision of the Covenant allowing States parties to the Covenant to suspend their obligations in times of public emergency:

“in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and which is officially proclaimed, states party to the present covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present covenant, to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.”

Article 4(2), however, provides a list of non derogable provisions within the Covenant and included here is Article 7, the prohibition of torture.

The discussion in Part III will look in at the use of international humanitarian law – the laws of armed conflict or war – as a lex specialis rule in order to avoid obligations under human rights laws. However, it is worth noting here the references to torture within this arena. The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 regulate the treatment of wounded and sick (First Convention); shipwrecked (Second Convention); prisoners of war (Third Convention); and civilians (Fourth Convention). Common Article 3 of all four Conventions relates to the treatment of all peoples not taking an active part in the hostilities and prohibits “…in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;…” further reference can be found to torture in all four Conventions when referring to the consequences of grave breaches.

The prohibition of torture exists not only on an international plane but also regionally. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) prohibits torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 3. Further more, while the instruments discussed thus far contain general provisions for the prohibition of torture, a number of instruments exist with the intention of defining the act and further securing its prohibition. The 1987 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) defines torture in Article 1(1) as:

“…any act by which sever pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the legislation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in a lawful capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”

Further provisions of the CAT provide that absolutely no derogation from the Convention is permitted, including during times of war; that states must make the act of torture an offence in their domestic systems; and that each State Party shall undertake to prevent such acts of torture. The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which entered into force in March 2002, set up a Committee for the prevention of torture with the aim of investigating allegations of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment within Member States.

The explanation of international and regional torture prevention discussed here represents just a few examples of how the international community view and define such acts. Further investigation would highlight a number of other instruments that are designed to prevent and prohibit torture, but the aim here is to give an insight into how such instruments operate and to illustrate the intentions of the States Parties, at least at the time of the creation the instruments, was that the freedom from torture would be an absolute right. It is also worth noting here how reservations to treaties operate. Before a state ratifies, or even upon ratification, a state may put forward a reservation to any of the provisions detailed within the instrument, which may limit its obligations within the scope of that provision. However, a state may, under no circumstances enter a reservation to a treaty that conflicts with the main objective or purpose of the treaty. For example, a state could not enter a reservation that it does not consider itself bound by the definition of Torture detailed in Article 1 of the CAT.

Customary International Law

Customary international law, unlike treaties, takes an unwritten form and, therefore, involves further investigation to ascertain exactly how it is created. The principles of customary law can be found primarily in international case law, but as Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ states, it is a general practice that is accepted as law. This brings two factors into play. First that there must be a general practice by States (the State practice element); second, practice must be accepted as law. This latter element has been described as a belief on the part of the State, that the practice is prescribed by law; otherwise known as opinio juris.

A number of cases have suggested varying opinions on what amounts to a general practice. In the Asylum case the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarded general practise as “…a constant and uniform usage practised by the states in question.” This opinion received support in both the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. However, clarification on this matter was given in the contentious case of Nicaragua v United States in which the court opined that the practice need not be in absolute conformity with the rule, but rather that it is, in general, consistent with the rule, and any deviation denotes a breach of the rule, not the creation of a new one. For the purpose of the current debate relating to torture, it is also worth noting how a domestic law may give rise to customary international law. In the Scotia case it was agreed that, where the majority of other States had legislated the same provision in the same manner, this could give rise to a customary international law.

Opinio juris: the action of a state, in the belief that there is a rule of law that makes such actions obligatory. In the Lotus case a collision between two ships on the high seas – one French the other Turkish – led to the death of several people aboard the Turkish ship. The French officer of the watch was arrested by the Turkish authorities and charged with manslaughter. The French government argued that only the French State had jurisdiction to try the officer and used past case law, in which other States (in similar circumstances) had refrained from prosecution, thus demonstrating evidence of a general practice and customary law. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) disagreed; stating that in conjunction with a general practice there must be a belief that it is regarded as obligatory. Finally, it is worth noting briefly that a state may demonstrate opinio juris through a tacit acquiescence with a rule. Moreover, for a state not to be bound by a customary law, it must demonstrate evidence of a continued protest to the rule from the point of its creation.

So, how has the law prohibiting the use of torture become customary? It has been stated that the UDHR, although not legally binding, is the backbone of the constitution of the human rights movement and much of its content has become legally binding through customary international law. The reality that all countries are party to the Declaration and the subsequent Covenants; almost three quarters of the Worlds’ nations are party to the CAT; and all Members of the Council of Europe recognise and accept the ECHR, ipso facto suggests that they believe the prohibition of torture is a legal obligation. Moreover, Article 4 of the CAT compels states to make torture a criminal offence under its domestic legal system and, while some states may have found opportunity to offer the definition of torture a wide interpretation, it has been legislated in much the same way in many states, with similar definitions and punishment for such acts.

General Principles of International Law

Where the court faces a problem for which there is no law dealing with the exact facts of the case it may, in such events, resort to analysis of other existing rules or general principles that guide the legal system (be they from justice, equity or considerations of public policy) in order to make a ruling, thus creating new law. There are various recognised general principles including Reparation, good faith, estoppel, pacta sund servanda, equity, principles of humanity, procedure and evidence.

Judicial Decisions

Judicial decisions and the academic writings of the most eminent scholars, as noted above, are intended only to be a means of determining the law and not creating new law. Notwithstanding the fact that the system of international courts such as the ICJ do not incorporate a doctrine of precedent – as is found in most domestic legal systems – it is still common practice for judges to follow closely, previous decisions of the [ICJ] Court. It may be the case that, in practise, a court’s attempt to interpret an international law may, indirectly, give rise to a new law with the possibility that this may be recognised at a later date in the creation, for example, of new treaties. Of course, it may also be the case that such judicial interpretations are discarded as incorrect. However, it must be noted that the principle role of the Court is to assess its previous case law and its relevance vis-à-vis the facts of the case before it.

In terms of scholarly writings, Shaw notes that the rise in positivism has confined the use of the textbook or article to statements of the law rather than the source. Nonetheless, jus cogens is rooted largely within the ambit of natural law, the birth of which is found in the writings of philosophers such as Vattel and Kolb. Thus, this branch of international law will contribute substantially to the discussion in Part II on the concept of jus cogens and its place within international law.

Before departing from this discussion, however, it is necessary to provide some illustrative case examples that have come before international courts relating to the use of torture. In Ireland v UK the European Court of Justice (ECtHR) examined the use of five techniques of ‘interrogation in depth’ within the scope of Article 3 of the ECHR prohibiting the use of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court investigated the five techniques and found that, while they could be reconciled with the law prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment, it could not amount to the definition of torture. The Court did find the techniques to violate Article 3 of the Convention, but it is interesting to note that, while the Convention permits no derogation for torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the two categories still amount to different practices; that is, at least in the eyes of the judiciary. Moreover, in Soering v UK the ECtHR determined whether or not, in extraditing the applicant to the United States to face the death penalty for murder, the time spent on death row and the subsequent onset of death row phenomenon could breach Article 3 of the Convention, but never differentiated between the treatment as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

While the aforementioned cases deal with accusations of torture and demonstrate the European approach to its prohibition, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the case of Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, the Tribunal said of the prohibition of torture:

“Because of the importance of the values it [prohibition of torture] protects, this principle has evolved in to a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even “ordinary” customary rules.”

Conclusions

What has become evident from the investigation of the sources of international law is that the principle of the prohibition of torture is much more than a written provision of the treaties of international law. The provisions of said treaties that make the prohibition absolute and non derogable; its further manifestation in international customary law; and its recognition in international cases (specifically that of Furundzija) all stand as testament to the notion that the prohibition of torture is a higher norm of jus cogens and States must strive to uphold the principle. However, State practice and the approach of courts to the international provisions illustrates an inclination to avoid the use of the term ‘torture’ and assert, albeit implicitly, that the acts fall within the realms of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. This fact will become ever clearer in Part III of the essay.

Jus Cogens

It is believed that within international law two types of rules exist – jus dispositivum and jus cogens. The former allows international rules and provisions to be excluded or modified at the will of contracting States, while the former allows for absolutely no derogation whatsoever. This section of the essay will look specifically at the existence and role of jus cogens in international law; firstly, taking into consideration how laws of jus cogens have came to being through exponents of the system of natural law. This will also look at the interrelationship between natural law, jus cogens and legal positivism. Second, discussion will turn to the role of jus cogens in modern international law and the means of identifying them. Finally, the essay will look at the characteristics of the prohibition torture vis-à-vis the criteria for identifying peremptory norms, with the aim of showing that the prohibition of torture, at least prior to September 11, is a jus cogens norm.

Natural Law Origins and Development

Partisans of the school of natural law argue that it exists in nature and therefore applies in the same way everywhere: “[Natural law is]an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and according to which the human will must act in order to attune itself to the necessary ends of the human being”. In the 19th and 20th centuries, secular natural law became predominant over religious and cultural natural law marking the birth of the universality of natural law. Christian Wolff introduced the theory of a “necessary law of nations which consists of the law of nature applied to nations” and the belief that States cannot alter or free themselves from the law of nations at will. Vattel also used the law of nations to identify valid and invalid treaties and customs expressing that where they are ‘indifferent’ – that is to say not within the scope – of the law of nations, then they can be concluded at the discretion of the contacting States, but any treaty or custom in contradiction with the law of nations is null and void. Moreover, the same principle would stand even in relation to laws that are lex specialis, where a special rule of law is said to prevail over general rules. Jus dispositivum or legal positivism requires that all law be written or enacted. Hence, it will not recognise the unwritten, universally applying rules of natural law. In that sense one finds it difficult to see how the principle of jus cogens, also of an unwritten nature, would reconcile itself against the principle of legal positivism. Indeed, Orakhelashivili notes the need to investigate whether such principles can prevail. The belief that legal positivism will not recognise unwritten rules ipso facto asserts the notion that just cogens norms can not exist unless expressly provided for in written laws and treaties. However, Parker and Neylon point out that the development of positivism has led to its weakening in the sense that it “necessarily requires using moral considerations or value judgements as to which is the better theory about the nature of the law”. As such, it is their assertion that the two theories are complementary, with increasing evidence being show that positive law prevails until confronted with an unjust law, at which point natural law and, possibly, jus cogens provide definitive answers, rendering the positive law void.

Prior to the investigations of the aforementioned scholars, Alfred Verdross had attempted to address the issue. He illustrated the views of eminent scholars and judges prior to the Second World War, particularly the belief held by Guggenheim who rejected arguments that all treaties contra bonos mores (against the public order) are void. He then demonstrated how, following WWII, a shift occurred in the approach to peremptory norms through reference by the International Law Commission (ILC) in the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, which was also subsequently accepted by Guggenheim:

“A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”

What is clear from this debate is that while jus cogens does not mimic natural law per se, it does exist in similar states and the universality of such norms – that is, they are necessary in the public order – has led to a complementary interrelationship with legal positivism. States are indeed free to regulate their relations through the creation of treaties and legislation, provided that they are not unjust. However, what amounts to an unjust law prohibited by a jus cogens norm has caused considerable debate. The differentiation between a general norm of international law and a general norm of international law that exists as jus cogens appears quite unclear and this issue must be addressed.

Jus Cogens in Modern International Law

Keeping ‘a foot in the door’ of natural law, it has been suggested that jus cogens norms are created on a non consensual basis, so as to bind the international community regardless of their acceptance of the norm. However, Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties refers to treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law:

“A treaty is void if at the time of its conclusion it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”

Danilenko examined the theories behind the creation of jus cogens norms and suggested two dominant arguments. First that the concept of jus cogens introduces an entirely new source of international law; and, second, the theory that existing sources are modified to allow the adoption of absolute rules by majority consensus for the purposes of jus cogens. The former argument was based on the wording of Article 53. In suggesting that a peremptory norm has to be accepted and recognised by the international community as a whole, a new category was created and that Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ did not represent the international community as a whole. Danilenko’s reasoning in dispelling this theory was twofold. First, there was a tendency for representatives at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties to speak in terms of established sources – treaties and custom – and regarding jus cogens as a product of existing sources. Second, in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua the court regarded the recognition of the prohibition on the use of force as peremptory, not as recognition of a new source but as creation on the basis of existing treaty and customary law.

The latter argument, again based on the wording ‘the international community as a whole’, purported that “the community as a whole may create rules which will bind all its members notwithstanding their possible individual dissent,” This theory has had strong support both in the field – used in the South West Africa Cases to demonstrate that prohibition of Apartheid, like genocide, had become a peremptory norm through the collective will of the international community as a whole and verging on unanimity and that the dissenting few can not escape its binding authority – as well as in academic circles. Scholars maintain two theories to the non-consensual wording of Article 53. Firstly, that the essence of jus cogens is that it must operate as regards all states without exception. This theory was flawed on the basis that it assumes that by accepting jus cogens States have reached agreement on a constitutional principle that peremptory norms bind the international community notwithstanding the possibility of dissent. Secondly, it is argued that the wording of Article 53 supports a non-consensual nature of peremptory norms. The Chairman of the Draft Committee stated that acceptance and recognition of a very large majority of States would be enough to enforce a peremptory norm. However, Danilenko notes that the authority of the statement does not mean that legal obligations can simply be forced upon all members of the international community without consent. Indeed, he emphasises a number of points that support the consensual nature of jus cogens. Firstly, jus cogens is a type of general international law and as no source exists for creating general international law in the form of jus cogens the it must be done within the framework of the existing sources which essentially require consent. Second, the inclusion of both “accepted” and “recognised” in Article 53 enforces the need for consent by States. Finally, this is further supported in the ILC’s reference to international crimes which require the recognition of all States. It must be noted, however, that a small number of dissenting states does not mean that they will evade the authority of the norm. Hence, Danilenko’s model of jus cogens suggests that to become a peremptory norm the rule must first pass the normative tests for rules of general international law followed by its acceptance and recognition by the international community as a whole. This, he notes, provides the dissenting minority the chance to disassociate itself from the binding character of the peremptory norm. However, one must argue, in line with the natural law theories, that if a dissenting minority exists and that minority is therefore not bound, then the norm can not be peremptory. Moreover, he suggests that if it is the case that acceptance and recognition of the norm must be by all essential components of the international community, then this acceptance is verging on unanimity. While it was expressed that an individual state could not amount to an essential component, the criteria would still set a very high threshold. One must argue here that the non-consensual nature of jus cogens falls closest to the reality in that acceptance by the large majority can bind the dissenting minority.

In light of the difficult nature of determining the characteristics of a peremptory norm, Janis attempts to give an example of an existing norm that is the definitive embodiment of a peremptory norm. That is the principle of pacta sunt servanda. He argues that the principle is nether a customary nor a treaty norm but rather a norm of the fundamental legal system from which the two derive. It is jus cogens in the natural law sense that it “is natural to the international community of states because there would be no such community without such a rule.” In light of the complex nature of jus cogens it would be prudent for this essay to examine the nature of torture as a possible peremptory norm. Such discussion is pertinent to the debate in Part III regarding the alleged uses of torture by States as a means of interrogation in the proclaimed “war on terror”.

Torture as a Peremptory Norm

In line with Article 53 of the VCLT, Parker and Neylon are able to demonstrate the acceptance and recognition of the prohibition of torture by the international community as a whole. Indeed, the acceptance and recognition of the prohibition of torture satisfies even the highest threshold described in Danilenko’s examination of the subject. The UDHR and ICCPR containing identical provisions for the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. At a regional level provisions are made to prohibit torture in the America Convention on Human Rights and in the ECHR. Moreover, all Four Geneva Conventions classify torture as grave breaches of the laws of war. In all stated cases, the prohibition is accepted without reservation. Parker and Neylon also cite the statement of Special Rapporteur on Torture, Peter Kooijmans:

“Torture is now absolutely and without any reservation prohibited under international law whether in time of peace or war. In all human rights instruments the prohibition of torture belongs to the group of rights from which no derogation can be made. The International Court of Justice has qualified the obligation to respect the basic human rights, to which the right not to be tortured belongs beyond any doubt, as obligations erga omnes. The International Law Commission…has labelled serious violations of these basic human rights as ‘international crimes,’ giving rise to the specific responsibility of the States concerned. In view of these qualifications the prohibition of torture can be considered rules of jus cogens. If ever a phenomenon was outlawed unreservedly and unequivocally it is torture.”

However, the statement of Kooijmans does not exactly ring true today. The Adoption of the CAT, while accepted by the large majority of the international community, is not without reservation. The understandings submitted by the United States with reference to the definition of acts of torture suggests that the United States recognises reference to mental harm means prolonged mental harm and thus does not prohibit treatment that causes short term mental harm. Moreover, a number of States did not recognise the competence of the Committee Against Torture which was created by virtue of Article 20 of the CAT. Nonetheless, no reservation has been made against the purpose and objective of the Convention – indeed, any such reservation would be void – and as such the prohibition of torture must still be seen as accepted and recognised at the very least by the essential components of the international community as a whole.

Anthony D’Amato embarked on what seemed like a crusade against jus cogens norms in an attempt to render null and void the widespread branding of many norms as peremptory. He disagreed with many of the assertions of Parker and Neylon as well as scholars such as Janis and Tunkin. Irrespective of this view, the evidence that supports Parker and Neylon’s theory that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm is somewhat overwhelming. It does not fall short, by any measure, of the criteria laid out in Article 53 of the VCLT and as such one must conclude that the prohibition of torture is indeed a norm of jus cogens.

Conclusions

This section of the essay has discussed the nature characteristics and application of peremptory norms in international law. It has been shown that the concept of jus cogens has developed from its roots in natural law to incorporate elements of legal positivism. Moreover, to be accepted as a peremptory norm, it must be accepted by the large majority of the international community and as such is binding on any dissenting minority. Finally, it is argued that, by virtue of its unreserved acceptance and recognition by the international community in its entirety, the prohibition of torture is most definitely a peremptory norm.

However, the findings of this section subsequently call into question the practise of some states, following the September 11 Attacks, which suggest that torture is being used as a means of interrogation and to obtain information to aid the fight in the “war on terror”. The discussion Part III of the essay will examine these alleged practises and the possible justifications for such actions before attempting to answer the question, in light of such conduct following the September 11 attacks, does the prohibition of torture survive as a peremptory norm?

The Post September 11 Situation

Following the September 11 attacks the United States, under the Bush Administration, proclaimed a “war on terror” – the notion that the US were in an armed conflict against not only members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but against any terrorist organisation. US military forces began apprehending suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda members from a number of countries including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Gambia, Mauritania, Pakistan and Thailand whereupon they would be transported to a military detention base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In March 2003 US and British troops invaded Iraq with the intent of bringing to the nation, who had long suffered under Saddam Hussein, democracy and respect for the rule of law. In both instances the treatment of suspected terrorists, civilians and prisoners of war has been condemned by members of the international community, scholars and non-governmental organisations on the grounds that interrogations methods in use, in most if not all cases, amounted to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which has been universally accepted as prohibited. Allegations became reality when, in April 2004, photographs of US soldiers treating prisoners of Abu Ghraib Prison inhumanly – even amounting to torture – were made public.

In this section of the essay the allegations of mistreatment of prisoners by US forces will be the core focus of the study. It will be shown that the justifications, offered by senior US officials, of coercive interrogation methods and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment have provided the catalyst for other States to follow suit and openly accept torture in certain circumstances. Moreover, academic support for such measures will be illustrated in order to defeat such theories. Thus, the first part of this section will examine the allegations and justifications for the use of torture which involve circumventing International Humanitarian Law and giving wide interpretation to the definition of torture in the CAT. Secondly, discussion will focus on the academic support that has attempted to put forward a model for accepting torture in specific circumstances. This will include illustrating arguments for and flaws in: Dershowitz’s torture warrant; Heymann and Keyyem’s acceptance of torture when prescribed from the highest officials (specifically the President himself); and two hypothetical scenarios – the “ticking bomb scenario” as put forward by numerous proponents; and the “public presentational torture” model described by Daniel Rothberg. Finally, this section will conclude by offering a succinct answer to the question, in light of such conduct following the September 11 attacks, does the prohibition of torture survive as a peremptory norm? This will apply the previous discussion in Part I and II to the actions illustrated in Part III in an attempt to show that the status of the prohibition is not such as to be removed from its position as a peremptory norm, but that the actions shown represent breaches of a peremptory norm that can not go unpunished.

The Actions of A Few Bad Apples? Mistreatment of Prisoners from the Highest Levels

When the photos of the abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison became public, the initial response of the US government was to pass the actions off as the misconduct of a few low level soldiers. It appeared to be an attempt to deny any complicity with the actions and to keep other such violations a matter of clandestine practise. The reality was quite different. The Human Rights Watch investigation into the abuses and violations at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib Prison uncovered a number of policy decision by senior US officials which had not been mentioned in any self-investigation that had been carried out. Indeed, the only investigation that had the ability to scrutinise senior level officers and officials was the carried out by James Schlesinger and instigated by Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. The policy decisions uncovered by Human Rights Watch can be summarised thus:

• The decision not to grant detainees at Guantánamo Bay their rights and protections under the Geneva Conventions. The Labelling of prisoners as “unlawful combatants” who cannot be afforded the status of prisoner of war, regardless of the fact that the Conventions cover any status of detainee from the battlefield.
• Decisions which undermine human rights laws by not clarifying that the detainees are protected by the ICCPR or CAT. Rather, the US issued proclamations that the international humanitarian law supersedes human rights law during times of war and armed conflict, acting as lex specialis.
• Decisions to interpret prohibitions under the ICCPR and CAT narrowly, thus permitting certain forms of coercive interrogation and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
• The holding of some prisoners in incommunicado detention; in some cases even denying the International Committee of the Red Cross access.
• The decision to practice “irregular renditions”. That is, extraditing prisoners to the custody of States who were known at the time to practise torture.
• Decisions not to prosecute soldiers who had been implicated in the homicide of two prisoners.
• The approval by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld of interrogation methods including stress positions, hooding, stripping and scaring with guard dogs. Moreover, there was a reported approval, by an unnamed senior official, of the use of “water boarding”.
• A decision to oppose the International Criminal Court.
• Decisions to concoct legal theories including the assertion that coercion does not amount to torture unless the pain caused is equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely result.

The Human Rights Watch has also recently issued a report implicating a British complicity in acts of torture conducted by and in Pakistan of terror suspects. The report pertains to the allegations of torture and ill-treatment of UK nationals of Pakistani origin. The torture was carried out by Pakistan officials and with the complicit knowledge on the part of UK intelligence officials that the interrogation methods of Pakistan amounted to torture. The British Government has subsequently refused to take on even an individual investigation of the allegations. What is perhaps clear from this situation is that, in light of the will of the British to refuse investigation, one could argue that the UK is “following in the footsteps” of the US.

Academic Support for the Use of Torture in Specific Circumstances

Dershowitz suggested the use of a “torture warrant” which he defended following considerable criticism. A torture warrant, Dershowitz explains, would permit the use of non-lethal torture as a method of interrogation subject the acquisition of permission (warrant) from judicial authority. The rationale behind permitting the use of such an intense method of interrogation is based on the belief that, as it stands, torture is already engaged in by many States in a clandestine practice away from the public eye. Dershowitz argues that by regulating the use of torture in the legal arena, its use will be limited:

“My own belief is that a warrant requirement, if properly enforced, would probably reduce the frequency, severity and duration of torture. I cannot see how it could possibly increase it, since a warrant requirement simply imposes an additional level of prior review.”

Dershowitz points to the alleged security wire taps placed on Martin Luther King and the absence of any request for a wire tap following the detention of Zaccarias Moussaui as evidence that the use of torture would go down as no one would seek to obtain such warrants without strong evidential grounds for doing so. Moreover, a person in the position to torture would do so less frequently and more carefully if he must get judicial approval before he does so. However, Roth makes a number of observations regarding the warrant system currently in place, for example in obtaining wire taps or home searches. He first points out that the procedure for obtaining a wire tap is not at all equitable. Meetings with judges would take place ex parte without the knowledge of the person to be tortured and in the absence of any counsel to oppose the request. He further points out that the vast number of applications made for wire taps compared to the infinitesimal number of rejections suggests that the judicial oversight in the case for torture warrants would be no more rigorous:

“According to the Centre for Democracy and Technology, between 1993 and 2003, courts operating under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) were asked to approve nearly 10,000 wiretaps of foreign sovereign agents. Of those, all but four were approved. When an intelligence agent claims that life-and-death matters of national security are at stake, there is no reason to believe that the scrutiny by Dershowitz’s torture courts would be any more rigorous.”

Heymann and Kayyem offer the theory that accepts the universal prohibition of torture and any other coercive, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, but would permit it in circumstances where it has been authorised by the highest officials and provided American lives were at stake (“American” lives can be substituted with the lives of nationals according to the state making such a proclamation). The theory is based on the reluctance of any Head of State to authorise such measures except in the most extraordinary circumstances. However, as Roth points out, President Bush has already shown the will to proclaim himself “Commander-in-Chief” and permit the use of torture as a method of interrogation. This has even been shadowed by his immediate sub-ordinates who have claimed the power to order cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment provided it is against non-Americans. Indeed, both of the aforementioned theories contain serious inherent flaws and until it can be proved with absolute confidence that a measure can be undertaken to prevent such flaws, one must argue that they are far from suitable to deal with such an inexorable practice as torture.

The two theories put forth by Dershowitz and Heymann and Kayyem are based on a hypothetical situation know as the ticking bomb scenario. Strauss offers an example of the ticking bomb scenario that could be considered a rather extreme hypothetical scenario in the sense that the likelihood of any situation ever playing out in this manner is very unlikely:

“The police in New York have, in custody, a suspect known to be a terrorist. He is adjudged perfectly lucid and rational. He admits to planting a nuclear weapon in the heart of the city and informs the police that the bomb will go of within five hours. Other evidence obtained by the police make the threat totally credible. There is no possibility of evacuation and no possibility of finding the bomb, except by the most amazing stroke of luck, during this time.”

This is the very situation in which the writers are supporting the use of non-lethal torture as a method of interrogation. With no real answer from Dershowitz, Strauss later posed the question of the expansive nature of the method. Why stop at torturing the terrorist suspect? If he will not talk, why not torture his family friends or colleagues? The clear ability of the situation to “snowball” out of control is evident.

In Public Committee Against Torture v Israel the court condemned the use by Israeli police officials (the GSS) for their use of torture methods included shaking; holding in the “Shabach” position; forced “frog crouching”; and sleep deprivation. It stated that under no circumstances could the use of torture or cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment be permitted.

The final hypothetical situation which is worthy of mention may also be dispensed with briefly. Rothberg examined the use of torture as “public presentational torture”. That is, the mutilation of bodies, before or after death, which are then placed in public places or points in a road where they are certain to be found, to gain political ends. Rothberg refers to the practise of such torture in the conflict in Guatemala as a means of deterring association with guerrilla forces. His hypothetical scenario warrants extensive quotation:

“Imagine a state that faces a protracted guerrilla/terrorist threat involving significant harm to large numbers of civilians. The group engages in constant bombings, drive-by shootings and other acts of violence. Despite the state’s greater military and logistical resources, they are unable to prevent these actions that are growing in intensity and undermining the nation’s social integrity, political stability and economical viability. The guerrilla/terrorist groups are composed of small cells that blend easily among the populace and have the capacity to recruit new members to replace those killed or captured. One day, state agents engage a cell operating in an isolated are which ends in the deaths of all the guerrilla/terrorists. The head of national security suggests that the corpses of the guerrilla/terrorists should be mutilated and prominently displayed in public places to deter recruitment and advertise the willingness of the government to engage in acts of severe, painful reprisal. The head of security argues that this action will involve no serious violation of human rights law since the guerrilla/terrorists were killed in a legitimate state action and will not be subject to any actual torture. Assuming that this practice could actually reduce recruitment and support for the guerrilla terrorists and thereby save countless lives should this policy be supported”

It is the opinion of this writer that two arguments can be put forward in opposition of such a practice. First, in light of the difficulty in accepting torture in a “ticking bomb” scenario, one can not then accept it in such extreme measures as public presentational torture. Second, by mutilating the bodies for the purpose of deterring association with rebel groups, one must argue that the state has gone far beyond the pale. By engaging in such methods it must be argued that the state has gone beyond “legitimate action” and has, in fact committed a war crime, or perhaps even genocide.

Conclusion: In Light of Such Conduct Following the September 11 Attacks, Does the Prohibition of Torture Survive as a Peremptory Norm?

It is possible to draw a number of answers to this question based on the discussions above. Firstly, one could submit that if the interrogation methods of the US somehow do not fall under the canopy of the various definitions offered by the State for actions amounting to torture, then there has in fact been no crime committed. However, such outcome is unlikely as it would render obsolete the existing, universally accepted prohibition of torture detailed in the UDHR, ICCPR and CAT. The more likely outcome is that the actions of the US do not alter the status of the prohibition of torture as a peremptory norm, but rather signify a breach of jus cogens which must not go unpunished. Moreover, it must be noted that, in some circumstances, the US officials are prepared to refuse the use of torture but permit coercive interrogation that amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It must be stressed that the international instruments previously cited draw no distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and as such must be taken as prohibited on an equal plain to torture.

As regards the academic theories that support the use of torture in given circumstances, one must agree that, should the flaws in Dershowitz’s or Heymann and Kayyem’s models ever be overcome, and the methods subsequently adopted, then it would call for a restructuring of the aforementioned international instruments to include either a derogation or a limitation clause for states of emergency or specifically prescribed occasions in which torture can be used as a means of interrogation. In such an event one would expect that the prohibition of torture would no longer amount to a norm of jus cogens. However, while it is possibly foreseeable that the growing conflict with terrorists worldwide will only spur support for these models, the present situation is that torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolutely prohibited. That means no derogation and no limitation of obligations. Hence, one must conclude that the prohibition of torture is indeed a jus cogens norm.

Overall Conclusion

This essay has examined a number of issues pertaining to the notion that the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments is a norm that is recognised as such by the entire international community and is therefore a peremptory norm from which no derogation can be justified.

Part I of the essay discussed international sources of law and the way in which they operate. It introduced the international instruments that prohibit torture, which had been, in most cases, accepted and ratified by the international community as a whole and those which had not been ratified by the entire international community were verging on unanimity. It also discussed the prohibition as a norm of customary international law and examined the role of judicial decisions and scholarly writings in the sources of international law. It concluded by demonstrating that far from just prohibited in written instruments, the prohibition of torture was enshrined in customary law and backed by judicial decisions of the ICJ and European Court of Human Rights.

Part II of the essay examined the theory behind jus cogens and examined its origins in natural law before going on the set out the criteria by which a peremptory norm is created and applying the criteria to the status of the prohibition on torture. Part II concluded by showing that the unreserved acceptance and recognition of the prohibition by the international community as a whole, at the very least verging on unanimity, adequately satisfies the criteria for becoming a peremptory norm.

Finally, Part III of the essay investigated allegations that, following the September 11 attacks, the Unites States had engaged in interrogation methods which amounted to torture or at the very least permitted coercive interrogation techniques that were cruel, inhuman or degrading. Such evidence was found in the treatment of the detainees at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib Prison. It was submitted that the behaviour of the US provided a catalyst for other states to follow suit and derogate from their obligations under international law. Moreover, a number of models were suggested that would permit and regulate the use of such methods during times of crisis. However, it was concluded that such behaviour amounted to a breach of a peremptory norm and that no such model supporting its use could be accepted.

One must conclude overall that the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute and non-derogable. Moreover, it is, as things stand, a jus cogens norm. When faced with the question of what should be done in a “ticking bomb” scenario, it is the opinion of this writer that Yuval Ginbar summed up the necessary action:

“Therefore I have a simple conclusion and recommendation as to what we should do in a TBS [ticking bomb scenario]—when we hold a knowledgeable prisoner who will not talk, and innocent lives are at risk, or what we should demand that our neighbours, our government, our courts and legislature, our liberation movement, our international community do in such a situation: they—we—must do anything humanly possible to save the lives at risk.

“Which means doing everything in our power that does not involve losing our own humanity. Which in turn means never to torture or otherwise ill-treat another human being, whatever the circumstances.”

Table of Cases

International

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951

Asylum Case (Columbia/Peru), ICJ Reports, 1950

Lotus Case, PCIJ, Series A, No 10, 1927

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), ICJ Reports, 1986

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark) and (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), ICJ Reports, 1969

South West Africa Cases (Liberia v South Africa) and (Ethiopia v South Africa), ICJ Reports, 1960

Regional

Ireland v UK (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 25

Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, ICTY Reports accessed at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf (07/12/2009)

Soering v UK (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439

Domestic

Public Committee Against Torture v Israel H.C.J. 5100/94

Scotia Case 81 U.S. 170 (1871)

Table of International Statutes, Treaties and Conventions

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

European Court of Human Rights

International Criminal Court

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

International Court of Justice

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

International Law Commission

Permanent Court of International Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Table of Other Statutes

Human Rights Act 1998

Bibliography

Articles

D’Amato, A., It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s jus Cogens (1990) 6 Connecticut Journal of International Law 1

Danilenko, G. M., International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law Making (1991) 2 European Journal of International Law 42

Dershowitz, A., The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss (2003-2004) 48 New York School Law Review 275

Heymann P. and Kayyem J., Preserving Security and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terror Cambridge, Mass.: Report for Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 16, 2004

Human Rights Watch Cruel Britannia (November 2009) accessible at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uk1109web_0.pdf (09/12/2009)

Human Rights Watch “The Road to Abu Ghraib” (June 2004) accessible at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0604.pdf (09/12/2009)

Janis, M., The Nature of Jus Cogens (1987-1988) 3 Connecticut Journal of International Law 359

Parker, K. and Neylon, L. B., Jus Cogens: the Compelling Law of Human Rights (1988-89) 12 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 411

Roth, K., Getting Away With Torture (2005) 11 Global Governance 389-406, at p. 392

Rothberg, D., “What We Have Seen is Terrible” Public Presentational Torture and the Communicative Logic of State Terror (2003-2004) 67 Albany Law Review 465

Verdross, A., Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law (1966) 60(1) American Journal of International Law 55

Waldron, J., Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the Whitehouse (2005) 105 (6) Columbia Law Review 1681

Books

Ginbar, Y., (2008) Why Not Torture Terrorists: Moral, Practical and Legal Aspects of the ‘Ticking Bomb’ Justification for Torture, New York: Oxford University Press, at p. 356

Shaw, M.N, (2008) International Law, 6th Ed., Cambridge: University Press

Steiner, H.J., Alston, P., and Goodman, R., (2007) International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 3rd Ed., Oxford: University Press

Orakhelashivili, A, (2006) Peremptory Norms in International Law, New York: Oxford University Press

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