Space Governance Needs More Than Diplomacy
TRANSCEND MEMBERS, 18 May 2026
Glen T. Martin, Manuel Galiñanes and Leo Klinkers – TRANSCEND Media Service
[A letter to the editor of Nature Magazine in response to an article about “space governance” that really does not solve the terrible problem of the use of space for war. Nature rejected the letter saying that they do not print unsolicited responses. But our response needs to go out on this very important topic.]
13 May 2026 – The recent Nature Comment’s call for “space diplomacy” rightly diagnoses a growing coordination failure in outer space governance¹. Yet its proposed solution—enhanced dialogue, voluntary norms, and soft coordination mechanisms—underestimates the problem’s structural roots. Fragmentation in space is not merely the result of insufficient communication among actors; it is the predictable outcome of a system that lacks coherent normative authority and an enforceable legal hierarchy. Without addressing this institutional deficit, “space diplomacy” risks becoming another layer of well-intentioned but ultimately ineffective governance.
At its core, the challenge of space governance mirrors a broader problem in global governance: the coexistence of sovereign states, private actors, and scientific communities within a legally pluralistic yet politically disjointed system. Existing institutions—such as the United Nations, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)—provide important forums for coordination but operate under a paradigm of voluntary compliance and inward-looking state sovereignty that limits their ability to impose binding, uniform standards²,³. These bodies lack enforcement mechanisms, rely on consensus, and produce largely non-binding outputs. The result is governance that is not only slow but also structurally incomplete. Historical experience reinforces this concern: despite early warnings about planetary limits, notably in The Limits to Growth report⁴, comprehensive and enforceable global governance frameworks have remained elusive—an omission that space governance should not replicate.
This limitation is especially acute in domains with shared, finite, and highly vulnerable infrastructure, such as low Earth orbit and emerging lunar environments. In these contexts, the absence of binding authority produces classic collective-action failures: orbital congestion, debris accumulation, and incompatible technical standards. The proliferation of actors—over 90 states and thousands of private entities—exacerbates these dynamics, making coordination through diplomacy alone increasingly untenable¹. The analogy with aviation is instructive but incomplete: the success of the International Civil Aviation Organization rests not merely on voluntary alignment but on a dense web of binding agreements embedded in a broader system of international law and state accountability. Space governance lacks an equivalent structural backbone.
A more adequate response requires moving beyond diplomacy toward institutional innovation. One possible pathway is the gradual development of a federative global framework to address systemic deficiencies. Such an approach would provide a unified legal structure, democratically legitimized decision-making, and enforceable regulatory authority over clearly defined global commons, including outer space. Properly designed, a federal system would not eliminate subsidiarity or national sovereignty but would allocate authority over shared interests to the appropriate level.
The theoretical rationale rests on subsidiarity and the need for centralized capacity to provide genuinely global public goods. Outer space, like the high seas or the atmosphere, is a domain where fragmented sovereignty creates negative externalities that cannot be effectively managed at the national level. A federative framework would not replace national space programs but could embed them within a constitutional order capable of establishing binding standards for safety, sustainability, and equitable access.
Such an approach need not be utopian. Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations provides a legal mechanism for reviewing and amending the Charter, offering a pathway—however politically demanding—toward deeper institutional integration⁵. By leveraging existing bodies such as COPUOS and the ITU, governance could evolve incrementally, transforming coordination forums into components of a more coherent and accountable architecture.
Proposals along these lines already exist. The Constitution for the Federation of Earth designates outer space as part of humanity’s common heritage, subject to a democratically accountable global authority⁶. Similarly, Galiñanes and Klinkers propose classifying extraterrestrial domains as collectively governed world territories⁷. Although they differ in design, these approaches share a key insight: effective governance requires not only norms but also institutions capable of implementing and enforcing them.
Without such evolution, reliance on “space diplomacy” alone risks perpetuating the very conditions that have created the current governance gap. Voluntary norms, even when widely endorsed, lack the binding force needed to prevent defection in competitive environments. Experience in environmental governance and arms control shows that without enforcement, compliance remains uneven and contingent.
The urgency is clear. Orbital congestion, expanding satellite constellations, and competition for lunar resources are already reshaping the space domain. The window for effective governance is narrowing as technological capabilities outpace institutional adaptation. Incremental improvements in coordination, though valuable, are unlikely to match the scale of the challenge.
If outer space is to remain a domain of shared opportunity rather than a source of escalating conflict and degradation, governance must evolve. Diplomacy can facilitate dialogue, but only a legally empowered, democratically grounded framework can ensure coherence, accountability, and sustainability. The architecture of space governance cannot remain merely coordinative; it must become constitutional.
References:
- Rau, G. et al. Space diplomacy: bridging the operating gaps between myriad missions. Nature 652, 1122–1125 (2026).
- United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (UNOOSA, 2021).
- International Telecommunication Union. Radio Regulations (ITU, 2024 edn).
- Meadows, D. H. et al. The Limits to Growth (Universe Books, 1972).
- United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, Article 109 (1945).
- World Constitution and Parliament Association. Constitution for the Federation of Earth, Article 16.
- Galiñanes, M. & Klinkers, L. Constitution for a World Federation: A World Pact (Letrame, 2026).
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Manuel Galiñanes, MD, PhD – Academy of Medical and Health Sciences of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, Barcelona, Spain
President of the Federal Alliance of European Federalists (FAEF) e-mail: manuel.galinanes@gmail.com
Glen T. Martin – Professor Emeritus in Philosophy and Peace Studies
Radford University, VA, USA
President, Earth Constitution Institute (ECI), and World Constitution and Parliament Association (WCPA) gmartin@radford.edu; gmartin@earthconstitution.world
Leo Klinkers – Consultant in Public Administration State University Utrecht, Netherlands
Former President of the Federal Alliance of European Federalists (FAEF) leoklinkers@me.com
Tags: Military Industrial Technological Complex, Nuclear Arms in Space, Space Command, Space Digital Military Branch, Space Weapons, US Military Bases in the Moon, Warfare
This article originally appeared on Transcend Media Service (TMS) on 18 May 2026.
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